Pictures of the Day: Leveraging the Sea as a Base

As long as the Navy continues to contribute excellent photography and stories regarding events taking place off Liberia, we'll continue to expend the blogger bandwidth highlighting the story.


A few thoughts. Anyone want to speculate a bit on the tugs? How many would be used in an operation like this? Would two be enough? Is that LCU acting as a sentry in the background of the second picture? One more thought, in observing the lighting setup, while it may work for this type of operation, one would imagine that isn't an optimal configuration for a Sea Base in wartime.


I don't know about you, but this story doesn't get old. They say a picture is worth a thousand words. From our POV, the pictures have us craving a thousand words not only on the Sea Basing aspect, but now we are curious about the work this base at sea is supporting.

In observing these photo's, are we right in assuming the pictures are being taken from one of the Ro/Ro's looking out onto the causeway pier? Somewhere I imagine the gods of the sea are smiling down observing this in the fine historical tradition of Hercules, Wimbrown VII, and Ocean 6 among too many others to name from Vietnam. As the gods would tell their servants, we have moved way beyond refitted barges for building bases at sea.

Does anyone else think it is time to come up with a clever name for this little US Navy FOB at Sea off the Liberian coast. I'd be curious to know what those folks in the picture are calling their sea base.

I still want to see a picture from sky view, something to give a context to the size and scope.

Return of the Maritime Strategy Discussion

Update: Report is online and available here. This is a good read.

We were under the impression an excellent contribution to the Maritime Strategy discussion would be released today by Bob Work and Jan van Tol of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies, but maybe I didn't get the memo of a date change?

Regardless, Mr. Work gave me permission to discuss the contribution, and I'm going to take him up on his offer. Hopefully the CSBA webmaster will upload the new contribution to the website tomorrow if they get the impression I'm stealing thunder. In honesty, I only wish I could promote this more than the traffic on this blog will allow, because the contribution is critical to the discussion of Maritime Strategy. The contribution: A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower: An Assessment will hopefully soon be available for download from the CSBA website.

We have been aware of this contribution to the Maritime Strategy discussion for several weeks now, and in discussions with SteelJaw Scribe, Eagle1, Chap, and CDR Salamander we have all agreed the best approach is to encourage everyone interested in the Navy to download and read this new contribution when it becomes available. We do not intend to discuss the content of this backgrounder in detail until Monday March 31st, assuming it is available by then, in this way hoping that everyone is able to digest the contents of this latest contribution and be ready for the discussion then.

Our assessment and initial thoughts: This is the smartest contribution we have read to date on the Maritime Strategy discussion, a must read for anyone interested in Maritime Strategy and US Military Strategy, and believe it is the context and knowledge that many have been looking for since the initial impressions (or depression) that followed the release of the Navy's Maritime Strategy last October. We'd like to encourage all of our readers to take the time to read Bob Work's and Jan van Tol's contribution, as we intend to focus on the Maritime Strategy topic next week, and will undoubted find inspiration as other blogs discuss the topic as well. We include this sample as food for thought:

A MARITIME STRATEGIC CONCEPT, NOT A STRATEGY

Although A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower may not constitute a complete strategy, it is nonetheless a very important and valuable strategic document. As highlighted boldly on the top of page 5, the document describes a new maritime strategic concept, defined by Samuel P. Huntington as a service’s collective purpose or role in implementing national policy:

Basically, this concept is a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security. If a military service does not possess such a concept, it becomes purposeless, it wallows about amid a variety of conflicting and confusing goals, and ultimately it suffers both physical and moral degeneration.

A strategic concept is more akin to a strategic vision statement designed to guide and foster change in an organization. It therefore lacks the specifics that one might expect to find in a true strategy. One of its primary aims is to help garner the “resources, human and material, which are required to implement [a Service’s] strategic concept.” In other words, the key aim of a strategic concept is to bolster public support for the Service. As Huntington wrote:

If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.

In Huntington’s view, a strategic concept and the resources needed to implement it are two of the three key “elements” associated with any military service. The third and final element is its organizational structure—how the service “group[s] the resources allocated by society…most effectively to implement the strategic concept. Thus the nature of the organization is likewise dependent upon the nature of the strategic concept.”

