The Sea Hype of the Week

Russia has deployed its little surface action group to Venezuala. Why is this even news? That really is a good question.

A Russian Navy squadron set off for Venezuela Monday in a deployment of Russian military power to the Western Hemisphere unprecedented since the Cold War.

During the Cold War, Latin America became an ideological battleground between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Kremlin has recently moved to intensify contacts with Venezuela, Cuba and other Latin American nations amid strained relations with Washington after last month's conflict between Russia and Georgia.

The squadron comprising the Russian Northern Fleet's Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great) battle cruiser and the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ship Admiral Chabanenko will participate in exercises off the Venezuelan coast.

The local TV stations, Navy.mil, and this blog is about all the world gets whenever a US Navy strike group deploys from the US. Not so with the Russians, they put to sea a cruiser and a destroyer and the world media does backflips. I don't even know how to put that in context, except maybe to suggest, this really is more hype than substance.

To be honest, I am more interested in what the other two ships are. What is the logistical accompanying force with the 2 warships? That question tells us more about the state of the Russian Navy than any focus we put on the warships. If you recall, when the Russians deployed the Admiral Kuznetsov with a pair of warship escorts, we described that Mediterranean Sea deployment as the high end of power projection the Russian Navy is capable of. That remains true today. If you also recall, the Russians deployed the fleet tug Nikolai Chiker with the carrier group, you know, just in case.

The $10,000 question regarding this deployment isn't the significance of the deployment, because the only significance to be found here will be in the mind of Hugo Chavez, looking for a propaganda moment to his domestic audience. No, the $10,000 question is whether one of the two ships not named in any of the news reports is a fleet tug, and whether the Russians are ready to make a forward deployment without a fleet tug ready to salvage a major embarrassment.

It will also tell us the level of confidence the Russians have in their own Navy.

One side note. Some Russian news sources also suggest this task force will go to Syria after Venezuela. From my point of view, that is interesting. I'm not impressed that Russia can operate in the safety of the Caribbean Sea, I am interested when Russia is operating naval forces anywhere near the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

Fleshing Out the "Generation Gap"

Might be interesting, from the comments...

I believe that some additional fleshing out of the "generation gap" discussion is in order.

Some potential candidates for a more relevant discourse IMHO are: (1) The promotion system, (2) Recruiting (Hiring) and Retention, (3) Virtual (Web 2.0) absence = Actual (Real World) absence, (4) The “businessification” of USN officer corps and it’s unintended consequences, etc.

Being an early Gen X, I am just about fed up to the gills with the Boomers’ uptick in promoting the premise that Gen X and Gen Y are the, “What’s in it for me generation.” The observation from my vantage point is a potential vacuum of leadership from those that have gone before me, but certainly a vacuum of communication flowing down from the top. This may be bigger than a Navy issue, and I would welcome the input from the readership of this blog regarding the generational shift (in both business and industry) that we seem to be grappling with across a broad spectrum of policy (both business and strategic) issues.

Benjamin Walthrop, a frequent contributor brings up an interesting topic for discussion regarding the generation gap. I have hired (and fired) several people part of both generations, and work with a large number of folks in both generations on a daily basis. I am also part of Generation X, so add that to the context. These are my general observations that hopefully add to the discussion.

Generation X are best described in the 30s and 40s. They dealt with a 50% divorce rate growing up, often make several career changes, consider themselves "free agents" at work, and usually have a strong background in research, reading, and writing. This was the first technology generation.

In business these folks are usually your money makers, and manage day to day relationships with clients well. They embrace technology. The perception of GenX is that they are self-centered, entitled, and lazy (slackers). The reality is they are typically family centric, unwilling to sacrifice personal life for their occupation, and respond to challenges well.

Generation Y is the 20s generation today. They enjoyed a higher quality of life than any previous generation, and were brought up on technology in school and social networks. They are also known as the trophy generation, rewarded for everything they did, including stuff that doesn't merit reward.

