The Revolution in Transatlantic Affairs

Eagle1 is linking to the most interesting thing you will almost certainly read this week, a very thought provoking piece listed in todays RealClearPolitics Tuesday roundup. Written by Tony Corn, who wrote the incredible thought provoking and controversial "Clausewitz in Wonderland," an excellent read for those looking to be intellectually challenged, comes a new piece again from the Hoover Institutes Policy Review "The Revolution in Transatlantic Affairs."

Both are very long pieces, (very long) with today's piece going into a number of directions that can't possibly be analyzed by any single blog post. It would take a week for me to hit on the major points. However in reading the piece I was drawn to the maritime aspects, of which there were several, but specifically on the focus of the US Navy today. Tony Corn, a graduate of the US Naval Academy, raises a number of interesting points in his new piece, but he hits on two points that I thought were on target. First his comments on NATO and the 1000-Ship Navy.

In the 1990s, some foreign policy analysts called on the United States to adopt a policy known as "offshore balancing." Succinctly put, "offshore balancing is predicated on the assumption that attempting to maintain U.S. hegemony is self-defeating because it will provoke other states to combine in opposition to the United States, and result in a futile depletion of the United States' relative power, thereby leaving it worse off than if it accommodated multipolarity." 31 Whether such an offshore balancing is still possible or desirable for the U.S. in a post-9/11 environment is highly debatable. But a maritime globalization of NATO could become, for the Alliance itself, the continuation of "offshore balancing" by other means. Its main merit would be to constitute a hedging strategy of sorts against the SCO.

China is emerging as a maritime superpower as quickly as America itself (not to mention the UK) is declining as a naval power, to the point where China could become the leading naval power by 2020. The Russian Navy, which until now was a pale shadow of Gorshkov's navy (since 1991, the number of submarines has declined from 317 to 61 and of surface ships from 967 to 186) has announced plans to build a class of four new aircraft carriers in 2013-14, with initial service to begin in 2017. 32 One would do well to remember that it took hardly more than a decade during the Cold War for Russia, the quintessential land power, to develop a formidable navy. In 20 years, we could realistically see a China/Russia-led SCO that is hegemonic not only on land but at sea. As counterintuitive as it may be at first, NATO would be wise to consider the possibility of making maritime cooperation the centerpiece of NATO-Russia security cooperation.

Maritime operations are of course not foreign to NATO. In the 1990s, Operation Sharp Guard constituted a dress rehearsal of sorts for Operation Active Endeavor after 9/11. In 2003, OAE was expanded functionally and geographically to cover the whole Mediterranean and ended up including some Mediterranean Dialogue countries as well as Russia and Ukraine. Many NATO allies participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and it is no coincidence that the former head of Joint Forces-Naples, Admiral Mullen (the current chief of naval operations and JCS chairman-designate), is the one who developed the concept of the "Thousand Ship Navy" (TSN), which is today the talk of the U.S. Navy. 33 33 33 33 33

Though globalization has increased the importance of maritime affairs, there has been both a relative and an absolute decline of U.S. seapower, with a U.S. Navy today at its lowest level in the post-World War II era. For the first time in 20 years, the U.S. is in the process of drafting a new maritime strategy, but with a considerably reduced force that went from 600 to fewer than 300 ships, and with new responsibilities in terms of nonmilitary maritime security. Hence the concept of the Thousand Ship Navy, which is meant to create a global maritime partnership with foreign navies.

TSN is much more than an attempt to make a virtue of necessity. The Thousand Ship Navy -- the "Great White Fleet" of the twenty-first century -- represents a revolution in military affairs in that the concept raises the "network-centric" paradigm established by Admiral Cebrowsky from the domain of strategy (Network-Centric Warfare) to that of security (Global Maritime Partnership). In the process, it brings back a much-needed balance between techno-centric and culture-centric skills as components of success. Just as important, the TSN concept also represents a revolution in diplomatic affairs, in that a global maritime partnership would go beyond the traditional military-to-military contacts and, as Admiral Mullen points out, would unite "maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns."

As the Proliferation Security Initiative in Asia shows, though, this twenty-first- century naval diplomacy presents formidable challenges in terms of redefinitions of "sovereignty." Though the TSN concept is still a work in progress, it is worth noting that naval representatives from 72 countries have already taken part in the first symposium on the subject. NATO would do well to examine if the indirect approach of "going global" through a Thousand Ship Navy path is not also the best way to avoid making self-defeating waves in Asia.

