A Call For New Platforms To Fill the Gaps

Did I mention I am very pleased with this months publication of Proceedings? Yep, and I'll say it again, this months publication is excellent. I don't know what compelled Lieutenant James Rushton to pen this article, but I for one congratulate him for doing so. In this excellent article, tucked away for members only, Lieutenant Rushton channels Thomas Barnett and Andrew Krepinevich to echo a call made by CDR Salamander only last month.

The article, Fill the Middle Gap Rediscover the Corvette, marks the first article in Proceedings that advocates change based on the evolving lessons of this century and reflects precisely the new Maritime Strategy.

The U.S. Navy needs a new force structure for the new century's challenges. This force should include ships that are inexpensive enough to be plentiful, and robust enough to operate for prolonged periods in inhospitable environments far from the mainstream of U.S. Navy support. Our commanders must be able to commit these ships without reluctance to dangerous waters among the dhows, junks, and oil platforms in shallow seas. In short, we need a small warship that can self-deploy to (and stay in!) areas like the Horn of Africa, South East Asia, and the Gulf of Guinea.

First the author goes back to history in search of guidance moving forward.

Today the U.S. Navy finds itself in a position similar to that of the 1815 Royal Navy. No legitimate competitor challenges us for control of the seas, yet in many ways the world is a far more dangerous place than it was when the Berlin Wall fell.

This is a very similar point this blog made back in August. After doing some research at that time, I kept running into statements and testimony made by Bob Work for a concept he credited to Andrew Krepinevich known as "the strategy of the second move." As we detailed, the period following the War of 1812 for the Royal Navy represents the best historical example regarding the position the US Navy finds itself in today. It should be pointed out, and Lieutenant Rushton does point out, that while the time is known for colonial rule, the Royal Navy did a lot of good ranging from suppressing disorder in remote locations, almost completely eliminating the slave trade by themselves, projected British influence and interests around the world, and served as a instrument for peace as a deterrent for war.

Lieutenant Rushton goes on to describe the problem facing today's Navy.

The image of a 10,000-ton, billion-dollar cruiser being used to defend Iraqi oil platforms in painfully shallow and congested waters points to the limits of what can be done to reconfigure our existing Navy. The CNO's new maritime strategy acknowledges that preventing wars is as important as winning wars, and that new challenges face our traditional naval force structure beyond sea control and power projection: irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats emanating from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and disruption of the sea-borne economic lifelines that gird the globe.

To counter these threats, naval forces must operate in and around what Thomas Barnett calls the "non integrating gaps" in the world politico-economic structure. While traditional warships and the LCS can contribute much to stability and counter-proliferation operations, a more continuous and intimate presence is required than what can be achieved with a Navy composed solely of these capable—and expensive—assets.

Very well said sir, we agree completely. This is the message Rumsfeld transformational types do not want to hear. This is the message those still in search of a Mahan strategy for the modern Navy simply ignore. This is the message directly counter to the current direction of the Navy, its spending priorities, and its existing force structure.

For Christmas this year I bought each member of my team three books. The Pentagons New Map, Six Frigates, and Shooter. While I highly recommend all three, I believe The Pentagon's New Map is a prerequisite for understanding some of the ideas on the direction of the Navy and the force structure of the Navy promoted here. The new Maritime Strategy addresses the gaps, and not just with lip service.

The Navy should think clearly about how to approach the unique problems associated with the "non integrating gaps" and in doing so, recognize the metrics are dissimilar enough to require special attention, but flexible enough to scale all the way up to major war. This is why a common hull strategy for a larger fleet may be the way ahead, particular if the Navy eventually finds modular payloads both affordable and desirable. That is why when this blog advocates Corvettes and Motherships, we advocate based on the LCS hull and the LPD-17 hull.

Lieutenant Rushton goes on to make his case for the Corvette as the solution for the middle gap the Navy is looking to fill. In doing so he goes on to cite one of my favorite quotes.