In business they see technology as the foundation of work. They are very diverse already, having grown up in the first truly diverse culture that doesn't see sex, race, or religion the same way as generations past. They do not build strong, close relationships as well as previous generations, but can manage a higher quantity of casual client relationships better than previous generations.

They usually bring new insight through what are sometimes revolutionary point of views, they are very resourceful and adaptable, and they teach older generations new technology very well. They are usually very informed on how to access information quickly. The perception of GenY is that they are undisciplined, that they challenge authority, and that they are disrespectful. The reality is they crave structure, want to learn from their elders, and tend to treat everyone as equals by nature.

Now consider how that meshes with the generation gap.

Baby Boomers are late 40s - 60s generation. This was the first generation to go to college as a generation, and grew up in a "work your way up the ladder" cultural mentality. This is the "me" generation with a "get the hard work done" attitude. They are typically very loyal to clients and very competitive with coworkers. They are very traditional and tend to form habits that define a comfort zone, but will embrace change when clients demand it. Boomers are traditionally client-service oriented.

Baby Boomers are the premier business management culture, and they are good at it. They transition well and usually run the business today. The perception of Baby Boomers is that they are obsolete, greedy, and work-a-holic's. The reality is they do embrace new ideas when they understand them, value money, and baby boomers are hard workers by nature.

Feel free to comment how you think this might effect the promotion system, recruiting (Hiring) and Retention system, Virtual (Web 2.0) absence = Actual (Real World) absence, or the “businessification” culture in the services. I'll leave my opinion in the comments, eventually...

And please be nice.

The Technology and Culture of a Generation Gap

The activity about blogging almost seems fast and furious, except for average bloggers who see it as just another day in a connected world. Web 2.0 moves information quickly, and those who understand the tools and are comfortable with the technology learn to multi-task quickly, receive and disseminate information quickly, and move on towards accomplishing the next task quickly.

Thad Allen, Commandant of the US Coast Guard, had a bloggers roundtable today discussing the Coast Guards activities in moving towards the utilization of Web 2.0 technologies to open up the information system of the Coast Guard for accessability, but what also sounds like the process of building a communication network between the Coast Guard and its customers and clients, including the taxpayers. There was a lot of revealing information, and I thought the transcript was worth the read in full (PDF).

The reactions are interesting. David Axe, who is a journalist but also blogs both on his own blog and at Wired, sees some irony in the whole process. He's right though, the Coast Guard did trip out of the gate with its first Web 2.0 attempt, and it is easy to be skeptical of today's announced direction of the Coast Guard with a new approach to Web 2.0. I highly recommend watching out for whatever the Unofficial Coast Guard blog says, because lets be honest, it is kind of silly they got denied FOIA request due to lack of legitimacy for an editorial standard when Jim Dolbow is one of the bloggers there. After all, he is on the Editorial Board over at the United States Navy Institute. Are we supposed to believe the Admiral would give priority for the dissemination of very technical Coast Guard information to people in the MSM over that group of incredibly knowledgeable Coast Guard dudes and the Coast Guard is really taking social media seriously? Sounds like they see value in the tools, but still want to have complete control of the content. In other words, they are still in the learning process regarding what Web 2.0 and social media is.

The only thing I picked up is that Wired's Danger Room is screwed if Noah still lets me write articles for them, because while I have no problem wearing a name tag that identifies me and the blog at a Navy sponsored event, I have no intention of identifying myself by name intentionally online until this blogging thing becomes more than a hobby.

However, moving beyond some of the silliness and into the substance, I thought Armed Liberal's question revealed the depth to which the Coast Guard is taking Web 2.0 seriously.

Q Okay. My first question is sort of, as you try and talk about transitioning -- and I apologize because I was a minute or two late -- are you talking about moving the Coast Guard to sort of one common, social media platform? Or are you talking about, in essence, a cloud of tools?

