LANTFLT racking up the hours

Neptune's helpers have sent us here at ID some interesting information which is relevant to our discussion of strategy, current operating conditions, and ship type allocation. It consists of a detailed list of ship operations of LANTFLT's non-nuclear vessels for FY2008, and offers one metric we're most concerned with: Underway Hours (UH) for each ship.

None of this information is marked for classification in any way. Still, since we're not positive of the position of LANTFLT on its distribution, ID won't post the information in full. We're going to ask you to trust us, just as we trust the information, for the purposes of argument. In any case, here are some highlights. More nuggets as we dig through them.

Of the top five ships listed by underway hours, there are two LSD, two DDG and one PC. The ship with the most underway hours is an LSD, by a margin of over 200 hours, with a total underway time of 5,097 hours (out of a total of 8,766 hours/year!) Note that this specifically does not include non-underway time on the boilers; that is accounted for separately. The PC has an underway time of 4,711 hours. As for averages by ship type, we get the following (UH = underway hours):


As Galrahn and others have been maintaining, it's the amphibs and the coastal workers which are going to get whipped from pillar to post in a soft power, littorals-focused operating environment, and that's what we see. The LHA number is slightly disingenuous as an average, as it consists of a single-ship class (USS Nassau, LHA-4) but that datapoint is still valid. It should also be pointed out that two of the nine PCs had underway times under a thousand hours, and one had a time of only 40 hours, which has a definite impact on the average time; the other seven are notably higher. The underway time for the PC and FFG are quite high - but their projected replacement the LCS is being sold as an MCM replacement with a steel hull, an FFG replacement without organic blue-water weapon systems, and a 3,000 ton instead of 330-ton PC with the same speed.

One piece of information I don't presently have is the expected duty cycle of these warships at design time, as distinct from expected life; I'll see if I can dig that up.

(Picture of the USS Whidbey Island LSD-41 - the vessel with the most hours in FY2008. Image from Wikipedia.)

Coast Guard Acquisition Future Is Looking Better

Peter Stinson at the Unofficial Coast Guard Blog said something the other day that I've been thinking about over the last few weeks.

Many of us here in the blogosphere (and I count myself among the many) have been critical in the past of the Coast Guard's handling of acquisitions. I think it is safe to say that the Coast Guard got in over their collective heads.

I also think it is safe to say, although my fellow blogosphere brethran may disagree, that the Coast Guard has, indeed, turned a corner.

Actually Peter, I think you are on the money. I have not been very kind to Coast Guard acquisition, at least I wasn't when I first started blogging. I do however recognize that the National Security Cutter has been the primary source of criticism, but I am not sure the criticism has always been fair in context. In looking through this CRS report (PDF) I noted the following table included from a GAO report, I thought this was an interesting breakdown that explains the cost increases to Berthoff and other National Security Cutters. Click for better resolution.

Requirements changes to address post-9/11 needs are one of the main reasons for the cost increases. The new requirements include

• expanded interoperability with the Department of Defense, DHS, and local first responders;
• increased self-defense and survivability, including chemical, biological, and radiological measures;
• increased flight capability via longer and enhanced flight deck;
• upgraded weapon systems; and
• improved classified communication capabilities.

Another contributing factor was Hurricane Katrina, which not only caused considerable damage to the shipyard, including tooling, equipment, shops, and other facilities, but also caused an exodus of the experienced workforce. The overall number of shipworkers declined significantly, causing the contractor to use more overtime hours. The loss of workers, in turn, considerably disrupted the ship’s learning curve, which normally results in greater efficiencies in production of subsequent ships.

However, some of the increase can be attributed to Coast Guard actions. For example, the contractor used the Coast Guard’s failure to precisely execute the contract according to the implementation plan as basis for requesting an equitable adjustment. Furthermore, even though the Coast Guard’s own technical staff raised fatigue life concerns — later confirmed by a U.S. Navy study — during the design phase, the decision was made to proceed with production of the first two NSCs and enhance the structure later.

I think it is interesting e GAO graphic above is saying about 70% of the cost increases are directly attributed to either 9/11 mandated requirements, Hurricane Katrina, or the economic issues the nation is facing. Consider for a moment that in the case of Berthoff, the design problems have only contributed 20% of the total cost increases. For perspective, if the LCS was only suffering a 20% cost increase, the hull would cost only $264 million instead of around $650 million.

Are there still problems with Deepwater? Yes, but the GAO has about as much praise as it does criticism in is June 2008 report according to that CRS report, and given recent events it would appear some of those criticisms will not be evident in their next report.

Would you rather have C4ISR problems you can overcome with a bit of yard work, or problems like this (PDF)? In context, the Berthoff issues aren't as big a deal as the claims make them out to be, at least under the reforms implimented by Admiral Allen.

