China Cruises the East China Sea

How should we put this into context? Perhaps as the way China conducts a Coast Guard cruise?

China sent out a large patrol fleet, including China's most advanced maritime patrol ship Haixun 31, to the East China Sea for a five-day mission on Tuesday.

Deputy director-general of Zhejiang Maritime Safety Administration He Yipei said that the fleet will consist of two other large patrol ships Haixun 113 and Haixun 111 and over 60 small vessels.

He noted that the bureau will also send 50 maritime vehicles and over 1000 personnel in the large campaign on clamping down on accidents off the Zhejiang coast.

The fleet will sail 17,000 sea miles in five days en route of Zhoushan Islands, Dachen Island of Taizhou and the Chunxiao gasfield.

We will be looking into this in more depth later, because I'm very curious what "50 maritime vehicles and over 1000 personnel" will do to "clamp down" on "accidents".

Has the US Coast Guard ever conducted a patrol like this involving more than 60 ships? If it has, I can't recall it happening. Imagine the reaction of Hugo Chavez if the Coast Guard deployed 60+ vessels to the oil regions of the Caribbean Sea.

China never seems to do anything small. They either don't do anything, or make it look like overkill.

On Reputations, Confidence, and Expectations

In crawling the daily reading list today I came across a post over on Thomas Barnett's blog that is interesting to think about. In his post The "League of Democracies" prefers Obama—by a lot! Tom makes an interesting observation worth thinking about.

Polling data saying that if the election is held in Europe, Obama wins in a landslide.

It is interesting to consider what this means, if anything. My first reaction is to remind myself that when the founders of this nation produced a document called the Declaration of Independence, the opinion of Europeans regarding American politics became irrelevant.

But upon further reflection, there is more depth to this than my initial nationalistic reaction. There is a conventional wisdom put forward that America's reputation has declined in the world, and in Europe specifically. It is said that the decline of America's reputation is relevant to Americans, as if what other countries think about us is in constant motion and we the citizen must adjust our behavior to rebuild our popularity. This shame via reputation tactic to shape behavior is particularly popular among the global warming community.

We find this conventional wisdom regarding the relevance of European opinion of American reputation to be in direct contradiction with our concept of American independence and liberty. We see no evidence that an adjustment in the behavior of Americans will improve our nations reputation with Europe in any substantial way, indeed we see no evidence that our behavior has any effect on the nations reputation in any way.

As we think about the relationship between the US and Europe, we see no evidence that our 'reputation' has actually declined, nor that it ever moves much at all. It is important to understand why the terms matter, reputation is a personal term thus it inspires one to believe they have personal responsibility in upholding its value. These polls claim to measure reputation, but if you read the questions, they are actually measuring confidence, an abstract term that carries no personal attachment.

Europeans don't think less of Americans today than they did ten years ago, and the same is true in how Americans view Europeans. We each have perceptions of the other, if upon encounter the expectations are met during an encounter, the encounter is always pleasant. If expectations are not met, the encounter is recalled as less than pleasant. It really is that simple.

We tend to think the real issue behind all this "talk of America's bad reputation" is actually an issue of expectations. For example, the EU3 has absolutely failed miserably for at least 4 years now in trying to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, and it is perhaps one of the greatest diplomatic failures in modern European history, and could potentially result in an incredibly costly war in the Middle East. Despite this absolute, total failure of European diplomacy, Americans don't think less of Germany, France, or Great Britain for their total failure in diplomacy. Why?

Because Americans never had any expectations the Europeans could solve the problem.

The reason the Europeans or anyone else might have a low opinion of the US, thus our terrible reputation, has everything to do with our leaderships inability to meet the high expectations our leadership set for the rest of the world regarding the influence and power of the United States. The reputation in America was unchanged even after the war in Iraq started, despite the lack of European approval for the war. The "reputation" of the US declined only after we failed to meet the expectations of a quick resolution to the Iraq war, expectations that US leadership set and did not meet.

Leadership is about setting expectations towards a positive goal, then meeting those expectations. Despite all the rhetoric about a bad reputation for the United States, if the next president can set reasonable expectations and meet or exceed those expectations, the "reputation" of America will make a 'remarkable' recovery.

Navy R&D;

We are big fans of Sharon Weinberger, she is consistently insightful in regards to military technology, and uses keen observation skills to highlight the 'fine print' that is often missed in defense reporting. While her writing on Danger Room normally sticks to the details, her sharp wit comes through in her commentary by leveraging sarcasm when appropriate. Sharon published a piece last night in Foreign Policy called The Pentagon’s Doomsday Men, and we really liked it.

Sharon is continuing the discussion we recently highlighted as the Paradigm Shift in the DoD, the debate over future force structures in the military services regarding how the military should evolve into a force for nontraditional threats and/or stay focused on building forces to counter major power war.