As can be seen, then, in Huntington’s hierarchy, a sound strategic concept is the most important overriding element of any military service, as it is used both to garner public support for resources and to inform its organizational structure. Importantly, however, although a strategic concept is tied closely to both resources and organization, the three elements are separate and distinct. By recognizing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower as a maritime strategic concept instead of a comprehensive strategy, its glaring lack of resource priorities and implications and concrete organizational initiatives becomes more understandable, as does its sweeping, visionary style.

We intend to bump and link when the document is released, hopefully on Wednesday. Should the document be released this week, we intend to discuss the document in full starting Monday. Bob Work and Jan van Tol deserve a lot of credit producing a thoughtful approach to the new Maritime Strategy, because with the discussion in Denver this week and the NWC symposium this weekend the time is ripe to talk strategy instead of stay focused on the shipbuilding issues in Congress.

Gene Taylors "Pure Fantasy" Comment Describes DDG-1000 Program

Capt. Jim Syring has one of the hardest jobs in the Navy, he is the DDG-1000 program manager. Of all the tough jobs it seems to me that would not be one I'd want, too many things out of ones control can ruin a career. If we are speaking strictly from a historical perspective, while it may his job, this doesn't strike me as something smart to say. This is from today's CHINFO Clips in an article by Dan Taylor and Inside the Navy.

Each lead ship costs about $3.3 billion, and a single DDG-51 in FY-09 under the Navy’s multiyear procurement contract costs about $2.1 billion, but the service expects to get the DDG-1000’s costs down to $2.3 billion by the time the fifth ship is purchased in FY-11, Syring said.

“To me, that’s an excellent trade in terms of costs versus capability, and we think that that’s the apples-to-apples comparison unit,” he said. “It’s not $3, $4, $5 billion, whatever people tend to write about. It’s just over $3 billion for each lead ship, and just over $2 billion recurring for each successive [ship].”

Syring said the DDG-1000 will be significantly more stealthy, have lower manning requirements and be able to fire at three times the range of the DDG-51.

How complicated is the DDG-1000 compared to the DDG-51? Twice as complicated? We all know about the 10 new technologies in the DDG-1000, and we know about the size increase, but what I would ask is how does all of this new stuff like new hull form and new technologies contribute to the construction simplicity? My guess is it probably doesn't.

Of the last 10 ship classes built by the Navy, 5 of the last 10 first in class ships suffered a cost overrun of 100% or more. A couple examples would include the LPD-17 with a cost overrun of 155%, but also the DDG-51 with a cost overrun of 110%. The LCS, supposed to be a simple design according to the Navy program managers themselves, is already over cost around 188%.

Furthermore, Capt. Syring is suggesting a ship where shipbuilders have the experience of 62 previous ships constructed will cost $2.1 billion, which could be true, but even if true he is suggesting a brand new ship with 10 new major technologies and 5,000 tons larger will only cost $200 million more after building only 4 ships prior, 3 when you consider there are 2 different first in class. Does that sound like a program using believable numbers that is unlikely to have cost overruns?

The way we see it there is a 50% chance the DDG-1000 will have a minimum of 100% cost increase on the first in class ships. With 50% chance of probability the cost overrun alone for the first two ships, never mind other money spent on the program, could run as high as $6.6 billion dollars. In testimony earlier this month Ronald O'Rourke and Eric Labs guessed to put the price of a new DDG-51 Flight IIA at around $1.7 billion, and Capt. Syring is suggesting a brand new variant would cost around $2.1 billion. The way we see it, there is 50% chance that with the cost overruns of the first in class DDG-1000s alone the Navy could buy nearly 4 DDG-51 Flight IIAs or at least 3 of these new variant DDG-51s.

There is an unavoidable traditional cost overrun associated with first in class ships, and looking at the numbers Capt. Syring is distributing to the media, it is not very difficult to see why there are so many skeptics there won't be a big cost overrun with the DDG-1000. Does anyone believe the DDG-1000 is not going to have major cost overruns? The Navy's cost estimate for DDG-1005 is only $200 million less than what they claim a new DDG-51 costs, and we are supposed to believe that isn't a red flag for a 100% cost overrun, which history tells us has a 50-50 shot of happening anyway?

I don't know if DDG-51s are a suitable substitute for DDG-1000s, but there are clearly some bright red flags here with the DDG-1000 that helps explain why Congress is looking for other solutions. Does anyone have any reason to believe the numbers Capt. Syring is offering? I admit I find this depressing, Gene Taylor called it "pure fantasy" and I think reasonable people who look at what is being suggested would agree.

