Communications, Strategy, or Communication Strategy?

I ended my short tour of our nations capitol city by attending a very clever and well run barcamp, which is the official way of saying I attended an unofficial and somewhat informal convention. It was quite interesting actually, a good networking experience and a way to take perspective on the various approaches government is taking towards managing their social media engagement. From my own perspective, after back to back to back meetings discussing social media strategies for 3 straight days with a few dozen organizations, this was a cool way to get some perspective of how others are doing it. In the end, I found myself in conversations with a very small group of folks just like me who actually develop and implement social media business strategies for others, and ironically we found ourselves listening to sessions run by people who have only found success in social media by touting social media.

That isn't intended to be an insult, rather imply their are a lot of opportunities in DC for folks who have experience building social media business strategies, particularly folks who can address the IT side of things and can debate business cases while understanding project management in government.

Government 2.0 Camp was, for the most part, very interesting. As I am reading the reviews, I noted that one of the suggestions for next year is that there should be more critics. Well, I was clearly in the wrong sessions, because I thought for a moment I was going to get tossed out of that session for being too critical. Actually, I think the Air Force is doing something interesting, but I'm still on the fence whether or not I think it is smart or not.

The US Air Force has a slogan that captures the essence of their new media approach: "every Airman is a communicator." They even have a really slick 8 minute video that discusses their social media approach, which as of Tuesday night, is still not actually available to be seen through social media websites like YouTube. I particularly liked the way the Air Force video frames the "Carrier" PBS series in the video, which the Air Force celebrates as a success, even though the Navy did not.

The point is that "every Airman is a communicator" is as best I can tell not only the slogan, but the business strategy of the Air Force, and because I had no problem playing the role of the critic, my question is whether or not that is a smart communication strategy? I would suggest it could be, but it may also be the perfect example of why the military services, other than the Coast Guard, are struggling to find their voice with new media.

For example...

If the purpose of "every Airman is a communicator" is to get Air Force personnel involved in new media, have them engage the tools and become comfortable with the technologies and options available, then this is a real strategy. Does it have value? It might, the ability to communicate with family while on deployment for example could be a way to maintain morale among those forward deployed. Connectivity online in new media is social communication that younger generations are comfortable with, and in many ways expect access to. In that regards, the simple engagement philosophy behind "every Airman is a communicator" may work under the theory that encouraging everyone to do it is simply enough, and that any communication is better than a default of no communications.

The downside of "every Airman is a communicator" being the social media strategy itself is that the Air Force does not actually have a strategic communication strategy associated with its social media strategy, meaning there is no congruency in the message being generated or integrated into their communicator networks. The phrase "it's personal, not business" would apply to the Air Forces social media strategy, and under the theory "it's personal, not business" one might raise the simple question what the business function new media is actually providing for the Air Force?

In other words, does the Air Force lack a strategic communication strategy with social media because they have decided they want their airmen to use it for personal use, and indirectly garner the benefits of this indirect approach, or does it reflect something broader like...

When an agency or enterprise lacks a strategic communications strategy that builds through social media, does that reflect a business that doesn't have anything of value to say to the public? Be it known I asked that question to several different organizations while I was in Washington DC, including directly to several employees of 4 very prominent think tanks that are part of the national security discussion.

And it is the first question I would ask the Navy.

Strategic Communications content that is published consistency in social media (including comments) is considered branding. For example, a disclaimer that gives name or rank would represent a brand. If the services want to build an online brand through social media, they have to know how all their activities work together. There needs to be a consistency and congruency to these activities. Each part of the social media puzzle builds into a picture people have of the brand, how they imagine the brand to be as it relates to how the agency or enterprise really is will be determined based on how well this stuff is done right. Best of all, these activities don't require micromanagement to get right, they can be done effectively if the big ideas are done right and executed properly.

I would use the example of the USNI blog, where the authors do not actually coordinate topics nor does the Naval Institute put out guidance regarding content. We all understand the big idea though, and each have a good idea how to execute it. This allows the individual authors, without coordination, to represent the brand with integrity while producing content that can carry multiple points of view, including opposite points of view in posts.

From an organizational perspective, the complexities extend to how the services brand comes together when multiple individuals are posting topics for discussion. The impact of consistency and congruency on any topic centric strategic communication effort can and will often have a shaping effect. This is an important concept for military organizations today, because as part of our wars, we also find ourselves in an information war.

Information warfare through social media is often described as asymmetric warfare. For example, identity is information, a shaping operation for information context, so the identity of a military service blogger in cyberspace is part of a tactical shaping operation for the information being transmitted. By saying you are the US Navy for example, the Navy would be taking a symmetric warfare tactical approach in information shaping operations with their strategic communications. By using an alias when posting a comment, it is essentially taking an assymmetric warfare tactical approach in information shaping operations. As an example, I blogged under the call sign Galrahn for nearly 18 months primarily as an assymmetric tactical approach in information shaping operations, the intent of the shaping operation being to establish my credibility as a serious study of naval issues prior to people realizing I am actually a 33 year old IT nerd from New York.

I expressed these ideas many times while in DC, as it is part of my gig in explaining social media to organizations looking to better understand how it works, and how it might work within the context of their organization. When I brought this up in the Air Force session, the look on the folks in the "every Airman is a communicator" session left me thinking the Air Force doesn't actually have a strategic communications strategy with social media. I don't think they have given this as much intellectual rigor as their slick video suggests, but I do think they are on the right track with the slow approach.

Strategically, it may not matter if the Air Force is looking at social media as strategic communication yet. The only presence the Air Force had in the blogosphere of any consequence as of last year was In From the Cold, and given how widely reported that blog's analysis of Minot's nuclear problems were last year, it is entirely possible that blog contributed more than a little to the pair of high profile firings we saw from Air Force leadership last year (which suggests the influence social media is having, perhaps indirectly, on the national security debate). In other words, the Air Force has no blogosphere it can call productive for them anyway, so under the theory something is better than nothing the "every Airman is a communicator" strategy might be a good way to move ahead today while developing a comprehensive approach for tomorrow. In the end, they have time to wait and see what bubbles to the surface of social media as a successful example while developing a more unified strategic communications strategy.

I will say this though. If a military service or organization has something important to say, content they believe in; it doesn't make much sense to me for that organization not to have a blog to build a strategic communications network with. I don't think it is an accident that neither the Air Force or the Navy, organizations having a hard time explaining their strategy at a time the nation is at war, doesn't have a social media strategic communications strategy. After all, talking about their strategic vision and purpose is usually a prerequisite to strategic communications that presents an organizations vision or purpose.

With that said I will add that not talking, through social media or otherwise, also sends strategic communication signals.

For more thoughts on social media and government, check out Matt Armstrong's latest.

On the Navy and Oversharing

Earlier this week I attended the Navy League's annual "Sea-Air-Space" Symposium, and among the thousands of attendees were a number of my friends in the Navy trade press. Quite independently, three working journalists each brought up what one of them called the "CNO's gag order"--recently released guidance by the CNO to Navy Leadership discussed yesterday by Sydney Freedberg in a piece that also features the CNO's memo. I was unfamiliar with the memo, but not with the sentiments CNO expresses in it. His dissatisfaction with the amount of information getting out has been a popular topic of recent conversation, but I wasn't in on the memo.  But now that I am, I have a few thoughts on the subject.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Navy is "oversharing". There is also no doubt in my mind that it is "undersharing". There is furthermore, no doubt in my mind that the Navy is "inefficiently-sharing". The plain truth is that the Navy is incapable of figuring this out because it is not organized to address it. So when Freedberg opines in the column above that "many of my fellow reporters here at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference said they’d felt a chilling effect from the CNO’s memo", no one should be surprised at the wholly foreseeable reaction that CNO's memo caused among his flag and civilian leaders--even though he stated that "....I am not asking you to throttle back engagement with the media or with the public." In the absence of actual, specific guidance, their instinctual reaction is simply to clam up. This is how one avoids running afoul of the CNO, but this is not in the long-term interests of the Navy, American Seapower, or national strategy. Ultimately, the CNO must take responsibility for this and begin to advocate for necessary change. And that change must occur within the staff of his boss, the Secretary of the Navy, and within the OPNAV Staff.

