As Similar Ideas Go Round and Round...

This exchange took place during Thursdays hearing in the House.

Rep. Jim Langevin (D-RI)
You've stated that the new DDG 51s could incorporate additional technologies, but we haven't heard a clear explanation as to what those would be.

Do your cost estimates for the future DDG 51s reflect current design and capability? Or do they incorporate additional technologies, each of which could lead to insertion or new design costs?

And finally, do your life cycle comparisons between DDG 51 and the 1000s incorporate the increased personnel required for the 51s? And have you developed estimates -- termination costs for DDG 1000s?

Vice Admiral Barry McCullough
Sir, the capability set I described for a DDG 51 that would restart as DDG 113 is based on the modernization program that we currently have funded in the DDG modernization program.

And that includes the COTS-based computer hardware, the open- architected computer program, the multimission signal processor with inherent ballistic missile defense capability, and the extended range antiair warfare capability with SM-6.

That combat system, because of the way it's been developed, costs less than the current combat system that's in DDG 112. That will be available to drop into DDG 113 if it is an '09 restart. So I'm confident in the cost numbers that -- that we provided in letters, what the restart cost for a DDG 51 is.

Life cycle costs -- because the DDG 1000s are projected to come on service or in service inside this POM '10 developed F.Y. '10 future year defense plan, we used the N4's models on how we project costs for ops and maintenance and manpower on DDG 51s and the DDG 1000s.

And we look at -- when we look at manpower and fuel costs and spare parts, a DDG 51 over the life cycle is about $4 million more expensive to operate than a DDG 1000. I'll get you the exact number, but I think it's $4 million.

That's different than what's in the selected acquisition report because the SAR reflects different requirements for life cycle costs than we do when we do budget development for ops and maintenance and manpower on ships.

Clear as mud. There is a lot of confusion over this statement because the DDG modernization of record wasn't thought to include "ballistic missile defense capability," which implies maybe something has changed with the DDG modernization program? We will discuss the Navy's communication strategy later this week, but this is one example where explaining what the hell is going on is just not what the Navy does well.

Clearly there are a number of ways to interpret this statement, and after consulting my crystal ball, I came up short and decided to ask around instead. We "think" the Navy is saying there will be ballistic missile defense included in the new Arleigh Burke class destroyers, although we admit that is a guess, because on Sunday we did not think so. Basically, there is a lot of hardware/software issues that could be ready by FY15, meaning BMD is in play. As things stand today, what Vice Admiral Barry McCullough is saying does not automatically imply BMD will be included in the new Burke's. Either way, bottom line is, with or without ballistic missile defense the Navy wants new DDG-51 Flight IIA models with all the modernizations expected throughout the Flight IIAs. Those are good ships.

It is noteworthy the Navy has decided not to do any changes to the Arleigh Burke class destroyers beyond the modernization already planned. There are a number of potential reasons why, but most likely it is to try to recapture some credibility on costing for ships and build credibility for the Navy in shipbuilding. A run of eight destroyers on time and budget right now would be a very welcome sight in Navy shipbuilding, and perception means a lot in Washington. It could also be to avoid making changes to the design knowing Congress has passed a law that requires nuclear power for warships, a point brought up in the hearing on Thursday. After all, if you make changes A, B, and C why not also make it nuclear? Requirement creep should be a concern, the reason for the Burke's in the first place is because requirement creep has turned the SC-21 shipbuilding plan into an enormous disaster. At the end of the day we think the reason is much simpler to explain, the Navy is led by people who think all solutions start and end with large surface combatants, and they are making a grab at more large surface combatants.

However, there are also several compelling arguments why the Navy should make changes. Ronald O'Rourke makes a number of interesting cases (PDF) regarding hull design possibilities for the DDG-51 Flight IIA. In his testimony before Congress last Thursday he listed a number of options in his submitted statement, but among the more interesting options to us were a few operating and support cost saving initiatives.

adding automated equipment and making other changes to reduce crew size;

adding some electric-drive equipment for interconnecting parts of the ship’s mechanical-drive propulsion system so as to permit the system to operate more like an integrated electric drive system; and

installing a near-surface bow bulb above the existing sonar dome to improve hydrodynamic efficiency.