Problem solved? Nope. Peter is saying the Coast Guard has turned the corner, and I agree. What makes me even more optimistic is that it isn't just about turns, from where I'm watching it also appears the Coast Guard turned onto the right road. That All Hands email reflects only a small part of what is going on, and has a history well explained in this CRS report for those interested. What also has me encouraged was a discussion between David Axe and Rear Admiral Gary T. Blore (PDF), Assistant Commandant for Acquisition & Chief Acquisition Officer during a recent bloggers roundtable.

Now that is an interesting conversation on Coast Guard acquisition, and explains in detail why Peter is on to something.

The Gorshkov fiasco continues

So, we've seen a plethora of articles coming out from the latest negotiations of the ship. You can find one of the articles here.
The important part is the following:

Russia had stunned India last year by asking for $1.2 billion more for the warship's refit. Then, after a flurry of top-level discussions and visits to the Sevmash shipyard earlier this year, the cost escalation figure jumped to $2 billion, as first reported by TOI in July.

India, of course, realises it will have to pay "substantially more" for Gorshkov since the 2004 contract had "grossly underestimated" the amount of work required on the warship.

But Russia's propensity to jack up costs midway through the execution of contracted weapon systems continues to jar. The finance ministry has already shot down the defence ministry's proposal to consider Russia's original demand for a $1.2 billion jump in the refit costs, holding that it will set a bad precendent for other defence deals.

The finance ministry, in particular, has objected to the figure of $600 million for the year-long sea trials of Gorshkov slated to be held in Barents Sea from 2011.

India is banking upon Gorshkov for its long-standing objective to have two operational `carrier battle-groups'. The country's solitary and ageing 28,000-tonne carrier INS Viraat is currently undergoing another life-extension refit to ensure it can run at least five more years. Moreover, the delivery of the 37,500-tonne indigenous aircraft carrier being built at Cochin Shipyard is likely to take place only by 2014-2015 or so.

At this point, you wonder just how India can get out of this deal. Including the original 1.5 billion, this would wound up to be 3.5 billion, which is comparable to getting a brand new carrier as opposed to getting something that had been rotting outside. This price escalation seems to be consistent with all other recent transactions, which also has been prevalent in contracts with the air force and the ground force. At least the other large naval contract, talwar project, has not been plagued with the same problem.

It was interesting that this article also mentioned the other carrier project that is ongoing for India. Much talk have also been around how IAC has also been plagued by problems encountered in construction. It seems that Gorshkov at least put the problems with Indian shipbuilders in the back burner. It allows the Indian media to direct the anger at the manipulative Russians rather than the incompetence of their own inspection team who bought into the entire Russian assessment.

Supporting Valour-IT Day 8

So I am looking through the list of supporters for Team Navy, you know, pretending like I'm actually leading this fleet. For the record, I'm not, Boston Maggie is doing all of the work and I'm doing everything the Queen of the Sea tells me to.

As I'm scouting the list and reading various blogs I know little about, I came across this Health Information Systems site that focuses on Healthcare IT news and opinion. I have intentionally avoided talking about my work, and by contract terms I can't give details anyway, but I do have a ton of experience with Health IT software, including being the nerd who figured out how to run a bunch of McKesson and Cerner products in Citrix back when those companies were run by idiots who had never heard of Citrix. Actually, Cerner is still run by technical dipshits without a clue, at least I've never met an onsite tech from Cerner who knew how their own product worked on a technical level, although they are wizards with the software itself.

Even if you aren't in Healthcare IT, but you are just an IT dude, this is a really cool website and I added it to my RSS feed,. HIPAA has made health IT more complicated than it has to be, mostly because IT folks are taking tips from attorney's whose technical understanding is limited. Protect data? Most health care offices are wireless now, and if you look over their shoulder at the laptop, most don't use SSL and rely on WEP keys or whatever security is built into router based technologies. In my experience, security in healthcare is like security in most small businesses, I like to call it security through obsecurity. The hospitals do a better job than the clinics, well, the private hospitals do.

Anyway, I wanted to shout out a thanks to HISTalk for supporting Team Navy in Valour-IT. We need everyones support to reach our goal this year, add your donation here.

Piracy Escalation to VLCC in Somalia

As AP and other news sources are reporting, this past weekend saw a jump in the Somali piracy targeting with the capture of the Saudi-owned Very Large Crude Carrier MV Sirius Star, which was seized over 400 nm southeast of Kenya, somewhere southwest of the Seychelles. As has been pointed out, this is a bit of a jump in their takings. For one thing, the Sirius Star is huge; for another, it offers a somewhat disturbing opportunity for ecoterrorist extortion if it is carrying cargo and if the pirates choose to take that route. It seems unlikely on the face of it, since reports are that they're sailing it towards the haven of Eyl, and they would be unlikely to risk their home waters. However, watch for reports that this ship is being 'shadowed' much like the MV Faina - supertankers are much closer to 'national security risks' for large-navy nations, and large-scale spills are something nobody wants to have happen on their watch or their coast.
Image from the Vela website, constructors of the Sirius Star. Note that it was christened by the HR director of policy and planning for Saudi Aramco.