Project Valour-IT 2007 Fund Drive Contest - Last Call

Updated 1-24-08: This is last call. Submissions must be present in the inbox by midnight 1-31-08 EST. Enjoy!

We have 9 submissions to date.

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Back on November 12th, this blog became aware of a gift for those who contributed $25 or more to Valour-IT. The gift was a coin from the good folks over at Soldiers Angels. At that time, we decided we would hold a contest in honor of this gift to reward those who contributed to Valour-IT and received a coin. Last week our coins came in the mail, so let the contest begin.

Contest Details

The contest is simple. We desire 2 photographs, one of each side of the Soldiers Angels coin. The best submission wins. My daughter and I took a little adventure over the holiday to demonstrate an example of the type of photography we believe can lead to a winning submission.




Curious what ship that is? Ask xformed. That is the winter home of the only remaining Destroyer Escort in existence, and unfortunately, where my daughter is holding the coin is as close as you can get to the ship during the winter.

Email Submissions Here

Larger photo's may need to be sent one at a time as attachments, or compressed as an attachment. If you try sending me a virus, you better do a damn good job of covering your tracks, because we already read your email for a living you know...

The winning submission will reward the individual with the 200x150 location on the top right of this blog until the next Valour-IT Veterans Day fund drive begins. You can either provide, or allow us to design, what the winner chooses for that space (within good taste). This blog continues to grow, and could expose the winner to as many as 150,000 visitors (or more) to the winners banner in 2008. Who knows, maybe our banner won't be lame, and maybe it will generate traffic to someones blog.

Good luck to all, and have fun with the photo's. Most importantly, thank you to everyone who helped support our Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines through Valour-IT.

To Connect the Gaps, Build the Bridge Underwater

As the Navy moves to develop a future fleet designed to reflect the strategical and tactical ideas that are prevailing in our time, we believe it is going to require new calculations in balancing the requirements of major war and soft power. As we noted last week, the Navy surface fleet of 2012 will be the greatest naval force in human history when measured by raw firepower. As we have also noted many times in the past however, the surface fleet has a number of emerging requirements which trend towards a greater capacity in security operations, in both blue and brown water, and a surface navy of fewer but more powerful large warships is ill suited to meet that challenge.

To meet future challenges, we believe the Navy should add a new dimension to its future fleet studies. We observe that on the advice of Julian Corbett, the US Navy should disconnect traditional function from traditional classification in its future fleet designs, and only by doing so will the balance between the strategic peacemaker and warfighter requirements be achieved in the future fleet while at the same time, potentially expanding tactical capabilities.

In all eras of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a tendency to differentiate into groups in accordance with the primary function each class was designed to serve. These groupings or classifications are what is meant by the constitution of a fleet. A threefold differentiation into battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval thought that we have come to regard it as normal, and even essential. It may be so, but such a classification has been by no means constant. Other ideas of fleet constitution have not only existed, but have stood the test of war for long periods, and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if we wish to arrive at sound doctrine.

The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time, and consequently they have varied not only with the ideas, but also with the material in vogue. It may also be said more broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. It is true that few ages have formulated a theory of war, or even been clearly aware of its influence; but nevertheless such theories have always existed, and even in their most nebulous and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an ascertainable influence on the constitution of fleets.

-Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. Corbett, page 107

We are observing emerging trends and discussions towards the future fleet structure as the Navy struggles to match future resources with the future requirements outlined in new Maritime Strategy. With existing force structure plans in place, the challenge to meet the future strategic challenges with new future force structure requirements while also incorporating best tactical approaches that are counter to traditional roles is a daunting challenge for the Navy. We know the process is already underway, we acknowledge the challenges both political and institutional, but we have also observed the trends particularly apparent with the recent shuffle in leadership.

We recently observed a comment by Thomas Barnett, whom we believe is heavily influencing the strategic ideas that in turn contribute to the strategic requirement set for the future fleet. His influence in several articles of the January 2008 issue of Proceedings is further evidence of his strategic ideas taking hold within the Navy. We see this trend as a good thing, however we also note that his recent comment highlights Corbett's warning that it can be "unscientific and unsafe to ignore" alternatives to function and classification on the basis of tradition alone.

Truth on subs is that they're only good at three things: go after shipping, go after each other, hold nukes.