The last one is interesting, one wonders how it would effect the ship regarding sound. A louder Burke is probably counterproductive. However, in the report Ronald O'Rourke highlights that based on estimates for cost savings, these O&S changes could potentially save $7 million dollars a year, which would make the new Burkes purchased cheaper to operate and support than the DDG-1000 which had a sales point of being less expensive to operate. $7 million per ship annually for 35 years would be nearly $2 billion dollars operational cost savings over the lifetime of eight ships. Does it cost $2 billion dollars to make these rather simple changes to eight Burkes? Considering the probability that fuel cost would skyrocket during any period of wartime, the actual savings could potentially be much higher.

However, we also started thinking about a Flight III. Why would the Navy want to look at a Flight III, or more specifically, why would Congress? Considering the rationale of ballistic missile defense for surface combatants, we began thinking perhaps the best reason for doing modifications to a new purchase of Arleigh Burke class would be to invest towards the CG(X) program, which was what the DDG-1000 was supposed to do. One way to do that might be to go ahead and meet part of the Cruiser requirement early, save costs, and build some consistency regarding the combat system into the fleet.

In our research on the modernization program, trying to figure out why McCullough's statements are so confusing, we found ourselves reading Bob Work's report on the surface combatant modernization programs, and we came across this:

The seven “Baseline 2” cruisers are the oldest surviving “Ticos,” the five earlier “Baseline 0” and “Baseline 1” cruisers having been retired as a cost-saving measure. For the purposes of this report, these seven ships will be referred to as the CG-52 class. Each of the CG-52s is equipped with the earliest version of the SPY-1 radar, the SPY-1A; the oldest and least capable Navy-proprietary computers, known as UYK-7s and UYK-20s; and four fire control illuminators. Their main battery consists of 122 Mk-41 VLS cells. Their secondary battery consists of eight Harpoons or SLAMs, two 5-inch/54 naval guns, and two Phalanx CIWSs. They can hangar and support two MH-60R (or MH-60S) helicopters...

because their systems are so old, the first seven “Baseline 2” CGs cannot be easily upgraded to the SPY-1D(V) standard. Recall that these seven ships will not receive the SQQ-89(V) for similar reasons. As a result, the near-term TFBN battle line will consist of two different classes of Interim Large Battle Network Combatants with much different anti-air warfare capabilities.

If you recall, before Gene Taylor revealed his source was Admiral Roughead in the hearing Thursday, we revealed it while also discussing how current events were being played out much how Bob Work recommended as an alternative path to the DDG-1000. In that discussion we cited the modernization report. In the same report, one of Bob Work's suggestion for the Navy was to replace the seven DDG-1000s with seven modified Arleigh Burke class ships as a stopgap between generations as the Navy looks forward. What he calls the LBNC stands for Large Battle-Network Combatant.

Fourth, starting in FY 2008, build a minimum of seven modified Burke DDGs to help sustain the industrial base until the new LBNC is ready for production... all seven ships would serve as active test beds for DDG improvements identified as possible candidates for further BNRAM back fits, or to test next-generation LBNC technologies. As such, the ships would serve much the same purpose as both the Forrest Sherman-class destroyers, which helped to bridge the shipbuilding gap between World War II and Cold War combatants, and modified legacy combatants like the USS Gyatt, DDG-1, which helped to illuminate the way forward toward a new generation of warships. Provided all went as planned, Congress would authorize two of the next generation LBNCs in FY 2015, split funded as in the current arrangement for the DDG-1000, giving each of the two construction yards one ship. The general fleet-wide transition from Aegis/VLS I-LBNCs to the new design would then begin in FY 2017, with three ships authorized after a bidding competition. Of course, if the design was not ready, additional Burkes could be built until it was.

It is actually brilliant advice, indeed one might suggest Admiral Roughead was reading Bob Work when he came up with his plan. The Navy, or Congress, could go two different ways. If the decision was simply to buy Burke's instead of DDG-1000s, and increase the total destroyer force, the Navy could continue with the current plan sent before Congress.

