Littoral Combat Ship or Mine Warfare Frigate?

We are beginning to look back upon 2007 from a historians perspective and observe trends worldwide that may have occurred over the past year, and we believe we see a few. One of the first that stands out to us is how most competitors of the United States Navy appeared to expand on capabilities underwater, while the US Navy appears to have taken a few steps back this year in that regard with the reduction of P-3Cs, the retirement of the Osprey class, and the cancellation of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. We also noted that this year marked an interesting year in the discussion of threats and capabilities by competitors in Mine Warfare, specifically in regards to China.

National Defense Magazine turns its attention to US Navy MIW with an interesting article called "Navy Rethinking Mine Warfare".

Officials are now warning that potential adversaries such as China are viewing sea-mines as a viable weapon to deny access to U.S. vessels.

“Mines are a serious and widespread threat to Department of Defense access,” said Rear Adm. John Christenson, vice commander of the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command. He said the Navy is expanding training efforts so ship crews are prepared to operate in mined waters.

“We want mine warfare to be part of every naval officer’s expertise and experience level,” he said at an industry conference.

The command plans to train Navy leaders in the specialty and will require every expeditionary and carrier strike group to demonstrate proficiency in mine warfare in the near future.

Rear Adm. John Christenson is promoting an excellent idea, or is he? MIW is one of many 'irregular warfare challenges at sea' we are not seeing much attention given to in the context of changes and ideas. In fact, outside the NECC and GFS we are barely seeing anything more than academic discussion given to the conceptions and challenges of irregular warfare. That is because we are yet to see evidence the Littoral Combat Ship, once touted at the future of the Navy for addressing irregular warfare, is actually suited to the dynamic challenges of irregular warfare, or will ever be considering its unique specializations and small crews. We also note the National Defense Magazine article actually supports our opinion the Navy is changing the role of the Littoral Combat Ship.

Preliminary Navy plans showed the LCS operating independently at sea. Officials are now talking of incorporating the ship into expeditionary strike groups and carrier strike groups.

“If LCS operates with the carrier, that would make it easier, from my point of view, to make this mainstreaming a reality,” said Christenson. He said NMAWC officials and 3rd Fleet commanders are examining alternative war fighting paths for the ship.

Rear Adm. John Christenson, did you just change the mission for the LCS? The Littoral Combat Ship, touted to be the small boat killer, the future of anti-submarine warfare, the key enabler of mine warfare, not to mention the irregular warfare solution for oh so many things in the future is in fact turning into a frigate before our eyes. If you read Navy blogs, you have probably read a comment by sid regarding the Littoral Combat Ship survivability standards, specifically that the Littoral Combat Ship is being built with Level I survivability standards. What does that mean? The following descriptions come from the CBO, thus easy to read and difficult to misunderstand even for a Congressman.

Ships built to Level I are expected to operate in the least severe environment, away from the area where a battle group is operating or the general war-at-sea region. Those vessels should be able to maintain good handling in bad weather and should have systems for fighting fires on board the ships, hardening against electromagnetic pulses, and protection against chemical, biological, or radiological contamination. However, they are not expected to "fight hurt," as the Navy puts it. Such ships include material support ships, mine-warfare vessels, and patrol combatants.

Ships built to Level II are expected to operate in a more severe environment, such as in support of a battle group in the war-at-sea region. Level II survivability should include the capacity to continue fighting even if the ship is hit by enemy weapons. Such ships would have all of the features of Level I but more redundancy in their primary and support systems, better structural integrity and compartmentalization (such as being built with numerous water-tight sections), protection against conventional and nuclear blasts, and a smaller signature (meaning they have a smaller radar cross-section, make less noise when passing through the water, and are less susceptible to mines). Ships built to Level II include the logistics support ships that supply materials, fuel, and ammunition to carrier battle groups and amphibious warfare ships during combat.