Before I get to this weightier subject, some vignettes. In February of 2015, I had my hip replaced, and I was convalescing in an opioid-induced fog at home rolling through my Twitter feed, when I came upon this press release from the Naval Air Systems Command announcing that "Navy demonstrates synthetic guidance technology with Tomahawk missile". Had I been physically capable, I would have jumped out of my chair. In this test, what had previously been solely a long range land attack missile had demonstrated the capability to act as a long-range anti-ship missile targeted against a moving target. Having been involved in the creation of the concept of "Distributed Lethality" within the Surface Force, I found myself wondering how it was that this important component thereof found its way into the open press. Who made this decision? Why was it made? What was the process that created it?

Nearly a year to the day later, I was again at home rolling through my Twitter feed (ok, I spend too much time on Twitter) when I came across tweets from the OSD account announcing that the SM6 missile was being modified to provide a supersonic anti-ship capability. Knowing that -- or at least thinking that -- this information was classified, I began to write to some of my friends in the Pentagon wondering what was happening. Why was this capability being announced? Why now? As I watched my timeline roll on, more and more information ensued. Here is USNI's story on the subject from the very next day. 

Now, back to the problem and what to do about it.

The bottom line here is that we are re-entering a period of great power contention, but the Department of the Navy is still acting like it is 1996 and there aren't any real threats--at least at the level of how to communicate strategically.  In a post here on ID a little over a year ago (and just days before Secretary Carter spilled the SM6 beans), I advocated for a series of reforms of the Navy Secretariat, one of which was to bring some rigor to its strategic communications efforts. Clearly, if the Secretary of Defense decides he wants to declassify something, it is likely within his authority to do so. In this case though, there was no Service position from which to advise him. And this is because there is no formal or organizational method of achieving such a position.

If the Navy were serious about actual strategic communications, it would begin to think deeply about what it means to do so. The CNO's well-intentioned memo is the antithesis of effective strategic communications--in that the wholly foreseeable outcome of it is for the service to simply clam up, and in the process miss out on important opportunities to shape behavior of both potential adversaries and friends alike.

Effective strategic communications planning would necessarily involve (at a minimum) public communcations (CHINFO), legislative communications (OLA), executive communication (OSD), capabilities (SYSCOMS) and operational objectives (FLEET). This function would have a modest staff to serve as an administrative tool for teeing up subjects and tracking decisions to completion. The bottom line here is that a concerted effort to achieve message alignment requires both organization and action, and in their absence, lurches in unanticipated directions will disturb the illusion of calm created by enforced silence.

Every single program manager has a list of milestones for his or her program. Those milestones include tests and demonstrations of new or innovative capabilties. Every single one of these tests is an opportunity to communicate a message--yet we have no effetive mechanism for determining which ones should be released, which ones shouldn't, how information should be shared, what should be stressed, to what end, and how will that end be measured.

We need to get serious about this end of the business. There will be times where we want to rock our contenders back on their heels. There will be times when we wish to be coy. There will be times when we wish to remain silent. How we distinguish among these times should not be left up to chance. It is time for the Navy to get its strategic communications act in gear, and it isn't going to happen without the CNO making it so.

Reforming the Navy Secretariat: Bureaucratic Requirements to Achieve a Vision of American Seapower

Introduction
This post is a summary of ideas that have been germinating in my mind for a while. I have been arguing for a powerful vision of American Seapower for some time now, and closer Navy/Marine Corps integration has consistently been at the heart of it. I have come to conclude that the benefits of what I argue are worth pursuing, but that achieving them is unlikely as long as the two Services are not invested in a common understanding of American Seapower and led by an organization dedicated to discerning one.

In the Navy, I enjoyed four tours in Washington. Admittedly, none of them were on the Navy Secretariat, and so I do not write from a position of great authority on its inner workings. My observations are those of an interested observer who has worked around and in the vicinity of this staff. I welcome factual refutations of my opinions and observations.

Theory of the Case:
• America plays a critical and leading role in the world
• It is in America’s interest to continue to execute this role.
• America has interests that are thousands of miles from its own territory.
• America’s sovereign territory is relatively safe from military threat.
• The rise of China and a resurgent and belligerent Russia present a new era of Great Power competition.
• America is likely to encounter China and Russia as an adversary in areas contiguous to the world’s oceans, as this is where the majority of the world’s population lives.
• The Department of the Navy has within it two Armed Services that specialize in operating from the sea.
• These Armed Services provide the world’s most powerful naval force, the world’s most feared middleweight land force, and the world’s most mobile and lethal air force.
• These forces—if properly resourced—are capable of servicing the majority of U.S. presence, conventional deterrence, assurance, and crisis response requirements.
• In order to do so, these expeditionary capabilities must be more closely integrated into a cohesive and integral maritime fighting force, a new vision of American Seapower.
• In order to achieve a new vision of American Seapower, a closer alignment of all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping the Navy and Marine Corps must be considered. Planning, programming, and budgeting must also be included. Redundancy, overlap, and conflict must be minimized.
• The Department of the Navy Secretariat, under the Secretary of the Navy, is the organization that must bring about this closer integration and alignment.
• Process and administrative changes in the Secretariat and throughout the two Services will be required.

Explanation
America’s role in the world and its favorable geography create the conditions under which Seapower can and should play a central and distinct role in its security and prosperity. By combining the capabilities of the world’s most powerful Navy, the world’s most feared middleweight land force, and the world’s most mobile and lethal air force, the Department of the Navy plays a leading role in all of the missions of the Department of Defense:
• Counter terrorism and irregular warfare
• Deter and defeat aggression
• Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges
• Counter weapons of mass destruction
• Operate effectively in cyberspace and space
• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
• Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities
• Provide a stabilizing presence
• Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
• Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

This is not to say that the Department of the Navy performs ALL of all of these missions. Its role varies from mission to mission. What should not be disputed however, is the fact that the primary operational formations derived of the forces organized, trained, and equipped within the Department perform these missions as a matter of routine on a global basis. The very nature of American Seapower offers the nation the ability to field and operate forces that can protect and sustain American interests thousands of miles from its own shores, at the point of impact where the overwhelming majority of the world population lives. And while the Seapower resident in the Department of the Navy cannot perform all of the missions above in their totality all of the time, it can perform them to a greater degree than any other aspect of American military power most of the time in most places most efficiently.

In not recognizing the unique and foundational contributions of American Seapower to the nation’s defense, duplication, and waste are promoted as precious resources are inefficiently allocated, rendering the nation somewhat less capable of defending its interests for a given investment.
It is therefore essential that the an integral and coherent vision of American Seapower be formulated and espoused, one that presents the case that the nation can and should lean more heavily on the Department of the Navy for its peacetime crisis response and security requirements, while the forces of the other military departments prioritize preparation for the conduct and winning of largescale conflict.

