Saturday, February 2, 2024

Private Firms For Humanitarian Assistance

Claude Berube has written three articles on private security firms can contribute to the Navy. The first was an article for Orbis called Blackwaters for the Blue Waters: The Promise of Private Naval Companies (subscription only). His second article was in the November issue of Proceedings "Now Hear This" section called Contracts of Marque. Both articles introduce interesting ideas for outsourcing low intensity maritime conflicts to private security firms. Before someone dismisses it out of hand, lets keep in mind that contract naval services in the form of privateers defined United States naval power prior to the 20 century, and often we find good ideas are nothing more than old ideas used a new way.

Lt. Berube's latest article fits the theme for the last week, expeditionary warfare, and will go very well with the theme over the coming weeks. The Cooperative Maritime Strategy puts the our nations maritime forces into a posture for a Strategic Defensive in dealing with emerging challenges, including challenges like globalization and The Long War. When Maritime Forces are in a Strategic Defensive posture, Julian S. Corbett makes the point in his study of Maritime Strategy that it is important to seize the offensive at the operational level when opportunity allows. I believe that humanitarian missions represent one of many tactics our maritime forces can exploit as opportunity allows to go on the offensive at the operational level in The Long War.

Lt. Berube's article in Serviam magazine, called A Coalition of the Capable, How private naval companies can expand humanitarian efforts, is an interesting take on how maritime forces can utilize private security firms to cost efficiently address humanitarian response. The article lists a number of historical examples, including the role of Blackwater in response to Hurricane Katrina, and he makes an interesting case.

While PSCs have proliferated in recent years, particularly with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, applying global security operations to the maritime environment hasn’t fully matured, much less been explored. McLellan, a former Navy surface warfare officer, suggests that they’re “ahead of our time; people are just catching on to the value” of using private companies to support the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard. Pistris’ approach to its maritime component in support of humanitarian assistance efforts is its innovative use of commercial craft. Pistris is partnered with a shipyard that converts fast support boats for use with multimillion-dollar yachts. Yacht owners don’t want their own decks encumbered with helicopters, small boats, or supplies, so they purchase these boats that trail behind. Since everything is now modular, according to McLellan, you could easily install containers of surgical supplies or anything else the mission requires.

Another firm pursuing at-sea opportunities is Blackwater Worldwide. Tom Ridenour, the director of maritime operations at Blackwater, is a retired Coast Guard captain. Last year, Blackwater purchased the former National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration ship M/V McArthur, which was launched in 1966. Since then, Ridenour and his crew have refurbished the ship, which now includes capacity for several rigid hull inflatable boats and a flight deck and hangar that can house two helicopters. Like the Pistris vessels, the McArthur has room for 20-foot modular containers. With a crew of 13, the McArthur can deploy with up to 42 government, military, or nongovernmental personnel.

The humanitarian mission exists, and it is important. Berube notes that the hospital ships are enormous, and are very effective but limited to major ports. As we have observed in humanitarian response, the most important part isn't being able to support humanitarian operations in major ports, rather in areas where major port facilities do not exist. The capabilities required are expensive, and if they do not fit into the strategy for dealing with major war, the Navy will not spend money for such capabilities with their limited budget funds, nor should they.

Private Security Firms have a bad reputation. We would argue this has less to do with private security firms being a bad idea than with certain agencies in the government doing a poor job managing their contracts. In observing Congress in dealing with Blackwater in Iraq, we observed our elected leaders on both sides of the isle recognized rather quickly that the private security firms were doing a good job, but were not being managed well with the policies and standards of the government agencies involved. We see this as a process issue to be worked out, and see a future where government will be able to utilize private contractors for a number of services more cost efficiently than traditional military forces. Examples include environmental hazard disposal, humanitarian response, and security services in developing countries and as part of post war operations. Unlike some, we don't dismiss the potential of contract services for military related operations based on previous mistakes, recognizing that mistakes happen and lessons can be learned.

We see private security firms as a force multiplier for low intensity operations such as humanitarian response, particularly for the Navy where the number of sailors is being reduced, and primary responsibilities at the high end of military power are so expensive. Low cost solutions, like outsourcing the vital but manpower intensive role of humanitarian response is an interesting use of private military contractors, and a cost effective way to fill the gaps that will always exist in the Leviathan force of the US Navy.

Lieutenant Berube teaches in the political science and history departments at the U.S. Naval Academy. The co-author of two books, he served with Expeditionary Strike Group Five in the Persian Gulf (2004-05), has worked for two U.S. senators, as a civil servant, and with a defense firm.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Truman Carrier Strike Group

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56) - 6th Fleet
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
HMS Manchester (D95)
HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)
USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8)
USS Montpelier (SSN 765)


Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Tarawa (LHA 1)
USS Cleveland (LPD 7)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Hopper (DDG 70)
USS Ingraham (FFG 61)


In Theater

Ocean 6
FGS Augsburg (F 213)
FS Guepratte (F714)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Premier Maitre L'Her (F792)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
HMS Campbeltown (F86)
HMS Argyll (F231)
HMAS Arunta (FFH 151)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

Friday, February 1, 2024

Globalization and Expeditionary Warfare

The war the nation fights today is not a war of America’s choosing. It is a war that was brought violently and brutally to America’s shores by the evil forces of terror. It is a war against America and America’s way of life. It is a war against all that America holds dear. It is a war against freedom itself.

