Type 920 Hospital Ship

The type 920 medical ship was given the number 866 a while back and officially joined the navy on the 23rd. You can find articles about it on Sinodefence and on Global Security.

This is the article that talked about its entry into PLAN.

本报讯 (记者/陶达嫔通讯员/陈佳楠)由我国自行研制的全球首艘专门设计的海上医院船，23日在广州完工交船。
　　据悉,这艘海上医院船由广州造船企业、广船国际研发制造。该船的交付使用，将使我国成为世界上少数具有 远海医疗救护能力的国家之一。
　　据介绍，这艘排水量超万吨的医院船配有数百张病床和先进的医疗保障系统及消防、救生设施,每个病房舱室 都设有一个护士站，诊疗条件达到三甲医院的水平。
　　大型医院船是现代海军的重要标志之一。目前，包括美国等先进国家的海上医疗船均系民船改装而成。23日交付的该船，其排水量之大在同类船舶中堪称“亚洲第一”。据悉，在战时，该船可为作战部队伤病员提供海上早期治疗和部分专科治疗，或为舰艇部队提供卫勤支援等；在平时，则可执行海上医疗救护训练任务，也可以为舰艇编队和驻岛礁等边远地区部队提供医疗服务等。

It said that China's first indigenously designed global medical ship has been handed from Guangzhou shipyard to the navy on the 23rd of this month.

This is designed and built by the Guangzhou Shipyard International Company Limited and makes China one of the very few countries in the world to far long range medical rescue capability. This ship's displacements is in tens of thousands and has hundreds of bed, advanced disinfectant and life saving instruments. Each sick room has a nursing station, it reaches level 3A hospital standard. Large hospital ship is an important sign of modern navy. US and many advanced world's hospital ships are converted from civilian ship. This is the largest ship of its class in Asia. It says that in wartime, ship ship provides early medical treatment for injuries on sea and part of the specified treatment, can also support other ships. In peace time, it can be used for medical training on sea and can provide medical treatment for the fleet and distant islands.

Aside from their commentary, we can probably add humanitarian missions to the list of its duties also. Galrahn actually commented on this ship a while back on its humanitarian values. I think this ship will probably end up in SSF, so it can serve in Taiwan scenario, helping those islands in South China Sea and be part of the growing sea-projection part of SSF.

Saving Money In Wonderland

The future threat, particularly from proliferated ballistic missiles and advanced antiship cruise missiles, can be better addressed by the DDG 51. Modifying the DDG 1000s to support these missions is unaffordable from the Navy's standpoint.

Given the range of missions assigned to the Navy in the future, the technical complexity of the threats we are to face and the relative likelihood we will be called upon to execute these missions, the greatest single threat is the proliferation of advanced ballistic missiles, followed by a burgeoning deep water, quiet diesel submarine capability by potential adversaries.

The future Navy will have to address these threats first and today. The DDG 51 presents more capability in these areas than does the DDG 1000.

Testimony July 31,, 2008, House Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough

Like most people, I've assumed all along the reason for truncating the DDG-1000 was cost. In reviewing the Navy's testimony on July 31 in front of the House, other than indicating the costs of the DDG-51 were known and the DDG-1000 costs were less known, the only time the Navy made cost an issue was in the comment above that the cost to add AAW/BMD to the DDG-1000 is unaffordable.

I was looking through a CRS report out on the DDG-1000 program and noticed an interesting phrase, that the Navy "proposal to build DDG-51s rather than DDG-1000s is intended to be roughly budget-neutral over the period FY2010-FY2015..." I think the implication the Navy is treating this as "budget neutral" is very interesting, because as I look at the numbers, I've begun wondering how "budget neutral" this swap for DDG-51s really is.

InsideDefense was able to obtain some numbers on the DDG-51 proposed change. The OSD request begins the discussion on the decision to truncate the DDG-1000 by telling the Navy to "Provide better arguments as to why the DoN's truncation cost estimates are correct - think the DoN's estimate is too low." That doesn't build much confidence, but upon examination, neither do the numbers.