The last one is still marginally useful in small numbers.

The challenge in the design of the future fleet is to connect the strategical and tactical ideas that are driving future fleet metrics, but also connect those ideas to manage not only the warfighters major war role, but also manage the Navy's emerging peacemaker role in addressing the non integrating gaps driving the approach outlined in the new Maritime Strategy. To meet the future challenge, the surface fleet that is currently around 75/25 high/low mix warship structure will need to shift to a high/low mix somewhere closer to 40/60, perhaps even 35/65 if it is to meet the metrics of the surface navy peacetime requirements. We have previously outlined those metrics to include manned presence, persistence on station, quantity of force, and distribution of force to the vast regions involved. As we have previously noted, unmanned systems can be force multipliers for the warfighter, but there is no substitute for the presence of a sailor as a peacemaker. If the Navy is going to bridge future requirements of both warfighter and peacemaker, we believe part of that bridge should be built underwater.

As Corbett notes, function based on classification needs not to be constant, and we believe it is past time for a new calculus that addresses the emerging tactical and strategic requirements of our time. Barnett is discussing 'traditional' roles for submarines, but like many aspects of the nations military force designed in the cold war, the Navy is learning that 'traditional' isn't always best. In this regard, new ideas are required to maintain tactical superiority while also addressing strategic priority. We believe the submarine is best suited to be such a bridge.

The emerging future submarine force is very different than the submarine force of the cold war. Today's active duty submarine force offers the Navy 574 VLS cells specific to a cruise missile deep strike capability. A future fleet projected to include all 4 SSGNs, and perhaps 48 SSNs with VLS will feature close to 1200 cells for cruise missiles. From a tactical perspective, a true stealth platform like a submarine can conduct launches of land attack cruise missiles much closer to the enemy coast, allowing it much greater range, and can do so against a minor power with limited sea denial tactical capability, or a major powers with an advanced anti-access / area denial capability that would keep surface ships far back from the engagement line.

Strategically speaking, migrating a portion of the strike firepower the Navy requires for supporting warfighter requirements from sea off the surface fleet reduces the size requirements of the surface vessels that make up the surface fleet. The reduction of size implies not only a reduction in cost per unit, but a greater number of units that can ultimately be leveraged for the Navy's peacemaker roles.

Submarines offer very little to peacemaker roles beyond intelligence gathering and special operations, both of which (as Dr. Barnett accurately points out in a later comment) can be conducted to equal effect by surface forces. If the Navy intends to build a peacemaker force in the future that aligns to the ideas and ideals expressed in the new Maritime Strategy, the Navy would be both strategically and tactically wise to migrate more of the warfighter responsibilities to the submarine force, with the intention to expand the peacemaker capabilities of the Navy of which can only be conducted by the surface navy.

The truth on submarines we see is that for the Navy to evolve and balance its Leviathan role and SysAdmin role in the spirit of Thomas Barnett, the Navy should apply the strategical and tactical ideas of our time by transitioning the warfighter function to the underwater service as a means to enable the peacemaker capabilities of the surface fleet. The surface fleet, when relieved to some degree of one of its many primarily traditional functions, should then be in a better position to offer the contributions required to meet the strategic peacemaker objectives desired in spirit by the Cooperative Maritime Strategy.

We see it as both ironic, and understandable, that Dr. Barnett would dismiss the submarine casually as an instrument of the Leviathan to conduct war. Indeed it is exactly that! However it is also the key enabler for the Navy to remove some of the warfighter burden from the surface fleet, a surface fleet that is in high demand in dealing with the world that emerges within the content of Dr. Barnett's writings and vision.

A Sign of the Time

I've been reading too much Corbett and too many stories of Nelson to not let out a huge sigh of frustration when reading stories like this.

A FAULTY meat fridge is forcing a Royal Navy aircraft carrier to return to base today just two days after setting off for the Indian Ocean.

HMS Illustrious departed from Portsmouth Naval Base on Monday to head the multi-national Task Group Orion 08 which will be carrying out exercises and diplomatic visits during the next four months in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean.

Navy spokesman Anton Hanney said a refrigeration unit used to store meat on the warship had been found to be in danger of breaking down.