ADM. ALLEN: The answer is probably, all of the above. I think you need to use a variety of tools that are out there. First of all, I think we have to have an air gap between the .mil and .com domains. There's so much stuff that goes on inside the .mil domain where we have to have security concerns. And a lot of it which it can't even be discussed at this level. And a lot of that plays into the decisions we're making about what can be done within the .mil domain and what can't be.

There are also issues about bandwidth and the cost of doing all of this. If you take a look at how many people are on .mil domains that are involved in a .com site at any time during the day dealing with our bandwidth that we're purchasing right now goes towards that connectivity. I'd like to see us move into the .com domain wherever we can and push that content over there.

That said, you shouldn't rule out anything because you don't know what the next big application is. Right now, I intend to work on Facebook. But you know, I'm not saying I shouldn't be in Second Life at some point. I'm not sure we're ready to get there now. And whether or not you're dealing with a specific platform or a cloud, I think you should figure out the effect you're trying to achieve, and it should match that.

That said, whatever we're dealing with that's going to be out there in public domain has to be information that's truly releasable to the public and is consistent with our security policies. And that's where we intend to go.

Back in the day it began with MUDs, then upgraded to Talkers, and eventually IRC. Along came AOL, the webboards and PHPBB, and then it was ICQ. Next it was the MMOs, which rapidly evolved everything as the gamers required Roger Wilco and other voice activated applications to stay coordinated against their opponents. Before you knew it, Napster was a household name, and Yahoo was running commercials during Monday Night Football. That was before Y2K.

The means by which social networking has exploded the internet into content of all forms, from MySpace to Facebook, Teamspeak, Ventrilo, and Mumble. Twitter, Social bookmarks, BitTorrent, blogging, YouTube, and pod casting are just the tip of the iceberg. Ask a Korean gamer in the coffee shop about Lineage II, and you'll begin to understand how 1.6 million Koreans in 2004 represented a global generation that opened the door for MR T. and Verne Troyer to revive their careers as spokesman for the 10 million gamers of World of Warcraft.

If you had a job in 1990 in the military services, a lot of what I'm talking about above means absolutely nothing to you. I graduated High School in 1994, was an IRCop in 1990, and was part of the thinkgeek generation where >SELECT * FROM users WHERE age > 40 returns "no idea what the hell you are talking about." Have your IT guy explain that one to you...

Today's recruit was born in 1990, while today's Generals and Admirals were in the Persian Gulf in 1990, and they don't understand how the world changed when a bunch of young parents watched CNN on a certain winter evening. The culture changed back home, and with the fall of the wall a connected youth experience evolved the culture of a generation of young people to something unfamilar to previous generations. The culture most American youth grew up in is nothing like the culture that today's officers knew as a youth, and it extends far beyond technology even as it was heavily influenced by technology.

I read Admiral Allen's answer and for me it reveals the Coast Guard has seriously considered Web 2.0 in the broad context necessary to be successful over the long term. Domain distinction does matter. OPSEC is the consideration with the largest learning curve. Bandwidth defines the amount of content flow, so it must be center to the decision process. Technology is rapidly evolving, there is no maturity in any of the Web 2.0 technologies currently leveraged for moving information (despite what people believe), and it is unlikely these technologies will fully mature until after IPv6 becomes the accepted standard. We live in a 32-bit information world in transition towards X-Box of information flow. The distance between a MUD and World of Warcraft is the distance between the record player and the IPhone.

My advice to the Coast Guard is the same advice I would give all the services, evolve at the pace necessary to give the older officers time to adapt to the culture changes best reflected in the generation you are recruiting today, because the changes will be much broader than just the tools of technology. Technology is just one of many ways the generation gap is reflected. The entire culture of the connected generation is different, and the generation gap will extend far beyond technology.

Psst.. Would You Like to Meet the Commandant?