In thinking how to present a "budget neutral" example of the DDG-1000 trade for DDG-51s, I've come up with the following equation and definitions:

(PLAN A) DDG-1000 + DDG-1000 AAW/BMD SW + HW + DDG-1000 R&D = (PLAN B) DDG51 Restart + FLT IIA + DDG-51 R&D + DDG-1000 R&D for first 3

Requirements for PLAN B:
AMOD
DDG-51 AEGIS SW + HW

Definitions:

(PLAN A) = Plan to build just the 7 DDG-1000s FY10+
(PLAN B) = Plan to build the 3 funded DDG-1000s and DDG-51s FY10+
DDG-1000 = 4 remaining ships FY10 - FY13
DDG-1000 AAW/BMD SW + HW = Raytheon bid to add BMD to DDG-1000
DDG-51 Restart = costs to restart industrial base for DDG-51
FLT IIA = New DDG-51s FLT IIA FY10-FY15
AMOD = AEGIS modernization, part of the new DDG-51s to be built in new purchase
DDG-51 AEGIS SW + HW = Missile Defense Agency funding from FY09 - FY13 to complete ACB12 (AEGIS baseline for new destroyers)

We do not know all of these costs, but we know enough that we can get a feeling for the "budget neutral" aspect of the discussion, and we can get a feel for the unaffordable BMD capability McCullough testified the Navy is worried about as quoted above. According to POM10 documentation available from InsideDefense (subscription), the planned R&D total for DDG-1000 is from FY10-FY15 is $2065.9 even after the program is truncated at 3 ships. The R&D for DDG-51 is $537.9 million according to the new plan. The following estimates based on the truncated program are also available.

DDG-1000 POR estimate by the Navy (in millions)

FY09 = $2,553.8
FY10 = $2,713.9
FY11 = $2,427.0
FY12 = $2,619.1
FY13 = $2,347.4
Total = $12,661.2

DDG-1000 for equation = $10,107.4 (4 ships Fy10-FY13)

DDG-51 POM10 POR estimate by the Navy (in millions)

FY09 = $0
FY10 = $2081.0
FY11 = $3608.2
FY12 = $2267.1
FY13 = $3775.4
FY14 = $2352.0
FY15 = $2361.1

FLT IIA for equation = $16444.8 (8 ships FY10-FY15)

I also have the following numbers. Dan Smith of Raytheon has used the BMD SW + HW number in numerous media sources. AMOD is a well known program and figure from numerous sources, and MDA is avialable via Presidents FY09 budget numbers.

DDG-1000 AAW/BMD SW + HW = $550 million
AMOD = AEGIS modernization is $1.2 billion FY08 to FY13
AEGIS SW + HW = Missile Defense Agency totals $5.3 billion from FY09 to FY13

Now lets fill in what we can using the equation above:

(PLAN A) DDG-1000 + DDG-1000 AAW/BMD SW + HW + DDG-1000 R&D = (PLAN B) DDG51 Restart + FLT IIA + DDG-51 R&D + DDG-1000 R&D for first 3

(Plan to build just the 7 DDG-1000s FY10+) $10107.4 + $550 million + $2065.9 = (Plan to build the 3 funded DDG-1000s and DDG-51s FY10+) DDG51 Restart + $16444.8 + $537.9 million + $2065.9

(Plan to build just the 7 DDG-1000s FY10+) $12723.3 = (Plan to build the 3 funded DDG-1000s and DDG-51s FY10+) DDG51 Restart + $19048.6

What am I missing here? Oh, wait, let me also account for DDG-51 AMOD and AEGIS SW + HW, because both are required in order to build the DDG-51 Flight IIA BMD capable destroyers that are replacing the DDG-1000 in the shipbuilding plan, and those costs are $1.2 billion and $5.3 billion respectively.

So according to the Navy's own budget plans to truncate the DDG-1000, as per the Service POM Briefs and Resulting Actions document dated August 27, 2024 available at InsideDefense, the FY09 DDG-1000 plan will cost $12723.3 million to finish the last 4 ships, but to cancel those ships and build DDG-51s starting in FY10 it will cost $19048.6 million, plus whatever it costs to restart the DDG-51 program, and even that has a mandatory requirement of $6.5 billion just for the new DDG-51s to have AEGIS BMD.

So the Navy ignores the mandatory requirement of $6.5 billion to put AEGIS BMD on the DDG-51s they want to buy, but McCullough is telling Congress in testimony how unaffordable it is to modify the DDG-1000 to support BMD, when according to Dan Smith of Raytheon that cost is $550 million? BTW, I confirmed that number with the Navy folks who know, the number is actually $558.6 million for anyone who wants to confirm my numbers are legit.

I'm adding in the cost of BMD for the DDG-1000s here in the equation as cited, and I still must be missing something. The new plan basically builds 4 more Burkes for an extra $6325.3 million + the costs to restart the DDG-51 line, but if the Navy's own cost estimates are correct, the Navy could build 3 DDG-1000s with all the AAW/BMD for almost the same price as the DDG-51 estimate based on the Navy's own budget numbers, meaning either 7 or 8 more DDGs through FY15, and the 7 DDG-1000s would be much more capable with the DBR/VSR than the 8 DDG-51s with a SPY-D upgrade.