Sharon takes an interesting approach with this piece, rather than discussing the shift the services are struggling with, she observes the lack of shifts in the research and development community within the DoD, a community that now spends a budget that exceeds $75 billion annually.

The Pentagon, for its part, frequently speaks about investing in “high-risk, high-payoff” efforts—research that might well fail, but could lead to significant breakthroughs if it pays off. The Pentagon counts stealth aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and the Internet as successful examples of this strategy. Defense officials often employ a similar justification when addressing threats that may have a low probability of occurring, but pose a devastating consequence if they occur.

The problem with this approach to risk is not the underlying philosophy, but the frequent lack of willingness to either qualitatively or quantitatively address the actual risks. At the extreme, we know an attack by aliens from outer space is theoretically possible, but improbable. On the more conventional side, we know that a terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland is more likely than another country’s sudden development of a fighter that can match the F-22.

Sharon goes on to highlight some of the more high profile DoD R&D projects, specifically ballistic missile defense and the much discussed hypersonic aircraft. We don't claim to have credibility on judging the merits of hypersonic aircraft, but her points on missile defense, specifically the risk of a ballistic missile attack from Iran or North Korea vs a nuclear bomb from a terrorist is one we agree with.

We have discussed this subject before. Considering R&D, we consider the question where the focus should be for the Navy.

The Navy has low balled its R&D budget the last several years, intentionally, only to see Congress boost the budget above what was requested. This is a well known budget tactic by the Navy, specific to the Navy cutting R&D in its base budget for more ships, specifically the DDG-1000. Congress doesn't appear fooled by the technique, particularly evident with the current DDG-1000 discussion in Congress and the expectation of a boost to the R&D budget again in FY09.

As we think strategic about what the R&D project the Navy should be going all in on, one item in particular rises to the top. As we look at the technology focus, we believe the Navy needs to go "all in" on a research effort to develop and produce the technologies that would focus on and eliminate the threat of AIP submarines.

The AIP submarine is the rising modern threat to the global system. As an inexpensive weapon system it is one of the most lethal technologies at sea, being produced at a fantastic rate not only for major powers like Russia and China, but also on the export market for a several small nations.

As the Yuan class submarine becomes full scale production, we expect to see production levels hit an average of at least 4 per year, which during a ~10 year run that also includes nuclear ballistic and attack submarines for China could arm China with well over 100 modern submarines by 2025.

Wouldn't be nice if at the 2025 time frame, just as China is fielding this incredible underwater force, the US Navy is deploying technologies that made the AIP submarine obsolete? From a "risk management" perspective, the perspective Sharon takes in her article, the risk of failure would still likely produce several useful technologies towards either the detection or destruction of submarines, even if it fell short of its goal for making the submarine obsolete. Success in such an initiative would also have the nice side effect of eliminating the threat of the quiet, inexpensive export conventional submarine as a viable weapon to be utilized against the US Navy.

If the program was very successful, one potential side effect would be the impact such a research program would have on MIW. Imagine a world where naval mines were easily detected and neutralized threats.

A maritime domain protected by the threat of submarine or maritime mine would indeed be a legitimately safer world.

"Preparing the Battlefield" Part دو

Seymour Hersh, call your office, this message is probably on your voice mail.

An Iranian navy commander leading a unit that arrested 15 UK sailors in the Persian Gulf last year has survived an assassination attempt.

The attack on Colonel Abolqasem Amangah, the commander of the Arvand Rood Navy Base in southern Iran, occurred while he was driving in the eastern Sorkh Hesar district of Tehran last week.

Two groups of unidentified assailants, a group on a motorbike and the other in a car, opened fire on the vehicle of the Iranian commander.

Amangah pulled his car over, took shelter, and managed to escape unhurt.

It kind of puts the title of his latest piece into perspective huh? "Preparing the Battlefield"

Indeed.

For all you new folks who aren't familiar with Colonel Abolqasem Amangah, he is a rock star in Iran, they even threw a parade in his honor earlier this year. That link never gets old, Eagle1 won comment of the year...

Building Requirements Through Experience

Defense Daily has an article called Marine Corps Board Reviewing Delayed Marine Personnel Carrier by Emelie Rutherford out this morning, and we didn't get very far before we think something doesn't sound right...

A Marine Corps board is expected to sign off this month on a new plan for the future Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC), a medium-weight armored vehicle program recently delayed by two years because of fiscal constraints.

Service officials decided in April to halt plans to allow the MPC to enter into the technology demonstration stage and then issue a request for proposals for it--actions expected this past spring--because of a lack of funding. A new plan shifting the schedule to right by two years is being staffed to the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC), said Kevin McConnell at Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

"I assume that that [plan] is going to be concurred with by the MROC members because it's been widely briefed," said McConnell, deputy director of the fires and maneuver integration division.