I had just spent 15 minutes talking about the Coast Guard with the man sitting to my right, RADM Fred M. Rosa Jr., who entertained my ignorance of the Coast Guard by patiently answering all of my questions, and tolerating my sarcasm. I may have annoyed him with one of my questions, specifically asking what he thinks about the Navy building high speed littoral ships while the Coast Guard is building endurance ships, which I suggested seems backwards to me, and whether he sees this as a sign the Coast Guard will be forward deploying to more places in the world where the Navy doesn't send warships anymore. I cited the Dallas specifically.

His answer was very good, he went all in with Deepwater and explained how endurance is more important than speed for the Coast Guard, highlighting how the Navy has their own logistics train when making a forward deployment whereas the Coast Guard takes everything with them on the deploying ship. Reliability was the word that stuck in my mind. The conversation was mostly a learning experience for me. While I understand what the Coast Guard does, I do not well understand how they do their job. RADM Rosa was both smart and interesting, and the coincidence of sitting next to him during the symposium turned out to be a nice distraction from the regularly scheduled program.

It was about 10:20am on Thursday September 18th, and the regularly scheduled program was about to annoy me, and I knew it. I've read The Art of the Long View by Peter Schwartz, and I wasn't looking forward to sitting through a video, because I wasn't sure if I had enough caffine to stay awake. So far that morning I had seen Karl Wallings presentation, spent time talking with Jack Taylor (who I will be talking about again soon), and has just completed my brief discussion with RADM Fred Rosa... and I was starting to wonder what the rest of the day would bring.

As the lights were about to go out, CDR Cappy Surette asked me if I wanted to meet General James T. Conway. My legs stood up before my mouth answered in the affirmative, and I followed him into the lobby. I was led into a room where a few men sat at a table, Ray Gronberg of the Herald Sun in Durham and Estes Thompson of the Associated Press. I was the guy with "Information Dissemination Blog" as a title on the name tag, and was being treated like a reporter. Turns out, that isn't too bad a gig, if you can get it.

After 5 minutes of chit-chat and introductions, General James T. Conway walked into the room, sat down with the three of us, announced he had about a half hour, and asked us if we had any questions for him. FYI, that was a really cool moment in time for this humble blogger, and I think there may have been a picture taken by a Marine in the room that captured my cheesy grin in that moment.

Maybe it was the atmosphere, a long rectangle table with the General at the head of the table, flanked on both sides by a reporter, and me sitting to the Generals right two chairs down. A small side room, a half hour, and his staff outnumbering all of us with a few Navy uniforms filling a few chairs across from my position. As Estes led the questions, all of which centered around the wars, I realized I would be the guy to talk about the topics other than the war. I remember almost everything that he said, and can't remember anything that either reporter or myself said, and the setting and atmosphere combined with the time allotment gave the General an opportunity to discuss at length every answer for every topic.

Most of my questions centered around amphibious ship concerns and Sea Basing topics that have been discussed on the blog. Both reporters focused on questions central to events in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here are my thoughts from that conversation.

The General never said it directly, but change is coming to the Marine Corps. The 3 ship ARG in particular was a subject he covered as 'possible' to change. Equipment is heavier and requirements are changing, and the Marines are looking to be flexible in the changing environment. Sea Basing is about logistics and reserve from his point of view, and General Conway is committed to Sea Basing as a concept, but he didn't talk much about the specific plan.

The the General mentioned something that caught me completely off guard, and definitely something that needs to be followed up with the Navy. He actually repeated it to everyone in the audience in the open session during his keynote address later that day.

The Navy has told the Marines that the Navy will not be putting amphibious ships closer than 25 miles to shore to embark Marines due to the threat environment of the littorals. I thought that was a profound statement of concession of territory by the Navy, and I immediately thought about how many lessons the Army has learned in Iraq about the dangers of conceding territory.

And once that statement was made, General Conway stressed the Marines needed the MV-22 and EFV, highlighting that LCUs take too long at 8 knots to travel the open 25 miles between ship to shore. I missed about 3 minutes of the discussion shortly after General Conway made that statement, because my mind began racing as I thought about how the idea of fighting in the littorals must have evolved inside the Navy to come to the conclusion to concede out to 25 miles from the coast. My one regret was not asking who in the Navy had made that statement.