Observing the Sea Base Off Liberia

I don't know if the African Partnership Station Public Affairs office is reading the blog, but if you are we appreciate you being responsive to our request for more information, detailed information, and excellent information in covering the Sea Basing operation off Liberia. We credit Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class (SW/AW) Elizabeth Merriam for this excellent contribution to the Sea Basing discussion.

The INLS is a redesign of a floating dock system originally used during World War II. Composed of smaller component links the system pieces can lock together to create ferries, causeway piers, or roll-on, roll-off discharge facilities to transport cargo and equipment from ship to shore while leaving a minimal footprint tailored to the individual mission.

The construction began aboard container & roll-on/roll-off ship USNS Lance Cpl. Roy M. Wheat (T-AK-3016) when various commands from Naval Beach Group 2 worked together to crane the links off of the ship and combine them into their final structures...

Once the construction on the INLS components was completed the discharge facility was transported to container & roll-on/roll-off ship USNS 2nd Lt. John Bobo (T-AK-3008) where it was loaded with Marine Corps vehicles...

The vehicles were then transported to the staging deck aboard amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) where the ship's crew and the members of Assault Craft Unit 2, piloting the roll-on, roll off discharge facility, would attempt to dock an INLS structure in a well deck for the first time...

Once the Sailors secured the discharge facility in the well deck members of the 4th Marine Logistics Group simply drove the vehicles off the platform rolling directly into the staging area.

While Fort McHenry's crew worked with the discharge facility, John Bobo moored next to the INLS causeway. As part of the exercise, Marines reloaded the platform and the discharge facility and departed Fort McHenry to rendezvous with John Bobo, again exhibiting the ability of the INLS to dock with an amphibious vessel to transport cargo from ship to ship. Once the roll-on, roll-off discharge facility and causeway ferries were attached to the causeway, High Speed Vessel 2 Swift moored next to John Bobo, where ready receive Marine vehicles were transported to ship to shore.

This is the first time INLS has been used successfully at sea to transport cargo from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore. During the rest of WATC the INLS will be used to aid in transporting humanitarian assistance supplies to Monrovia as part of the APS contribution to the area.

I've admittedly butchered an excellent story, so I encourage people to read the story without my cut outs, particularly as I think some of the details offered in the interviews tell the 'rest of the story.' For our purposes though we remain focused on the process for now.

From our perspective, observing the news reports and admiring the photography, it appears the Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) has demonstrated an amazing degree of capability for Sea Basing operations. As we previously covered, the West Africa Training Cruise (WATC) 08 will continue until April 5th, which we believe means the Sea Base built with the INLS will remain constructed for another week supporting humanitarian operations before being broken down. As some commenter's have previously noted, the port infrastructure in Monrovia is subpar, at best, and almost certainly not of a condition to support the USNS Lance Cpl. Roy M. Wheat (T-AK-3016) or USNS Lance Cpl. Roy M. Wheat (T-AK-3016).

This demonstration leveraging the INLS has thoroughly impressed us, bringing together the combinations of well decks, large Ro/Ro prepositioning ships, and a high speed vessel shallow draft connector has changed our perspective regarding the possibilities of Sea Basing, not only for peacetime operations but also for warfighter operations. With selective offload in the future, we see the potential to leverage amphibious assault ships for multiple assaults, simply reloading Marine Corp equipment from a secure, remote location at sea.

The interconnecting nature of the ferries, causeway piers, and roll-on, roll-off discharge facilities sparks our imagination in regards to potential. In the excellent coverage to date, we observe the only thing missing is a photo from above to get an idea regarding the size of the INLS causeway pier system constructed.

Roughead Discusses Reducing the Number of Sailors on Warships

In general we see both sides of the primary argument, and we think it is an interesting discussion. We don't necessarily agree or disagree on the issue for the same reasons as most regarding reductions in sailors though. Roughead wants to reduce crew sizes on warships, and we understand his reason is budgetary in nature.

“There’s no question that crew sizes have got to come down,” he said. “We, frankly, are not aggressive enough in employing the technologies that allow us to take people off ships. It’s largely a cultural thing we’ve got to break through ... and we can do it, I’m confident.”

