Global Fleet Stations: Caribbean Cruise Continues

For those who are following the SOUTHCOM missions of the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) and the Swift (HSV 2), there have been a few events. On June 20th the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) arrived in Belize, and on June 21st the Swift departed Belize. In my discussions with peers I am finding there is considerable interest in the Swift (HSV 2) mission to Belize, but there wasn't much public information. I see the lack of information, either on NavyNewstand or in the Belize media on the Swift (HSV 2) activities as a good sign.

Belize has significant problems, from a lack of law enforcement to being a major port for drug trafficking in South America to being a major human trafficking in both servitude and sexual exploitation, and is still listed as a Tier 3 nation for human trafficking by the State Dept.

The lack of media attention implies the Navy was busy working with Law Enforcement. The typical Global Fleet Station media announcements have tended to be humanitarian in nature, and in some cases there has been too much of it, although some media reports have involved professionally established law enforcement like the reports from Guatemala. In Belize, very little of that kind of professionalism exists, so training would likely happen in secrecy to protect the law enforcement agencies involved. This is a critical element to the Global Fleet Stations concept, because security cooperation is not only the key, but results in cooperation is the goal. It will probably be several months before any information regarding the professional training activities conducted in Belize is revealed, if not years.

The Swift (HSV 2) then moved over to the Dominican Republic, arriving on June 24th. The Dominican Today provides a good media report regarding the intentions of the GFS visit:

Webb said the high speed ship’s presence -anchored in the capital’s Ozama river port- is part of the mission to reinforce marine security in the zone. "Drug trafficking, terrorism and piracy: the nationality doesn’t concern them. One country alone cannot solve a problem such as this, but together as partners we can in fact make the difference."

A team of instructors will train to 95 military until July 6, at the Dominican Government’s request.

This is exactly how the Global Fleet Stations should work. A nation requests assistance, and the US Navy responds with as much assistance as possible, including in this case, making a material investment donation to the Dominican Navy the Global Fleet Station intends to train:

The U.S. government has given two fast launches to the Navy, valued at US$7.5 million.

Both crafts will be used to control illegal trips, terrorism and drug smuggling in high seas.

Roland Bullen, Trade Attaché at the United States Embassy, said that the boats could reach a speed of 60mph, “making them the fastest boats in the area”.

This type of investment, in time, material, and training is a very clever (and relatively cheap) way for the US Navy to make a significant impact on long term security. It establishes a foundation to build cooperation from and leaves no question regarding the US Navy commitment. The evaluation of the results of this type of investment needs to be carefully evaluated though, because while observers can feel confident in the US Navy Global Fleet Station contribution from June 24th to July 6th, it is what happens with these two fast boats starting on July 7th that will determine success.

Which raises a point that needs to be evaluated within the Global Fleet Station concept. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the Army and Marines have learned the hard lessons regarding producing results in security cooperation from another nation. The most effective way to insure success is through continuous presence. Is that equally true in this case? Will the Dominican Navy be able to make significant progress in intercepting the drug running on small boats to and from Hispaniola when the Global Fleet Station leaves?

This is one the reasons why I believe the Global Fleet Station needs to be more than one ship, specifically needs something capable of deploying "fast launches" similar to whatever is being donated to a host nation, but more importantly, needs to be able to directly address the real issue of establishing a Maritime Domain Awareness strategy that puts the donated equipment, and existing equipment of the Dominican Navy to good use.

In a letter to the editor in yesterday's edition of the Dominican Today, a retired USAF Captain makes a point that what is needed is an information system to help distinguish the legitimate business from the black market, and although I wouldn't go quite as far as he suggests, I think the point of his idea shouldn't be dismissed outright.

In this case, the Dominican Republic has asked for specific assistance. The US Navy has responded appropriately (in my opinion anyway) by going above the call of training assistance and donating 2 fast boats. However, these 2 boats specifically address only a single aspect of the law enforcement problems facing the Dominican Navy that would be needed to effectively impact the maritime security issues. The ability for a global fleet station platform to establish an extended presence, perhaps as much as 6 weeks, and help local authorities establish a strategy for coordinating local legal maritime traffic making approaches to the Dominican Republic would allow the host nation to develop the processes and techniques to get a better grasp of the maritime smuggling issues.

Maybe it isn't possible in this trip, but I certainly hope the Navy has an information sharing strategy for the region in the cards for the Global Fleet Station concept. None of the multiple suggested Navy concepts to date appears better suited to making a significant impact in Maritime Domain Awareness, which in the end is the key to improving Maritime Security in troubled regions.