Such a vision is however, insufficient, as the current organization of the Department of the Navy and its subordinate Armed Services (the Navy and the Marine Corps) does not adequately support the integration of capabilities that would be required in order to bring it about. Simply put, a coherent vision of American Seapower at the operational level demands a greater degree of integration at the very top, in efforts including planning, programming, budgeting, organizing, training, and equipping. By thinking more expansively about the utility of American Seapower and how it can best serve the needs of the Republic, pressures arise on the Navy and Marine Corps to work more closely together bureaucratically and organizationally in order to bring about the operational results desired.
Such integration is unlikely to occur from the bottom up. Service cultures and comfortable roles and missions create a situation in which the promise of American Seapower is unlikely to be achieved if the Navy and Marine Corps are left to themselves to bring it about. A forcing function is required.

Therefore, a reorganization of the Department of the Navy, undertaken with support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and appropriate Congressional Committees is necessary to take positive steps designed to ensure that within the Department of the Navy, a greater level of Service integration is achieved, while also working to obtain the resources necessary to field the capabilities and capacities necessary to more effectively service the nation’s peacetime security and presence needs. It is not enough to say that we need a larger Navy and or Marine Corps. We must ensure that the American people understand what will be done with such an increase, why it is in the nation’s interest to do so, and how doing so will make a given level of defense spending go further.

Pathologies

Strategic Thinking
There is no organization within the Department of the Navy dedicated to thinking about integrated American Seapower.
Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps maintain three star directorates with “strategy” within their mandate, in addition to small, highly influential strategic cells that report directly to the Service Chief. In none of these organizations is there a meaningful representation of officers from the other Service.
The Department of the Navy Secretariat has no such organization.
The lack of such an organization has not however, resulted in no strategic thinking in the Department. Quite the contrary, two maritime strategies have been produced in the past ten years (2007, 2015). These were however, ad hoc efforts that do not appear to have influenced fleet operations or force structure, and in at least the 2007 instance, was undertaken around and without the inclusion of the Service Secretary.

Strategic Communications
Under the Secretary of the Navy, there is a Chief of Information (CHINFO) and a Chief of Legislative Affairs (OLA). These officers report directly to the Secretary, with dotted line reporting responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations. Neither organization is responsible for Marine Corps affairs, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps has his own legislative assistant and his own public affairs assistant.
In essence, the organizations charged with Department of the Navy strategic communications represent only one Service (the Navy), and to the extent that the other Service—the Marine Corps—requires these functions, they are creatures of the office of the Commandant, not the Secretary of the Navy.
In essence, any strategic communications efforts are derived of three disjointed and unaligned efforts—Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps.
Additionally, no one person in the Department of the Navy is charged with the creation and implementation of a coherent strategic communications plan including legislative affairs, public affairs, and international messaging. Put another way, even if there were a coherent strategic narrative promoting the benefits of American Seapower, there is no process, organization, task force, or group responsible for carrying it out.

Planning and Programming
The Navy and Marine Corps do not receive adequate planning and programming guidance from the Secretary of the Navy at the beginning of the annual budget cycle, guidance designed to achieve a coherent vision of American Seapower. Secretary priority items are included in current guidance, but the degree to which the Services respond to a coherent and integrated vision of Seapower is minimal at best. There is little evidence that the Services are instructed what to devalue or cut.
The Navy and Marine Corps maintain separate planning and programming functions designed to create inputs (known as a “program objective memorandum” or POM) to the annual defense budget. There is little or no coordination between the Services during the development of Service POM’s, and there is limited interaction between the Services and the Navy Secretariat.
The Navy Secretariat does not have an organization staffed to issue such guidance, monitor its implementation, and remedy shortfalls. To the extent that any changes are made to the Service POM’s, they come late in the process and are generally made within individual Service POMs.

Acquisition
Meaningful reform to the acquisition system is essential to achieving alignment within the Department of the Navy, as a vision of American Seapower would create derived requirements and the opportunity for capability trades between and among USN and USMC acquisition efforts.
This currently happens to some degree within the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. This work is however, undermined by the disjointed strategic communications efforts described above.
Captain Mark Vandroff, USN and I laid out a proposal for reforming Department of the Navy acquisition elsewhere, and rather than repeat it here, readers are urged to review it. Though not mentioned in that article, the need for an integrated strategic communications/legislative relations effort is essential to achieving some of the benefits of the recommended reforms.

Recommendations
• Revive the Office of Program Appraisal (OPA) on the Navy Secretariat at the two-star level. A staff made up of USN/USMC and civilian experts in strategic thinking and budgeting. Headed by a two-star with a one-star deputy who fleets up. Alternates between Navy and USMC. Billets would come from USN (N3/N5, N8) and USMC (P,P,&O/P&R). This organization would have the dual mission of aligning the American Seapower strategic narrative and providing oversight of Service POM development in order to achieve it.
• Empower the Under Secretary of the Navy to manage Navy Department Strategic Communications.  VCNO, ACMC, CHINFO, OLA, N3/N5, and PP@O would all serve on a DON strategic communications Board of Directors. Public, legislative, and international messaging would be aligned within this BOD.
o Both CHINFO and OLA would become truly Departmental organizations. The Commandant would lose the Assistant for Legislative Matters and the Assistant for Public Affairs. The two-star heads of these organizations would have a one-star deputy who fleets up. The heads of these organizations would be filled by officers from the two services, with no more than 90 days at a time in which officers from one of the Services are in both positions.
• Empower the Secretary of the Navy as the single responsible party for Departmental capability definition and its acquisition, subject to overrule only by the President or the Secretary of Defense (within the Executive Department). This is described more fully in the previously linked to USNI News piece.

Conclusion

The promise of powerful, integrated American Seapower tending to the nation’s peacetime presence and crisis response missions while it creates the conditions for garrison forces to fall in on for warfighting, will not occur organically. There are powerful interests aligned against it, and as this article may reveal, potentially good arguments against it.

I look forward to those arguments being made, and to those arguments in agreement with the central proposition of this proposal but with doubts about the offered solutions.

In the end, this nation’s geography, interests, and role in the world demand more of its naval services.  Seapower advocates must not shy away from the benefits conferred to this nation by a powerful naval force, even if it means relative comparisons with other elements of military power.

Reforming the Department of the Navy

This post originally appeared one year ago today, and it was posted then in no small measure to be timed to the arrival in office of the new Under Secretary of the Navy, Dr. Janine Davidson.  Janine is someone I admire quite a bit, and she and I discussed these reforms in detail as she prepared to take office. A new Secretary of the Navy nominee was announced yesterday, and Mr. Bilden and his team will have a significant opportunity to move forward on necessary reforms. This is reposted to provide that team with a few things to consider. 

Introduction
This post is a summary of ideas that have been germinating in my mind for a while. I have been arguing for a powerful vision of American Seapower for some time now, and closer Navy/Marine Corps integration has consistently been at the heart of it. I have come to conclude that the benefits of what I argue are worth pursuing, but that achieving them is unlikely as long as the two Services are not invested in a common understanding of American Seapower and led by an organization dedicated to discerning one.

In the Navy, I enjoyed four tours in Washington. Admittedly, none of them were on the Navy Secretariat, and so I do not write from a position of great authority on its inner workings. My observations are those of an interested observer who has worked around and in the vicinity of this staff. I welcome factual refutations of my opinions and observations.