However another option is to replace the "baseline 2" CGs with 7 new "plugged" DDG-51s, essentially a Flight III version of the Arleigh Burke with more missiles, or perhaps the Advanced Gun System (although now the Navy says surface fires requirements are already met). In Ronald O'Rourkes statement on Thursday this is covered as one of a couple alternatives.

Additional vertical-launch tubes could be installed by lengthening the ship’s hull forward of the deckhouse. A 1994 CRS report discussed, on the basis of Navy information, how a 12-foot extension could permit the installation of 32 additional VLS cells.19 In 1997, to support research that CRS was conducting into possible alternatives to the Navy’s proposed Arsenal Ship, the Navy provided CRS with information on how lengthening the DDG-51 hull so as to install additional VLS tubes might change the ship’s procurement cost. The information is summarized in Table 2 below. The estimated changes in procurement cost were parametric, rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates only, subject to further engineering evaluation, and did not include detail design or nonrecurring engineering costs. Although the table shows variants equipped with Mk 41 VLS tubes (the kind currently used on Navy surface ships), adding vertical launch tubes of a newer design may also be possible.

Instead of building 8-9 new Burkes, Congress could instruct the Navy to use the money towards building seven "plugged" Flight III versions of the DDG-51 that, according to CRS testimony, potentially carry up to 256 VLS cells. That would clearly make this new ship the most powerful weapon system ever built, but what is also interesting is that as an evolutionary "plug" that has already undergone some study, based on a proven design it would certainly be cost affordable for that much firepower. Why do we like this idea? Because evolutionary has a proven track record, one look at the Ohio SSGNs and one can see the value of an evolutionary approach that carries a lower cost but high rate of return on investment.

The key here is that by replacing the seven "baseline 2" CGs with a plugged version, the Navy sets itself up well with the challenges they face with the CG(X) program, what we have consistently called the most important surface combatant program for the future of the US Navy.

The CG(X) is already under a number of constraints, in particular the Congressional requirement for nuclear power, but also the necessity to scale well in a constantly evolving world driven by the pace of technology, a much faster pace than warships with a service life of 30-40 years. It has been suggested that the CG(X) would not use the DDG-1000 hull, indeed this was brought up in the hearing. If you recall last year, the Navy had discussed two types of CG(X) replacements, one was an escort cruiser of the DDG-1000 hull, or in this case the evolved DDG-51 hull, while the other was a large CGN(X) built to support ballistic missile defense, which at the time we speculated on the reported size as potentially using the LPD-17 hull.

It really isn't as bad an idea as one might think, particularly if you care about the CG(X). The CBO estimates the CG(X) may cost as much as $4 billion per ship for 19 ships, but those 19 ships are based on the use of the DDG-1000 hull at 14,500 tons. CBO does its cost estimates on millions per 1000 tons, which is noteworthy because 19 ships at 14,500 tons is more total tons than 12 ships at 20,000 tons. Essentially, while the CBO would estimate the 12 ships more than what the Navy currently budgets for the entire CG(X) line, the number would be less than the $4 billion the CBO currently estimates for the CG(X) line based on the DDG-1000 hull. Adding 12 nuclear reactors would probably make up the difference, but at least the Navy would then be within the current estimates and be conforming to the law regarding nuclear power, something a CG(X) program based on the DDG-1000 hull cannot do.

As for the seven "baseline 2" ships, we wouldn't retire them early. Just allow them as modernized first rate battleships to serve out their time in areas like Africa and South America where the ballistic missile threat is not as critical as it is in the Middle East or Pacific. These cruisers make excellent flagships for those regions, and as we have pointed out in the past, the local economy never complains when a ship with 400+ sailors makes port. These ships send the right signal when conducting exercises with major allies in Europe, and even without BMD they still outmatch everything competitors can put to sea. Another option might be to replace the FFGs currently in reserve with these seven cruisers, and keep them maintained as the new contingency platform. They would certainly make a much smarter reserve force than the old FFG-7s currently holding that position.