"You hear a lot these days about virtual presence. Well, for naval forces, virtual presence is actual absence. And we are not going to be absent. If you're not there you can't do much." (To Students and Faculty of the Naval War College, 31 August 2024 at the Naval War College Newport, R.I.)

Rushton cites Mullen in the article, but many have said it. Is the Corvette the answer to presence at the table of "non integrating gaps" problem? CDR Salamander would be happy, he has laid out at least a dozen good reasons why Corvettes make a lot of sense for the US Navy over the years, reasons that range from improving the officer corp to meeting the mission profile.

We tend to agree with Lt. Rushton as well, at least mostly. We think the Corvette is part of the solution, but we still believe the Navy needs a series of platforms that meet these irregular challenges to address both the high end and low end of warfare. We have called such a system the "Littoral Strike Group" in the past, but buzwords mean nothing, what we would prefer to see is a larger collection of concepts as part of a unified strategy to address the challenges, and integrate from the ground up a working relationship with other partners (both governmental and nongovernmental) that will be required to truly meet the requirements, with the Navy as the key enabler. Credit Lieutenant Rushton though for bringing up the subject, observing the need, and putting together an excellent article that highlights not only the historical view, but the strategic vision of today as well.

A Clear Picture of Littoral Combat Ship Program

This blog has been very critical of Proceedings, admittedly sometimes unfairly, with most of our criticism pointed directly at the editors for their choices regarding the content. Has out criticism been heard? Our logs show the good folks at the USNI have visited many times, so maybe? Probably not, but I will say one thing, January 2008 looks excellent!

This blog has tried figuring the numbers of the Littoral Combat Ship program following the FY08 budget, but ultimately we haven't been right. When trying to figure out where the money is, sometimes you need good information from the media, and sometimes that is hard to come by. A new article is out that gives a clear picture of the Littoral Combat Program, and Commander Otto Kreisher does a great job of laying out the facts. As usual, it is one of our favorites Bob Work setting the record straight.

Work also found the current cost estimates for LCS less troublesome than some of the critics. "The original guidance on that ship is that the total cost had to be $400 million, including the modules. The Navy made a guess that it would be $220 (million) for the sea frame, $180 (million) for the modules," he said. "What's happened is that the sea frame is coming in higher than expected, but the Navy's plan for the modules and the associated cost is coming in much lower than expected."

Work explained that the Navy initially had planned to buy three modules for each LCS, at an average cost of $63 million per module. But now the Navy is planning to buy only 64 modules for 55 hulls, for an average additional cost of $73 million per LCS, he said. That means a total cost per ship of $533 million, instead of $400 million, which is a 33 percent increase, he said. "That's not great by any means. But if you compare it to all the ships we've built over the last 25 years, that's not bad."

...

Despite the program turmoil and the higher cost, Congress essentially gave the Navy the green light to press ahead on LCS. The compromise FY08 Defense Appropriations Bill signed into law by President Bush slashed $571 million from the LCS funding the Navy had requested. But it provided $339.5 million in procurement funds and noted that combined with money left over from the canceled ships, that would be enough to buy an additional LCS, within the cost cap of $460 million.

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England later issued guidance cutting the planned LCS buys over the next five years from 32 to 21, which will slow the program even more.

The bold emphasis is ours. Alot of this we have covered in the past, but Work explains the $339.5 million included in FY08 which is something that has eluded us.

So now we finally have a real number for the "total cost" of a single Littoral Combat Ship, specifically $533 million dollars. I can also explain that second sentence by Bob Work though, why he claims "that's not bad."

You see, back in the day when the Littoral Combat Ship was a powerpoint presentation instead of a boondoggle, the Navy was supposed to be able to produce 3 Littoral Combat Ships for the price of 1 DDG-51. At the time, the DDG-51 was $1.2 billion dollars. That is how the number $400 million came about as the cost for the Littoral Combat Ship.