Theory of the Case:
• America plays a critical and leading role in the world
• It is in America’s interest to continue to execute this role.
• America has interests that are thousands of miles from its own territory.
• America’s sovereign territory is relatively safe from military threat.
• The rise of China and a resurgent and belligerent Russia present a new era of Great Power competition.
• America is likely to encounter China and Russia as an adversary in areas contiguous to the world’s oceans, as this is where the majority of the world’s population lives.
• The Department of the Navy has within it two Armed Services that specialize in operating from the sea.
• These Armed Services provide the world’s most powerful naval force, the world’s most feared middleweight land force, and the world’s most mobile and lethal air force.
• These forces—if properly resourced—are capable of servicing the majority of U.S. presence, conventional deterrence, assurance, and crisis response requirements.
• In order to do so, these expeditionary capabilities must be more closely integrated into a cohesive and integral maritime fighting force, a new vision of American Seapower.
• In order to achieve a new vision of American Seapower, a closer alignment of all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping the Navy and Marine Corps must be considered. Planning, programming, and budgeting must also be included. Redundancy, overlap, and conflict must be minimized.
• The Department of the Navy Secretariat, under the Secretary of the Navy, is the organization that must bring about this closer integration and alignment.
• Process and administrative changes in the Secretariat and throughout the two Services will be required.

Explanation
America’s role in the world and its favorable geography create the conditions under which Seapower can and should play a central and distinct role in its security and prosperity. By combining the capabilities of the world’s most powerful Navy, the world’s most feared middleweight land force, and the world’s most mobile and lethal air force, the Department of the Navy plays a leading role in all of the missions of the Department of Defense:
• Counter terrorism and irregular warfare
• Deter and defeat aggression
• Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges
• Counter weapons of mass destruction
• Operate effectively in cyberspace and space
• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
• Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities
• Provide a stabilizing presence
• Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
• Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

This is not to say that the Department of the Navy performs ALL of all of these missions. Its role varies from mission to mission. What should not be disputed however, is the fact that the primary operational formations derived of the forces organized, trained, and equipped within the Department perform these missions as a matter of routine on a global basis. The very nature of American Seapower offers the nation the ability to field and operate forces that can protect and sustain American interests thousands of miles from its own shores, at the point of impact where the overwhelming majority of the world population lives. And while the Seapower resident in the Department of the Navy cannot perform all of the missions above in their totality all of the time, it can perform them to a greater degree than any other aspect of American military power most of the time in most places most efficiently.

In not recognizing the unique and foundational contributions of American Seapower to the nation’s defense, duplication, and waste are promoted as precious resources are inefficiently allocated, rendering the nation somewhat less capable of defending its interests for a given investment.
It is therefore essential that the an integral and coherent vision of American Seapower be formulated and espoused, one that presents the case that the nation can and should lean more heavily on the Department of the Navy for its peacetime crisis response and security requirements, while the forces of the other military departments prioritize preparation for the conduct and winning of largescale conflict.

Such a vision is however, insufficient, as the current organization of the Department of the Navy and its subordinate Armed Services (the Navy and the Marine Corps) does not adequately support the integration of capabilities that would be required in order to bring it about. Simply put, a coherent vision of American Seapower at the operational level demands a greater degree of integration at the very top, in efforts including planning, programming, budgeting, organizing, training, and equipping. By thinking more expansively about the utility of American Seapower and how it can best serve the needs of the Republic, pressures arise on the Navy and Marine Corps to work more closely together bureaucratically and organizationally in order to bring about the operational results desired.
Such integration is unlikely to occur from the bottom up. Service cultures and comfortable roles and missions create a situation in which the promise of American Seapower is unlikely to be achieved if the Navy and Marine Corps are left to themselves to bring it about. A forcing function is required.

Therefore, a reorganization of the Department of the Navy, undertaken with support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and appropriate Congressional Committees is necessary to take positive steps designed to ensure that within the Department of the Navy, a greater level of Service integration is achieved, while also working to obtain the resources necessary to field the capabilities and capacities necessary to more effectively service the nation’s peacetime security and presence needs. It is not enough to say that we need a larger Navy and or Marine Corps. We must ensure that the American people understand what will be done with such an increase, why it is in the nation’s interest to do so, and how doing so will make a given level of defense spending go further.

Pathologies

Strategic Thinking
There is no organization within the Department of the Navy dedicated to thinking about integrated American Seapower.
Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps maintain three star directorates with “strategy” within their mandate, in addition to small, highly influential strategic cells that report directly to the Service Chief. In none of these organizations is there a meaningful representation of officers from the other Service.
The Department of the Navy Secretariat has no such organization.
The lack of such an organization has not however, resulted in no strategic thinking in the Department. Quite the contrary, two maritime strategies have been produced in the past ten years (2007, 2015). These were however, ad hoc efforts that do not appear to have influenced fleet operations or force structure, and in at least the 2007 instance, was undertaken around and without the inclusion of the Service Secretary.

Strategic Communications
Under the Secretary of the Navy, there is a Chief of Information (CHINFO) and a Chief of Legislative Affairs (OLA). These officers report directly to the Secretary, with dotted line reporting responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations. Neither organization is responsible for Marine Corps affairs, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps has his own legislative assistant and his own public affairs assistant.
In essence, the organizations charged with Department of the Navy strategic communications represent only one Service (the Navy), and to the extent that the other Service—the Marine Corps—requires these functions, they are creatures of the office of the Commandant, not the Secretary of the Navy.
In essence, any strategic communications efforts are derived of three disjointed and unaligned efforts—Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps.
Additionally, no one person in the Department of the Navy is charged with the creation and implementation of a coherent strategic communications plan including legislative affairs, public affairs, and international messaging. Put another way, even if there were a coherent strategic narrative promoting the benefits of American Seapower, there is no process, organization, task force, or group responsible for carrying it out.

Planning and Programming
The Navy and Marine Corps do not receive adequate planning and programming guidance from the Secretary of the Navy at the beginning of the annual budget cycle, guidance designed to achieve a coherent vision of American Seapower. Secretary priority items are included in current guidance, but the degree to which the Services respond to a coherent and integrated vision of Seapower is minimal at best. There is little evidence that the Services are instructed what to devalue or cut.
The Navy and Marine Corps maintain separate planning and programming functions designed to create inputs (known as a “program objective memorandum” or POM) to the annual defense budget. There is little or no coordination between the Services during the development of Service POM’s, and there is limited interaction between the Services and the Navy Secretariat.
The Navy Secretariat does not have an organization staffed to issue such guidance, monitor its implementation, and remedy shortfalls. To the extent that any changes are made to the Service POM’s, they come late in the process and are generally made within individual Service POMs.

Acquisition
Meaningful reform to the acquisition system is essential to achieving alignment within the Department of the Navy, as a vision of American Seapower would create derived requirements and the opportunity for capability trades between and among USN and USMC acquisition efforts.
This currently happens to some degree within the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. This work is however, undermined by the disjointed strategic communications efforts described above.
Captain Mark Vandroff, USN and I laid out a proposal for reforming Department of the Navy acquisition elsewhere, and rather than repeat it here, readers are urged to review it. Though not mentioned in that article, the need for an integrated strategic communications/legislative relations effort is essential to achieving some of the benefits of the recommended reforms.