The decision to delay MPC "was purely about the budget," and the program "is actually a very high priority," McConnell said.

Mr. McConnell, "purely" is such a strong term. I would have liked to hear questions about the MPC test conducted for loading and unloading on existing ships. Didn't hear about that? Well, the MPC prototype used for the test was too big and too heavy. Hopefully someone will enlighten us about the problems fitting through the stern ramp, or the problems using the ramps between decks.

The MPC is the latest in a series of Marine Corps equipment designs that is too big and too heavy for existing sealift. One side of the argument is to say "those damn Marines, they keep building bigger gear then complain because their equipment loads for MEUs continues to shrink." That same argument suggests the Marines need to be thinking a different way, a common buzzword is "flexible" and critics advocate the Marines need to shed their heavy gear and go light. There is one enormous black hole in the critics argument, unlike the Navy, the Marines are developing requirements based on experience and lessons of war.

Those critics would have the Marines dismiss all of the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq so they can fit some theoretical set of metrics developed absent the requirements learned on the battlefield. Sure the MRAP is big and heavy and doesn't fit very nice within the float, get over it. The alternative got a bunch of Marines killed. Is it going to suck when the Marines build a big, heavy Marine Personnel Carrier that further reduces the amount of equipment the Marines can carry with them within the existing ESG structure? Probably, but it shouldn't, the Marines are adapting to the reality of war based on the metrics derived through experience in war, anyone in the Navy who complains about that needs to get their wits together, and instead of complaining, get behind them and support the Marines requirements.

The problem isn't the increased size of vehicles, that was the solution in Iraq. The problem is the lack of evolution by the Navy to address the demands of this evolution in 21st century war. The Navy needs to work with the Marines to evolve the platforms that support the MEU, failure to do so is to place the theoretical requirements of the future over the absolute lessons learned in war. Looking at the big picture, it doesn't help the Marines any that the Navy is using Amphibious ships for their own purposes and resisting the call for more ships, because the reasonable conclusion we draw is that it is time to build more amphibious ships.

It is often suggested the JHSV is going to help this problem. Wrong. The JHSV has many potential uses, and will be fantastic in supporting operations after assault, but the JHSV cannot support the Marines from ship to shore to battle without infrastructure, either with a Sea Base or a port or some form of causeway. JHSV is great, but it, and sealift in general is not a replacement for amphibious assault. Don't be the guy claiming "but the Marines haven't assaulted a beach since Korea." That argument loses for two big reasons. First, every single major Navy in the world is building amphibious capabilities into their fleet right now, ALL of them. That makes it you vs the whole world in that argument, and there is tens of billions being spent worldwide proving your argument silly. Second, a US submarine hasn't sank a ship for an even longer period of time, do we abandon attack submarines too? Uhm, no.

This is why we continue to advocate for a 7 LHD, 2 LHA, and 19 LPD-17 amphibious force that transitions all existing LSDs into mothership roles for the Navy, but as secondary support platforms should a major amphibious operation call for it. The Marines need the extra vehicle space of the LPD-17s, and the Navy needs the LSDs to build forward sea bases. The requirement is 9 ESGs, that is 19 LPD-17s for 8 ESGs each with 2 LPD-17s, with for the forward deployed ESG, it would be 3 LPD-17s.

The attitude we often see put forth is that the Marines need to quit developing these big pieces of equipment. Well, that might be a legitimate argument for the EFV, but it isn't for the MPC. The way we see it, the Marines are the ones building metrics off experience in war, while the Navy is applying metrics built on the theory of war. Experience trumps theory everytime.

Given the choice between either battleship, DDG-1000 or DDG-51, and up to 19 LPD-17s, if the Navy is going to support their own requirements and the Marines requirements, they pick the LPD-17s. What do I mean by own requirements? We are not pulling these numbers out of thin air...

There have been 9 amphibious ships on deployment in 2008: USS Boxer (LHD 4), USS Nassau (LHA 4), USS Peleliu (LHA 5), USS Nashville (LPD 13), USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS Ashland (LSD 48), USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52), USS Oak Hill (LSD 51), and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). Of the 9 ships, three have been for Navy specific deployments: USS Boxer (LHD 4), USS Oak Hill (LSD 51), and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). That means a full third of the amphibious ships deployed this year have been for purposes other than the Marines, and I'm ignoring that the 24th MEU is in Afghanistan, not on the Nassau ESG. A full third...

We are suggesting 7 LHDs, 2 LHAs, 19 LPD-17s, and 12 LSDs used for the Navy. 7+2+19+12 = 40, with 12 for Navy purposes. What is the percentage of 40/12? "Match resources with requirements" is not a slogan, and requirements should be determined by experience, not by theory.