There are a number of options regarding the Arleigh Burke battleships the Navy wants for the stopgap. Congress should seriously consider all the available options, from the operation and support cost saving measures to the large plug advanced ballistic missile defense cruiser option. With BMD now the primary driver of the large surface combatant fleet, the "Baseline 2" CGs offer the Navy additional ways to save money by putting these ships into reserve and replacing them with more capable Burke's. In our opinion, the Navy should make adjustments to the ships, that way when these ships reach 20-25 years old, they won't be retired early like other older ships have in the past because they are made obsolete due to the emerging technologies of competitors.

The Greatest Battleship In History

Of all the revelations that came from Thursday's House Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee hearing, we particularly enjoyed how the Navy made a great case for the modern rating system for surface combatants used on this blog. In our opinion, the confusion reveals that we tend to be more consistent than the Navy's own classification system labeling ship types. John McCain once said he had never heard of a 14,000 ton destroyer. Neither have we, and a DDG that can't use Standard missiles sounds equally ridiculous.

For all the folks who are new, this blog has adopted a "solemn, universal and unalterable" classification for rating warships in the spirit of Samuel Pepys, who as Secretary to the Admiralty created a ship rating system in 1677 for administrative and military use within the Royal Navy. We note Pepys's classification system was updated many times, including in 1817, a full 140 years after it was developed. A few years ago we observed a modern rating system used by Bob Work, and with his permission, we have adopted it for use on the blog.

Our modern rating system, as Samuel Pepys rating system did as far back as the 17th century, rates a warship by its primary weapon system. In the modern era, the primary weapon system is the guided missile. Just as many modified Samuel Pepys rating system in his era, we have slightly modified Bob Work's rating system in our era, specifically by recognizing that not all ships are rated.

The Arleigh Burke class has either 92 or 96 VLS cells, depending upon which Flight the ship is. According to our rating system, ships armed with 90-99 battle force VLS cells, and/or 90-99 battle force missiles are rated as second class battleships. To classify the Arleigh Burke class as a second rate battleship in comparison to the rest of the world Navy's is not a stretch, indeed there are only 4 classes and 10 total warships outside the United States that are even in the same class or higher as the Arleigh Burke class. Those ten ships are of the 4 ships of the Japanese Kongo class, 2 ships of the Japanese Atago class, the 3 planned ships of the South Korean King Sejong the Great class, and one active Russian Kirov class.

The 62 Arleigh Burke class battleships, 53 of which have already been commissioned, represent one of the greatest surface combatant classes in naval history, and certainly one of the top few in US history. To put the Arleigh Burke class into perspective, if the Navy builds 8 more as is currently being discussed, DDG-113 commissioned around 2015 would be expected to serve in the US Navy until 2050 to meet its 35 year life, meaning the entire Arleigh Burke class would be expected to span at least 60 years of service in the US Navy. That would be longer than the Iowa class battleships that served in WWII and fought in Gulf War I.

I wanted to write this post today as sort of a bridge, or interlude if you will. While we fully support the Navy's decision to cancel the DDG-1000, and have long before revelations made last Thursday, we will not hide that we are not impressed with the decision by the Navy to build more Arleigh Burke class battleships.. This has nothing to do with the ship itself, the Arleigh Burke class is absolutely the best ship in the world today. Our criticism is instead rooted in strategy, we do not believe the best way to prepare the next generation of naval warfare is to turn back and build the ship best designed to win the war of the last generation. The 21st century is here, it is time to embrace both the changes and challenges of this century. While taking the best the last century has to offer is certainly a safe bet, we wonder if by 2035, when the ship is barely 20 years old, if she will be obsolete to meet the challenges of that era of naval warfare.

After all, the USS Ticonderoga (CG 47), ordered in 1978, commissioned in 1983, and decommissioned in 2004 after only 21 years may soon be turned into a museum. While she served strong for 21.7 years, her sister ships are expected to serve 40 years, and she would still be serving an additional 15 years from right now had she not been made obsolete by the evolutions in technology.

A Clear Example of Disproportionate Priorities

While the Navy is telling Congress it is time to reset the strategic environment back to the cold war to support leaderships vision of what the Navy needs to be doing, the reality of what the Navy should be doing is summed up all too well by the details of this article from back in May.

Company A, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), is training to operate boats the unit received, May 2.

“I’m pretty excited,” said Cpl. Tomas Montoya, Co. A, 3-187th Inf. Regt. “I never thought I’d have the opportunity to work on boats over here in Iraq.”