Recommendations
• Revive the Office of Program Appraisal (OPA) on the Navy Secretariat at the two-star level. A staff made up of USN/USMC and civilian experts in strategic thinking and budgeting. Headed by a two-star with a one-star deputy who fleets up. Alternates between Navy and USMC. Billets would come from USN (N3/N5, N8) and USMC (P,P,&O/P&R). This organization would have the dual mission of aligning the American Seapower strategic narrative and providing oversight of Service POM development in order to achieve it.
• Empower the Under Secretary of the Navy to manage Navy Department Strategic Communications.  VCNO, ACMC, CHINFO, OLA, N3/N5, and PP@O would all serve on a DON strategic communications Board of Directors. Public, legislative, and international messaging would be aligned within this BOD.
o Both CHINFO and OLA would become truly Departmental organizations. The Commandant would lose the Assistant for Legislative Matters and the Assistant for Public Affairs. The two-star heads of these organizations would have a one-star deputy who fleets up. The heads of these organizations would be filled by officers from the two services, with no more than 90 days at a time in which officers from one of the Services are in both positions.
• Empower the Secretary of the Navy as the single responsible party for Departmental capability definition and its acquisition, subject to overrule only by the President or the Secretary of Defense (within the Executive Department). This is described more fully in the previously linked to USNI News piece.

Conclusion

The promise of powerful, integrated American Seapower tending to the nation’s peacetime presence and crisis response missions while it creates the conditions for garrison forces to fall in on for warfighting, will not occur organically. There are powerful interests aligned against it, and as this article may reveal, potentially good arguments against it.

I look forward to those arguments being made, and to those arguments in agreement with the central proposition of this proposal but with doubts about the offered solutions.

In the end, this nation’s geography, interests, and role in the world demand more of its naval services.  Seapower advocates must not shy away from the benefits conferred to this nation by a powerful naval force, even if it means relative comparisons with other elements of military power.

Naval Diplomacy, Strategic Communication, and the NOC

Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) describes when, where and how U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict and prevailing in war in order to guide Maritime Strategy implementation in a manner consistent with national strategy. NOC 10 describes the ways with which the sea services will achieve the ends articulated in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21).

Above is the stated purpose of the new Naval Operations Concept 2010.

I have a lot to say about the NOC, but instead of a broad look I have decided to discuss one small point at a time. Generally speaking, I beleive the NOC achieves its stated purpose with clarity. The NOC can be quoted easily but does not come off as Cliche - and that isn't easy to do. This represents the first in what will be several discussions inspired by the NOC.

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I'm a big Lindy Kyzer fan, because as communication specialists go in the armed services - she is one of the best. I'm a bigger LT Jennifer Cragg fan - but that's more of a Navy > Army thing. Lindy has a post up on the Official Army blog worth noting, because it discusses a topic I've been thinking about as I read through the NOC for the third time. It is very nice that the official Army blog is dynamic enough that one can find someone who isn't a flag officer giving a strong opinion. Perhaps if the official Navy blog was similar I'd think it was worth a link...

Lindy has a strong opinion on the term strategic communication, indeed on the larger concept related to the DoD.

The term strategic communication has been around for awhile, and gained traction around 2002. And it’s almost always been tied to the military and State Department in our roles of communicating issues related to national defense and public diplomacy. Then National Security Advisor Condelezza Rice even established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Commitee in 2002 (word is they’re still out there somewhere, debating the definition of the term strategic communication).

As a social media maven, I feel the pain of the strategic communication community. A well intentioned military community too easily latches on terms or initiatives as easy fixes for more complex problems. Both terms are means to an end, rather than the end themselves.

I think in the social media community, we definitely need to stop and take the time to learn from the past to set the stage for evolved, developed social media implementation and engagement. When the social media train first knocked us in the military and government community off of our feet several years ago, most folks were simply scrambling for a presence - everyone felt a burning need to be on Facebook, Twitter and You Tube - simply because everyone else was. Hopefully our social media efforts have evolved and we’re stepping back to really think through the value of all of our online engagements and interactions. And taking the time to see how social media can truly fit into our larger organizational goals (perhaps a meeting with our strategic communication team is in order).

This post fits nicely with a recent article in the March 2010 issue of Proceedings by Lieutenant Robert McFarlin, USN. The article is found in the Professional Notes section (members only) and has some observations regarding strategic communication he experienced while serving as operations officer on the USS Farragut (DDG-99) during a recent Partnership of the Americas (POA) deployment.

The term strategic communication designates much more than only press briefings and talking points. Its official DOD definition is "focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchronized with other elements of national power." Note the word actions. Indeed, senior Defense Department officials have said that SC is "80 percent action and 20 percent words."

Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, characterizes it as providing audiences with "truthful and timely information that will influence them to support the objectives of the communicator." He identifies strategic and tactical SC levels. Planners operate at the former; at the tactical level the mission is accomplished. "Public affairs and all of the associated efforts are linked together and the execution . . . occurs."

The strategic level sets the course, but the tactical is most significant to ships on deployment because ultimately, SC is not about words or PR. It's about real people on real ships conducting real-world operations with our partner nations. Only through action can we foster and sustain relationships with our partners.

Both Lindy Kyzer and LT Robert McFarlin are discussing tactical viewpoints of strategic communication - Lindy from her perspective as the social media expert in the US Army and LT McFarlin as an officer aboard a US Navy ship making port in foreign countries. They both represent soldiers on the same information battlefield that competes to shape perceptions and influence.

Both observations are important to think about in the context of the NOC, because they highlight the absence of clarity and definition still present in the military services at the strategic intersection of organizational goals and the synchronization of activities. I think the combination of both opinions also suggest that at the tactical level - proficiency isn't the issue - suggesting the problems are top down, not bottom up.

The NOC discusses communications within the context of an information system, and does not discuss communications in the context of influence. The NOC never uses the phrase "strategic communications," for better or worse. Indeed, in the NOC, influence is only discussed in the context of a shaping operation or in the context of deterrence. The NOC spends a great deal of time and effort distinguishing the unique character of the 'Naval Service' as a maritime centric collection of services, and goes on to describe the unique nature of the maritime domain. Throughout the NOC I note a theme of distinction - or uniqueness - that is expressed to the reader as the document touts what can be described as an expected set of combat and non-combat capabilities provided by the Naval Service.

What is missing is perhaps what could make the NOC transformational, or at minimum relevant in the context of a Clausewitz view that suggests war is an extension of politics. The NOC does not integrate the Navy as part of a larger system of political influence, or the Navy as an influence enterprise. According to the NOC, the Navy is an instrument of political influence by shaping a permissive environment, or by acting as a deterrent with credible combat power. If the NOC is intended to guide the 'Naval Service' on how to implement Maritime Strategy, shouldn't there be even a nod in the direction of strategic communications?

The presence of a US Navy ship anywhere on the globe is a form of communication.

For example, we are currently conducting an ASW exercise with South Korea because of political objectives desired between Seoul and Washington, DC. It is one step in the escalation control taking place on the Korean peninsula - and that politically specific escalation control is leveraging the use of naval forces. The actions send clear signals to the DRPK; a communication element the US Navy can uniquely provide at this junction in the political posturing currently taking place. Yes, there are clearly unique and distinguishing aspects of the 'Naval Service' at work here, but more critically to the National Defense Strategy of the United States - the US Navy is an important piece of the whole of government approach that integrates unique options to an influence enterprise being directed towards North Korea - indeed the US Navy is an influence enterprise in and of itself.

The absence of describing the Navy as an influence enterprise in the NOC or even nodding in the direction of naval forces as an integrated part of influencing political objectives outside the context of permissive shaping operations or combat power deterrence bothers me, because the absence of Strategic Communications generally in the NOC highlights the absence of the entire concept of the Navy as an influence enterprise in CS-21.

