We have a New Link

This (PDF) was discussed in this mornings hearings. The Flight III is now in play.

Update: No wonder Roughead didn't endorse this. The DoD released the National Defense Strategy (PDF) of the United States today. It does help explain the move towards ballistic missile defense though.

The DDG-1000 Debate Begins a Day Early

Just when you thought you had everything figured out regarding the hearing on the DDG-1000 on Thursday morning, John Murtha decides to do his own thing. In a move we think is best described as a proverbial two handed middle finger gesture to everyone in the House, Senate, Industry, and Navy who thought they were involved in the narrative, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee rejected both the funding for a 3rd DDG-1000 in FY09, and the Navy's plan to replace the remaining planned DDG-1000s with DDG-51s. Megan Scully has the report.

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Wednesday rejected the Navy's new plan to revive production of its DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer next year, but also fell short of backing the more expensive DDG-1000 model service leaders are now hoping to cancel.

During its brief closed-door markup, the panel approved a $487.7 billion fiscal 2009 Defense spending bill -- $4 billion below the Pentagon's request -- that cuts $2.5 billion sought by the Pentagon to buy a third DDG-1000.

But the subcommittee approved $450 million for advanced procurement funding of the DDG-1000.

Note the last sentence, the $450 million is still in the budget markup. The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is sending a message: they remain open to possibilities. It is unclear what those possibilities they have in mind, but this debate is chess, and this is one of those unexpected early moves. The report continues with the rest of what we call the "Murtha Move."

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha, D-Pa., cited billions of dollars already invested in the DDG-1000 program -- as well as the costs of shutting down the production line at two shipyards, which he estimates at $600 million -- as reasons why his mark did not support the Navy's latest destroyer plan.

The Defense Department, Murtha added, would have to be "very convincing" to change his mind. "In conference [with Senate appropriators], we may decide to make a change, but I doubt it," he said.

Instead of pumping money into destroyer production lines, the panel opted to boost other shipbuilding projects, including an additional $1.6 billion for an LPD-17 amphibious warfare ship, $941 million to buy two T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo dock carriers and $397.6 million for long-lead items for the Virginia class submarine program.

Nothing is ever really decided in Washington until the ink hits the paper, but we note this as a very smart way to send broadsides at battleships. As we have noted this week, and despite what a certain editorial suggested this week, neither the DDG-1000 or the DDG-51 is actually replacing an existing ship about to retire. The ships the DDG-1000 is suggested to replace were already retired long ago, including the 50 year old pair of Iowa class battleships, but also the Spruance class destroyers which were retired early to save money. The ships in the Navy today about to be retired include the Austin class LPDs, the Perry class frigates, the Tarawa class LHAs, the Kilauea class ammunition ships, and Los Angeles class submarines. In other words, amphibious ships, logistics ships, and submarines. It is noteworthy that the amphibious force is being downsized, the logistics force is being downsized, and the submarine force is being downsized to pay for more battleships.

The Navy will decommission or retire exactly zero current cruisers and destroyers for the next 15+ years under current plans, and will commission and additional 10 DDG-51s and 2 DDG-1000s over the next five years that are already paid for and in some stage of construction.

The "Murtha Move" essentially tells the Navy that Congress will not be building any battleships this year and shifts money that would be used for building battleships to build a new amphibious ship, more logistics ships, and potentially another submarine. Many Congressman and Senators will hate this plan. Murtha stands on solid footing here, the 10th LPD-17 is the #1 priority on the Marines unfunded list, and 'we think' #2 on the Navy unfunded list. The submarine shortage is something that has been discussed every year in Congress so far this century, and the Navy robbed funding for previously purchased T-AKEs to pay for other projects, much to the anger of both the House and the Senate.