“The boats will create new opportunities and capabilities in their operations along the Euphrates River,” said Lt. Col. Andrew Rohling, commander of 3-187th Inf. Regt. “They bring a sense of security, strength and versatility the local populace has not always seen from the water.”

“The boats add invaluable dimensions to the unit’s ability to conduct full-spectrum operations,” said Maj. Curtis Crum, 3rd BCT operations officer. “The boats give the brigade a unique capability that is not typically resident in this type of unit’s arsenal.”

The unit’s predecessors, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, ordered the boats in November 2007 to conduct operations along the Euphrates to deter insurgent activity. The boats were delivered to 3-187th Inf. Regt., in January.

I'm not sure we could find a better example of the disproportionate priorities the US Navy has today than to highlight a photograph of the 101st Airborne Division patrolling Euphrates River.

One might look at this picture and wonder why the Navy couldn't find a Boston whaler to mount a machine gun on and do this mission, or was it because the Navy wouldn't do the mission? It is a serious question, because it highlights the lack of priority the Navy's leadership has in regards to the NECC, not to mention the lack of funding.

The story is a good read. In particular note the attitudes of the guys in 3-187 interviewed. Imagine a world where the Navy's leadership was excited about doing the Navy's job as those Army guys reportedly are. As the Iraqi's take over duty at the dam, one wonders if the Navy will step up and take over for the Army. From what I'm hearing, the answer is "probably not."

The nation has been at war in Iraq for over five years now, a war with a clear Navy riverine mission profile, and yet here we are after five years into the war watching the Army stand up a riverine force for the Euphrates river from an order given in November of 2007, and the unit is already on patrol by May of 2008.

This is a leadership issue, specifically an attitude of leadership issue.

The Navy's New Cold War Strategy

The Navy is looking to build a ship designed during the cold war, built after the cold war, and intended to fight in a strategic environment last seen during the cold war. So what is the solution? Tell Congress there is a cold war. Since the end of the cold war, the Navy has been searching for the threat to justify more big cruisers and destroyers. It appears they have found three (PDF), as testified by Vice Admiral Barry McCullough.

Rapidly evolving traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose increasing challenges to Combatant Commanders. State actors and non-state actors who, in the past, have only posed limited threats in the littoral are expanding their reach beyond their own shores with improved capabilities in blue water submarine operations, advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. A number of countries who historically have only possessed regional military capabilities are investing in their Navy to extend their reach and influence as they compete in global markets. Our Navy will need to out pace other Navies in the blue water ocean environment as they extend their reach. This will require us to continue to improve our blue water anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile capabilities in order to counter improving anti-access strategies.

The Navy should be applauded for recognizing the emerging threat of ballistic missiles on the horizon and announcing that it intends to take the threat seriously. Rear Admiral Thomas Marfiak, who wrote an article in Proceedings called Where Are the Ballistic-Missile-Defense Cruisers?, a very relevant article that Proceedings has made publicly accessible, outlined the emerging threat in a compelling way and gave good advice to the Navy on how to adjust and pace itself to meet the emerging threat.

During last Thursday's testimony when discussing the threat environment, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough answered a question by Rep. M. James Saxton (R-NJ).

Rep. M. James Saxton (R-NJ):
Could you just specifically -- as specifically as you can say how the threat has changed and how you believe the decision that you made will best meet that threat?

Vice Admiral Barry McCullough:
There are three specific areas. One is with the increased proliferation of ballistic missiles that provide antiaccess challenges to our forces today globally, not only the high-end threat posed by potential adversaries in the Pacific, but lesser-included capabilities in the Arabian Gulf region, in Northeast Asia, and the ability that that -- or the proliferation into that threat globally. So the ballistic missile threat is the first piece.

The second piece is when you see high-tech threat capability that's usually resident in a nation state come off the beach in a conflict against a non-state actor and strike a war ship and do significant damages to it. It's where is that capability going to go next, with what potential non-state actor. And that happened in the Eastern Med in 2006.

And I will tell you there are nations that are developing quiet diesel submarine technology and putting it into blue water to challenge where we operate. And we need improved capability against the open ocean deep water quiet diesel submarine threat.

