Human Interest Trumps Professional Discussion

The December issue of Proceedings is out, and well, subscribers know what I mean. Proceedings has managed to turn itself into the journal of social politics and human interest testimonials with an armed forces twist. Consider the social science education the USNI is putting out, and compare it to the social science education I get for free at the Small Wars Journal, and explain to me how I'm getting my money's worth from the USNI.

I can't imagine a single woman profiled in this months issue would honestly agree with the idea that during a time of war the Nations Premier Independent Forum for National Defense is being properly leveraged 2 months following the new Maritime Strategy to profile women. But hey, at least we didn't get 5,000 words of praise for the Ivy League treatment of the military from one of several reporters who work for a certain Baltimore Newspaper. Progress!

While this months content is not objectionable, it is also not interesting. Luckily, Dr. Norman Friedman comes through with one noteworthy topic for discussion, specifically he states the purpose for the new Maritime Strategy as he sees it.

The first job of public naval strategy is to educate said public, which often means policy-makers, in the basic realities of the maritime world. The Sea Services are expensive. They operate mainly in places few civilians see, since most who travel outside the United States do so by air. The reality, which has not changed, is that most goods move by sea and most people in the world live near the sea (or near major rivers), because transportation by water is so much easier than any other sort. If fuel becomes far more expensive, the sea is likely to become more, not less, vital as a means of transportation.

I have discussed in the past blogging and more specifically, Navy centric blogging and the purpose behind it, although each time I bring up the subject I end up going a different direction.

I tend to agree with Dr. Friedman, which raises the question, where are the large variety of opinions in Proceedings regarding the new Maritime Strategy? Where is the depth of thought, debate of ideas, and given the mild (at best) reception of the Maritime Strategy it is a legitimate question whether the Navy itself, at the CDR level, buys into the Maritime Strategy they will be expected to execute.

Unfortunately for Dr. Friedman, to date you can't find the very education and discussion you believe this document is intended to produce in Proceedings, the editors are too busy praising the Ivy League's military policies and touting the accomplishments of women, you know, the really important subjects related to National Defense. They haven't found time yet for trivial discussions like the Maritime Strategy. Dr. Friedman finishes his article as such:

It is not 1982, and the new strategy is not explicit because the war we are in is not very well defined. However, the sea is still there, and it is still highway rather than barrier. That message, with all its implications, is the single vital one the Sea Services must send out to a world that needs to understand it.

Someone tell Robert Timberg and the Board of Directors at the Naval Institute.

Observing Iranian Submarines

There is a new video first released by IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks) out highlighting recent naval modernizations taking place in the Iran, specifically a destroyer and submarine refit. We are unable to confirm the date when the video was taken, but it did pop up on the internet over the last week.

We note with interest two aspects of the video. First, the video shows a Kilo class submarine as being overhauled, and from all indications it does not appear to be in disrepair as previously advertised. It also does not appear to be available for operations anytime soon. If this video is indeed recent, it is an interesting piece of intelligence worth noting, because combined with media reporting earlier this week, it gives the general state and location of all 3 Iranian Kilo class submarines.

Officials aboard the cruiser Vicksburg spotted and photographed two surfaced Iranian Kilo-class submarines in the Persian Gulf a few weeks ago, the ship’s skipper told U.S. Navy Secretary Donald Winter during a visit to the ship on Nov. 24.

The Russian-designed diesel-electric attack subs were tracked and photographed by sailors onboard the Mayport, Fla.-based ship, said Capt. Chip Swicker. Crew members showed Winter the photographs of the surfaced subs. The Vicksburg did not communicate with either of the subs, Swicker said.

“They watched us and we watched them,” he said.

The article goes on to note the USS Vicksburg (CG 69) is near the Iranian coast when the incident occurred. That is an interesting piece of information. It has been noted that the cruiser of the ESG, which the Vicksburg is, traditionally operates in the northern Gulf region near the Iraqi Oil Terminals. Adding this piece of information implies the incident took place in the North Persian Gulf. If true, I would think we are getting a half story from the reporter regarding the level of alarm. Within Iranian territorial waters or not, if it is near the northern Persian Gulf I'd be a heck of a lot more alarmed than if the encounter took place in the Southern part of Iran.

However, the video has another piece of noteworthy footage, specifically the video pans a Nahang class mini-submarine. We have previously discussed the various Iranian underwater warfare capabilities, but recently we have had some debate regarding the purpose of the Nahang class. From our perspective, from a public perspective we have the most photography of the Nahang class mini-submarine, but internally we have the most contention regarding what this mini-submarine is.