We are looking for two things tomorrow. First, Admiral Roughead started this process, he is the source for Gene Taylor and everyone knows it, even though the press can't report it yet (only because they can't prove it, they all know it too). Will Roughead throw Vice Admiral Barry McCullough to the wolves and allow his career to be handicapped by the contradiction crossfire he will almost certainly be called out on? If Vice Admiral Barry McCullough is the primary Navy contact during that hearing, he will never get another promotion. However, Roughead might reward him with a better posting in the future. We think there is an interesting dynamic at play here that will tell us a lot about Roughead. We think he should testify and lead by example.

A major part of the CNO role is to be the spokesman for the Navy, and never has the Navy needed that spokesman more than tomorrow morning. Anyone who spends any time talking to sailors hears the confusion, and the lack of confidence in leadership is evident. It is also often observed the desire for strong leadership is prevalent, and expectations are high, but within grasp. Will Roughead cease the opportunity he has been given?

Second, the $450 million is a carrot. Given the necessity for a "very convincing" argument, will the Navy come swinging with the strategic stick? The Navy has never linked strategy with shipbuilding in a public discussion since the release of the Maritime Strategy. Not Once. Does the Navy have a compelling case to make? Or will the discussion focus on the industrial, not strategic plan? Failure to make a compelling case tomorrow in that setting is validation the Navy doesn't have a compelling case for itself and its strategic vision that includes shipbuilding.

We observe the "Murtha Move" is the only option so far in this discussion that aligns Navy shipbuilding to strategy, but we don't like that it punts the industrial questions. We think complex problems like the Navy's current shipbuilding situation demands a comprehensive solution, and the "Murtha Move" is not that. However, this move does set up an interesting discussion tomorrow. The hearing will begin at 10:00am EST.

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Addendum: People read John Murtha's name, think of a certain episode regarding some fine Marines, and tend to go on a ballistic partisan political rant. Don't. The partisanship of Navy shipbuilding is a fictional creation of partisans. The political debates are almost never divided by political parties, rather are driven by regional interests. Political centric rants belong on another blog, and if you can't find one to sufficiently let it out, just send it in an email. For this discussion partisan political rhetoric adds nothing of substance to the discussion of the issues specific to Navy shipbuilding, and a zero tolerance policy for political rants will be enforced for this discussion. Put simply, stay on topic.

Lockheed Martin is Having a Really Good Week

Have you seen a picture of LCS-1 Freedom yet? If the answer is no, that makes you the only person on the internet yet to see the pictures. Lockheed Martin deserves a lot of credit, the recent news that Israel wants to buy 4 of Lockheed Martin's multi-mission combat version of the LCS, known as the LCS-I, began a string of stories that puts Lockheed Martin in a positive light, and some smart marketing guru at LM is earning their paycheck.

Following the announcement of a potential sale to Israel, we got some photo's of the inside of Freedom just 5 days before builders trials. Have we been duped into being a stooge for Lockheed Martin? If we have, good for them, the way we see it Lockheed Martin just as much a part of this community as everyone else. We've certainly given their executives hell in the past, and will again should it be deserved. Not this time though, the Navy is in dire need of a feel good shipbuilding story and you can credit Lockheed Martin for doing their part. They are in the business of selling ships, and right now business is looking good.

With the arrival of LCS-1 builders trials, it has taken just 3 days for the Navy to get 18 very clear photos of LCS-1 up in their "Eyes on the Fleet" section, all courtesy of Lockheed Martin. Throw in not one, but two videos, and the only thing missing is the ability to embed the videos on blogs. Tim Colton, who sees the PR machine in motion too, has often commented on the inability of Lockheed Martin to build ships. We default to his expertise on that subject, but whether they can build ships or not, they can certainly sell ships better than say, Northrop Grumman.

Consider for a moment that when the USS Green Bay (LPD 20) had builders trials, we are the only ones on the internet who had photos for the public, and they weren't courtesy of Northrop Grumman, who published no photos. Brett Favre and the Green Bay Packers have been the talk of sports news for a hundred million Americans since mid June, and the Northrop Grumman marketing men never came up with a way to showcase their product? In a month, the overpriced LCS is likely going to have a much improved reputation, and the LPD-17, which has been meeting cost targets, will still be a bastard of shipbuilding because of a cost problem of eight years ago.