Level III is the most severe environment envisioned for surface warships. Vessels designed to withstand that environment should have all of the features of ships designed to Level II as well as better defensive systems and more ability to deal with the degrading effects of hits from antiship cruise missiles, torpedoes, and mines (through better damage-control systems and greater structural integrity). Ships built to Level III specifications include aircraft carriers and major surface combatants, such as Aegis-capable cruisers and destroyers.

This is more evidence that the 313-ship plan, and the new 21st century combatants the Navy is starting to build, simply does not represent the comprehensive maritime strategy, or fit any real strategy at all. On one side, we are building this cheap naval truck to haul offboard platforms around "away from the area where a battle group is operating or the general war-at-sea region" to conduct stand off detection of mines and submarines while having the ability to interdict a speed boat smuggling drugs, with the speed to catch the speed boat no less.

In reality we have folks like Rear Adm. John Christenson advocating for the capability within strike groups, a frigate role, despite the Level I survivability standards, simply to integrate the Littoral Combat Ship function as a mine warfare truck into the Navy's primary battle groups. If the LCS was in fact a frigate, with Level III survivability standards this would make a lot of sense, but instead it is being built to do something different. Is the LCS design flawed, or the strategical approach to MIW lumping all the tools into one tool box the real problem? It is increasingly clear one or the other is flawed...

I have a question for everyone, including Admiral Roughead, who is still pushing for the Littoral Combat Ship. If we indeed recognize that the most likely scenarios for MIW are to occur in a battle with China over the next 25 years, which is the hull life cycle of the 2 Littoral Combat Ships being built, do you still believe the LCS represents the best plan for deploying MIW for the Navy? Why is no one being called out for building a "warship" with Level I survivability standards with the intention of "probably" (most likely) fighting China with our carrier strike groups? It is unlikely we would deploy our current minesweepers with CSGs, heck they wouldn't be able to keep up (see the Gulf War I logs for evidence)! At what point can someone swallow some pride, admit it isn't the right platform or design, and start taking the various aspects of irregular warfare at sea seriously?

Of all the new programs, only the NECC and Global Fleet Station, both born from a wartime requirement, appears well thought out, and they are both still relatively early in development. We cannot say the same about the 'big navy' who appears locked in a cold war rut struggling to field 20th century ideas. The Littoral Combat Ship is not designed to meet the missions already being assigned to it. The DDG-1000 is a platform in search of a role in the new Maritime Strategy. The Sea Base is being designed to fight the last war, literally, reducing amphibious ships at a time when the Navy is struggling to find more amphibious ships to deploy for irregular warfighter requirements. Do people realize how good the LPD-17 actually looks compared to everything else, $840 million over budget and it looks brilliant next to everything else going on with the surface fleet. Why? Because the platform actually meets its desired requirements!

What we don't see is a comprehensive plan for the irregular warfighter requirements which include both phase 0 and post war phase capabilities from the sea in dealing with irregular challenges and COIN with a Naval approach. We don't see the future fleet matching the requirements being placed upon the Navy based on acquisition strategies of adversaries. For example, more submarines were built and delivered worldwide the last 5 years than surface combatants, but the US Navy's reaction to this has been to reduce the ASW capability of its aviation fleet in metrics like endurance, payload, and quantity, and like I have said before, the LCS is not about ASW no matter what you've heard.

If you ask me, this article confirms that Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command is the right arm and whoever is building platform requirements for the LCS is the left arm, and together the right has no idea what the left is doing. Still waiting for evidence of well thought out approaches for the future fleet. This type of uncoordinated requirements planning highlights the real gaps facing the Navy thanks to the Pentagon pushing these techno-wiz-bang ideas of the last 7 years that do not fit a comprehensive strategy.

More Shenanigans of Shipbuilding

We are still not sure what to make of this story. In case you haven't heard the details, basically Northrop Grumman Newport News has been accused of a welding issue, what is being termed a "welding process" issue. From Defense News:

In a letter dated Nov. 11 to the shipyard work force, Sector President Mike Petters wrote the “welding discrepancies” have “delayed sea trials and the planned year-end delivery for North Carolina and has impacted other Virginia-class ships as well.”

He said the matter is a “technical issue that has called into question the discipline of our processes.”