Strategic considerations aside, there is an additional reason for Global NATO to get associated with the Thousand Ship Navy. Hard as it is to remember today, there was a time when NATO captured the imagination of Western audiences: Until the mid-sixties, in fact, the prospect of an Atlantic Union was seen in Europe as the wave of the future, while the idea of a European Union was associated mainly with coal, steel, and the standardization of electric plugs. 34 34 34 Today, hard as they try, the 700 million people of the West can't really bring themselves to get exited when the "deliverables" of NATO Summits amount to -- the purchase of three C-17s? If that is NATO's level of ambition these days, no wonder that even the EU is beginning to look good. NATO will require nothing less than a Thousand Ship Navy if it is to recapture the imagination of public opinion.

I added links to his citations, because they matter.

Is SCO a legitimate NATO competitor? You decide:

In the past hundred years, the instrumentalization of Islam has been a recurrent temptation on the part of every rising power, be it Wilhemine Germany or Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, not to mention America itself. As the latest rising power, China itself would not be immune to that temptation even if it were energy self-sufficient. The fact that China's energy needs are huge guarantees that the constitution of a Sino-Islamic axis is for Beijing not just a tactical option, but a strategic necessity.12

While the pivotal states of this strategy appear to be Pakistan, Iran, and (more recently) Saudi Arabia, the geopolitical situation of Iran puts it in a class by itself, as the most precious proxy in China's "indirect approach" against American primacy. It is therefore no surprise to learn that China is using Iran as a conduit for the delivery of arms to both Iraqi and Afghan insurgents, and providing Iran itself the kind of small boats needed to conduct attacks against commercial shipping or the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf.13

If the instrumentalization of Islam constitutes the geographical axis of China's grand strategy, the functional axis is -- or ought to be -- of equal interest to NATO, since it consists in the artful combination of space power, sea power, and soft power.

Space power. While lending support to Russia's ludicrous posturing on NATO missile defense, China is experimenting with antisatellite weapons -- a disturbing trend given the reliance of modern military (especially navies) on space power.

Sea power. A hundred years after Theodore Roosevelt sent his Great While Fleet around the world to signal the emergence of a new great power, China is rediscovering the writings of Admiral Mahan on the importance of sea power in history and dreaming of a Great White Fleet of its own. Against the backdrop of an ever-shrinking U.S. Navy (more on that later), China is transforming itself as a maritime superpower at such high speed that Western analysts estimate it could become the world's leading naval power by 2020.

Last but not least, soft power. On the military side, China is focusing on developing security cooperation within the ASEAN Regional Forum framework with the intent of marginalizing America. On the civilian side, China is peddling "Asian values" from Africa to Eurasia and from Latin America to Southeast Asia. For the past six years, China has been promoting autocracy through soft power while America has been promoting democracy through hard power, and the verdict is in: China today has a more positive image worldwide than America.

No analysis necessary here, the rest of the paper is a more important read than anything I can say. Welcome to the geopolitics of the 21st century, where policy is the new substitute for strategy, and strategy is MIA in US, EU, and/or NATO policy.

Navy Poised for Action in Hurricane Response

I was pleased to see the Navy is already in position ready to react to the damage Hurricane Dean is likely to leave in its wake. Then I realized it wasn't the US Navy, rather the Royal Navy.

Royal Navy vessels HMS Portland and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker Wave Ruler are following 240km (150 miles) behind the hurricane ready to offer help if needed.

It will be interesting to watch how the US Navy does. We have spent 11 months hearing about how the Global Fleet Station is going to make a significant impact to its Area of Operation, including in humanitarian response, yet on the eve of disaster I remain highly skeptical.

I hope to be proven wrong.

Why SCO Is Named After Shanghai, Not Moscow

Unless you are following closely, you might get distracted by the flares and fireworks of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Formed as a partnership, specifically as a block interested only in keeping the United States out of the affairs of central Asia, SCO is made up of the six central Asian nations of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The definition and intention of SCO is often debated, cold war observers see SCO as a new Warsaw Pact, a Eurasian counterbalance to the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while 21st century observers taking a Chinese perspective see it as seeking neither to integrate with nor balance against the US, but to create an alternative international order that "routes around" Washington.

Both definitions actually apply very well, as SCO is a counterbalance to the US from the Russian perspective, while SCO is a way around the US from a Chinese perspective. Many Russians believe they have a destiny to counter-balance the US, and make decisions solely based on this destiny. China, on the other hand is seeking a way to avoid a direct confrontation with the US, and makes its decisions accordingly. Thus is the world of Asian politics, where the US plays a role because it potentially could inject influence although that influence isn't wanted.