While the LCS is a feel good story for Lockheed Martin, consider how events completely out of their control only elevate their good news. The Congressional Hearing tomorrow could turn into a major endorsement of AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense. If Congress decides to build more DDG-51s, and cancels the DDG-1000, the net result allows Lockheed Martin to beat back competition from Raytheon's combat system, which is intended for the DDG-1000. That is a major coup btw, Raytheon's combat system is truly open while AEGIS is not.

As if that isn't enough good enough news for Lockheed Martin, the bad news regarding LCS-2 Independence is just terrible timing for Austal. The good folks at the Mobile Press-Register newspaper deserve a lot of credit. DefenseNews tells the tale.

An internal U.S. Navy audit found a "significant breakdown" in oversight and cost controls for the second littoral combat ship, now about $300 million over budget and a year behind schedule at its shipyard in Mobile, Ala., according to a July 30 report.

The Navy document, obtained under the freedom of information act by the Mobile Press-Register newspaper, reported that project managers at Austal USA, the shipyard building the General Dynamics-designed LCS 2, were not keeping Navy acquisitions officials in the loop about the Independence's cost and schedule problems.

The Press-Register blog has the report linked for download. From the report, this is an example of how a shipbuilder, AND the Navy leaves a really terrible impression of management and oversight.

We found that EVM was not sufficiently implemented and overseen by any of the responsible parties on the LCS-2 “Independence” detailed design and construction contract. Our audit identified the following risks associated with the implementation and use of EVM on the LCS program: (1) Austal’s EVMS as related to the LCS program, did not comply with 20 of the 32 DoD established EVMS guidelines; (2) SUPSHIP Bath did not provide adequate surveillance over Austal’s EVM implementation; (3) GD/BIW, as the prime contractor, did not effectively oversee Austal’s EVM implementation; and (4) PEO Ships and PMO did not have adequate visibility over the LCS contractor’s cost, schedule, and technical performance. These conditions occurred because (1) DCMA, as the Executive Agent for EVM, and NAVSEA did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure EVM was properly implemented for the LCS-2 “Independence” contract; (2) Defense Contract Audit Agency had not performed required audits of Austal’s EVMS; (3) SUPSHIP Bath and the contractors did not implement a fully effective surveillance program; and (4) LCS PMO and the contractors placed limited emphasis on the implementation of EVM for the LCS program.

Considering the turmoil surrounding the shipbuilding budget right now, the frustration of so many regarding poor management in shipbuilding across the board, and that "Austal’s EVMS as related to the LCS program, did not comply with 20 of the 32 DoD established EVMS guidelines" which at this point in shipbuilding there is absolutely no excuse for, all that money invested in Austal is starting to look like a questionable investment.

This news comes on the same day it was reported Austal delivered the JHSV Phase II design to the Navy. We have previously covered the JHSV program. That is just terrible timing. Austal is in competition with General Dynamics, who wants to build their Rolls Royce JHSV design (PDF) in Bath, but is also in competition with Incat, who would build their JHSV at Bollinger Shipyards, which happens to be the other shipyard Lockheed Martin would build Littoral Combat Ships.

Lockheed Martin is enjoying a great public relations week, and the competition just happens to be simultaneously dealing with terrible public relations. Lockheed Martini is clearly having a really good week, and it only gets better if the DDG-1000 program dies tomorrow.

George Washington Fire Fallout

With a $70 million dollar repair bill, a deployment on a strict schedule, a bit of irresponsible behavior by a few of the crew, and a political spotlight coming from a major ally in the far east, and the result can't be too surprising. The Navy took action today in the George Washington fire.

The Navy’s Pacific Fleet commander, Adm. Robert F. Willard, in his final endorsement of an investigation into the fire, directed that Capt. David C. Dykhoff and his executive officer be relieved of command.

Dykhoff was fired “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command and his failure to meet mission requirements and readiness standards,” Navy officials said in a statement released Wednesday afternoon.