Near the end of the conversation, General Conway allowed me the last question. I asked about the evolution of the Marines, the necessity to be the 'kick down the door' heavy force and the 'small wars' force for the US, and which direction the Marines intend to evolve in the future. General Conway said the Marines will be both, and believes they can be both. Marines will stick to a 7 month deployment schedule and 14 month training schedule, and in 14 months the Marines will train to be the conventional war force that can insert itself into any warzone, and the COIN force ready for small wars across the globe.

His mind was made up on this point, the decision has been made and there isn't an either/or debate to be had with the Marines. The Marines will be everything required, and the discussion isn't what type of force the Marines will be, rather how the Marines will be both the conventionally optimized, kick down the door force able to adapt quickly to COIN with the same men and material as conditions require. In listening to him discuss it, I realized how much intellectual rigor is wasted in the public domain as others debate the merits of whether that is the right decision, and how little intellectual rigor I've read regarding how to make it happen. Conway did not see the necessity to specialize Marines towards one or the other at this time, everyone will do both.

From about 10:30am until 11:30am on Thursday I had the best hour of my day. General Conway is the most impressive man I've met in my life to date, and I think I've met some impressive people over time. He made it clear he sees a major reduction in Iraq of the Marines over the next year, but he also made clear it takes 12 months for the Marines to pull out of Iraq from the day the order is given, because that is how long it will take to move the equipment out.

General Conway was very candid, clearly when you reach the last step of your career you feel free to speak clearly. He made it clear to us he no longer sees Iraq as the best mission for Marines, and he believes it is time for the Marines to go to Afghanistan.

As for what I believe... I think there is great irony that on the same day the Navy takes delivery of the Littoral Combat Ship, General Conway tells a crowd in North Carolina that the Navy has no intention to take amphibious ships within 25 miles of the beach. We get very little information directly from the Navy, but combining this information with what the Navy said in the House back on July 31st, I get the sense the littorals warfare discussion we have had over the last several years has ended with the Navy in retreat. If that is not correct, I am clearly missing the signs, statements, and smoke signals that suggest otherwise.

The Challenges of the 21st Century Conversation

I've never taken a poll, but I would guess that about half the readers of this blog have read Ian Toll's book Six Frigates, the story about the birth of the US Navy. The story captures the time period between about 1775 until the War of 1812, the last war between the United States and Great Britain. It is an excellent book that captures the history of the US Navy, but also describes in detail the first maritime strategy of the United States as our nation struggled in competition with the major powers of Europe at the time.

Karl F. Walling told a similar story on Thursday during the Conversations with the Country. We have previously discussed his article A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists (PDF), and with only a few exceptions, the story he told on Thursday was almost exactly what is published in that JFQ article. I have read the article several times, including waiting for my plane on Wednesday, on the plane Wednesday, and before I went to bed on Wednesday. The presentation itself was average for me, but the slides were good and the jokes were good. Talking with folks about his presentation afterward, many who had heard the content noted it was not his best presentation. The content was very good though, because for those who had not heard it before or had never read the JFQ article, many told me they enjoyed his presentation a lot.

The Need for Consistency

As Professor Walling was giving his presentation, and as I was observing the crowd reaction, several thoughts came to mind. First, lets start with one item that got me thinking throughout the day.