And that's where we see the capability that has come rapidly left from where it was projected. I don't think anybody ever envisioned Hezbollah being able to launch a C-802, and they did that quite well.

The Navy is making the argument that the combination of Ballistic Missile Defense AND anti-ship missile defense AND blue water submarine threats is why the DDG-51 is now the optimal ship for the Navy to build instead of the DDG-1000. We look at the emerging threat environment the Navy is seeing in order discussed.

The US Navy today operates 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers, and the Navy has already purchased 62 Arleigh Burke class destroyers , 53 of which have been commissioned and the next 9 to be commissioned over the next 2-3 years. All 84 have the AEGIS system and are capable of supporting the requirement for Ballistic Missile Defense.

The Navy's existing plan of record for AEGIS ballistic missile defense is to convert 18 ships, 3 cruisers and 15 destroyers to fully capable AEGIS ballistic missile defense capable ships by October of 2010. There is currently no plan to upgrade the remaining 66 AEGIS ballistic missile defense capable ships with AEGIS ballistic missile defense, and instead of addressing the emerging ballistic missile threat on the horizon with the existing 66 AEGIS ships that could be upgraded quickly, 9 of which haven't even been commissioned yet, the Navy has decided to make the shipbuilding argument to build 8-9 new AEGIS capable ships at a price of 1.8 - 2.2 billion dollars a piece as the way to meet that emerging challenge.

It is worth noting that in testimony on Thursday, it was suggested by Vice Admiral Barry McCullough and stated outright by Ronald O'Rourke that the 8-9 Burke destroyers would be exact copies of the DDG-112, meaning they would not be built with AEGIS ballistic missile capabilities. Given the emerging strategic environment, not to mention the demands of field commanders today for ballistic missile defense requirements, the Navy is telling Congress to build 8-9 more DDGs without ballistic missile defense to meet a ballistic missile defense requirement, and the Navy did not even discuss the option of expanding the existing and ongoing cruiser modernization schedule, or the upcoming destroyer modernization schedule. We are going to assume this is coming in POM10, but we can also assume those costs are not in the current budget looking forward.

According to Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, the expanded threat matrix for ballistic missile defense includes Iran and North Korea. This is not difficult to sell given public opinions, North Korea has launched ballistic missiles and has a proven (uhm, sortof) nuclear capability, while Iran has also demonstrated its ballistic missile capability, including its desire to expand it. Iran is on the path towards the development of a nuclear capability in blatant ways that are in clear defiance of the IAEA, to the point the world has slapped a number of sanctions to date through the UN on Iran.

But by most professional analysis, the ballistic missile capability of Iran and North Korea are minor current threats, and questionable future threats to the maritime domain. These are terror capabilities as conventional weapons, and are only effective as weapons against the Navy if armed with nuclear warheads. While the UN process cannot prohibit the development of nuclear weapon technology, as demonstrated by North Korea, it can certainly make it fiscally impossible to expand and improve a comprehensive ballistic missile technology program. North Korea is a financial mess, and Iran is on the fast track to financial ruin. Forecasting expansion, growth, and improved technology gains for such expensive weapon systems when the financial situation of these states is already dire is counter intuitive. That isn't to undermine the necessity of Naval power to be able to address the ballistic missile threat in the future, rather we highlight the lack of urgency necessary in shipbuilding regarding the Iran and North Korea threat. 8-9 more Burkes does not significantly, if at all, improve the capabilities of the US Navy against today's ballistic missile threats from North Korea or Iran. New warships built today are intended to meet the threat environment of 2020-2050, not 2008-2020.

The anti-ship cruise missile threat is more interesting, but not based on how the Navy explained it in testimony. It is very revealing the Navy has used the irregular warfare environment in testimony to support building an Arleigh Burke class destroyers to meet the anti-ship missile threat. Until today, the Littoral Combat Ship was the only ship the Navy has attempted an intellectual argument publicly regarding the irregular threat matrix at sea. How can the example of Hezbollah be intellectually compelling as a rationale for more Arleigh Burke destroyers without completely invalidating every ship that doesn't have AEGIS, including the LCS?