Where is the chapter on Naval Diplomacy? Even though naval diplomacy is practiced ten thousand different ways by the US Navy every day, the broad range of capabilities it represents barely gets a nod in the NOC. Chapter 6 should have been titled Naval Diplomacy instead of HA/DR, because the story of Navy HA/DR in history suggests HA/DR is one of several categories of Naval Diplomacy.

And had the NOC also put Strategic Communications as one of the categories of Naval Diplomacy, the Navy might find a good starting place for discussing and integrating their influence enterprise.

Waging Escalation Control in the Twenty-First Century

“So we see how, from the very outset, the absolute, the ‘mathematical’ as it is called, no longer has any firm place in military calculations; from the outset there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which…makes War of all branches of human activity the most like a gambling game.”

Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), 312-313.

USAF General Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver have an article in Strategic Studies Quarterly titled Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century (PDF). They take on the questions from national security policy scholars and practitioners who are asking whether deterrence remains a relevant, reliable and realistic national security concept in the twenty-first century. The answer given by the authors is, as one might expect, yes! This article discusses deterrence along a broad range of topics, a good primer if you will.

There is an emerging challenge in the 21st century to our deterrence theories that goes missing in articles like this, and that is how the United States leverages deterrence theory in our emerging role as crisis managers during escalation of conflicts between other state or non-state entities. There are several examples so far in the 21st century including the Lebanon - Israel campaign of 2006 triggered by the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers from Hezbollah, the sectarian violence that emerged in Iraq triggered by the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, and even the recent attack in Mumbai by terrorist forces that has significantly increased tension between Pakistan and India. In all three cases a 3rd party, non-state actor conducts an operation that creates confliction between two opposing forces, either two states or in the case of Iraq - two ethnic groups, and as these events were unfolding there was an absence of deterrence capability to be applied by the United States to prevent escalation, and act in the role of a peacemaker.

This deterrence capability including the necessary associated strategic communications strategy that both State and the DoD can leverage for these situations still, even after 21st century examples cited above (and there are more, Russia/Georgia?), still goes missing from our 21st century deterrence theory discussions. While part of the larger deterrence theory, the capability I'm observing absent is called Escalation Control.

Escalation Control will require our deterrence strategies to be applicable to rising tensions not directly related to us, but have significant strategic and cost implications indirectly to our nation. Effective Escalation Control strategies will require our nation to possess the cultural, political, and strategic awareness of all parties involved in identifying how actions taken on one side will influence the actions of the other in escalating and deescalating conflicts. Our deterrence strategies must also be adaptable of rapidly adjusting to conditions as the battlefield environment changes.

For example, scholars who study recent skirmishes between Pakistan and India are split regarding which country restrained from escalating that conflict. India had the edge in military capabilities, but during the Kargil conflict Pakistan pulled several major conventional forces, including their air force, from the front lines in an effort to manage escalation. Both countries faced severe consequences in a war between the two countries, and while the details are unclear regarding all of the political and strategic influences that prevented war, what is clear is that in the future as India expands their conventional capabilities, the political and strategic calculus in Pakistan adjusts. Said another way; in the future India will be able to create conditions towards “escalation dominance,” which means Pakistan may be more likely to rely on nuclear weapons to achieve “escalation matching.”

The Kargil conflict is an important study in Escalation Control, because media, or what I am calling strategic communications had significant influence over the perception of the populations in that war.

These policies of Escalation Control are most often applied to preventing escalation of conflict towards a level of nuclear war, but in the 21st century the necessity to apply an indirect deterrence theory of Escalation Control to both conventional war and irregular war is emerging as a requirement.

During the cold war, escalation control consisted primarily of two policies. The first is to have “escalation matching” capabilities: forces that can fight a war at whatever levels the enemy chooses to fight. The other policy is “escalation dominance” that refers to having superiority at every possible level of combat. These two policies were exercised at both the conventional and strategic nuclear level in controlling escalation towards a potential war with the Soviet Union, and both were important concepts. Escalation matching capabilities were often utilized to frame strategic communications in a way that suggested a strategic balance was being developed for activities. In a modern context, this might include matching a US naval force at sea to shadow a rival naval force at sea, for example. Escalation dominance signals a strategic communication in an attempt to keep wars limited due to overmatch in capability if they were to occur, with the strategic intent to minimize the likelihood of war breaking out in the first place.

Neither escalation control policy applied in the cold war is sufficient for applying deterrence to the emerging challenges that put the United States, as the world’s only superpower, as the strategic peacemaking diplomat of escalating conflicts between other parties. Furthermore, neither theory has any significant influence on the role of a non-state party to incite the confliction in cases cited above.

This emerging challenge absent from our deterrence theories requires more attention from our thought leadership. The necessity to optimize coordination between State and the DoD, and develop a strategic capability to be rapidly deployed with an associated strategic communications strategy that when applied works to deconflict tensions emerging in crisis. If the United States is to play the role of a strategic crisis manager for the 21st century, our thought leaders need to be resourced to develop a broad strategic theory for deterrence at the point where phase 0 of conflicts is shifting to phase 1 between two states, including and in particular when non-state actors are the source for creating the conflict between those states.

I believe General Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver have added an important contribution to the discussion of deterrence to direct threats to the United States in the 21st century. It is my hope the conversation doesn't fade with a single article, the authors raise important points regarding the necessity for our country to reshape our nations posture for deterrence towards addressing 21st century challenges.

I believe it is also important our government invests significant study and collaboration with thought leaders towards developing deterrence capabilities for indirect threats as well, because as the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Iraq shows, our inability to control escalating tensions between other parties can have significant strategic consequences to the United States.

Crossposted at the United States Naval Institute Blog

Strategic Communications and Information Operations

I have something on my mind, and open the topic for discussion in hopes the feedback is of professional quality.

Should the Navy conduct Information Operations?

I feel like they do every day, but they target the wrong people. There is an information operation taking place right now, supported by industry, and it targets Congress directly. The change to the Littoral Combat Ship program is a perfectly executed information operation intended to pressure lawmakers into a decision without debate or consideration of consequences. It really is clever, and only required a few steps.

1. Wait until after the election, the day after to be specific, to insure no public debate or discussion.
2. Apply industrial pressures on Congress, pressures the Navy forced on industry by waiting until after the election to make a selection for LCS.
3. Take advantage of the busy lame duck period to avoid public discussion and debate, which would highlight the complete absence of a TOC discussion the Navy has no answers for.

It is a clever little information operation and the target is Congress. Without showing any financial information, the Navy claims huge savings in buying 20 ships of two distinct classes with two distinct support and maintenance lines compared to the original plan of purchasing 17 ships with a single support and maintenance line. Even in Washington DC, that is unbelievable!

An information operation is a form of information warfare, and if we simply use the definition of information warfare we can ask whether this is indeed what the Navy does when it comes with shipbuilding - the LCS being an example - when one considers Congress the enemy.

Information warfare is the use and management of information in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. Information warfare may involve collection of tactical information, assurance(s) that one's own information is valid, spreading of propaganda or disinformation to demoralize or manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of opposing force information and denial of information-collection opportunities to opposing forces. Information warfare is closely linked to psychological warfare.

It is my opinion that the only information operations the Navy, under current leadership, is effective in conducting are the information operations that are conducted on the American people and Congress. I believe the DDG-1000 program history on Capitol Hill is another perfect example of a successfully conducted IO campaign against Congress. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

Should the Navy conduct Strategic Communications?

