The Maritime Strategy discussion continues over at
CDR Salamanders place, but also at
SteelJaw Scribe's place, with
remarkable access to the writer available to anyone interested in asking questions. Remarkable, because there are few people actually taking advantage of the access being provided to bloggers and blog readers. To me that says a lot, the Navy made every effort to include interested citizens in the development process of the Maritime Strategy, and again is making an effort to explain it and answer questions, but in the end, no one cares.
Either way, credit the Navy, who attends the service even if the church is empty.
It has been said in policy discussions that strategic thinking is missing in the United States. I think we are seeing evidence of this. There is a tendency for a lot of people to move away from the strategic context and move directly to the CONOP. I'm not ready to make that move yet, there will be plenty of time for shipbuilding, procurement, and operational concepts but for me, I'm still stuck trying to make sense of the strategic vision this strategy sets going forward.
The new Maritime Strategy is intended to be the bridge that connects Seapower with policy. The following statements represent to me the executive summery in that regard.
This strategy stresses an approach that integrates seapower with other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies. It describes how seapower will be applied around the world to protect our way of life, as we join with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, inter-connected system through which we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland and winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing war.
The United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will act across the full range of military operations to secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships and establish favorable security conditions.
I have observed that most of the frustration regarding the new MS revolves around 2 fundamental issues; the language in defining the strategic environment and the conceptional approach to strategic vision.
The language used to define the strategic environment is distracting, unclear, and doesn't even attempt to establish the intellectual basis for a new direction for the Navy.
The new MS takes the Navy into a revolution of security affairs. The term "safety and security" or just "security" is used many times as a substitute for the word defense. The language of the strategy puts the security of the global maritime environment in a brighter light than the defense of the nation. The language used to emphasize security blurs the distinctions between hard and soft power, civil affairs and military affairs, which then contributes to conceptional confusion for readers. This adds complexity to a document intended for a broader audience, which I think contributes directly to the lack of interest.
The language implies emphasis of collective security and stabilization instead of emphasis on collective defense. The strategy specifically mentions NATO and informal relationships like the Global Maritime Partnership initiative as a foundation for collective security agreements. This represents a grand strategy for global governance of the maritime domain with regional security as the mutual interest for engagement. However, by blurring the distinction between security and defense, and emphasizing the promotion of international partnerships built for regional security purposes, the strategy gives the impression the Navy desires to have its cake (collective defense) and eat it too (collective security). One doesn't equal the other, but the language used implies otherwise to a reader of the new MS.
There are very few cases where long term international partnerships for stabilization and security have been effective, and most have not been effective over the long term. Afghanistan is an example where it has been ineffective due to disproportional support, and in many cases UN peacekeeping missions apply as ineffective as well. The only thing going for the Navy is that failure in security and stability operations do not translate into failures of alliance, at least historically, meaning there is capital here for the Navy to spend without risking NATO or other formal and informal defense relationships. In the end, partnerships and alliances only lose credibility when they fail in their defense agreements, not when they fail in their security agreements.
The conceptional approach to the MS strategic vision has left many, including me, wanting more, but that doesn't mean the strategy is bad. The strategy lays out a broad outline in guidance, but the lack of specifics doesn't offer the details promoting changes many were hoping for. The conceptional approach was apparently intentional, which is a striking contrast to the 86 MS which was very detailed in outlining its strategic vision.
I think this was the right approach. Policy in the current political environment is a moving target, particularly for a nation already engaged in two wars that is also trying to prevent engagement in other theaters. In the US the target could potentially shift every 4 years with a new administration. The bridge between a shifting policy and Seapower needs flexibility, and for that, conceptional vision is the right approach.
The conceptional approach does provide some specificity in strategic vision, which leaves a lot of room to build tactical CONOP for those looking for change. "Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power" and "Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces" sounds buzzworthy, but the tasks behind those descriptions are actionable and accurately articulates a 'Defense in Depth' strategic vision. The conceptional vision begins from a foundation of 6 core capabilities; Forward Presence, Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection, Maritime Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.
The conceptional approach established on a core set of capabilities intended to perform a number of specific tasks explains why some in the industry won't care much for the new strategy. The outlined Defense in Depth with a strong emphasis on security implies the need for new metrics in procurement, because no matter how you look at it, the Navy has embraced security cooperation as a major part of the Defense in Depth conceptional strategic vision. For starters, the conventional military configuration is less relevant when the threats are of the asymmetric variety, meaning several big budget item crowds are going to need new PPTs in justification of their gold plated capability.
I think there is a lot of strategical depth worth exploring in the new strategy, but I think the reason why the conversation has stalled over the last few days is in a large part due to the confusing language which missed the mark with the broader audience the MS was intended to reach. Some of this is due to a lack of strategic literacy in the US, citizens have had government substituting policy for strategy and this has contributed to the problem. Either way, credit the Navy, by being available for questions, people have no reason to claim ignorance, they can only claim citizen inaction in understanding the new Navy Maritime Strategy.
Last week, the day after the USS McHenry (LSD 43) deployed on its African Partnership Station Initiative, Nigeria signed on. Nigeria's participation is a big deal, a huge opportunity for AFRICOM and the Navy and is an excellent example of the soft power discussed in the recently released Maritime Strategy.