With the new plan, even the cost reasoning for truncating the DDG-1000 doesn't make much sense. If the Navy numbers are accurate, like they continue to claim, how is this plan smarter than the original DDG-1000 plan? As the CRS reports by Ronald O'Rourke have made clear the last seveal months, the DDG-1000 plan is better for the shipyards, so why is this new DDG-51 plan that creates instability in shipbuilding at greater cost better than the old plan?

Am I the only American taxpayer wondering WTF? What am I missing here?

Update: Scott B rocks, and helped clean up some of my numbers. I have adjusted the numbers above, and it still doesn't make sense.

On Hearts, Minds, and Piracy

This article in the UAE paper The National takes the hearts and minds approach necessary to fight piracy to the next level.

“In Somalia, there are over 2,300 maritime pirates who include trained military men, security experts, professional translators and experienced brokers,” Farhat Hussameddin wrote in an opinion piece for Egypt’s pro-government Al Ahram.

These organised, hi-tech gangs have managed to seize a Ukrainian vessel carrying tanks, arms, ammunition and military equipment and their ransom demands are high.

“These pirates have become rich and powerful and the owners of many commercial institutions,” he wrote.

“Pirate Jama Shino in the Somali town of Garowe, threw the most lavish wedding party for his second marriage and invited hundreds of people from the local authorities and among citizens,” Hussameddin wrote.

“The bride and the young women who attended the party, said: “Marrying a pirate is every Somali girl’s dream. He has power, money, immunity, the weapons to defend the tribe and funds to give to the militias in civil war.”

Emphasis mine.

I may be disqualified from this conversation, I was the dad who let his 13 year old put a picture of Johnny Depp on the wall in her room, so is it really hard to believe the ladies of Somalia see the real thing as "dreamy"?

Moving beyond the love angle of the story, there is a lot of good information here that describes the piracy problem the international community faces in Somalia. Keeping in mind Somalia has a culture of conflict, one can get a feel for the network behind the guys in boats with this article.

The question is, with piracy a high visibility problem but in context, a very low cost problem from a global commerce perspective, are there low cost, effective international solutions to either curb the growth of piracy or even reverse the trend of piracy? For example, Peter Chalk's RAND study of global piracy cited the IMB as suggesting piracy was costing somewhere between $1 billion and $12 billion globally. What a range! It highlights how nobody has any idea how much the real cost is. However, he also notes the World Trade Organization estimates the value of maritime commerce in 2005 to be $7.8 trillion. What is the real effect of $12 billion costs to a $7.8 trillion dollar industry?

Unfortunately, without local control and action in Somalia, solutions to piracy from the perspective of the West are both violent and brutal, meaning politically they are unlikely to be utilized by western nations. Add on top of that they are probably somewhat expensive, and you have a recipe for inaction. The most likely outcome is that containment will be attempted on the cheap, and we will wait until pirates do something that creates an economic ripple before serious action is taken against Somalian pirates by the West.

Observing the Photo of the Week

Last Thursday this picture was taken of the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) arriving in Yokosuka for a port of call. This is the third really good photo of the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) on its current deployment.

The first good look we got of the Ohio was over a year ago, on October 22, 2024 when the submarine pulled into Pearl Harbor in the beginning of her maiden deployment. At that time, she was observed carrying one Dry Dock Shelter (DDS).

The second really good look we got was on Feb. 28, 2008 when the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) pulled in Chinhae Naval Base, South Korea. At that time, the submarine was also noted to be carrying only one Dry Dock Shelter.

As you can see, during the Yokosuka visit, the Ohio was carrying two Dry Dock Shelters. While we could sit and speculate forever all the reasons and activities going on with the SSGNs, the reason this is noteworthy is because as the deployment of the USS Ohio approached, several officers involved in the SSGN program emphasized that the payload possibilities for the submarines would be tested, and the Navy intends to test as many payloads as possible. The implication at the time was these platforms, at least early on, would not be underwater arsenal ships, but would be utilized as underwater sea basing platforms to test, deploy, and recover as many technologies in the modified bays as could be fit.

That we are seeing different configurations when we do get a good look at the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) during this deployment is very encouraging, because the implication is the Navy is indeed testing the various payloads and technologies under development. What those technologies and payloads might be can be speculated elsewhere, we are just pleased to see the Navy isn't settling with these platforms as underwater battleships for land attack, because the potential for other capabilities is far greater.

7th Fleet Focus: Observing Pictures of Malabar 08

I don't know where this partnership at sea is going, but it looks really good getting there.


Click the pictures for link to hi-res.