Today, a brand new DDG-51 in FY08 dollars would cost 1.6 billion dollars according to the CBO. At $533 million dollars for 1 LCS, you can still buy 3 Littoral Combat Ships for the same price as 1 DDG-51, the only real difference being fewer modules. It almost makes one wonder whether this is a coincidence, doesn't it?

The Proceedings article, called "Is the 313-Ship Fleet Realistic?" is an excellent read, and can be accessed by registering for free on the USNI website. The majority of the article is actually a counter to Loren Thompson for his profoundly rediculous claim that the 313-ship plan is dead because Sec Winter canceled the LCS. We felt very comfortable disagreeing with Mr. Thompson back in November regarding his comments, and would like to thank Commander Kreisher for validating our criticism. We only wish Commander Kreisher would have advocated our advice for Mr. Thompson within the pages of Proceedings, because we believe our advice still applies.

If Loren Thompson wants to be an advocate for a better Navy, maybe he should advocate for a better concept in dealing with the irregular challenges outlined in the Maritime Strategy. One way to be an advocate for a better Navy would be to call out the Navy for throwing 'a naval truck one size fits all' platform as the only solution to irregular warfare, the only alternative to 3+ billion surface combatants, and the only new Naval surface fleet shipbuilding program less than 14,000 tons.

Oh well, can't win them all. Either way the article is an excellent update that gives the most clear picture you will find on the status of the Littoral Combat Ship program as we kick off 2008.

The Duncan Hunter Fleet Of One

Duncan Hunter is still trying to push the Sea Fighter. You know, X-Craft, that beacon of hope for those who hold out for major Navy transformation. Duncan Hunter is under the assumption that if the Navy would just field the Sea Fighter with 500 missiles from a certain company who continues to get earmarks from Mr. Hunter, a company that donates a lot of money to his political campaign, the US would have a better Navy. InsidetheNavy has the money quotes of the latest back and forth. Sorry, subscription only, no link...

House Armed Services Committee ranking member Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) continues to push to make the Navy's Sea Fighter a deployable vessel even though the service says it only plans to use the catamaran for at-sea experiments.

Hunter this year included language in the House version of the fiscal year 2008 defense authorization bill calling for the Sea Fighter to take over the tasks of the HSV-2, a catamaran the Navy is leasing until next July. The report states the Navy’s plan to use Sea Fighter only for experiments “fails to take full advantage of the capabilities of this vessel.”

Though the final FY-08 defense authorization bill agreed to by House and Senate conferees includes no money for modifications to Sea Fighter -- the House report language included $22 million in unrequested funds for the conversion -- Hunter's office maintains that the House-passed language altering Sea Fighter's use stands.

Duncan Hunter's fleet of one is in Florida and he isn't too happy about it. This is the second year in a row Duncan Hunter has tried this trick, and last year the Navy did nothing to move the process along to Duncan Hunter's liking. The difference, in 2007 the House actually put $22 million in the budget which "authorized and appropriated $23 million for the Navy to begin the process of upgrading Sea Fighter so it can be operationally deployable -- through steps including adding offensive and defensive weapons and improving ship survivability systems." This year Congress didn't include any money, that probably has something to do with a certain 2006 election. Maybe L3 needs to give more political donations to Democrats...

The Navy ultimately never spent the FY07 money, it still exists and sits there.

ONR is custodian of the ship, which is operated by a civilian crew. ONR spokesman Colin Babb said there are no plans for Sea Fighter to be used to replace the HSV-2.

“It's not being deployed and [there is] no intention of it being deployed like that,” Babb said.

Hunter scolded Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead at a Dec. 13 House Armed Services Committee hearing for not using Sea Fighter differently.

“You've had the opportunity to embrace transformation and you've chosen not to,” Hunter said, citing the Sea Fighter's speed and capabilities.

He said 500 medium-range cruise missiles could potentially be put on the ship, which he argued would give the Navy “multiples in terms of capital investment versus firepower, manning versus cost, operations and maintenance versus cost.”

If Roughead is rejecting the Duncan Hunter's version of transformation, I'm a bigger Roughead fan than I thought.