Roughead said he thought smaller crew sizes were a top feature on the Navy’s new generation of warships, including the Zumwalt-class destroyers — which, although they’re the Navy’s largest new surface combatants since World War II, have a projected crew of 142 — and the littoral combat ships, which will be crewed by 40 sailors who’ll be given multiple jobs.

Roughead said he didn’t have specific goals yet for how much he’d like to reduce crew sizes on so-called “legacy ships” that the Navy plans to upgrade, but he said “my objective will be get it down to the number that allows us to maintain combat effectiveness and provide for the safety and security of the ship.”

“In the past, we’ve had some initiatives underway but they had a hard time taking through,” Roughead said. “In my tenure, I intend to be a little on the bold side.”

Despite the fact his reasoning is driven primarily by the bean counters, there really is an interesting 'other' discussion with this issue. In general we agree with both sides of the argument, and don't pick sides based on those two camps. We simply do not have evidence, other than what history tells us, regarding the number of sailors required to support damage control efforts.

In favor of reducing crew sizes is the need for the Navy to save money. There is a camp within the Navy that believes damage control equipment has become robust enough to be effective in wartime, and apparently damage control and survivability are not sacrificed by large reductions in crew sizes. Against the reduction of crew sizes are reminders of past experiences where damage control required many, many continuous difficult hours by very large crews, even on smaller frigates, to contain damage and save ships from sinking. Both the USS Stark (FFG 31) and USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) were saved due to valiant damage control efforts by the 200+ sailors and officers.

In Bradley Peniston's book No Higher Honor the damage control efforts of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) is well chronicled. The story describes how over 200 officers and sailors worked for 18 straight hours to keep the ship from sinking after hitting a mine in the Gulf. The argument of those against the reduction of crew sizes on warships asks an important question, how can ships without sailors to operate in shifts during damage control operations hope to keep a ship from sinking after taking serious damage? In what way has technology improved so much, at a time when armor on ships has been reduced considerably, that a ships survivability is not hampered greatly by the reduction of crews?

I think the entire damage control debate is interesting, but it is not my primary consideration when I ponder the decision by the Navy to reduce the number of sailors on ships.

If we assume that damage control and fire extinguishing technologies are vastly improved today, robust enough to sustain substantial damage and remain operational, and a reduced number of crew doesn't effect survivability of modern US Navy warships, then we believe the Navy is absolutely doing the right thing by reducing the number of sailors on warships. We believe the Navy has figured out that they do not require large numbers of sailors to fight a war at sea with modern technology. Under those conditions we agree completely with Roughead that naval warfare has become an exercise in the utilization and application of technology to strike the enemy effectively first, and manpower is not a primary consideration for meeting those conditions if sailors are not required for damage control.

However, as we review the Maritime Strategy and apply the lessons of peacemaking operations including those we are learning from the Marines, we are constantly reminded that for peacemaking operations manpower is a hard requirement. We observe a constant in modern warfare, on land and at sea, that unmanned systems are force enablers for warfighter operations. We also observe another constant, on land and at sea, that manpower is the force enabler for peacemaking operations.

As Network Centric Warfare in the present and future envisions distributed unmanned platforms dispersed to perform fleet scouting operations in wartime to reduce the time in the C2 kill chain, we believe that under a peacetime Maritime Strategy, if it is to be successfully executed, it will ultimately be the distribution and utilization of manned platforms to establish the social presence for establishing stability and security in troubled regions.

With the reduction of sailors on warships, we observe that the US Navy intends to increase distribution through unmanned systems via platforms like the Littoral Combat Ship. We believe that such a plan ultimately will not be as effective as currently envisioned, because it fails to increase the human element required for peacemaking operations. Presence is determined by interaction between local populations and the Navy, and not determined by the interaction of a robotic system and the local population. When it is all said and done, the presence of an unmanned system can not substitute for sailors in peacetime operations, as it cannot deliver the support and assistance that is outlined as guidance in the Maritime Strategy. In this regard, we believe the assumed increase to capability offered by unmanned systems is flawed in its desired effect, because while it will add tremendous capability to warfighting, a robotic system cannot substitute for the sailor in peacemaking.

