This is the first of our guest author series. Note this article was written prior to the DoD announcing the actual price was over $100 million. Shooting Down A Satellite: A Prudent Public Health Measure? by Peter j. Brown... Enjoy!
Examining the Threat Posed by Hydrazine Fuel Onboard a Malfunctioning U.S. Spy Satellite Upon ReentryIn mid-February 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) announced that in the interest of public health and safety, a decision had been made more than 6 weeks earlier to shoot down a relatively small yet malfunctioning National Reconnaissance Office spysatellite known as USA-193, also known as NROL-21.
DoD's stated purpose here was to protect the public's health and safety by preventing a 1000-pound block of frozen hydrazine fuel aboard this satellite from possibly coming down in a populated area. Hydrazine is a hazardous material that poses a significant threat to public health. It is often used as a fuel for spacecraft, rockets and as a backup fuel source for single-engine F-16 aircraft. It is a very toxic and flammable substance, and, a known carcinogen.
This writer last observed this top-secret, 5000-pound spy satellite high over the coast of Maine heading East-NorthEast at just after 6PM on the evening of February 20. Hours later at just after 10:30PM, the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser Lake Erie fired a missile and delivered a knockout blow to USA-193 as it passed at a speed of more than 17,000 miles per hour approximately 150 nautical miles over the Pacific Ocean west of Hawaii. A widely circulated DoD video recording documented the instant pulverization of this satellite by the missile fired from the bow of the Lake Erie.
"Operation Burnt Frost" was immediately deemed a complete success by the DoD.Several hours earlier, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had issued a Health Advisory, "Potential Health Effects Associated with Hydrazine and Satellite Reentry" (1) which was distributed via CDC's Health Alert Network.
The CDC stated, among other things, that "because the satellite’s fuel contains the toxic chemical hydrazine, it is possible that the reentry of the satellite could pose a public health threat if pieces of it fall into populated areas. The risk of health effects related to the satellite is considered to be low. However, CDC is encouraging health officials and clinicians to review information about the health effects related to hydrazine to prepare in case their communities are affected by satellite debris."
According to a spokesman for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), ASPR and CDC were engaged, but relied heavily on DoD projections.
"We agreed that hydrazine could be a threat, but how large of a threat was based on DoD casualty estimates that were given to us. There was not enough information to accurately model ourselves. Out of an abundance of caution, CDC issued a Health Alert Network message providing basic information about hydrazine, which was taken mostly from existing public web pages with hydrazine information," this ASPR spokesman said. (2)
Two days earlier, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security via the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had issued a, "First Responder Guide For Space Object Re-Entry" which was aimed both at the public, and at the first responder community. (3)
This 18-page FEMA document stated that, "the satellite has hazardous materials on board that could pose immediate hazards to people if they come in contact with the material. Specifically, the satellite contains fuel and metal containers that are considered hazardous materials and could survive entry intact. Any debris should be considered potentially hazardous, and should not be touched, handled, or moved."
"First responders should secure a perimeter and control access around any debris. DO NOT pick up any debris. Notify your local emergency manager of its location immediately. The concerns are similar to those encountered after the space shuttle Columbia entered the atmosphere. However, this craft has far less hazardous materials and is much smaller in size," FEMA stated.
FEMA's brief response to a set of questions submitted by this writer simply stated that, "DoD was the lead agency for the satellite re-entry and provided all supporting agencies with the details involved with the spacecraft. Any additional comments would need to come from DoD." (4)
When the DoD's North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) issued a press release on February 26, the language used attempted to minimize the hydrazine threat by stating that, "the objective of the satellite intercept mission was to minimize the possibility of injury to humans from the hydrazine fuel tank enclosed in the satellite. The likelihood of debris falling on a populated area on the ground was remote, however, NORAD continues to monitor the debris field in order to predict the possibility of debris falling within North America." (5)
A bi-national Canadian and American command, NORAD monitors all rocket launches around the globe for DoD, and keeps a sharp eye as well on everything in orbit including thousands of pieces of debris in space. When asked if NORAD was aware of any prior instance where an adverse public health impact resulted from a spacecraft -- out of control or not -- hitting the ground either in the U.S. or elsewhere, a NORAD spokesman simply replied that, "we are unaware of such an occurrence." (6)
Finally, the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) stood by ready to dispatch support personnel and equipment as part of the DoD joint task force support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management operations. USNORTHCOM also was responsible for providing updated information to state and local agencies.