For example. Iran has 4 mini-submarines of an unknown class that it obtained from North Korea almost a decade ago. Those submarines are almost completely dedicated to divers, and calling them mini-submarines is somewhat a misnomer, as they are better described as swimmer delivery vehicles. We have also observed the Ghadir class which is clearly designed to be a mine laying submarine, able to deploy up to 16 mines per sortie. However, when it comes to the Nahang, there are a number of theories.

The Nahang appears to be a bit wider and a bit longer than the Ghadir, perhaps as much as twice the displacement (around 350-400 tons), and appears to have more electronics than other mini-submarines observed. The first theory, of which I'm not a subscriber, is that the mini-submarine is intended for offensive warfare operations against other ships. The second theory, which is possible, is the Nahang can deploy either more or larger mines than the Ghadir class can. The third theory is that the Nahang class is for smuggling and special operations.

I don't really know, my expertise is in systems not submarine engineering, so we offer some of these photo's hoping that our readers can offer some insights into what this submarines purpose is. Clearly we all observe some 'characteristics' of the submarine based on the photography, and there is no reason to expand that discussion, however our interest isn't capabilities rather purpose. With an understanding that Iran has swimmer delivery vehicles for diver operations, and the Ghadir class is almost certainly for mine warfare, based on models and photo's (of which many more are available via google image search) we are looking for broader opinion regarding potential purpose of this class. If you have a theory that doesn't 'detail' too much information not for public consumption, please offer an opinion in the comments.

7th Fleet Focus: Confirming Kitty Hawk Taiwan Strait Transit

As we noted Wednesday, given the weather data publicly available and noting some rather unhappy Chinese media reporting on the Kitty Hawk, we had speculated that the 2 minesweepers and the Kitty Hawk CSG crossed the Taiwan Strait following both port incidents. This weekend the media confirmed this indeed did happen.

A spat over China's denial of port calls to U.S. naval vessels has led the Pentagon to deploy an increasing number of large ships to transit the Taiwan Strait in some of the most sensitive waters in East Asia.

While the U.S. Navy has explained the passage of at least seven ships through the Strait in the past nine days as the result of bad weather, it also conveys U.S. displeasure to China over its refusal to let Navy vessels dock in Hong Kong.

Displeasure sounds so nice. China complains like a whining baby in their press when our Navy takes the Formosa Strait route, so whether it was weather related or not, and it almost certainly was weather related, expect China to bring this incident up in future press reporting when taking an opportunity to discuss the dangers of the US Navy.

Our observation is the transit was the right thing to do. You can bet very few people have looked up the publicly available sea state and weather information of that region during that week of November, but if you do check you'll clearly see the Kitty Hawk obviously took the short cut to avoid the storm.

Keep in mind that it isn't a good idea to take warships into a storm when the storm can be avoided, because consider this. Had China denied access to Hong Kong, and the Kitty Hawk CSG were to take the long route back to Japan through the storm resulting in either ship damage, or worse the loss of life to American sailors over the Thanksgiving holiday, we would be stuck in an international incident. Better to piss of the Chinese over their poor judgment than to compound a dispute by creating a disaster.

Today's Royal Navy Condition Reported "Not Good"

It seems like every week the British media releases a major news article observing or expressing another aspect of concern for the Royal Navy. In observation, it is unclear if it is more noteworthy that the British media is constantly ringing the alarm of concern, or the number of British citizens who parade across the internet downplaying the reports.

This time around, Defense Secretary Des Brown in the MoD called for a report on the status of the Royal Navy to be used to counter criticism from the media and opposition parties regarding the state of the Navy. Unfortunately for him, the report confirmed what many, including this blog, have been saying. Via the Telegraph, this report is damning from top to bottom.

With an "under-resourced" fleet composed of "ageing and operationally defective ships", the Navy would struggle even to repeat its role in the Iraq war and is now "far more vulnerable to unexpected shocks", the top-level Ministry of Defence document says...

"The current material state of the fleet is not good; the Royal Navy would be challenged to mount a medium-scale operation in accordance with current policy against a technologically capable adversary." A medium-scale operation is similar to the naval involvement in the Iraq War.

The document adds that the Navy is too "thinly stretched", its fighting capability is being "eroded" and the fleet's ability to influence events at the strategic level is "under threat"...

"A combination of age and reduced spending on maintenance has resulted in today's ships carrying a far higher number of operational defects, which directly erode operational capacity."

The fleet, it states, is "thinly stretched", "increasingly taut" and facing "significant risks".