The Sea Fighter represents a number of things. It represents the signature program in the Department of Defense regarding earmarks, as it was basically the bone Rumsfeld threw to Duncan Hunter through ONR back when Hunter was chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. It also represents the trademark program for naval transformation, specifically the small warship concept, the arsenal ship concept, the modular ship concept, and the fast ship concept. In that regard, it also represents the debate on what the future Navy should look like.

Here is the basic question fairly presented, without the hyperbole one would see from those who don't like or advocate for the concepts...

Should the Navy build ships like the Sea Fighter, which is similar but also different than the Littoral Combat Ship, to fight wars for the Navy? The differences between the Littoral Combat Ship and Sea Fighter are more numerous than one might believe. The Sea Fighter is a technology demonstrator for what would be a 1500 ton warship, where the LCS is a 3000 ton naval truck. The Sea Fighter is designed to be modular, with a focus on large numbers of affordable weapons for land/sea strike. The LCS is designed to be modular, with a focus on deployable unmanned systems for specific mission profiles like small boat ASuW, ASW, and MIW.

The Sea Fighter could be a $150-200 million dollar hull with over $500 million invested in weapons and systems. The Littoral Combat Ship has turned into a $350 million dollar hull with around $120 million dollars worth of deployable platforms. Both hulls are fast, with top speeds over 40+ knots, and both hulls have limited endurance. Both hulls are modular, and can support multiple payload packages. Both hulls are intended to have small crews, and both platforms have low survivability standards compared to other warships in the US Navy fleet. It should be pointed out that Sea Fighter is built to commercial standards, while the LCS is built to the Level I standard, the lowest standard of warship design.

Is Duncan Hunter right about Sea Fighter, or is the Navy? Should the Navy build 1500 ton low cost hulls built to house $500 million worth of weapons and equipment, or should the Navy stick to the LCS design for its modular solution? As this blog has noted in the past, we are not sold on the idea that Sea Fighter is a replacement for HSV Swift, nor are we sold that it should be operational or mass produced, but we are open to changing our mind and agree it is a new approach.

There is one thing that does stand out in all of this though. If the Navy isn't willing to utilize the Sea Fighter, why should anyone believe, particularly given the previous cancellations, the Navy will be any more excited about a similar, more expensive Littoral Combat Ship? Regulars know where we stand on this, the new Maritime Strategy calls for new metrics, metrics one can find in Motherships and Corvettes.

Give Us More Submarines!

Apparently someone believes it is a good idea to expand the number of submarines. No, not the US Navy, rather some are calling for up to a dozen new submarines to follow the Collins class for the Royal Australian Navy.

AUSTRALIA may need to double the size of its submarine fleet tocounter the growing and deadly threat posed by rival submarines in the region, former defence minister Kim Beazley said yesterday.

His comments come after The Australian this week revealed that Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon had ordered planning to begin on the next generation of submarines to replace the six Collins-class boats when they are retired in 2025.

Mr Beazley also called on the Rudd Government to urgently tackle what he said was a "glaring weakness" in Australia's anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

"This weakness comes at a time when (the navy) will soon be producing the best submarine targets in the region with the new air warfare destroyers and amphibious landing ships," Mr Beazley told The Weekend Australian.

That last observation is noteworthy. A few things need to be considered. The US Navy and Royal Australian Navy are joined at the hip, anyone who thinks otherwise isn't paying attention. The military satellite systems in the Pacific have become joint ventures, and several of the communication networks both countries use have become the same. The intention of this is obvious, it is to insure that should China engage one or the other in a war, China will have to fight both.

Additionally, if there is a weakness on the F-100, it is certainly ASW. The obvious alternative though is that Australia is not buying VSTOL Joint Strike Fighters, so there will be plenty of room for ASW helicopters on their new LHDs which could make them excellent ASW platforms, apparently a detail lost on Mr. Beazley (or more likely he wants to see the VSTOL JSF). However, if given the choice between using a LHD as an ASW platform or having more submarines, I'll take more submarines every time.