This is why we believe large motherships and small surface combatants is a better model under the Navy's Maritime Strategy than small motherships (LCS) and large surface combatants (DDG-1000). As unmanned networks will enable the warfighter in the future, we believe the development of large, distributed manned networks at sea is the holy grail of peacemaking operations in the future. Due to the nature of the environment at sea, we acknowledge that such a network will be defined by force structure, which is also why the need for small, inexpensive fast manned platforms remains a requirement for US Naval forces today under the Maritime Strategy. In that way, we believe it is fair to suggest Streetfighter as a maritime strategic concept for fleet constitution is the desired force structure for peacemaking operations in the future.

Julian Corbett believed the object of naval warfare "must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it." Corbett was specifically discussing the strategic objective of a fleet for warfighting. In that spirit we observe the strategic peacemaking requirement as outlined in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower to be the establishment of cooperative processes that mitigates the disruption of cooperative command of the sea to promote peacetime commerce. As part of a circular theory of maritime strategy that accounts for both warfighting and peacemaking. the strategic peacemaker responsibility for the Navy exists both prior to warfare (cooperative partnerships) and after warfare (reconstitution of commerce and security), also described as the periods of time absent warfare. We observe this strategic approach to peacemaking relies upon the application of warfighter capabilities to regain command of the sea when command is lost.

In other words, while manpower may not be required to secure command of the sea or prevent the enemy from securing it, manpower will be a critical part of the requirement within the context of the maritime strategy for periods where command of the sea is assured, which ironically defines the vast majority of the operational time of the US Navy today.

We observe the Interaction Patrols (IPATS) that integrate the use of a landing craft utility (LCU) with air assets, with recent exercises in both the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, are utilizing sailors to increase the distribution of a manned presence for VBSS operations as part of the development of these manned network theories for peacemaking operations. Due to these developments, we have a lot of faith that while the crew reduction issues remain controversial for damage control discussions, ultimately the Navy appears to realize the value of sailors to executing the Maritime Strategy. We remain interested in observing as the crew size debate continues, but rather than the damage control debate we know many have concerns about, we are more curious to see how the Navy develops its manpower strategy in the context of fleet constitution and Maritime Strategy, with the strategic execution approach, not the fleet constitution approach, being the most relevant budgetary consideration in our opinion.

USS Russell (DDG 59) Takes Blogging To Sea

This is what I call evolution, a clear example of someone my age leveraging the tools of my generation for a purpose never attempted before. Our good friend LCDR Chris van Avery, aka Yankee Sailor, the XO of the recently deployed USS Russell (DDG 59) has started a blog for the USS Russell (DDG 59). We love the name: TheDestroyermen, and we love the purpose.

To deliver an authentic, unvarnished, informative and entertaining account of life aboard a U.S. Navy destroyer, report on USS RUSSELL's contribution to the Global War on Terror and execution of America's Maritime Strategy, and provide insight into the character of the American Sailor.

This is a very clever idea, and something we have a great deal of interest in observing. The Navy does a lot of work behind the scenes out of view of the public and PAOs, and a blog which has the potential to be more personal can do a lot of good sharing stories normally concealed due to lack of mediums for exposure. When we have talked in the past about the Navy needing to leverage the internet to get its message out, we see this as exactly the right way. Steve Cohen may not have discussed it in his February 08 article in Proceedings, but we believe this is exactly what he was talking about when he advised the Navy on the need to talk to the public in his article Marketing is not a Dirty Word.

We see this as good for the Lincoln CSG, good for the Russell, good for the families of the sailors on the Russell, and good for the Navy. We are featuring the blog predominately on our link list for the duration of the USS Russell (DDG 59) deployment.

Good luck to Chris and those working with him in this venture, and good luck to the officers and sailors of the USS Russell (DDG 59) on this deployment. We look forward to great photography and interesting stories that give us land bound folk a taste of the salt air in the Pacific.

Picture of the Day: More Sea Basing Off Liberia

Today we feature another picture from the Sea Basing operation off Liberia. I still say this is the best Navy story the media doesn't talk about. Another great photo, but again, this picture makes me think this is a slow process.


80322-N-0193M-107 MONROVIA, Liberia (March 22, 2024) Members of Navy Cargo Handling Battalion (NCHB) 1 guide a Marine Humvee from the Marine Corps container roll on roll off ship USNS 2nd LT John P. Bobo (T-AK 3008) onto the deck of a roll-on roll-off discharge facility as part of West Africa Training Cruise 08, a sea basing initiative in conjunction with Africa Partnership Station. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Elizabeth Merriam (Released)