Saturday, February 23, 2024

Australian Leadership Looking to Slash and Burn Defense

Under the Howard government, Australia made a number of defense purchases to upgrade a military that has been in heavy use and in need of replacements. Of the projects that made a lot of sense to us included the Air Defense destroyers, the LHDs, and new Abrams tanks, all of which are important warfighter capabilities that fit very well within the trends of globalization and expeditionary forces. We were never very impressed with the Super Seasprite deal, the F/A-18 Hornet purchase, nor did we ever fully understand the thinking behind purchasing the F-35A, which would not be capable of utilization on the new LHDs.

The Rudd government has decided that some of this doesn't make sense, and it appears they aren't happy with the direction of defense, or defense spending, and some major changes are in the works for Australia's military. The news starts with a study.

Work will begin this week on the 2008 defence white paper, the biggest review of Australia's defence priorities since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. It will reassess the Howard government's policy of spending $50billion to build a defence force that fits seamlessly into the US military machine.

In many ways this is smart, the Howard government was all over the map with its priorities, and did a very poor job of delivering a public intellectual basis for expensive programs. The purchase of the F/A-18s is an excellent example, Eric has blogged the history for awhile and the Howard approach consistently begged the question, where is the strategy?

We observe this report uses the phrase "white elephant" a lot. Apparently it escaped the Howard government that if you cannot match defense funding with purpose, your program can be said to be lacking of purpose.

THE Federal Government will launch a major cost cutting assault on multi-billion dollar defence projects established by the Howard government, with the controversial $6.6billion Super Hornet jet fighters first in its sights.

Other defence white elephants in the Government's target include the Abrams tank, three massively expensive air warfare destroyers, two huge amphibious carrier ships, dud Seasprite helicopters, unnecessary flying drones and $16billion worth of undeveloped F-35 joint strike fighters.

If I was a citizen of Australia, I'd be a little concerned when almost every major defense program is labeled a white elephant. We note that only the Collins class and Collins class replacement are not mentioned. Is every single program actually a white elephant, is that really the world we live in where a nation should in fact invest in no new defense programs? I'm not sure the phrase white elephant applies, but in a nation loaded with resources in a region of increasing competition for resources, I think the word "Ivory Tower" best describes the white elephant approach to defense. Rather than a military "that fits seamlessly into the US military machine" this article is painting an ever scarier picture, because it sounds a lot like a plan for Australia to be as dependent as possible upon the United States for defense in the future. There has to be a wise approach somewhere in the middle.

That isn't to suggest there shouldn't be a review, or cuts, in fact we believe both should be done. From our perspective, Air Defense destroyers are hardly white elephants for an island nation. Without the ability to defend shipping, you better be ready and willing to produce everything, without any imports, because only with the proposed Air Defense destroyers will Australia have the capability to defend its sea lanes. ANZACs and Adelaide frigates cannot fill that role in the Pacific, too many contenders.

The LHD is also very important, in fact we would suggest one of the most important military programs for Australia. One of the pillars of Australia's defense lies on its option for intervention in the South Pacific. Without that capability, Australia eliminates that pillar of regional defense, and is just begging for other powers to assume that role. The power most likely to assume that role in the region, in protection of its own interests, is China. I have a hard time believing the sacrifice of that pillar of defense to China is in the best interest of Australia, but that is the road being paved by the elimination of the LHDs. The Abrams tanks, which can be carried on the LHDs, is an important part of that defense strategy.

As for the aircraft purchases and frigate modernization, I believe this is something for the Rudd government to take a serious look at. The Super Seasprites are a disaster, Howard lacked the guts to call a spade a spade and do what is required. Rudd should take action there. If the modernized frigates can't deploy to forward theaters, they aren't of any use. The replacements for the F-111s also raises questions, and is tied directly to the F-35A purchase. The problem is two fold, first what is the strategic purpose of ground based aircraft, and two what considerations are required within the scope of the strategic purchase of future aircraft for expeditionary deployment. The Howard government never answered those questions, and it is unclear if the Rudd government is even asking those questions. Until strategic purpose is identified, it is premature to believe any platform is right for Australia, which is why the cross-hairs are on the aircraft purchases.