Petters wrote in the letter that the problem stems from filler material used in non-nuclear welds and that welders had been allowed to carry several different types of filler material while welding.

Hampton Roads has additional information on the specific ships and submarines being evaluated for the broader inspection.

So far, seven ships beyond the Virginia-class subs have been targeted for an assessment, Dellapenta said. Four are carriers - the George H.W. Bush, the Carl Vinson, the Enterprise and the George Washington. The other three are Los Angeles-class attack submarines - the Toledo, the Newport News and the Oklahoma City.

The carrier Bush is under construction and slated for delivery to the Navy next year, while the Carl Vinson is in the yard for a refueling and maintenance overhaul. The George Washington, now in port, and the Enterprise, scheduled to return Wednesday from a Middle East deployment, have been worked on by shipyard employees in the past three years.

The subs Toledo and Newport News are in the shipyard now for scheduled maintenance, Dellapenta said.

For the record, the USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723) returned from a 6 month deployment on November 9th.

We thoroughly enjoyed Springboards observations of the issue, he unloads perhaps fairly, perhaps not, but certainly points to an interesting time line. His observations reinforce the perception that we are observing, these people do not inspire confidence in shipbuilding. We also note that he isn't the only one pointing out a "process" issue worthy of discussion. From Maritime News and Comment.

HUGE WELDING PROBLEM AT NEWPORT NEWS. Defense News reports that there may be faulty welding throughout all the ships that Northrop Grumman Newport News has built in recent years, including as many as four aircraft carriers and the last few "Los Angeles" class subs. Read the article here. Read the Virginia Pilot's coverage here. No response from NG. Oh lord, what next from these people? In this connection, three of my regular correspondents have already pointed out that at these super-efficient shipyards that NG runs, a welder is paid a bonus based on the amount of weld he or she lays down, he gets that bonus regardless of whether the weld is accepted or not and he also gets it for cutting out any bad welds. Well that makes perfect sense in NG's "screw the taxpayer" world, doesn't it? December 18, 2007.

I love his sarcasm here. While the problem has forced a delay in the delivery of the Virginia class submarine North Carolina, it should be pointed out that other than whatever forced the original inspection, no faulty welds have been found on other ships inspected to date. That isn't to say this isn't an issue, but it may be one of those issues where process could have contributed to a broader problem, but in fact did not... at least so far. We will have to wait and see.

Either way it is another in a series of examples where the US Shipbuilding industry doesn't inspire much confidence, which isn't good considering the Navy inspires even less confidence with their current non plan for shipbuilding. We often hear about the innovation taking place in America, the huge strides we are taking in developing new technologies with new ideas. I'd argue while that is all nice and good, our nation has gone a generation missing the most important part of innovation and improvement, leadership. One would think the practices that Tim describes on his comment site would be something SECNAV should look into.

With a lack of leadership in our political class, perhaps we should be looking to the private sector for leadership. Where is the Joshua Humphreys of the modern era? My bet is he is sitting in a board room part of the system that pays the stockholder and screws the taxpayer.

The Low Cost Ballistic Missile Defense Program That Works

Whenever you hear anyone talk about ballistic missile defense costing too much, not working, or a waste of money, they are not talking about the Navy. Leading into 2008 anyone who bashes the Navy about ballistic missile defense is woefully ignorant. Best part of all, ballistic missile defense is yet another way the Navy builds partnership with other nations. The latest success proves that statement.

Japan said Tuesday it had shot down a ballistic missile in space high above the Pacific Ocean as part of joint efforts with the United States to erect a shield against a possible North Korean attack.

Japan tested the US-developed Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor from a warship in waters off Hawaii, becoming the first US ally to intercept a target using the system.

Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba described the successful test as "extremely significant."

"We will continue to strive to increase the system's credibility," he told reporters, insisting the missile shield was worth the high cost.

"We can't talk about how much money should be spent when human lives are at stake."

Japan plans to spend a total of 127 billion yen (11.2 billion dollars) over the four years to March 2008 on missile defence using the US-developed Aegis combat system, according to the defence ministry.

