Following up on yesterday's post regarding the JMSDF's acquisition of BMD capability, the USN undertook a test of their own forces on Saturday. Emphasizing the difficulty with BMD in general, and (in my opinion) reinforcing the usefulness of BMD as a tactical rather than strategic system, the two Navy vessels (The DDG 51 class ships DDG 60 USS Paul Hamilton and DDG 70 USS Hopper) went one for two. The Hamilton's Standard SM-3 "successfully intercepted" the threat target missile, but the Hopper's missile failed to intercept. I'm not sure, from reading the news reports so far, what range the missile was intercepted at or how far it traveled, which would allow us a better chance of determining how 'difficult' a target it was. The story mentions that the missile was launched from the Pacific Missile Range on Kaui, and that the intercept attempts occured 'north of Kaui' but don't tell us how far north or what the target missile type was.In any case, this test was notable for being the first end-to-end test of the system carried out by the Navy, rather than with BMDO participation. As such, it is a better look at how the system might perform in the organization and force during actual use. While destroying one of two inbound ballistic targets is a tactically useful system, it offers little to no benefit for a policymaker making strategic decisions based on the system's capability - and in fact shows that 'selling' this capability as a strategic-level BMD system might be counterproductive.
Don't get me wrong; I'm not dishing on the Navy for the result. BMD is a fantastically hard problem. I remain concerned with how the capability is viewed at the policy and strategic level. I'll keep poking around. I want to know how the intercept compared to the much-discussed MARV-ed PLA(N) weapon profile. (Photo of the Hamilton's launch from US Navy)