SCO is often mentioned in terms of a strategic defense agreement, despite the fact no strategic defense agreements actually exist within the SCO arrangement. It would be more accurate to say SCO is about strategic economics, sales of Russian military hardware to China, as it does apply. SCO does hold defense exercises, but the intention of such exercises is no different than say Malabar 2007, or even a Neptune Warrior for that matter. Militarizes train together every day, the deeper purpose of which can be inferred by anyone with an agenda.

This weekend the world was distracted by major exercises in the Ural Mountains by members of SCO. While we were distracted, events occurred by the nations of SCO that remind me a bit too much of the cold war. No, not that massive Russian military buildup part of the cold war, rather that "Moscow is skeptical of Shanghai" aspect of the cold war that no one in the west really understood until after the wall came down.

This past weekend, while the big bad SCO was riding high the tide of military might and media concerns, China sealed the deal with Kazakhstan to build a pipeline from the Caspian Sea to China, while at the same time inking a deal for a natural gas pileline from Turkmenistan, by transit through Uzbekistan, to China.

In one weekend, while Russian President Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao are kicking it back at a retreat in the Ural mountains overseeing "Peace Mission 2007," China just rearranged the strategic balance of central Asia. The Art of War by Sun Tzu has a chapter on deception, and it was just played masterfully. Stratfor explains.

China is forced to import the majority of its energy from abroad. China fears many things, but few frighten it more than the possibility of having its maritime supply routes cut off by hostile powers. China lacks -- and will continue to lack for at least a generation -- the navy to protect its maritime interests and so its only option is to go inland. And that means Central Asia.

This means that, barring a bilateral divide-and-conquer plan in which the two share what they both exclusively need, a Chinese clash with the Russians has moved from the realm of the possible to the inevitable. Russian state natural gas firm Gazprom is currently the sole significant purchaser of Central Asian natural gas exports.

China's plans do not foresee exploiting many fresh sources of natural gas in the region, but simply diverting output from routes Russian to routes Chinese. This development, which could be in place as soon as 2009, would greatly interfere with Russia's strategic policies in a very real, sudden and broad sense.

Given Gazprom's technical limitations, without Central Asian natural gas, Gazprom can meet its export requirements for Europe or it can meet domestic demand -- not both. And considering that cheap energy acts as a panacea for social disruption at home and is a critical arm of strategic policy abroad, the Chinese decision to grab the ring will muck with Russian geostrategy in Europe, Central Asia and even at home.

It will be very interesting to watch this unfold. China sealed the deal by spending several billion dollars cash, something Russia doesn't have, to lock up strategic energy routes out of central Asia. This does a number of things at once. First it greatly diminishes the influence of Russia over the central Asian states, providing them an alternative to Russia that has been more than a bit overbearing since the end of the cold war. Second, it removes a major power base from the Russian sphere of influence, and I doubt Putin is too happy about losing any power, much less power Russia has all but enjoyed as a strategic energy reserve for decades. Third this makes Iran even more important to Russia, Russia is going to need a new source for Natural Gas, and there are only a few places left where large deposits of natural gas exist yet untapped, Iran being one of the closest (Iraq being another BTW).

Finally, this is a big chink in the SCO armor. In its self interest, China just upended strategic leverage of energy resources Russia had over Europe. Eventually, Europe will have to find another source for natural gas, something France might be thinking about today as they look for a reason to engage in Iraq.

While on the surface this little pipeline agreement between a few former Soviet block states and China seems like a very small thing, it directly effects Russia, Europe, the United States, and anyone engaged in the energy resource politics of the 21st century. It also reminds the world that the SCO is named after the real power broker in central Asia, Shanghai, not the modern pretender club in Moscow. Game on.

Sly Fox Program Mission 9

If it was a submersible too, then I'd be really impressed. At least someone is thinking out of the box.

The unmanned military capabilities of a hybrid hovercraft and ground-effect vehicle are currently being investigated by a team of NSWC Dahlgren engineers and scientists in a ground effect research and development program known as Sly Fox Program Mission 9.

"The goal of Sly Fox Program Mission 9 is to integrate, test and evaluate the hybrid 19XRW vehicle’s utility as a military vehicle, including an unmanned capability," said Dohn Burnett, Sly Fox Program Manager. "This vehicle has great potential to provide very flexible warfighting capability across a broad spectrum of missions. This team of junior engineers and scientists will be exploring the concepts and designs for changing this vehicle from a commercial water craft to a military system."

Potential Navy and Marine Corps applications of the hybrid vehicle were presented to over 30 NSWC Dahlgren personnel before they watched the craft demonstrated in ground-effect mode over the Potomac River Test Range on July 25, 2007.