I don't think that last part is accurate, rather Japan intends to spend 127 billion yen on ballistic missile defense, including Patriot systems and detection systems. If I'm wrong, I'd be surprised, because one of the things we are learning is AEGIS BMD is inexpensive compared to alternatives.

There are two agencies in government that need a major housecleaning with a new president, the Missile Defense Agency and the Dept. of Homeland Security. While people might want to jump in and claim other agencies, the difference is if you replaced every member of management in the two agencies above, you couldn't screw up. If you replaced everyone in the CIA or State Dept. in reality you'd have an even bigger mess than exists today.

One of the aspects of the Missile Defense Agency that really bothers me is the lack of funding priorities. They don't invest their money in what works, instead they invest their money in what doesn't work. I'm not convinced the MDA has its priorities straight when they chase pie in the sky missile defense and barely fund missile defense systems that actually already work. From insidedefense.

MDA is developing three boost- or ascent-phase systems: the Airborne Laser, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and the Navy's Aegis ballistic missile defense system, which features the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA interceptor. All three are in various stages of development, with the Aegis system the furthest along.

The Bush administration has invested heavily in each system as part of its layered missile defense concept comprising weapon systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at any point in their flight. The ABL, which got its start in 1996 during the Clinton administration, could cost $5 billion from its inception to a currently scheduled 2009 target missile shoot-down attempt. If successful, the program would needs billions more for a second prototype aircraft and seven planned production systems for the Air Force.

The 2008 budget request MDA sent to Congress last February calls for spending more than $1 billion on the Aegis program between fiscal year 2008 and FY-13. That money would be spent on the entire program, not just the ascent-phase defensive system.

The article goes on to highlight that when budget cuts hit the Missile Defense Agency, they decided to cut the KEI program and limit the scope to just the booster rocket. There may be a good reason for this, but I'm starting to wonder how the MDA justifies sinking billions into pie in the sky technologies like the ABL, but basically spends nothing on AEGIS BMD and applies budget cuts to the most promising future technology, the KEI. Priorities? Ya, it must start with the lobby, because results do not appear to be a factor, nor is there a return for cost evaluation over at the MDA.

Either way, AEGIS BMD has turned into a huge success story for ballistic missile defense and the Navy, but like most things successful programs it doesn't get the attention it deserves. Below is the you tube of the latest launch. Previous coverage of Ballistic Missile Defense here, including more detailed costing for those who want the annual details.




Nice.

5th Fleet Focus: When the Headlines Faded Away

Someone did an excellent job. This type of stuff used to be important enough for the black helicopter crowd to come up with a new conspiracy theory on a daily basis. Most people probably didn't even notice the Iranians are trying to appear threatening to the Persian Gulf, and anyone in the world who will pay attention by exercising their armed yacht club Navy.

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps has successfully completed the second phase of the Shahamat 86 naval war-game in the Persian Gulf.

IRGC Navy Commander, Ali Razmjou, said the Shahamat 86 war-game aimed at boosting the navy preparedness had been going on successfully in the Persian Gulf.

The Iranians are the only ones talking about it.

The Second Zone Commander of the Naval Force of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC) General Ali Razmju said on Saturday that forces under his command guarantee security of the country's territorial waters in Persian Gulf with full strength.

Briefing reporters on the `Shahamat' (Courage) Wargame to be staged this year, Razmju said the maneuver, to be conducted in three phases for four days on in an area of 7,000 square miles from orth of Bushehr province to Assalouyeh general zone as of Sunday, ill involve hundreds of launching vessels, torpedoes, marines, divers, and Basijis.

He said different kinds of equipment and new vessels will be showcased in the exercise whose aim is to repel likely threats of enemies and guarantee security of Persian Gulf, islands and coastlines.

The exercise is happening right now, being "showcased" and all, and absolutely no one cares enough about it to write even a single conspiracy theory outside of Iran. We used to get at least one long, amazingly stupid conspiracy theory a day. Isn't it amazing, or perhaps, coincidental how Fallon, Gates, Rice, etc.. spent a few months calling on everyone to tone down the rhetoric on Iran so they could get some work done, and out of nowhere comes this strangely worded NIE written by the State Dept. that has that effect.