The lesson of 2006 is not that the cruise missile threat is so severe we need to concentrate on building AEGIS ships, the lesson is a reminder for Naval forces not to fight in a war zone with your defensive weapon systems off line. That is the same lesson the US Navy should have learned in the Tanker War of the 1980s with the USS Stark, and if they didn't learn that lesson, and believe more DDG-51 class destroyers is the solution, then something is seriously wrong. We think the Navy learned the right lessons from 2006, and while Vice Admiral Barry McCullough is making a valid point about the danger of anti-ship missiles, he is making an irrelevant argument in favor of more Burke class destroyers with his argument.

We also find the submarine argument interesting, because this is a shipbuilding issue. If the lack of a blue water submarine threat was the rationale against building $2.2 billion dollar Virginia class submarines for the last decade, and why the Navy has allowed the submarine force to drop to historical lows, why is the Navy now taking the position that the presence of a blue water submarine threat is the rationale for a $2.2 billion dollar surface combatants? You know, submarines don't have to defend themselves against anti-ship missiles or ballistic missiles, they inherently operate outside the threat environment of those weapon systems. They are also much more effective hunting submarines than Arleigh Burke class destroyers.

The Navy's emerging strategic threat environment is "coincidently" exactly what we have been observing in regards to China's improving capabilities. Back in February, we observed the mass production of the Type 022, the massive buildup of conventional and nuclear submarines, the continued growth of mine warfare vessels, and the rapidly expanding arsenal of ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan. In examining China's strategy, we observed it to be something akin to a Streetfighter strategy that saturates the battle space with cheap streetfighters above and below the sea supported by mines and ballistic missiles. It isn't really a blue water capability, although it can be in the Pacific.

The anti-ship missile threat today, when accounting for who might represent a potential adversary, highlights the United States is facing much fewer large surface warships with anti-ship missiles than during the cold war. The US Navy is also much more capable today against that threat than it was during the cold war. The only change to the threat environment regarding anti-ship missiles is the massive production of Type 022s from China. Is that the driver for the threat environment change?

The same is true of the submarine threat. It is noteworthy Vice Admiral Barry McCullough discusses quiet diesel submarine technology, not AIP submarines. Is this a nod to China's Kilo and Song class submarines, both of which are diesel? The nuclear submarine threat is extremely low compared to the cold war, one can count China's entire nuclear submarine fleet on two hands. Russia's submarine and surface fleets are still shrinking, but Russia has begun the process of rebuilding its fleet and could be a factor in this strategic shift. After all, nothing says cold war like putting Russia up on the PowerPoint.

Essentially, the strategic shift in the maritime environment is nothing more than the Navy embracing China as its peer competitor and waving a hammer and sickle in the direction of Russia. With peer competition, the Navy can then focus all shipbuilding resources dedicated to this new purpose, which of coarse means buy more battleships. Looking for the next big one, creating it if necessary, is what Naval Next-War-Itis looks like.

The proposed plan is to buy 8-9 more battleships so the Navy can fight a war in a battle space saturated by China's surface and subsurface streetfighters. We don't know if the DDG-51s would be effective against swarms of fast attack missile boats and large numbers of diesel submarines, but clearly given the available options, the Navy sees that as the best course forward.

The decisions make a lot of sense, as long as you believe the US is going to fight a war against China in the future. In effect the Navy is accepting risk in irregular warfare to build its future military capabilities to fight the big one against China..., or Russia, either is fine as far as the Navy is concerned.

That would be a strong strategic argument, if it wasn't completely counter to the new direction expressed in the National Defense Strategy of the United States (PDF) released last week. I guess this explains why Gates hasn't endorsed the Navy's plan, and why Roughead didn't endorse the National Security Strategy. From our point of view, we question if it is a good thing that the Navy has decided to do its own thing, after all, why would anyone be concerned about the Navy making a conscious decision to sprint at flank speed down the road recently blazed by the Air Force? Oh, that.