Sounds like a Rudy Giuliani campaign speech, but that is actually a quote from the 2001 Quarterly Defense Report (PDF). Lately I've been trying to introduce more strategic content into the blog, examples being Milan Vigo's and Admiral Cebrowski's insights on future fleet requirements, or Bob Work's insights on the lack of definition for Sea Basing. We have also added some articles with our own analysis of the subjects. As I have been looking deeper into Expeditionary Warfare and Sea Basing specifically, I have found myself drawn to the writings of George V. Galdorisi. We had previously discussed a Proceedings article he contributed to on the topic of RW gaps back in September.

Galdorisi's contribution to Globalization and Maritime Power, Chapter 21, is excellent in full. We find this section on Globalization and Expeditionary Warfare brilliant, and we find it more relavent today than in 2002 when it was written.

The forces impelling globalization suggest the need for a military strategy that combines peacetime regional engagement, crisis management, and maintenance of warfighting capabilities to mitigate and contain likely conflicts. As concerns about the impact of globalization on U.S. security have gained traction during the past decade, U.S. forces have often been called upon to operate in multiple, simultaneous, lesser regional contingencies. The number of contingencies is striking. During the 1990s, the United States engaged in more than 500 lesser regional contingencies. The ability to respond to these contingencies—occurring at the rate of one per week—depends upon the ability of naval expeditionary forces to remain forward deployed, mobile, flexible, and combat-credible.

Expeditionary warfare forces in general and amphibious warfare forces in particular have provided first responders to these crises that occur more frequently. Less well understood is the impact that these forces have on the globalization process. What effect does the ability of the United States to field a robust amphibious warfare capability have on the ongoing process of globalization? Are these forces a facilitating element, or are they merely crisis response forces operating on the margins?

The economy that essentially defines globalization is built on the worldwide transport of goods and services as well as the accelerating connectivity wrought by modern telecommunications and information technology. Although some time-critical material travels by air, the overwhelming bulk of this worldwide transport occurs by sea and is facilitated by international law such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other accords. However, regional aggressors, international pirates, rogue states, international terrorists, and the like have little respect for international law. Ultimately, it is incumbent on maritime powers such as the United States to guarantee this worldwide transport of goods and services by protecting the ocean commons—both the high seas and the ports of embarkation and debarkation.

In concert with the navies of allied nations, the Navy and Marine Corps are the guarantors of international trade, allowing it to flourish and expand without the fear of long-term disruption. While localized crises such as the Iraq-Iran tanker war during the 1980s can temporarily disrupt international trade, ultimately the maritime powers in general, and the United States in particular, restore order on the global commons with their naval forces. Clearly, without this worldwide naval presence—and the threat of retaliation against those who would disrupt world trade—it is unlikely that globalization as we know it today would be a reality, and thus, the continued expansion of a globalizing economy could well be an uncertain thing.

Increasingly, expeditionary warfare forces are becoming more visible in their role in undergirding the political stability necessary for globalization. Other naval assets—such as CVBGs, submarines, independently operating surface combatants, and long-range tactical aviation—play key roles in enforcing order on the high seas portion of the global commons. But it is the nature of amphibious forces—that is, the ability to project power from the sea onto the land in a measured, tailored fashion—that makes them the most likely asset to be called upon to perform stability operations. Landing marines ashore has an obviously longer-term impact (and more flexible outcome) than aerial bombing or a missile strike. In this sense, amphibious forces are the most visible sign of reassurance for friendly nations and deterrence for potential hostile actors.

Should an aggressor threaten commerce on the global commons—either on the high seas or in the littorals—expeditionary warfare forces are structured to extract swift retribution: from destroying ships, aircraft, ports, or airfields that disrupt or even threaten to disrupt global commerce, to protecting the ports and airfields of friendly nations to ensure the continued free flow of trade, to directly attacking pirates or other rogue entities that seize or otherwise hazard international merchant shipping, to escorting this same shipping during selected portions of their transits.

The ability of expeditionary warfare forces to serve as key guarantors of international commerce from terminus to terminus makes them indispensable assets in facilitating and accelerating globalization. While these forces dramatically impact globalization, so too does globalization impact the rule set for the conduct of amphibious warfare. This suggests that the paradigm for expeditionary warfare may be changing as rapidly as globalization is changing the world.