The first conversation was about homeland security primarily, so I will call it building the moat. It occurred during the founding era from 1776 to 1825, between the followers of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton’s followers, the Federalists, were often veterans of the American War for Independence. Hamilton himself was General George Washington’s right-hand man throughout the war and until Washington’s death in 1798. These veterans remembered that on July 2, 1776, 2 days before Congress declared independence, the British sent the largest maritime expedition in history thus far to capture New York City, with 10 British ships-of-the-line (the aircraft carriers of their age), 20 frigates, and over 100 transports carrying an army about twice the size of the one Washington had to defend the city. So no one should be surprised that Washington, who had no navy, was unable to confront the British invasion at sea. Outnumbered on land, he lost more than half of his army to the British invaders on Long Island and Manhattan and had to abandon the city to the British, who occupied it until the end of the war. No one is quite sure how, but a fire started as the British moved in, and over 60 percent of the city burned to the ground. For these veterans, this was their 9/11, the burning of New York City.

This type of storytelling for the Navy works, and it was very effective in the room I was in. American business owners tend to know who Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, or George Washington is. It is also appropriate to compare the Great Fire of New York City in 1776 with 9/11, an analogy everyone understood. However, there is one part of this that bothered me a bit, and it bothered me because as the day went on the attempt to associate historical function with modern function began a process of blurred comparisons, and ultimately some confusing rhetoric.

The power of history as a maritime narrative for the Navy when having a conversation with the American people was very evident from my perspective during Thursday's symposium. The intent was clearly to keep things generic, to maintain a very high level of conversation to insure that regardless of whom makes up an audience, there were no confusing details or unnecessary depth. I've read many folks in the comments over the last year suggest they would want to attend one of these conversations. I assure you, if you fully understand the maritime strategy concepts discussed here, including the liberal use of acronyms used in blog posts, the Conversations with the Country forum is not for you. That forum is for people who read this blog and often don't understand anything the rest of us are discussing. There are many people like that in America today.

However, when presenting even generic narratives, we need to insure consistency among the services. British ships-of-the-line were not the aircraft carriers of their age, they were the AEGIS cruisers and destroyers of their age. That distinction may sound too detailed at first glance, but later in the day Major General Williams compared aircraft carriers to airfields at sea, and General Conway went into detail describing Sea Basing as building a port at sea to support Marines with a logistical lifeline from sea. As this was happening, it dawned on me that the services do not share the same dictionary for 21st century capabilities. Perhaps it is time for the Naval War College to write one, and I do not jest when I make that suggestion.

HMS Africa was a 64-gun third-rate ship of the line of the Royal Navy that displaced 1,379 tons as a battleship. She led a 3 ship squadron during the War of 1812 in a failed attempt to run down the US Navy frigate USS Constitution early in the war. This is one of many tales detailed in Ian Toll's book. HMS Africa was three times smaller than today's Oliver Hazard Perry frigate, so how is it possible we call her a battleship? Because in relation to the ships of her era, the rating system for surface combatants at the time accurately described what the ship was. We call the Zumwalt class a battleship on this blog, but CDR Salamander describes the ship as a light cruiser, while the Navy calls the ship a destroyer. CDR uses light cruiser based on the metric of displacement from the time period of WWII, but I'd argue he fails to account that light cruisers played two primary roles in WWII, AAW for task forces and ASuW when leading destroyer squadrons on torpedo runs. The Zumwalt isn't primarily a AAW or ASuW platform, instead is a naval fires ship, which for the record is what battleships were in WWII. Relative to other ships of the modern era, the Zumwalt will have the highest displacement of any surface combatant of the modern US Navy, not to mention be capable of carrying more missiles (the weapon of the modern era) than any existing surface combatant in the world, and we aren't even talking about the Advanced Gun System.

My point is not that our modern rating system is exactly right (which it is btw), the point is the Navy is trying to tell a compelling narrative leveraging naval history to relate the narrative to more American citizens. If we are going to do that, we need to evolve our maritime dictionary to the 21st century while maintaining proper historical context. When Professor Walling calls the battleship of 1812 to the aircraft carrier of 2008, he is inconsistent and doesn't give the same visually driven description that Major General James Williams did when he described today's aircraft carrier as a mobile air base at sea. The fact is, the aircraft carrier of today has absolutely nothing in common with the role of a battleship of 1812, just like the nuclear submarine has nothing in common with anything fielded by Navies before the 20th century.