We commend the Navy for embracing the strategic challenges of ballistic missile defense that is clearly emerging in the future, and give credit to Admiral Roughead for having the vision to announce the Navy intends to address this challenge sooner rather than later. We are also very pleased the Navy went to Capitol Hill and tried to make a strategic argument, it has certainly been enlightening. The Navy will always find more success with strategic arguments, at least when those arguments make sense. Did this strategic argument make sense? Not to us, on this blog strategic thought is in line with grand strategy, and moving the Navy in a direction not just counter, but opposite, the National Defense Strategy of the United States is not grand strategy, and is counter to what is expressed in the 3rd paragraph on the second page of the introduction in the Navy's own Maritime Strategy (PDF) which states the Navy will be guided by the National Defense Strategy of the United States.

With that said, the Navy may find success with its strategic argument, there are plenty of China hawks in Congress.

6th Fleet Focus: Task Force 65 Under New Command

This blog does not shy away from our interest of western Africa. We believe this will ultimately be a major region to watch in the 21st century, and have a number of reasons why that we will not cover in this post. Needless to say, we discuss what is taking place there as often as it grabs our attention, and will continue to do so.

The US Navy Task Force that operates in that region is known as Task Force 65. When we talk about the African Partnership Station, that is the Task Force we are talking about. Stars and Stripes is reporting Task Force 65 is under new management as of Friday by Capt. Cindy Thebaud, and we really like her attitude.

The APS program’s main mission is to teach African navies, militaries and other organizations to secure coastlines and waterways to counter drug-smuggling, illegal human trafficking and illegal fishing, a $1 billion industry. The goal is to have African nations defend their own shores and waters so the U.S. Navy, or others, don’t have to.

"I see it as a brilliant, very much needed, and dynamic mission," said Thebaud. "Everybody I’ve spoken with … the Africans I’ve met at various APS conferences ... all reiterate the development of maritime safety and security is imperative in establishing stability in the region and economic growth and prosperity."

APS also aims to bring in humanitarian organizations at the onset of planning of missions and to work closely with embassies in the region to establish what projects and needs the Navy can get involved in, Thebaud said.

Lets be blunt, the Gulf of Guinea among other regions in the area of operations for Task Force 65 is a backwater shit hole with a ton of problems. It is also ground zero for massive economic growth in Africa, and has one of the most strategically important counterinsurgencies in Africa taking place in Nigeria. This is ground zero for every peacemaking and war winning military strategy concept the joint forces has in their arsenal, and what we see as one of the biggest challenges in the 21st century facing the United States.

Who are the players? The big fish is China, and lets be clear on this. There are many who see China as more than an economic competitor, rather as an adversary the United States will need to deal with. Regardless of whether the relationship between the United States and China is competitive in nature, or adversarial in nature, one of the front lines for that clash of economic titans is the Gulf of Guinea.

We love Capt. Cindy Thebaud's attitude, because while the Navy may be in a peacetime posture, the necessity to go on the offensive with a peacetime strategy is much needed in that region. The African Partnership is one of the more effective tactics in that regard, but it is not the only tactic that can be used. There is a clear military role in the region, specifically for the Navy, but that role is in support of the joint government approach that the State Dept., USAID, and others need to embrace. This is where full spectrum peacemaking strategy must be effective if the United States is going to be a factor in Africa, and build real partnerships in the 21st century.

Capt. Cindy Thebaud is filling big shoes by taking over for Capt. John Nowell, who we followed during the African Partnership deployment and had an opportunity to talk about APS with him during a blogger roundtable. The African Partnership Station represents the most important tactic the United States has in its strategic peacemaking arsenal for Africa. It isn't just the Navy though, as David Axe noted over the weekend on Danger Room, the Coast Guard is there too. Check out the transcript (PDF) of the recent bloggers roundtable with U.S. Coast Guard Capt. Robert Wagner. That is a good read.

For the record, note how the story of US Navy and Coast Guard involvement of Africa is being told. Bloggers. This is why we are supporting independent journalists like David Axe. If we don't support them, who else is going to tell the story?

We want to wish Capt. Cindy Thebaud good luck in her new command, but want to also advise a warning. Sixth Fleet really dropped the ball a few weeks ago. As the near miss of that incident reminds us, APS is only part of the solution.

Update: The Unofficial Coast Guard Blog is also discussing the USCGC Dallas (WHBC 716) operations off Africa.