George V. Galdorisi was on target. We observe that nearly 6 years later the paradigm for expeditionary warfare has already changed as a direct result of globalization. The major, visible influence of globalization is that the importance of expeditionary forces has increased, but in the process we observe the prominence of amphibious assault within the context of expeditionary forces has decreased. This has led to new expeditionary warfare force requirements, and the results appear to be Sea Basing... and all the definitions of it.

The Mystery of the Empty Expeditionary Strike Group

Navy Times is reporting the Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group will be deploying in February, and it will be deploying without Marines. The 24th MEU, which has been training with the Nassau ESG for months is being sent to Afghanistan. At that point, the story starts raising some interesting questions. These are two good ones.

While it’s not yet clear why a trained Navy strike group is not transporting the Marine contingent, a Navy official with knowledge of the operation said the strike group may be broken up due to the new orders. “The sealift portion of the Marine deployment will be done by [Military Sealift Command] ships. None of the ships in the Nassau strike group will deploy any earlier than planned,” said the source. “The surface combatants will deploy in support of maritime security operations and options for deployment of the amphibious ships are still being evaluated.” Asked why MSC and Army ships were chosen over Navy ships for the job of transporting the Marines and their gear overseas, the source said: “When planning the lift of Marines to Afghanistan, the use of MSC ships was determined to be the best of many options considered.”

When asked what makes MSC “best,” the official said that’s what the Navy and Marines decided, without elaborating.

We don't have any details to elaborate on ourselves, but gladly open the floor to comment and speculation. What do we make of the Marines choosing to use the Fast Sealift Ship Algol? The Marines picked the ship specifically, because usually the Algol is in reserved status. In operational use, the Algol would deploy around 70% of the materials of an Army Stryker brigade. It isn't often we see a CONUS based prepositioning deployment for a MEU that intentionally splits man and machine. Obviously the details are sensitive, but also obvious is this complex deployment approach strange on a number of levels.

Algol then set out for Wilmington to onload the Marines’ gear.

Boulay said the MRAPs are not part of the MEU’s gear; once in the Persian Gulf, the Algol will transfer the Marine equipment to Army-owned cargo ships for the final leg to an undisclosed port, where the vehicles can get to landlocked Afghanistan.

The Algol has capacity for 150,000 square feet of cargo. Boulay said this shipment of MEU gear will occupy only 66,000 square feet of space.


The Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Nassau (LHA 4)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Nashville (LPD 13)
USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)
USS Ross (DDG 71)
USS Bulkeley (DG 84)
USS Albany (SSN 753)

When the Nassau ESG arrives in the 5th Fleet AoR, the Tarawa ESG will be about 4 months into its deployment, so it is understandable that the Nassau group is deploying. That the Navy is deploying an ESG empty raises a red flag. Even if we assume the Algol is going to deliver the supplies to Bahrain, and all the equipment is transported to Afghanistan, there really isn't a scenario where the Nassau could evacuate the equipment by sea out of Afghanistan even if it had to.

So why deploy a LHA, LPD, and LSD empty? Remember, the 24 MEU is taking its aviation, so we are basically observing 3 highly capable expeditionary platforms to influence the maritime environment deploying --- empty! If that turns out to be true, I think it would be an enormous missed opportunity.

Three motherships, and the Navy has no equipment to load? With all the tech generated so far in the 21st century, the Navy doesn't have a plan to leverage the aviation spaces, the well decks, or any of the other broad metrics these three platforms provide empty of Marines? I find that depressing, it requires the absence of vision to fail to leverage existing platforms like a LHA, LPD, or LSD for new alternative purposes when opportunity presents itself. It used to be a theme of Seapower 21 to exploit existing platforms in new and innovative ways. I guess innovative ideas never made it off the Powerpoint.

South Africa Expands Silent Force

South Africa has taken ownership of its third and final Type 209/T.1400 class submarine built by Germany. These are very good submarines.

The SAS Queen Modjadji was handed to the SA Navy crew after it successfully underwent sea trials off the German coast, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems said in statement.

The vessel is expected to leave for South Africa on April 2 and is due to arrive on May 22.

There the submarine will be united with her two sister ships, the SAS Manthatisi and SAS Charlotte Maxeke, that have already been taken into service by the SA Navy.

It is worth noting that in the Southern Hemisphere there is a submarine expansion taking place. If you turn the globe upside down, you will note Brazil, Australia, India, and South Africa are all either buying or have just completed purchasing new submarines. It is also worth noting that South Africa is in a pretty important strategic location, and these submarines represent the most influential military capabilities for maritime influence by any African nation in regards to global maritime trade.

Some countries are simply more important to the global economy than others due geographic influence on maritime trade, and South Africa qualifies. Panama and Egypt are other examples. Iran leverages its geographic position in relation to the Straits of Hormuz in blackmail of the vital regional maritime trade to leverage that nations nuclear ambitions. Maritime trade represents the lifeblood of the global economy. That is offered as perspective regarding the strategic influence the three South African submarines represent.

Previous observations of South African submarines here, here, and here.