The absence of strategic communications as a starting point, or even the subjects inclusion to any significant degree, is a tremendous weakness of the current Naval Operational Concept. Consider for a moment the deployment today of the USS Carl Vinson and associated strike group - here is the official Navy article in full:

SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, led by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

This deployment will be the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

"This will be Stockdale's maiden deployment," said Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Jeffrey Bennett. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to deploy, executing missions across all warfare areas and joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team to be prepared to execute a full spectrum of military operations from presence and security to humanitarian assistance and disaster response."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts, which help establish conditions for regional stability.

Media wishing to cover the departure of USS Carl Vinson can embark aboard Vinson for the day as the ship departs San Diego Bay; and be flown back to Naval Air North Island at approximately 4:30 p.m.

For more information on CSG-1 and the USS Carl Vinson, visit www.cvn70.navy.mil or www.facebook.com/ussvinson. For more information on USS Bunker Hill, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/cg52. For more information on USS Gridley, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg101. For more information on USS Stockdale, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg106 or www.facebook.com/pages/USS-STOCKDALE-DDG-106/128805733826735
>
For more news from Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet, visit www.navy.mil/local/c3f/.

Uhm, 3rd Fleet Public Affairs - do not take this criticism personal.

What is the strategic communication in this Navy.mil article? Who is the audience? What is the context? Lets review the talking points...

• This is Stockdale's maiden deployment
• The "team of awesome warfighters" are both "ready to deploy" and will be "executing missions across all warfare areas"
• The "team of awesome warfighters are "joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team" to "execute a full spectrum of military operations" like "presence" and "security" and "humanitarian assistance" and "disaster response."

The audience for this article is... unclear.
The context of this article is... not provided.
The strategic communication of this article... is not strategic.

We are left with information, provided for an unknown purpose to an unknown audience and with an unknown context. Is it even possible to be less informed by this information? Below is my version of the same article - an example of how I think the Navy needs to be thinking when deploying every single ship in the fleet.

SAN DIEGO -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

Carrier Strike Group 1 is departing on schedule despite a disruption in training schedules that occurred when USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and Bunker Hill (CG 52) supported disaster response and humanitarian operations in Haiti earlier this year. This deployment includes several firsts. This is the first major deployment for USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) after a three year nuclear refueling. Additionally, this deployment is the first deployment for Bunker Hill (CG 52) underwent Cruiser modernization, the first Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser to complete mid life modernization. Finally, this deployment is the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

This will be the third deployment for USS Gridley (DDG 101) despite the ship being commissioned less than four years ago.

"The Vinson Strike Group is a remarkable collection of warships containing the latest technologies and capabilities," said PACFLT REAR ADMIRAL I_WENT_TO_STRATCOMM_SCHOOL. "The sailors of the Vinson Strike Group are well trained to meet multiple challenges that may be encountered during their seven-month deployment."

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

"This deployment comes as tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula and our forces are engaged in heavy fighting in Afghanistan," said Commanding Officer, CAPTAIN I_KNOW_MY_STRATCOMM. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to meet these challenges, executing missions across all warfare areas. Carrier Strike Group 1 is fortunate to have Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, who recently took command of CSG-1 in late October. His experience as a former commander of the Japan based forward deployed Destroyer Squadron 15 will benefit the Vinson Strike Group as we cooperate with other US Navy forces already forward deployed, not to mention our South Korean and Japanese allies over the coming weeks and months dealing with tensions in northeast Asia."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to help establish conditions for regional stability.

I assure you 3rd fleet public affairs could do this better than me.

The audience for this article is informed citizens and foreign populations examining the purpose and intentions of a US Navy Carrier Strike Group deployment, primarily because the context of this article is current events. The strategic communication of this article is one of projecting American power abroad in support of our interests and resolve towards assisting our allies.

Note the strategic communications to Asia in this fictional article is delivered in context of current events even though the deployment was scheduled long ago. The strategic communication is targeted - projecting confidence for the domestic population, projecting strength towards adversaries, and demonstrating our national resolve and support for allies.

A study of the details, something we know every naval analyst in the world does, would reveal an ultra modern collection of warships in Carrier Strike Group, and also note CSG-1 commander came on late but is apparently a perfect fit for operations during a period of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. These details, by being touch early on, allow the Navy to further develop strategic communications in the future in directing messages to specific audiences. For example, projecting confidence towards Japan should the Vinson Strike Group exercise with the Japanese Navy sometime in the future is an option because Rear Admiral Perez lived and served - in Japan. Familiarity and experience represents a context that can be leveraged to engage audiences.

Want to send a signal to North Korea? Run a simple information operation by discussing the new sonar tail on Bunker Hill. This stuff really isn't complicated, and if the operational side doesn't know how to do it - they can ask OPNAV in the Pentagon for assistance - after all, they've become great at it on Capitol Hill.

I see the absence of strategic communication in official Navy information equivalent to the absence of value in official Navy information. How much value is lost when a Navy ship or fleet cannot communicate effectively at the strategic level every time the ship conducts any action, including movement? As a taxpayer and a citizen who studies the history of naval power, I think there is tremendous value in thinking about that question. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

What I see today in the US Navy are information operations that target domestic audiences and a complete fail by the Navy when it comes to strategic communications. If a question gets asked about shipbuilding, the answer reads like a smoke grenade thrown by the Navy. If a question gets asked about a deployment, the answer is packaged and shipped like a brochure and often is completely void of context.

This is an organization that coined the phrase "Information Dominance?" Perhaps the scope of what is covered by such a profoundly ironic description should be examined more closely.

The Responsibility to Develop This Necessary Support...

A second element of a military service is the resources, human and material, which are required to implement its strategic concept. To secure these resources it is necessary for society to fore go the alternative uses to which these resources might be put and to acquiesce in their allocation to the military service. Thus, the resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public support of that service. The service has the responsibility to develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security. Hence this second element of public support is, in the long run, dependent upon the strategic concept of the service. If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.

National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy, Proceedings, May 1954, Samuel Huntington

Something most people may not know. After the House hearing on July 31st, when the Navy made its case before the House to truncate the DDG-1000, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough did not stay and answer questions from the media. From all accounts he basically ran into a waiting black SUV and drove away quickly without talking to the press.

With the exception of Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating, we do not see many Admirals out talking to the press, and nobody can remember the last time Admiral Roughead did an interview with the press. The Navy is not making its case, or any case for that matter, and by ignoring the press, the Navy ultimately ignores the American people. We are less than a year from the release of the Navy's Maritime Strategy, and yet we see no broad public follow up, no emphasis of it in the decision process, and the only people the press quotes these days are LTs and Captains who get sent out to speak on behalf of Navy decision makers.

It isn't just the top Navy leaders though, the inability to say anything intelligent to the American people is particularly obvious in places like NAVSEA. Admiral Goddard was so inexperienced talking to the American people that when given a chance to talk about the DDG-1000 on signing day, he compared it to HMS Dreadnought apparently oblivious to how ridiculous that made the Navy look. The Littoral Combat Ship is an excellent example, Lockheed Martin is out selling their ship to the American people with a full court press strategic communication effort, highlighting the technology, with Moosally out front touting the capabilities. When we look at this, what sticks out for us is that it is the industry, NOT NAVSEA, out selling the Navy's ships to the American people. Hell, when the Littoral Combat Ship was questioned from a strategic perspective in Proceedings, it was Lockheed Martin, not NAVSEA, out front defending the potential strategic flexibility of the LCS. We didn't buy the argument, but we noted who made the argument! Now we are noting who DIDN'T make the argument.