As for the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20), she left Belize last week for Guatemala on the 27th, and left Guatemala on July 2nd and should be in Panama either by July 4th or 5th. You can follow the Comfort mission via Navy Newstand here.

The LCS Drama Continues

NavyTimes has an article that describes the damage of a fire that erupted onboard LCS-1 back in April. According to the Navy investigation, the cause was accidental. This is understandable, shipyards are fire hazards, and it appears the damage estimate is only 3.5 million, although it is a contributing factor to the delayed construction of LCS-1 which is now due to join the Fleet in 2008. Who will pay the cost is yet to be determined. The cost question of the LCS is included in the NavyTimes article:

As of June 21, the Navy has yet to determine total construction costs for either the Lockheed or General Dynamics ships and continues to characterize the cost growth as “between 50 percent and 75 percent depending on the basis of comparison,” although unofficial estimates are higher for both designs.

That is interesting, because 50% increase of the original 470 million for LCS-1 would be 705 million, while 75% would be 822 million for the first ship. DID is claiming, based on what has been reported, the best case cost estimate for a single LCS is around 427 million.

Now comes another announcement reported by NavyTimes, LCS-5 is now being estimated to cost 460 million. This is a fairly high number, well above the DID estimate of 427 million per. If you look at the DID cost increases, it is broken down by estimating a sea frame cost of 297 million + 50 million to each hull for NVR changes + 80 million for a single mission module for 427 million, which doesn't include the 25 million for a MH-60S/R. If I am reading the NavyTimes report correctly, the Navy is now including a single mission module in the its 460 million cost estimate for LCS-5, It is unclear from the article if the cost includes a single helicopter, but odds are good it does not.

This might be good news, or not... If the estimate is being made for LCS-5 is accounting for building only a single ship, it is possible the Navy can get down to the originally estimated 400 million per hull + module if building 6 per year. Possible, not likely. More likely the cost of the LCS would only drop about 10% per hull if building 6, meaning each LCS + a single mission module will be around 425 million per. While it certainly hurts the LCS program and the Navy to fail to get multiple mission modules per hull, at least there is a light at the end of the tunnel suggesting the Navy will be able to afford more than a handful of LCS.

That is of coarse assuming the Navy doesn't get its act together and realize the LCS may not be the best platform for the mission it is designed to conduct. I won't hold my breathe, but the LCS program won't be shaken out until the next presidential administration in FY2010, meaning it is possible a new administration will help the Navy see the light, and force the Navy to go in a new direction more suitable to the proposed mission profiles.

The Ever Expensive Expeditionary Fleet

The USS San Antonio has become the poster child for raising costs in the US Navy, at least until the LCS hits the seas. On June 22nd Navy Secretary Donald Winter sent a letter to Northrop Grumman that reportedly is littered with frustrating comments regarding the quality, or lack thereof, of the USS San Antonio. Among the comments as reported by Bloomberg:

Northrop Grumman Corp., the nation's biggest warship builder, has mismanaged construction of the first in a class of new Navy amphibious warships, delivering a vessel with ``serious quality problems,'' according to Navy Secretary Donald Winter.

Northrop Grumman Corp., the nation's biggest warship builder, has mismanaged construction of the first in a class of new Navy amphibious warships, delivering a vessel with ``serious quality problems,'' according to Navy Secretary Donald Winter.

The USS San Antonio was commissioned into the fleet during a January 2006, 21-gun salute ceremony at Ingleside, Texas. Yet the Navy says it has suffered from problems ranging from faulty steering and leaks to delays, incomplete work and cost increases.

Because of ``inefficiency and mismanagement'' the Navy ``still does not have a mission-capable ship,'' Winter wrote June 22 to Northrop Grumman Chief Executive Officer Ronald Sugar in a letter obtained from the Pentagon by Bloomberg News.

The ``persistent shortcomings'' of the nine-vessel $13.5 billion LPD-17 program ``are troubling'' and also raise ``grave concern'' about the company's capability to manage the Navy's new $36 billion DDG 1000 destroyer program, Winter wrote.

...

The Navy says it may pay $36 million of its own money to fix these problems because the vessel is no longer under warranty to Northrop Grumman, the Sea Systems Command said.

``By taking delivery of incomplete ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered unacceptable delays,'' Winter wrote. ``These delays create further problems as work must be completed or redone by other shipyards that are not as familiar with the ship's design,'' he wrote.