On Wednesday, Vice Adm. Thomas J. Kilcline Jr. pulled Dykoff from command and also fired the ship’s executive officer, Capt. David M. Dober, “for substandard performance,” according to the statement.

It was probably a good day to be fired, because tomorrow after 10:00am the Navy story everyone will be talking about will be the DDG-1000. By making a statement in the afternoon on the west coast the eve before a major Congressional pissing contest on shipbuilding, this story gets at best a 12 hour news cycle and then disappears.

According to the Navy Times article the combination of unauthorized smoking and improperly stored combustibles started the fire. The full report was not released, but the article mentions some of the report might be released in a few weeks. We hope so.

It is an exercise in futility to speculate what the contributing factors were on the ship itself, only the report could tell us. Were the inspection procedures being followed properly? Was there a breakdown in quality of leadership for inspections with this specific area of the ship? Was there a ship wide systematic problem that led to the change of command? Why wasn't a DC party able to quickly address a fire started by a cigarette before it consumed over 80 spaces of the ship? Lets be serious, if you can't quickly put out a cigarette, how the hell can you expect to put out a massive fire caused by an anti-ship missile consuming multiple decks and burning white hot on rocket fuel? There are plenty of questions, but only the report could tell us the answers.

The Navy continues to send signals to its commanding officers that perfection is demanded, anything short of perfection and the CO can be gone. Actually, that isn't completely true, the only time we ever see this type of perfection demanded by anyone over the rank of Captain is when it involves women, what we call the Tailhook rule. Accidents are not allowed, ever, and every major incident is always the COs fault, always. If an accident happens on your watch, kiss your career goodbye. It's a tough topic to speculate beyond the generic signals, because the Navy never explains why it takes the actions it does, meaning everyone in the Navy is left to speculate the same observations we list above.

In this case, the CO and XO are almost certainly not the smokers who contributed to the fire, but several members of the chain of command and crew would have been responsible for stowing flammables and not smoking in an unauthorized area. The Navy should put as much public humiliation on those folks responsible as they do on the officers. Failure to do so gives disgruntled sailors a lot of power, the ability to 'accidentally' screw up and insure a CO's career is killed.

Five Good Reads

David Axe is discussing Medical Diplomacy and SOUTHCOM over at Danger Room. David is one of many bloggers who will be taking a trip on the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) as it begins its medical diplomacy deployment next week. We intend to cover that deployment as next weeks theme as long as we find live blogging from the event. This humble blogger was invited to participate in this excellent endeavor, and had to respectfully decline such an incredible oppertunity due to work schedule. Yes, we really do have plenty of time to work when not updating the blog, unfortunately plenty of time also means all the time for this sometimes exhausted small business owner.

EagleOne is discussing a real Littoral Combat Ship that has gone to sea with an Army crew. SOUTHCOM again, man do those folks get it. We really do like the capabilities the M-80 brings to the littorals, and we can't wait to see the evaluation the platform gets after this real world evaluation of the platform.

SteelJaw Scribe is discussing Navy Ballistic Missile Defense. We agree with his conclusion, the Navy has done an excellent job evolving the capability and it is nearing the point of production stability. The time is now to start thinking about, and talking about, the approach to put this capability into the fleet as a whole. The way we see it, the more the Navy does BMD as part of strategy, the less the nation needs to make political waves putting BMD capabilities in other countries, including Europe. When it comes to footprints in the 21st Century, less is more, but less footprint doesn't mean we have to settle for less capability. AEGIS BMD works.

Our observations regarding the evolution of Renaissance Networks appears to have legs among many people much smarter than this humble blogger. We note the existence of such networks exist as evidence of this discussion alone. Consider for a moment that armed with my public school high school diploma an idea from this generalist, generated as a result of professional experience in video games, gets disseminated by the professionals at places like The Complex Terrain Laboratory and NYU. If that isn't evidence of the theory in motion, what would be? The term is actually a decade old, I tell the story behind the term in the comments here, a great read. Many won't get it.

Off Topic: For the record, I agree with this list.