The Navy, probably through the Navy War College, needs to write a 21st century maritime dictionary for the maritime services that captures the evolution of seapower to the 21st century. Next time the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines stand in front of the American people, the services need to be consistent in terminology. Consistency is very important in these endeavors, and I had a good chuckle more than once watching Marines be very consistent with their ideas while the Navy made more than a few poor historical associations during the discussion. History is a great relational tool for any conversation with the American people, but until historical context is applied properly to modern capability using the same definitions, the services will fall short on clarity in its communication.

The 21st Century Evangelist

Another aspect of the Professor Walling presentation that had the hamster in my head running the wheel full speed was when this part was discussed.

The second national conversation to which I would draw attention is about securing free use of the global maritime commons and sea control. It began in the 1890s under the leadership of another forward-thinking maritime strategist, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan of the Naval War College. Mahan was an evangelist — some even say a propagandist — for the Navy.

When the group broke for lunch, I was having an entertaining conversation in the lobby with some of the CHINFO folks, in particular a pair of LTs who I found interesting because both were familiar with the blog, each for different reasons. Following that conversation, RADM Frank Thorp walked up to me, introduced himself, and after a brief conversation escorted me into the dining area for lunch... all the way to a back table where the two of us sat down for a half hour conversation.

For the discussion I had with the two LTs, and the discussion I had with Admiral Thorp, the subject was specific to blogging. With the LTs I explained that what I do is nothing like what they do, and I explained a bit of what I do here and highlighted the differences. That same conversation came up with Admiral Thorp, who properly questioned the purpose for an official Navy blog. I made two points to Admiral Thorp, and I'll let the audience decide if I'm right or wrong.

First, CHINFO would have a hard time running a blog for navy.mil, and I don't think it would work. As a pair of sports fans, we used an ESPN driven analogy to describe what we do. If getting Naval information out to the masses is SportsCenter, then navy.mil already has anchors manning the desk telling the people the news of the day. On navy.mil, the Navy is Stuart Scott. It would be hard, if not impossible, for the Navy to evolve its conversation with the American people beyond that function.

As a blogger I'm the guy on Sportscenter who Stuart Scott interviews to describe the football, basketball, or baseball action, except I don't need the SportsCenter anchor to have that conversation. Whether it is the Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, or MSC, my role is to be the color analyst, and give an opinion regarding not only the play that just happened, but describe what plays work, why they work, and in the case of this blog, when it comes to the subject of maritime strategy we attempt to forward new ideas and new plays for the playbook. How exactly would the Navy do that? Which LT, LCDR, or CDR in CHINFO is going to be given the flexibility to second guess the value or purpose of something navy.mil is reporting in the news? I'm not saying the Navy doesn't need to blog, indeed the Navy needs to blog, but there is an evolution required if the Navy is going to blog and that evolution will be top down with policy, not bottom up due to desire.

The second part of the discussion I had with Admiral Thorp was about Professor Walling's discussion about a Navy evangelist. Either intentionally or unintentionally, the professor highlighted during his presentation that the Navy always had an evangelist when attempting to have a conversation with the country. Professor Walling also noted that critics of a Navy evangelists have a role in the conversation specific to the message of the evangelist. From 1776-1825, the evangelist for the Navy was Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that the nation needed to adopt the Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation for the sole purpose of raising taxes to build a Navy. Ultimately, Jefferson built the wrong Navy, but at least he pushed the conversation forward that the nation needed a Navy.

Mahan was noted as the evangelist starting in 1890. He ultimately got many, many things right in his strategic thinking, but he also advocated a battleship heavy Navy that lacked enough destroyers to manage the problems the nation faced at sea in WWI. Professor Walling notes Franklin Roosevelt and Carl Vinson as the evangelist of the period between WWI and WWII, but the strategic thinking leading into WWII was clearly flawed. As it is noted in Captain Hughes great book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, with the exception of mine warfare vessels, every type of ship entered WWII serving one function for the fleet, but came out of WWII serving a completely different purpose as part of the battle force.