Tons of Debris From Space, But Nobody HurtThere is no record of any severe personal injury or death resulting from any inbound spacecraft-related debris including the February 2003 crash of the Space Shuttle Columbia, for example, where the massive debris field covered thousands of square miles, primarily in Texas. (7)
According to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, "a surprising number of the shuttle's 64 tanks and pressure vessels survived the breakup and landed intact." Among other things, debris from the shuttle rained down on 39 public and private schools including one six-inch piece of metal that passed through a school roof and penetrated down to a kindergarten room floor. Monomethyl hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide from the shuttle's maneuvering rockets and auxiliary power unit were identified and removed from a number of sites. (8)
The Aerospace Corp's Center for Orbital And Reentry Debris Studies (CORDS) maintains detailed records of reentry debris. Over the past 40 years, according to CORDS, "more than 5,400 metric tons of materials are predicted to have survived reentry, with no reported casualties." On its list of the largest objects to reenter -- USA-193 was far too small to be included on this list -- 6 out of these 15 objects were classified as "uncontrolled at the time of reentry. During Operation Burnt Frost's period of planning and execution, CORDS listed several significant reentries that were projected to occur in this same timeframe. (9)
Indeed, the threat posed by debris in general is far more substantial than the threat posed by reentering fuel tanks and pressure vessels as a distinct category of debris. With the exception of a single report of debris striking a woman in Tulsa, Oklahoma -- she did not suffer serious trauma -- there is no record of death or injury, despite the fact that one town in Argentina was once bombarded by a storm of debris, according to CORDS.
John Logsdon, director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University, says that the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster and the earlier crash of the Russian COSMOS 954 satellite in northern Canada in the 1970's with its radioactive components, sends a strong signal, and "the fact that there has not yet been a significant human health impact is a matter of good fortune." (10)
Given the classified nature of USA-193's mission and its onboard components, the action by DoD taken might have masked another threat to public health. The possible presence of a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) or some other radioactive power source aboard USA-193 was widely discussed, but not given much credence. Nor has any other potential public health threat surfaced.
As deadly as hydrazine might be, many perceive the advanced nature of USA-193's onboard equipment or payload, and its sensitive imaging equipment in particular as the real motivator here. In other words, the chance that this spy satellite's hardware might have somehow ended up in the hands of our adversaries -- if and when USA-193 crash-landed -- was unacceptable and was to be prevented at all costs.
DoD adamantly denies that this alternative theory has any validity, and holds firm to the idea that this was undertaken as a prudent measure designed to protect public health and safety.
The fact that all contact was lost soon after the spacecraft was launched in late 2006, and that there was no way to control it as a result, is widely accepted. What is unacceptable to some experts is the notion that the estimated 1000 pounds of hydrazine could survive re-entry because it had frozen into a solid mass. Some experts question how, if this spacecraft was tumbling out of control, the hydrazine could freeze solid in the first place as the sun would be able to warm the tank in question, and thus the fuel would remain in liquid form.
Yousaf Butt, a staff scientist at the Center for Astrophysics at Harvard University, is one who contends that the hydrazine fuel remained a liquid, and that the spacecraft's fuel lines would have been severed during a violent re-entry, resulting in a devastating explosion. Butt points to the presence of this vaporized hydrazine in the containment vessel contact layer, a so-called pyrovalve-related phenomenon, because this same phenomenon is believed to have played a
pivotal role in the earier destruction of two spacecraft more than a decade ago.
For example, in the case of the destruction of the Landsat 6 spacecraft in late 1993, approximately 270 pounds of hydrazine were present, less than half the amount aboard USA-193. Butt estimates that direct re-entry heating of the USA-193 hydrazine tank to ~2500 C would therefore yield a much more violent explosion. By the way, this estimated fuel load of 1000 pounds is neither exceptional nor excessively large based on satellite designs in use today. (11)
As "Operation Burnt Frost" was underway, commanders at the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in Omaha examined many photos of empty satellite fuel tanks which had been taken over the years in all sorts of locations.(12) With the exception of the Space Shuttle Columbia, this writer is unaware of any report of hydrazine being found in or near satellite and spacecraft fuel tanks discovered on the ground following reentry.
In contrast, civilian deaths and injuries have resulted from failed rocket launches. The best known incident of this type resulted in several deaths down range from a launch facility in China in January, 1995. In addition, allegations of widespread environmental damage resulting from failed rocket launches have triggered several well-publicized disputes involving the governments of Russia - including the former Soviet Union - and Kazakhstan involving rockets fired from Kazakhstan's Baikonur launch complex. (13)
These and other rocket launch-related incidents can and often do involve one form of hydrazine or another. Rocket debris also accounts for a substantial portion of total debris, according to records maintained by CORDS, for example.
Keep in mind that routine hydrazine-related aerospace hazmat issues involving fuel handling, storage, transport and production, along with any of the associated occupational safety or public health issues surrounding these activities are not addressed in this commentary. One hydrazine fuel spill that triggered the evacuation of nearby residents resulted from a train derailment in California in the early 1990's. All F-16 aircraft carry a supply of hydrazine in an aqueous solution designated H70 as part of an emergency reserve fuel supply, for example.
There is another possibility to be considered, given the USA-193's highly classified mission. It involves the overall structural design of USA-193 including its fuel tank and fuel line assembly, and the possibility that USA-193 was quite different in this regard from other satellites including the two above-mentioned satellites. When asked, Butt said that while he was not sure, he would not expect the USA-193 hydrazine tank design to be different.