With that said, the regional players who are buying submarines is nothing to shake a stick at. China will soon have the largest submarine fleet in the world, and India is soon to have the third largest behind only the US and China. Indonesia and Malaysia are also upgrading their submarine fleets, and that doesn't include Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan who either have or are working on new modern submarine fleets of their own. It is too early to estimate how many submarines will ultimately be in operation throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but you can be sure of one thing, that number will be very high.

We have already heard Australia is planning to spend around $20 billion US for new Collins class replacement submarines. Now we are hearing the number 12 tossed around. What does it all mean?

It means Australia sees the Collins replacement to be more expensive than the Collins. This also implies the design doesn't exist today, and the commitment to building the submarines domestically, where it will be more expensive, is legitimate. As far as the design not existing today, we are hearing that from virtually every direction. It also means the number 12 is a target, not the plan. It should be pointed out the original plan was for 8 Collins class, not 6.

As far as the design specifics, ME is probably closer to the mark with his Darwin Class suggestion than we were with our S-80 option, but in the end it is hard to guess what the final product will be. The one aspect of the new submarine we continue to hear discussed is the design effort that will focus on a USV launch. If that is truly the case, with 20 billion dollars Australia has a number of choices.

In observing the various time frames, it seems to me there are a lot of options here. If the US Navy was really on their game they would work with the RAN on this project. Just doing the math, it looks to me like the Ohio class SSGNs are going to need to be replaced around the same time as the Collins class submarines. Maybe I'm off here, but it seems to me that if both countries are looking for a next generation underwater mothership around the same time frame, there is something to be said about a joint venture on the project. There is certainly something in it for the US Navy, for example, a joint submarine program could potentially lead to that submarine base in Australia the US Navy wants so badly.

New Year Brings New Australian Defense Debacle to Discuss

With the Collins class submarines working better than originally planned, and the Super Seasprite not quite shiny enough to make a big headline, the latest Royal Australian Navy spending debacle has the early makings of something the Australian press can sink their teeth into. What is interesting about this story to me is that it has all the elements needed to create mass disinformation, from politics to foreign influence.

AFTER a $1.4 billion "upgrade" the navy's front-line fighting ships cannot defend themselves and are unable to be sent into battle.

A navy whistleblower says sending the 4000-tonne Adelaide Class Guided Missile Frigates to war would be like sending a VK Commodore to race at Bathurst.

Senior officials admit the 1997 FFG upgrade project was a "debacle" created by the Howard government's decision to maximise the sale price of the Sydney-based contractor Australian Defence Industries when it was sold to the French firm Thales.

The Adelaide Class frigates will eventually be replaced by the Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyer ordered last year. While delivery schedules are preliminary, the Adelaide class is expected to serve in the fleet for about five more years.

Apparently, this problem has had an effect on morale. If the whistle blower is in fact telling the truth, the problems for the Adelaide class are total. Virtually every aspect of systems integration has failed. In several ways, this is difficult to believe, and reminds us of similar issues we have seen with the Super SeaSprite program. How is it that so many proven technologies can produce so many software problems? Australia is unique in regards to this problem as well, as other nations have not experienced similar problems with similar platforms, Egypt and their SH-2Gs comes to mind as an example. Other nations have not had trouble integrating ESSM with other naval air defense systems as another example.

We are unsure where the problem lies exactly, and it will likely not easily be identified, but it raises questions regarding the quality of software engineering in the Australian Defense Industry at a time when the Defense Industry is starting a number of major projects. Whether it is new Amphibious Ships, new Air Defense Destroyers, new fighter aircraft, or other defense priorities this raises serious questions whether Australia will in fact be able to achieve their desired goals for future platforms.

If you can screw up the upgrades for known technologies, how do they expect to get it right for brand new technologies? That isn't a rhetorical question, it should be of major concern otherwise Australians will find themselves with more cost overruns than they can afford, or fewer pieces of equipment than originally intended.