Let me carry this one step further than Professor Walling. The evangelist during the cold war was Admiral Rickover, one who had his fair share of critics throughout his remarkable career. A very complicated man, Admiral Rickover got it exactly right by promoting the necessity of nuclear technology for the Navy, and in particular the submarine service. The most recent example of the evangelist of the Navy was Admiral Cebrowski, who was ultimately run out of the Navy by his critics, only to have his ideas twisted and perverted to help contribute towards the mess we find ourselves in today. As I told Admiral Thorp, the Navy does not currently have an evangelist which the Navy may need to sell the strategy and have the conversation with the country, and almost certainly needs if they have any intention of being credible regarding shipbuilding. I also told Admiral Thorp the Navy is very unlikely to have an evangelist anytime soon because of the conditions of our time.

The simple truth is, the next evangelist for the Navy will be online. The next evangelist will probably not be an Admiral in the US Navy, rather the evangelist for the Navy will be more similar to how information is disseminated in the era by which the conversation takes place. If I was playing the role of futurist, I would suggest the next evangelist for the military services will ultimately be a distributed number of popular and respected bloggers that make up an evangelist networl.

I'll take it one step further... the Army and the Marines already has their evangelist network, because in classic 21st century form the network core for the evangelical network of those services appears to be the Small Wars Journal, where a number of active duty officers ALREADY contribute to the strategic discussions regarding the challenges facing those services. I don't know if the Small Wars Journal is the model for the Navy or the Navy blogosphere to follow, but I do know the Navy doesn't have that kind of online network forum yet. If I was to make a suggestion, I know where I would suggest the network forum should evolve from.

The Road Ahead

While I have been a bit nitpicky of Karl F. Wallings presentation during the Conversations with the Country on Thursday, he has done a remarkable service for the Navy. His contribution is brilliant because it captivates audiences with excellent content, which he constructed perfectly to send the message the Navy wanted to send to its target audience. The Navy held 18 of these conversations with the country, the Durham conversation was supposedly the last, and Professor Walling presented at all of them. His presentation is the model for the Navy to follow in the future. By linking well understood American history and easily articulated strategy to a modern context, Karl F. Walling's illuminates the Navy's message to a broad audience in a way that can be generally understood. It is a message that comes off as personally relevant, and specifically connects with the audience in a way that builds a relationship between the Navy and the American people.

Before his presentation, I was introduced to Professor Walling. I assure you, he was quite unimpressed, and I doubt he could pick me out of a lineup. However, if I was to make a suggestion, I would be interested in seeing him produce a follow up that answers many of the open questions he concludes his presentation with.

Should we focus on securing our moat? What is a moat in the age of nuclear missiles, and how could a navy supply such a moat today? What kind of moat is required in an age of international terrorism and illegal immigration? Or should we focus on free use of the global commons? What does that mean in the age of space and cyberspace warfare? Or should we focus on projecting power from the sea as far as necessary to defeat a distant enemy, such as al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Perhaps we must do all of the above. Fine, but how do we diversify our strategic portfolio so that we can protect our most vital interests without becoming overextended militarily, economically, and politically? What roles might a variety of allies, both formal and informal, play as we hedge our bets against the worst case while striving to achieve better cases? These are just the tip of the iceberg of the questions we must address to have a viable strategy in the future.

Does the current Maritime Strategy answer these questions? If the Navy answered these questions on Thursday, I missed it. An enduring strategy should, and would... answer these questions. If the Navy wants to hold a conversation with the country, it may be necessary for the Navy to have an evangelist, using a common dictionary shared by the three maritime services, who can answers these questions in a way that relates history and strategy to the context of the 21st century maritime environment and challenges. That evangelist didn't perform that duty during Thursdays conversation, probably because that evangelist (or evangelist network) doesn't exist for the modern conversation with the country.