Geoffrey Forden, a research associate at MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society estimates that, "IF the tank made it to the Earth's surface it would have a 3.5% chance of affecting a person. However, I estimate that it was highly unlikely that it would make it to the surface of the Earth. (Though I cannot quantify that probability.) I believe the most likely eventuality was that the tank would break up in the atmosphere." (14)
Conclusions --While tons of man-made spacecraft and rocket-related debris have struck the Earth's surface over the last 4 decades including the massive amount of debris triggered by the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003, no serious threat to public health and safety has resulted thus far.
The DoD's decision to portray "Operation Burnt Frost" as a necessary response to protect the public's health and safety suggests that this determination was made as the result of a series of consultations with other agencies. However, while a determination should have been made by CDC, FEMA, NASA and perhaps EPA in joint consultation with DoD, one senses that NASA alone was consulted prior to the decision to proceed.
In our post-SARS world in particular, where an emphasis has been placed on a global partnership that emphasizes coordination, communication and an open exchange of information, the absence of proactive international discussions and planning represents a step backward from a public health standpoint due to the global implications of what was taking place. Yes, foreign governments were informed at the last moment, but they were not engaged as partners or contributors who somehow helped to shape or influence the outcome in the weeks leading up to this shootdown. (15)
In effect, DoD should have simply gone ahead and conducted this demonstration of its anti-ballistic missile or anti-satellite capabilities at sea, instead of using a potential public health impact as an excuse in the process.
The CDC Health Advisory addressing toxic satellite debris establishes an awkward precedent even when stating that, "the risk of health effects related to this satellite is considered to be low." It appears that DoD was intent upon pursuing its own agenda, and that ASPR, CDC and FEMA contributed to this cause by falling into line and willingly participating in a series of events that DoD set in motion. This was not part of any large scale drill or exercise, and, the sequence of events, and the deliberate public health and safety posturing initiated and promoted by DoD in this instance are puzzling.
Exposure to hydrazine can result in serious injury or death, and the public benefits when learning of this fact. However, from the standpoint of public health preparedness, this event provides an opportunity to remind everyone that while informing the public in a timely manner about vital hazmat issues is extremely important, at the same time, any form of nationwide public health and safety messaging -- even at the level of an advisory rather than an alert and warning to first responders and / or the general public -- needs to be handled with great care.
Relevant communications-related practices, procedures and protocols must be carefully crafted and tested on an ongoing basis. Strict guidance needs to be in place to avoid any miscalculation and any miscommunication involving the general public. A zero tolerance policy concerning potential abuses and distortions of potential threats to public health in particular must be enforced. Anything that might compromise or undermine the public's confidence in the integrity of this nation's public health advisory, alert and warning apparatus -- now and in the future -- must be examined carefully and addressed accordingly.
Peter J. Brown is a Maine-based freelance writer who has specialized in satellite technology for over two decades. His work includes several articles on emergency communications and disaster response. He will address the expanding role of satellites in preparedness, surveillance, and response in an upcoming issue of "Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness", a journal of the American Medical Association. He served on Maine's Emergency Notification System working group which was set up to improve alerts and warnings for the deaf and hard of hearing community in Maine. He also assisted both the Maine Emergency Management Agency, and a regional health preparedness consortium in Maine to address various emergency communications issues.References --
1) See,
http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/hydrazine/HAN_02_2008.asp;http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/hydrazine/http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/hydrazin.html2) ASPR's response to author's questions via email
3) See,
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/media/2008/fema_erg.pdf4) FEMA's response to author's questions via email
5) "NORAD and USNORTHCOM roles in Satellite shoot-down," USNORTHCOM press release, February 26, 2024
6) NORAD's response to author's questions via email
7) "Expansive Hunt for Shuttle Debris" Associated Press, February 3 2003
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2003/02/575318) "TCEQ crews assisted in space shuttle recovery," Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Natural Outlook, Spring 2003
http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/comm_exec/forms_pubs/pubs/pd/020/03-02/
emergency.html9) See,
http://www.reentrynews.com/largeobject.html;And,
http://www.aero.org/capabilities/cords/index.html10) Logsdon's response to author's questions via email.
11) Butt's response to author's questions via email.
12) "Weeks of intense work paved way for StratCom's direct hit" Tim Elfrink, Omaha World-Herald, March 2, 2024
13) In a commentary in the Moscow Times earlier this month -- "Kazakhstan at Crossroads in Space" -- the author specifically mentioned this U.S. decision to shoot down a malfunctioning satellite, and discussed how this relates to the Proton rocket fuel controversy which is still simmering in Kazakhstan. See --
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1016/42/369526.htm14) Forden's response to author's questions via email.
15) "U.S. Makes Case About Satellite To Foreign Envoys" Marc Kaufman, Washington Post, February 16, 2024
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/02/16/
ST2008021600306.html
The Sub Report recently took a tour on the USS Texas (SSN 775), and brought a camera. Eric has commentary and photo's up on his blog. That is a fun read with great photography.