"A number of potential sponsor organizations have expressed interest in the hybrid craft’s unique characteristics," said Jim Hebert, NSWC Dahlgren lead for development of a militarized version of the vehicle. "Marine Corps Special Forces think it could potentially transport troops directly from ship to objective; members of the Surface Warfare Development Group believe it could address fast attack craft threats; and the Counter Narcotics Terrorism Group expressed interest in its possible use to locate and stop go-fast boats."

Actually it does peek my interest quite a bit, not because of the possibilities but that people are actually open to the concept itself. This type of program is certainly interesting, but how does it handle in high sea states?

Just for imaginations sake, if say a mothership offloaded 20 of these craft , heavily armed, to patrol up and down a hostile coast, how effective would they really be in causing trouble? Are we talking about NSFS here, or is this just a way to sink small boats and cause general mischief in the littoral?

If they are truly fast, can be heavily armed, can be deployed by one or two man crews, and can sustain operations for periods of 12 - 18 hours straight there might be something to this. It would certainly change the way the Navy could blockade a coastline for example, and depending upon the speed, it could be a relatively inexpensive way to provide fire support to MSO teams without always requiring a helicopter.

In the end this is probably another potential mothership concept waiting to be sunk.

5th Fleet Focus: "Hell" In the Gulf

We can expect a lot of rhetoric from Iran over the next few weeks. The tension between Iran and US is building, and with last weeks intentional media leak regarding the label of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as terrorists, we should expect the IRGC to act the part.

Iraqi Kurdish officials expressed deepening concern yesterday at an upsurge in fierce clashes between Kurdish guerrillas and Iranian forces in the remote border area of north-east Iraq, where Tehran has recently deployed thousands of Revolutionary Guards.

Jabar Yawar, a deputy minister in the Kurdistan regional government, said four days of intermittent shelling by Iranian forces had hit mountain villages high up on the Iraqi side of the border, wounding two women, destroying livestock and property, and displacing about 1,000 people from their homes. Mr Yawer said there had also been intense fighting on the Iraqi border between Iranian forces and guerrillas of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), an armed Iranian Kurdish group that is stepping up its campaign for Kurdish rights against the theocratic regime in Tehran.

Sounds bad, but it really isn't what it appears. The US already labels the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) a terrorist organization, so the US gets to sit and watch. The US has allowed Turkey to do some dirty work against the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) recently, and is unlikely to pick sides in a fight between the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

That doesn't mean the US won't continue to watch the IRGC though, or continue to point out to the IRGC as a major problem in Iraq. It is all part of the script, and I predict the script will continue until General Petraeus has his day for the world on September 15th.

Until that day though, the rhetoric is going to hit a fever pitch, and the US Navy needs to be ready just in case the IRGC doesn't decide to play the game the way the US expects. The IRGC is not some small military special force, they have a large small boat navy (1500+ various armed boats), they control the ballistic missile inventory for Iran, they are the Iranian nuclear program, and have access to a number of options in naval combat that can make the Gulf very dangerous indeed.

It was the latest in a series of defiant statements from senior Guards figures after U.S. officials on Wednesday said the United States may soon name the force a terrorist group, a move that would enable Washington to target its finances.

"With the power the Guards have obtained now, if the enemies want to ... start a military confrontation, the Persian Gulf will become a hell for them," Ali Razmjoo, a naval commander of the Revolutionary Guards, told the Fars News Agency.

"By using modern systems, no activities and threats by the enemies in the Persian Gulf would be hidden from us," he said.

I refuse to underestimate Iran, but I have no intention to over estimate their capabilities either. Iran has the capability to create major problems in the Gulf, but to the extent they would try shutting down the Gulf, I remain highly skeptical. Eyes will be shifting to Basra this week, and if things don't go well it might get really ugly near ABOT and KAAOT, which will put maritime forces off Iraq in the middle of a dangerous situation. As tensions increase, it will be interesting to watch for major strikes by the IRGC, which may or may not occur inside Iraq. While it is assumed activity conducted by the IRGC can only work against the US, in Iraq I have noticed a trend proven by virtually everyone that assumptions and overconfidence leads to major mistakes and miscalculations. We have seen it by the US, by the UK, by the Iraqis themselves, by Al Qaeda, and it is very possible we could see it in the near future from Iran.

This blog maintains the position advocated by Stratfor on the Iranian crisis, that things will appear to be approaching a state of crisis before a peaceful settlement is possible. The rhetoric on both sides will increase substantially as that moment of crisis approaches in the near future. Hang on, its going to be a bumpy ride over the next few weeks.