``It is imperative that Northrop Grumman deliver ships devoid of significant quality problems and that it meet its costs and schedule obligations,'' Winter wrote.

A few points here. First, Secretary Winter was the lead executive for Northrop Grumman Corporation's Missile Defense Program, so he should be more than familiar with the problems there. I think he should be commended for taking a tougher stance, because the lack of a tough stance on shipbuilding problems throughout the current administration by Gordon England was a large contributor to US Navy shipbuilding cost increases.

While many may disagree, there are some serious problems right now in the way the Navy is handling, or mishandling the USMC, which unlike the Navy, is not only currently heavily engaged in the GWOT, but is the tip of the spear for future GWOT type scenario's as well as traditional military roles like that of North Korea. For example.

Lets assume for a minute the LPD-17 cost caps at 1.8 billion as recently reported following the latest round of cost overruns. Lets also assume LPD-18 cost overruns only go to 350 million (which admittedly may be a bit higher than currently expected) for a total of 1.11 billion, and the rest of the class which is reported in better shape rounds out at a cost of 1.2 billion average. In the end, the Navy is getting 9 LPD-17s for the expected 12 billion. While it is certainly a possibility the Navy will get a 10th LPD-17 class in FY08, nothing is certain yet.

But based on those figures alone, if you add in the costs of the MV-22 and EFV, the two specific vehicles the LPD-17 was specifically designed to carry, the Marine Corp appears on a self destructive coarse hand in hand with the Navy on reducing its capability. While it has been reported the MV-22 will be deployed to Iraq in September, I won't be holding my breathe. There is also plenty of reason to be skeptical about the EFV, which just had its entire program reworked. Aviation Weekly reports:

The program now will seek only 573 EFVs, almost halved from 1,013 units previously, and officials have built in a delay of four to five years in the schedule.

Milestone C approval is slated for mid-2011, instead of last January, and full operational capability will not occur until 2025 compared with the last plan targeting 2020.

The estimate for the total program acquisition cost in future dollars of the

restructured EFV program is $15.9 billion, officialss said. That compares with estimates of about $8.7 billion earlier in the 11-year-old effort, according to a Government Accountability Office report in May 2006 (DAILY, March 21).

The average procurement unit cost now is $21.6 million, up $4.2 million from the last Selected Acquisition Report and far more than an early $8.5 million price tag.

The article goes on to point out some reliability issues:

Under the restructured program, the Marines have sliced 750 pounds off the vehicle and leveraged another 1,000 pounds of "trade space" to meet reliability requirements, the cause of the EFV's troubles, Taylor said.

The changes also lower the sea state in which the EFV is designed to operate, from sea state three to two. Sea state refers to the amplitude and frequency of waves.

The problem here is they forgot the most important part of the EFV story.... it turns out the changes made to the EFV has made it extremely vulnerable to IEDs, something Congress isn't happy about. Expect this to get news coverage next time the EFV is discussed in committee. It may be one of the primary reasons the number of EFVs to be procured was cut in half. With only 573 EFVs now planned, the upcoming LCU(X) and LCAC(X) programs are going to become even more important, considering they will have by default become the primary future ship to shore sea based connectors.

What are the answers? Maybe it is time for the Navy to think about Norman Polmar's original advice, and start looking at what other nations are doing regarding Expeditionary warfare. While the capabilities aren't as sexy as those currently being demanded at any cost by the Navy and Marines, at least they are affordable and capable. The LPD-17 class is without question a giant step forward for Expeditionary warfare, but at what cost considering the MV-22 and EFV demands and cost increases?

The LPD-17 isn't a lost cause though, at least as a hull. There is a "plug" version of the LPD-17 that has been touted as a potential mothership, both increasing the well deck and the ships aviation facilities. For subscribers, you can also read InsidetheNavy.com on the new LPD-17 hull proposal for Command Ship variants, hospital ship variants, not to mention the recently proposed sea based BMD LPD-17 proposal.

