The resistance movement against the cancellation of the DDG-1000 on Capitol Hill is gathering itself for the fight ahead. Lets be clear, this is a lobby driven movement, there is nothing strategic about it from a maritime strategy perspective, rather from an industrial strategy perspective. That isn't a bad thing, the industry is critical to the success of the future Navy, but lets not confuse what is happening as anything other than Defense Industry giving some key politicians some directions.
The industry has some powerful friends. Emelie Rutherford reporting for
Defense Daily gives us a good example.
Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee Chairman Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) said Tuesday he supports continuing to build DDG-1000s. After news spread late Tuesday afternoon on Capitol Hill that the Navy wants to halt production of the destroyers, Inouye said support for the DDG-1000 remains in his chamber.
"There are some very special people in the United States Senate who want this [DDG-1000], one is [Sen.] Ted Kennedy [D-Mass.]," Inouye told Defense Daily yesterday. "And at this stage, it's kind of difficult to say no to them. And, furthermore, I think a study will show that to upgrade the [DDG-]51 may be a bit more expensive than buying the [DDG- ]1000." His panel has not yet marked up its fiscal year 2009 defense appropriations bill.
Senator Kennedy is in a tough position here because Raytheon, who has two of the most important new technologies in the DDG-1000, has its headquarters in Massachusetts. We sympathize with the Senator for his difficult position, his job demands that he supports his constituency. There should also be no doubt that both the
Dual Band Radar (PDF) and the
MK 57 Vertical Launch System (PDF) are two absolutely critical technologies for the future Navy, both of which developed by Raytheon. We will dive into both technologies in a later discussion.
While we aren't sure which contractors Senator Inouye (D-Hawaii) is looking after, the DDG-1000 is such a massively expensive and complicated system that it is a fair bet some portion of the system development is taking place in Hawaii. Indeed virtually every state likely has an economic interest in the DDG-1000, and with many of the subcontractors of the DDG-51 no longer with a personal interest, politicians find themselves in a difficult position. They can either support a sea change in the Navy's current course, a decision absent the support of any specific constituency, or support the current course which has the side effect of supporting some specific local voting constituency.
This is why we have spent a lot of time discussing the problems of the Navy regarding
strategic communications with the
American people. In the case of the DDG-1000, a politician is more influenced by a Defense Industry interest than by a citizens interest, because as we have laid out on the blog, the citizen has no interest whatsoever in the issue, doesn't know why they should, and the Defense Industry is the only group politicians are hearing from on the subject.
Emelie Rutherford goes on to highlight why the Navy doesn't really have the high ground here, and it is a point we agree with.
Kennedy, chairman of the SASC Seapower subcommittee, does not support the Navy's new plan, his spokeswoman Melissa Wagoner told Defense Daily yesterday.
"No, the Navy has not produced adequate justification for the requested change," she said in an e-mail, adding Kennedy was contacted by the service Tuesday. "Senator Kennedy believes it is unwise to restart the DDG-51 production line since he agrees with [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy] Adm. [Michael] Mullen that to do so keeps the Navy using 1980s technology when it has a program that is meeting all its milestones to deliver cutting edge technology."
In a statement she elaborated, noting the Navy's $11 billion investment in the DDG-1000 effort. She said the Navy now wants "to change the long-term shipbuilding plan without presenting an alternative plan to satisfy their future requirements or any discussion with the appropriate congressional oversight committees."
This is one example of the consequences of producing a maritime strategy without a resources discussion attached, you can't talk about ends, ways, and context while completely ignoring the "strategy of the means" and expect Capitol Hill to roll over absent any intellectual persuasion.
The plan, at least as suggested in media reports and as discussed by Gene Taylor, is to cancel the DDG-1000, a battleship by any standard, in favor of the DDG-51, a second rate battleship by our modern rating standard. There is nothing strategic about the decision, indeed the net effect is the cancellation of 5 ships for what is at most 11 ships, a net gain of 6 ships which btw, doesn't really save any money because they are simply shifting money around for a few more hulls.
Admiral Mullen is exactly right with his comment that this change "keeps the Navy using 1980s technology when it has a program that is meeting all its milestones to deliver cutting edge technology." That comment is an unpopular fact.
So in review, the costs of DDG-1000 or DDG-51 is a wash
if the DDG-1000 is on budget. That is a big
IF. The technology favors the DDG-1000. While the politics of the shipyards (BIW) is a wash, the politics of the subcontractors scattered across the entire country favors the DDG-1000, almost entirely due to the reality the American people do not care about the issue at all, nor understand enough about the issue to realistically know why they would care one way or the other. Where from here? Two options.
The first option is the strategic view. The strategic view doesn't support either option, the strategic view for surface combatants is to
eighty six the battleship and expand the fleet with smaller surface combatants able to saturate the seas with presence, an option not even being discussed. We believe this issue will continue to be very ugly unless that position, the one that unfortunately creates even more near term uncertainly for the industry, is chosen.
One way ahead for the strategic view in our opinion builds on the efforts of
Zumwalt's PF-109 program. The Navy tells Congress they want BIW to some variant of
this (PDF) instead of DDG-51s, and while getting the process of that program started, the Navy begins working with Raytheon on the CG(X).
The other option is to evolve the DDG-51 to a ballistic missile defense version, of Flight III version of the DDG-51. This may come up as a topic over the next week. The DDG-1000 does not support ballistic missile defense, so it is one area where the DDG-51 could establish itself as more capable than the DDG-1000. That may not sell well on Capitol Hill, and we are reminded of
this report by Geoff Fein back on July 11th.
In a July 2 letter to Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.), John Young, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, acknowledges the DDG-1000 hull form could not support certain radars being considered for CG(X).
"I agree that the Navy's preliminary design analysis for the next generation cruiser indicates that, for the most capable radar suites under consideration, the DDG-1000 hull cannot support the radar," Young stated.
However, Young added, that it is his "understanding that engineering analysis shows that the existing DDG-1000 hull design can support significantly more capable radar suites than the existing DDG-51 hull design."
One more piece to a massive, complicated, and political puzzle with nothing but ugly endings.
In the last 48 hours, over 250 unique stories about the DDG-1000 have popped up across the country, and awareness is on the rise. The CNO has done what was once thought impossible, not only has he completely blown up the current shipbuilding plan, but the news has brought attention to both the Navy and shipbuilding, and all eyes are now on the CNO.