The only communications the American people ever get from the Navy outside an operational activity briefing is when we see Congressional testimony. Given this stage, do we see the Navy emphasize its maritime strategy? Nope, we see operational considerations drive acquisition decisions behind the backdrop of a shipbuilding plan that is absent considerations of available resources. The results are predictable, news coverage highlights events then finds any number of dozens of observers who note the inconsistencies and problems. As should be expected, the inconsistencies and problems get highlighted and becomes the focus of the Navy's strategic communication with the American people, resulting in chaos.

My question is who are the folks behind the scenes advising Navy leadership regarding its strategic communications effort? Are they Officers, or consultants? It is a serious question, because this is the question the Navy needs to answer.

What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?

It is a serious question, and the problem right now is the Navy doesn't have a compelling answer for itself. I could make that case, but it isn't my job. Huntington asked that question of the Navy in 1954 when the Navy was losing the strategic argument to the Air Force regarding its vital contribution to the national interest. With the Army and Marines engaged in two wars, and allegations that the planners of the Navy's new Maritime Strategy see NO ROLE AT ALL for the Navy in the current environment, the Navy appears to lack a credible answer. While intentionally not naming China as a serious future challenge of the Navy, but claiming the capabilities of China is driving acquisition decisions, the Navy lacks a clear and concise strategic message to the American people. The result is confusion, just as Huntington advised it would be. With the American people uninterested, undersold on the value of the Navy, and ultimately apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the Navy regarding its financial requirements, the House and a Senate are making decisions based on their interests, under no obligation to consider the Navy's interests.

Huntington had advice for the Navy in 1954, and it applies to the Navy of 2008.

This attitude can only be overcome by a systematic, detailed elaboration and presentation of the theory of the transoceanic Navy against the broad background of naval history and naval technology. Only when this is done will the Navy have the public confidence commensurate with its important role in national defense.

Consider for a moment the direction of the Navy's strategic communications with Congress and the American people. The Navy intentionally avoids the media, thus does not utilize its available resources by which to communicate to the American people. The Navy completely ignores blogs, so the service has no stake in the daily narrative during the information age. The Navy classifies almost in entirety the links that connect ends, ways, means, and context... assuming of coarse there are links. Finally, the Navy appears to ignore every opportunity to capitalize on the rich US Navy history of which has the power to capture the imagination and tell a compelling story relevant to today.

I think the Navy's current communication strategy is scary stupid. I may not be as smart as the consultants advising the Navy, but given the opportunity to make a point, I would highlight one enduring fact. You have to talk if you want to be heard. When the Navy decides to start talking again, we suggest telling the country what you believe, but equally important, believe what you tell the country.

HA/DR: Operational or Strategic?

From a Sept. 30 bloggers roundtable with Rear Adm. Richard Landolt, Commander of the Amphibious Force 7th Fleet based in Okinawa, Japan. I was supposed to make the call, but my work schedule has been fairly crazy for 6 weeks (ends later today, thankfully). I was able to email in a question early that morning, and Petty Office Selby let the question fly.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Okay. And we'll go back around the horn in a second. I have a question from Galrahn, sir: 7th Fleet generates a lot of regional publicity surrounding their humanitarian assistance programs, like Pacific Partnership, but also their disaster response and recovery operations -- the 2004 tsunami being one of the most visible, but also in several cyclone and mudslide responses in southeast Asia. As we are at the two-year anniversary of CS21, I was wondering if you can answer whether HA/DR is strategic or operational for the Navy, and how and why; or even what might be missing.

ADM. LANDOLT: I would say it's both strategic and operational. We're going to continue to do these. The amphibious force is that force that's on call and in high demand to practice these with other countries, as we do during Pacific Partnerships or African Partnership Station, or when they go down to South America. But we also make money when we do this and create those relationships during their execution that stand the test of time.

I have -- as I just said, USS Denver has done this twice now in the last two months. It's a good example of this -- to set for other countries who could be thinking about this, because a lot of countries take heat, their governments take heat when they don't respond well to these type of events. We are more than happy to show them how we train for this and the capability we bring. And that, in turn, might help them to drive some of their programs towards those kind of platforms or assets they may need.

Having been around the world in a number of places, for instance, I see too many countries that -- they want to buy a fast, sexy, pointy-nose aircraft; and what they really need are helicopters that can lift cargo and get into mountainsides and help their own people out during times like these.

So I think it -- the answer is both, strategic and operational. We will continue to do this. Pacific Partnership, by the way, is going to involve Indonesia next year. And in fact, the Indonesians have a hospital ship called the "Doctor Soeharso," S-O-E-H-A-R-S-O. Because there was so much damage to the hospitals in Padang, the Soeharso pulled into port there, and was very useful to them. And that same ship will take those lessons learned -- she learned from this real-world exercise -- real-world event, and use it during the Pacific Partnership next year.

I would have followed up by asking what he means when he says "we also make money when we do this." I have a few ideas how this analogy applies, but I'd be curious for his specific examples.

I think the answer is interesting, but I'm not sure I am convinced. I remain unsure, two years after CS-21, whether HA/DR is strategic or operational. Obviously it is operational, but there are so many things that go into effective HA/DR and I am starting to lean towards the camp that says for the US Navy, HA/DR is operational.

That isn't to say HA/DR can't be, or isn't strategic, only that it isn't for the US Navy. Let me touch on my thoughts here.

Many of the aspects of HA/DR that make the effort strategic comes from outside the US Navy, for example, the strategic communications and political cooperation and partnerships that build from HA/DR can have a strategic quality about them, but the Navy piece is operational. With that said, all of those other pieces that make the combined total effort don't work without the Navy, so this is a complex issue and not cut and dry.

What this means is Navy can do everything right in HA/DR and still fail in a strategic objective, and the Navy can do everything wrong in HA/DR and still succeed in a strategic objective. That doesn't mean the quality of the Navy effort doesn't matter, only that the effort itself is dependent upon so many external factors and the work of so many others throughout government that I think that elevating HA/DR as a prominent strategic activity in CS-21 is going to always be controversial, particularly as it may not always be a strategic activity.

Obviously this is theory and academic as a discussion, built on the idealism that assistance is always welcome in times of disaster or need, but we all should recognize that is not always the case. In the Pacific I think there is a good argument to be made that assistance provided to the Philippines and Indonesia are strategic, when part of a strategic communications package at the political (and population) level that contrasts our response with the response of others, specifically the Chinese. I am not much into the financial analogy used by Rear Adm. Richard Landolt regarding how we make money, but I do see a college football sports analogy here.

As an operational effort the US Navy is scoring political points by helping the local political leaders be seen as responsive. As a strategic effort, the more our assistance is contrasted with the absence of assistance by those like China, we are scoring strategic points in the region as well. The domestic political points are field goals and close wins as they don't impress much, but the strategic points enabled by the STRATCOM wizards who engage the population and political level in a meaningful way are like touchdowns and can ultimately influence the perception of the games outcome, in particular by influencing the BCS voters around the region who like to see blowouts over close victories.

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I think there is plenty of room for a good discussion on this topic. I'll get the comments fixed tonight (doesn't show comment count), and be moderating throughout the day to insure comments are posted quickly (be aware, regular users are approved immediately and will no longer be moderated, only new users are moderated through the first 5 posts). If you want to sign up with a unique nickname for comments, sign up with a js-kit account.