I think it is funny people want to claim our spy services are broken, because it seems to me they are still very effective at some things.

Russia's Not So Super Secret Special Submarine

The Sub Report has an article up on a new submarine produced in "secret" in Russia. I have worked with Russians since 1996 and trust me, they don't have any secrets that date back to the cold war, they were all sold long ago to the highest bidder. However, that didn't explain why when I read about this news today, something rang a bell.

The Sevmash plant in Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast, has completed construction of the B-90 “Sarov”, a new diesel-fuelled submarine with a nuclear reactor as a supplementary power generator.

The B-90 “Sarov”, which is part of the project 20 120, left the shipyard on Friday, a press note from the Sevmash company reports.

The vessel is unique with its combination of diesel and reactor engine. The sub is likely to be applied by the Northern Fleet as spy vessel in northern waters.

The vessel has been designed by the Rubin engineering company in 1989. Construction was started at the Krasnoe Sormovo shipyard in Nizhnii Novgorod, and then later continued at the Sevmash plant.

It took us a few minutes to remember where we had heard about this submarine, and most likely, you have probably heard about this submarine and didn't know it also. Project 20120 was the submarine whose details were accidentally revealed on the internet earlier this year on the City of Sarov website.

According to the official press release, and other Russian news services, the submarine is a technology demonstrator. Designed in 1989, one has to wonder if this was a cold war project that was better left unfinished. Unless Russia has invented a light switch for turning a nuclear reactor on and off, it is hard to consider this type of hybrid powered submarine some sort of revolutionary design. But after doing a bit more research, it may be a revolutionary design though for AIP, Stratfor detailed back in September:

Sarov was once the secretive closed city Arzamas-16, also known as the Russian Los Alamos for its role in the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Though nuclear submarine construction is well-established at the Sevmash shipyards in Severodvinsk, Sarov could be a site for further research into the use of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs).

RTGs use the heat of radioactive decay from radioisotopes like plutonium-238 and strontium-90 to generate electricity. They are much simpler than full-fledged naval reactors and have been used to power remote lighthouses and weather stations as well as deep space probes unable to rely on solar energy.

However, there are technological hurdles that must be overcome. RTGs have been used predominantly in situations where wattage was not the limiting factor. Modern RTGs used on NASA probes produce hundreds of watts and are about the size and weight of a 120-pound person. But to use both German and Swedish systems as a benchmark, a magnitude of 200 to 300 kilowatts is necessary for AIP. Though much of this distance can be overcome by designing an RTG specifically for this purpose and then fitting multiple RTGs to the submarine, there is still a technological gap the Russians would have had to overcome.

The point is not how an RTG-based AIP would stack up against the German or Swedish methods; rather, the point is that an RTG is rather uniquely fitted to the Russian knowledge base -- and the Sarov locale.

Though not earth-shattering, a successful AIP uniquely suited to the Russian defense industry is a potentially significant development for the next generation of Russian patrol subs -- both for domestic coastal defense and export abroad.

The specifications of the Project 20120 "super secret submarine" are:

Length: 72.6m
Width: 9.9m
Draught: 7m
Displacement: 2300/3950 tons
Diving depth: 300m
Speed: 10/17 kts
Endurance: 45 days

According to the official press release, the submarine requires a crew of 52, which is actually one more person than the Akula class SSN, so we assume one more enlisted (25 officers, 27 enlisted). While the news report quoted above claims the submarine will be used as a "spy" submarine, we see the submarine being put to use as a training vessel and technology demonstrator.

While Stratfor is speculating, all of the data we are seeing does seem to fit the picture they painted back in September. If indeed Russia has come up with a hybrid RTG-based AIP system that is as effective as European AIP designs, then it would confirm what we have been hearing that Russia's design base for submarines is still very healthy and the innovation is still there. It will be interesting to see what details come out via the media over the next few days.