This will be interesting to observe unfold. Will Australia go the way of Europe, basically rely on the US for its defense, and if so, what does that mean for the US? The lack of defense spending in Europe is creating a greater reliance on the US for defense, will we have to do the same for Australia in the future? This is why a rising India is so appealing to many in the US, it is a lot easier to partner with nations, specifically democracy's. that take their national defense and regional security responsibilities seriously.

Despite Bad Press Otherwise, The Quiet Success Story Continues


Military.com covers the delivery of the PCU North Carolina to the Navy.

The Navy took delivery of its newest attack submarine, Pre-commissioning unit North Carolina (SSN 777), from Northrop Grumman Newport News (NGNN) Feb. 21. North Carolina is the fourth Virginia-class submarine and the second delivered by NGNN.

According to Virginia-class program manager, Capt. Dave Johnson, the delivery of North Carolina was a 10-month improvement compared to NGNN's first Virginia-class submarine, USS Texas (SSN 775).

"The Navy's shipbuilding partners have brought the learning curve down and performance continues to improve," he said.

The Virginia-class is the Navy's first major combatant designed and delivered specifically for the post-Cold War security environment. The class provides the ability to dominate across a wide range of missions including strike; special operations; anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; battle group support; and Mmne. warfare in both shallow and deep-water environments.

Does everyone remember the concern for cost increases with the Virginia class submarines? The concern was so high in fact that the program was scaled down, producing only 1 hull a year divided among two shipyards, because we were told cost increases were certain to make the class unfordable.

We don't deny that fast-attack submarines are expensive, but we note the Block III Virginia class is an amazing evolution of the class, perhaps one of the most deadly weapons of war ever invented, and the costs have been reduced to support 2 billion per hull at a build rate of 2 per year. Why does this matter, because there will be no refueling costs, the reactors lasts the full service life of the class, so costs don't pile on later like they have with the Los Angeles class.

For all the hype and negative press thrown at the submarine community by the Navy itself, I'd like to review a few facts. The cost increases to the LPD-17 program is at 70%. The cost increase to the LCS program was last identified 80%, and has probably risen higher since.

The cost increase to the Virginia class submarine program = 11%, and just in case you want to know the source, it is J. Michael Gilmore and Eric J. Labs testimony to the House of Representatives on July 24, 2007.

Eric Labs is the most credible source we know of when it comes to shipbuilding, in that same testimony from last year he predicted the final costs of LCS-1 would be $630 million. Earlier this month the final cost for LCS-1 was identified as $631 million, which suggests Eric Labs is head of the class when it comes to identification of shipbuilding costs.

PCU North Carolina is expected to be commissioned May 3, 2008, in Wilmington, N.C.

Kitty Hawk To India Discussion Hits the US Media

Apparently, we are not the only ones who believe the Kitty Hawk is in play. This is the first article in the US media that has covered this topic, previous coverage has been exclusive to Indian press sources.

USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) aircraft carrier for free--provided the Indian Navy will agree to purchase 65 of the newest model Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to be operated off of it.

If true--and if New Delhi accepts--this can do more than just sink the Russian carrier deal and the MiG-29K contract. The Indian Air Force (IAF) are deep in the throes of a tender to purchase almost 200 new fighter aircraft, with Boeing and RSK-MiG both in the field of six contenders. An order of 200 fighter airplanes is unheard of--larger than any such export sale in more than 20 years. In an era where sales of 12, 20, or 40 fighters are more common, this is the PowerBall Lotto of export competitions.

If the Indian Navy decide to take on the F/A-18E/Fs, it makes logistical sense for the IAF to do the same and the competition for this massive sale would probably be over for all of the other competitors before it gets started.