At the end of the day, the LPD-17 and LPD-18 have been cost nightmares for the Navy and Marine Corp, particularly when accounting for their design for the increasingly expensive MV-22 and EFV. True the rest of the San Antonio class will likely be on budget, but with only 9 or 10, the Expeditionary Fleet will continue to shrink because both the Navy, the Marines, and the Industry cannot find ways to deliver improved Expeditionary capabilities at a reasonable cost.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group

USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)
USS Antietam (CG-54)
USS O'Kane (DDG-77)
USS Preble (DDG-88)


Nimitz Carrier Strike Group

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
USS Princeton (CG 59)
USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53)
USS Higgins (DDG 76)
USS Chafee (DDG 90)
USS Pinckney (DDG 91)


Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)
USS Chosin (CG 65)


Task Force 150

HMS Richmond (F 239)
FGS Köln (F211)
FS Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet (F794)
FS Dupleix (D 641)
USS Carter Hill (LSD 50)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HMS Cornwall (F 99)
HMAS Anzac (F 150)
JDS Suzunami (DD114)
PNS Shahjahan (D 186)
USS Hawes (FFG 53)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

The Art of Unreasonable Expectations

Being out of touch with the world for an entire week is difficult for an information junky like me. There are a number of topics to discuss, a number of interesting events that occurred, but in the end I can only cover so much from the time away. One of the more interesting articles I came across was the is the June 2007 issue of Defense Technology International that has a decent article on the British CVF.

However, one of the comments that struck me as somewhat odd, or overtly rediculous, was the expectation that a single CVF can provide 360 sorties per day, with each aircraft making around 10 sorties in a 24 hour period for 5 straight days. No matter how you cut it, this is wishful thinking of an incredibly rediculous kind.

Why is this rediculous? Because, in the real world those numbers don't reflect reality. RAND produced a sortie rate model several years ago that still holds true today. Their formula is easy to follow, and can be used to educate an aviation novice in military affairs 'how things really work.'

Sortie Rate = 24 hours / Flight Time +Turnaround Time + Maintenance Time

Last year, in an article highlighting the retirement of the F-14, and the differences between it and the F-18, Navy NewsStand reported on the maintenance hours of the F-18E/F Super Hornet to be somewhere between 5 and 10 hours. We will assume 5 hours for this exercise.

The RAND report covers the math regarding the Turnaround Time. The following table from the report shows the figures for USAF Turnaround Time for F-15s and F-16s shows 180 minutes, or roughly 3 hours for Turnaround Time, which doesn't include maintenance hours. While there is no good public data for the F-18, assuming anything more than a 33% improvement over these times is being completely unrealistic, but would be 2 hours Turnaround Time.


Flight Time is calculated by the distance the aircraft carrier is from the target. This is where Navy's tend to fudge the numbers some, in fact the US Navy likes to use the figure 250 nautical miles from target. I prefer the more realistic 500 nautical miles to target with an average flight speed of 500 knots, because many SH pilots have testified this figure to be more realistic. This means 1000 nautical miles round trip at an average of 500 knots, or roughly 1.68 hours. Given these numbers, we can now compute the sortie rate for the existing F-18E/F.

Sortie Rate = 24 hours / Flight Time +Turnaround Time + Maintenance Time
Sortie Rate = 24 hours / 1.68 hours +2 hours + 5 Hours
Sortie Rate = 24 hours / 8.68 hours
Sortie Rate = 2.76
46 F-18s x 2.76 = ~127 sorties per day

It has become vogue to claim that number of aimpoints (bombs) per aircraft means sorties, but it actually doesn't. It is absolutely true that each bomb can be independently targeted, but I think it is a bit dishonest to say that each bomb is a unique sortie. The F-18E/F would potentially be able to carry 6 aimpoints (bombs) in addition to other weapons per sortie, while the older F-18C/D can carry 4, so in this case each plane is able of a certain number of targets. Assuming that all 3 Navy squadrons (2 are SH squadrons) are 12 planes and the USMC squadron is 10 planes, the 46 planes would represent 232 aimpoints per sortie. This means a typical US Carrier with 4 F-18 strike squadrons is able to support 640 aimpoints per 24 hour period.

The article is assuming the Joint Strike Fighter V/STOL version, which is considerably more complicated than the simplistic F-18 design, will be able to achieve a sortie rate of 360 per day, or roughly 38% more efficient than the current US Navy carrier that has more planes of a less complicated design.

Believe what you want, but it is rediculous to assume a VSTOL Joint Strike Fighter is going to somehow achieve a 360 sortie rate per day capability for 5 straight days on the CVF. The numbers simply don't add up. Assuming the VSTOL Joint Strike Fighter is equal to the F-18E/F in sortie rate, or roughly 2.76, the CVF should average around 100 sorties a day, or roughly 400 aimpoints per day, which is still a substantial upgrade over existing carrier aviation capability for the Royal Navy, but not the unreasonable figures being promoted by some.