We see this report as both a warning and an exaggeration. Being in the middle of the Type 45 program it is easy to take cheap shots at the maintenance condition of the Royal Navy, because the Type 42s are literally within a few years of retirement. As I understand it, the maintenance funding for the Type 42s has been cut, mostly because the replacements are hitting the water. Technically, that makes the report true, but we also see the lack of maintenance funding for ships near retirement as a fair risk made by the Mod to conserve money in the budget.

The real problem in the Royal Navy is the total number of warships, and the clear trend that leaves the Royal Navy even smaller in the future with a high number of 20 surface combatants (frigates and destroyers) in the future. The report doesn't miss this fact, although I think the details in the link above explain it better.

The number of destroyers and frigates, the Navy's workhorses, has been reduced from 54 to 25 and the average age of those vessels is now 17 years old, compared with 10 and 12 years old in 1997 and 1987 respectively. The report also reveals that there has been a 66 per cent reduction in the number of submarines, from 38 to 13, and that the Navy's manpower has fallen from 66,500 sailors in 1987 to 38,860.

One of the aspects of the report that caught my attention though was the part of the report regarding ASW. We often hear about how the US relies on other NATO nations for ASW in the surface fleet. Well, yet another example why relying on others is a bad idea.

It goes on: "In order to maintain delivery of effect [conduct operations] against a backdrop of decreasing resources, significant risk is being taken against certain areas. Our anti-submarine warfare capability is below a prudent minimum level of both quality and quantity."

That is concerning. In previous discussions of the Royal Navy, we have highlighted the problems facing the Royal Navy in the future, but this report leaves a damning impression on the state of the Royal Navy today. If the MoD sees the condition of the fleet today as "not good" then that is new as far as we are aware. We see a very dark future for the Royal Navy. As we have highlighted in the past, under current plans we do not see a scenario where the number of surface combatants stays at 25 surface combatants, rather we believe (and outline why) it will be a struggle to maintain the fleet above 20 surface combatants by 2020.

It will be interesting to see what happens. The Royal Navy may end up with 2 aircraft carriers and an excellent expeditionary capability, but without enough surface combatants to escort them to the combat zone, or enough logistics ships to support them in a forward theater. Given this status report regarding the condition of the Royal Navy ships, it is hard to believe morale is high in the fleet. This final quote is worth a mention.

Last night, Liam Fox, the shadow Tory defence secretary, said: "We have come all the way from Lord Nelson to a part-time defence secretary, with the consequence that the Royal Navy now finds itself in the most degenerated state in which it has ever been. Labour has done what none of this countries' enemies have been able to do: bring the Navy to its knees."

The irony of the Nelson reference becomes crystal clear with the comparison one can make to the state and trends in the Royal Navy today vs the state and trends of the French and Spanish Navies. It is too bad there isn't a naval fleet strategy simulation game for the X-Box or PS3, because if there was I think we would find the Brit's embarrassed constantly choosing to be the Italian, French, or Spanish Navy instead of the Royal Navy. Without such visual effects, in these modern times where the message doesn't always make it to the masses, most people just don't understand the depth of the decline, nor the darker hole waiting in the future.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Truman Carrier Strike Group

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56)
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
HMS Manchester (D95)
HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)
USNS Artic (T-AOE 8)
USS Montpelier (SSN 765)


The Enterprise Carrier Strike Group

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)
USS Philadelphia (SSN 690)


Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Porter (DDG 78)
USS Carr (FFG 52)
USS Miami (SSN 755)


Task Force 150

FGS Augsburg (F 213)
FS Guepratte (F714)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Premier Maitre L'Her (F792)
PNS Tariq (D 181)
PNS Babur (D 182)
PNS Tippu Sultan (D 185)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)


In Theater

Ocean 6
USS Wasp (LHD 1)
RSS Persistence (L 209)
HMS Campbeltown (F 86)
HMAS Anzac (FFH 150)
HMAS Arunta (FFH 151)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)


Notes: Expect the Enterprise CSG to depart the region this week, the Enterprise CSG is expected to be home by Christmas. The French have added frigates and rotated the Motte-Picquet out. The Motte-Picquet was reported to have suffered a fire departing the region, 1 sailor injured. The French increase is specific to help the UN ships off Somalia deliver food (tons of great insights here). The Australians are currently in the middle of a rotation, which is the reason for two ships in theater. The British rotation has completed, the Richmond is on her way home. Finally, the Kearsarge is assisting the cyclone recovery and not technically in the region, while the Tarawa ESG has been diverted to stop in the Cyclone hit area while in route to the Gulf, so its arrival will be later than originally expected.

All in all, the reasons for the higher than usual numbers of ships is because of regular rotations being done by several nations most of which are occurring at around the same few week period of time. This is intentional to insure the sailors are home by the new year.