The rumors of this possibility entered the media discussion in India back in December, in fact earlier this week we highlighted the difference in cost between Russia and India appears to be $600 million. As both the Weekly Standard article and we have pointed out, it is the purchase of 200 fighters that is the real objective, not the carrier.

We are mixed on this. As comments have pointed out, this is basically a 180 degree approach than that of the Washington Treaty which moved to limit arms buildups across the world. In this case, both Russia and apparently the US are looking to 'give' an aircraft carrier away, because both Russia and the US know India is the primary military sales market for the next decade. India is building its capacity for domestic military production, but they are still many years away from this.

We believe this is a difficult choice for India, not as cut and dry as it might appear. The Kitty Hawk might be old, but she is much more capable than the Gorshkov, and unlike the Gorshkov the Kitty Hawk can be fielded within the time frame India desires a replacement carrier, but there are problems that would need to be addressed.

First, the Kitty Hawk isn't just big, she is huge and requires a much larger crew than the Gorshkov. Second, she will be more expensive to operate and she will need some work done to be remain operational for an extended period of time, work the US is unlikely to pay for. While the article points out the US is willing to 'give' the Kitty Hawk to India for free, that doesn't mean there won't be maintenance costs that will need to be worked out.

Will this happen? We will have to wait and see, but there is a good reason the US may sweeten the pot. Russia has not converted its economy from a military industrial complex economy yet, and an order of 200 fighters from India would allow Russia to continue as is for several more years. The only way Russia converts out of its military sales mentality is for sales to dry up, and should the US win the fighter deal with India it could force major changes within Russia's export economy, and while that would create many short term problems for Russia, it would be very good for Russia and the world long term as their economy is forced to adapt to compete.

If the US wins the fighter deal, it is a good bet Russia is going to be pissed off. If the US ends up replacing the Gorshkov with the Kitty Hawk as well, it would be like a double kick in the nuts for Russia. At that point, the predictive variables become difficult to measure. It honestly has us wondering out loud if the India does pick the US, would Congress block it solely out of fear of backlash from Russia? Nevermind the proliferation issues, which are important issues, but the question whether the US Congress would back down to Russian rhetoric is not a small issue, as many are ready to do so today on the missile defense issue.

Welcome to the future, where globalization is the only new factor to the energy desires of rapidly developing nations. After all, in the 1930s, the need to secure resources was a major motivation for Japanese expansion. Over the next several decades, it isn't about conquering nations for resources, but it is about protecting access and delivery of those resources, and the Kitty Hawk can go a long way towards those ends for India.

One final thought. If you have read our previous coverage of this topic then read Reuben Johnson's article, we wonder if he is simply 'reporting' our coverage and speculation, or if he did this on his own. It may be this article simply repeats our coverage, speculation, and reporting and we are completing a loop by covering it. It is highlighted the Weekly Standard article used our picture of the Kitty Hawk from December. This is a common image, but he connects several dots that were connected here first, and are not connected anywhere else that we are aware of (including in the India reporting). Not that it matters, we don't copyright and it isn't like he can cite a blog who is an anonymous source, but it is something we noted.

By the way, we will probably hear more, not less of this, see here for why.

H/T: Mike

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Truman Carrier Strike Group

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56) - 6th Fleet
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
HMS Manchester (D95)
HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)
USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8)
USS Montpelier (SSN 765)


Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Tarawa (LHA 1)
USS Cleveland (LPD 7)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Hopper (DDG 70)
USS Ingraham (FFG 61)


In Theater

Ocean 6
FGS Emden (F 210)
HDMS Thetis (F357)
FS Guepratte (F714)
FS Commandant Bouan (F797)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
HMS Campbeltown (F86)
HMS Argyll (F231)
HMAS Arunta (FFH 151)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

Friday, February 22, 2024

A Few FY09 Budget Highlights

FY 2009-2013 Shipbuilding Budget



FY 2009-2038 30 year Naval Vessel Construction Plan



Ships Planned for Disposal by Dismantling



(click pictures to enlarge)