He explained: "She has a minor problem with her refrigeration unit. It hasn't broken down but because she is off the south coast, the sensible thing is for her to come in and get that fixed before she goes off again.

"It wouldn't be prudent for her to go off with the chance of the unit breaking down while she was in warmer climates and then engineers would have to be flown out to her to fix it.

"It will not delay her programme in any significant way, she will be able to make up 24 hours without a problem."

It is of coarse a completely understandable course of action, prudent even, but perhaps the best phrase is 'penny wise.' In a way, that phrase defines the Royal Navy today, dominated by a bean counter political culture comfortable reducing the image of the nations most historical national institution, and yes the Royal Navy ranks well above the monarchy only the tabloids pay any attention to outside Britain these days.

The Royal Navy is better than this, the most powerful vessel of the Royal Navy shouldn't need to turn home 2 days after deployment because a refrigeration unit might break, but it is a sign of the time. It amazes me the institution that almost single handedly ended slavery on planet earth would have so much difficulty repairing a refrigerator on its largest warship while on a deployment, that she would need to go back to port.

Oh well. Hope someone verifies the washing machines are in good order while their at it, one must look good and be well fed. I'm aware of other stories of US ships as well, but if a CVN ever turns around 2 days out of port because a refrigerator might break during a deployment, I'll be inking a full 3000 words of sharp sarcasm.

Navy Conversations with the Country

I really want to attend one of these. I know some of you already have plans to attend these, and yes I'm very interested in copies of any openly distributed materials. Most important though, presentation matters.

Senior Officers from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard will present the new maritime strategy known as "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" to more than 150 community leaders from Houston at the Houston Branch Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Jan 24, at 9:00 a.m. CST. They will discuss how U.S. seapower benefits the people of Houston and maintains the American way of life.

U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, United States Coast Guard, will offer a keynote address at 12:30 p.m. CST followed by questions and answers.

Houston is first stop of 2008 in a series of national "Conversations with the Country," that bring together a wide cross-section of American society to openly discuss the future roles of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in protecting the homeland and working with global partners to prevent war.

It goes on, then the press release has this strange addition.

The new strategy provides for the right balance of forces to conduct traditional combat missions, but also raises the prevention of war to a level equal to the conduct of war.

The second part I get, the first part... am I missing something? I'm pretty sure there is no force balance discussion in the Maritime Strategy. In Congress? Sure. On blogs? All the time. In fact you can go just about any forum online where the Navy is discussed and find a conversation on force balance and structure. However, no where in the strategy is there a discussion that "provides for the right balance of forces". I seem to recall the absence of that aspect in the Maritime Strategy drew considerable criticism.

Perception matters. This press statement implies the existing plans for "balance of forces" is right, which is odd considering we have been observing Adm. Roughead calling 313 ships the low number of ships he wants in the fleet, the implication being that even the Navy doesn't believe the "balance of forces" as it exists today matches the strategy.

Is the Navy going to discuss strategy, or force structure? Both would be interesting discussions, but the horse goes before the cart if I'm not mistaken.

Looking for Heavy Lift Options

I have a lot more I'd like to say, but this post is more for me to bookmark than anything. Popular mechanics is looking at heavy lift options for future military logistics.

A cornerstone of military planning is figuring out how to position who and what is needed to win the fight. Logistics can often decide the outcome of a war. That is why military planners looking at future United States combat operations are fretting over their inability to move the Army around without the benefit of well-developed airfields. It is a question of air power, but not the kind measured in laser-guided bombs or rounds fired per minute. This fight is measured in miles traveled and tonnage delivered.

Later this year, both the Army and Air Force will seek Pentagon approval to proceed to the next stages of development for new aircraft meant to carry big loads, then land on poorly built, short runways—or no runways at all. The Army and Air Force both want to fly demonstrators by 2015.

They go on to list the 6 major options pitched.

1. Massive Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
2. New Fixed-Wing Airplanes
3. Precision Airdrops
4. Converted Container Ships
5. Aircraft With Folding Wings and Rotors
6. Blimps With a Mission

Personally, I think the answer is a combination of the ones listed. I'll reserve full comment for another time, but I think it is past time the DoD takes a serious look at airships for rapid bulk transport, if for no other reason than for addressing special needs in humanitarian missions and moving large quantities of equipment off large container ships onto any beach.