A Wednesday Morning on USS Freedom

We discovered over breakfast on Wednesday that the first item of the morning was to turn on the turbines and do a little high speed testing. Sounded great to me, the speed of the LCS was one aspect I was interested to see first hand. It didn't take long, after completing breakfast I made my way to the bridge to monitor the crew prepare. There would be several different evaluations conducted during the 30 minute high speed test.

The most important evaluation was to inspect some repair work done with the anchor. There had been some flooding during previous high speed runs due to a part that didn't quite fit right, and the crew had made some makeshift repairs. I didn't actually feel any change as the turbines kicked on, but I could hear a high pitch sound very slightly from the bridge that represented the turbines being engaged. We built speed from 10 knots, then 20, 25, 30, 35, then finally 40 knots racing across Lake Ontario. To be honest, it was difficult to tell we were actually going that fast, and as I watched the ship hit 42 knots I had to find markers on the horizon to give an indication we were truly moving that fast.

Chris Cavas and I kept repeating a phrase first coined by Phil Ewing of Navy Times: Full CODAG power. It was kind of an inside joke to describe the unique nature of USS Freedom (LCS 1), but essentially describes the full power combination of the 2 Rolls Royce MT-30 gas turbines for a combined 96,550 hp (72 MW) and 2 Fairbanks Morse Colt-Pielstick 16PA6B diesels for a combined 17,160 hp (12.8 MW) that pushes water through 4 Rolls Royce Kamewa 153SII waterjets. USS Freedom (LCS 1) was not actually pushing full power, but we got to 42 knots that day without any problems.

After 30 minutes, the ship pulled beside the tug Ohio we were traveling with and normal transit resumed. I was impressed, it is an interesting capability that is part of the ships package. Rather than monitoring the crew review the various evaluations, I decided to use the time to take another long walk through the ship. Thinking about the speed I had just witnessed, I started by heading back to the mission zone bay, and taking measure of the ship I was on. Lockheed Martins Littoral Combat Ship is an interesting ship with interesting capabilities, but it comes with interesting limitations. The ship has a lot of speed, and looks like a warship, but the ship conserves weight by reducing survivability and has a ton of usable space, meaning that while it looks like a warship it is in fact more akin to a logistics ship. While I doubt the Navy would agree with me, the LCS is built to be a littoral combat logistics ship, or to borrow an acronym, a Littoral Combat Support ship.

The mission zones below deck on the Lockheed Martin LCS not only look big, they feel big. The aft zone has two doors, one I liked and one I have some concerns, but will wait and see. The doors in the back of the ship supposedly swing all the way open. I've read a bit about the aft doors on the USCGC Bertholf (WMSL 750), and how that will be one aspect of the cutter changed in future ships. I'm not a fan of doors that swing all the way open. I much prefer the way the side doors open, basically out and to the sides. I don't know how the door issue on the LM LCS will work out, but I think that is one aspect of the ship to watch for.

One of the big differences between the LM version of the LCS and the GD version of the LCS is that the LM version has an internal lift system along the ceiling for moving around the mission module components. I did not get a chance to see this crane system work, but I have heard the GD system uses the manual system to move the modules around. I'm not sure if it gives the LM version an advantage over the GD version, but I was thinking that if a mission module had a requirement to launch multiple RHIBs out the back hatch, the crane system would be much better than the manual system. Seems to me with small crews, the last thing you want to do is intentionally create extra manual labor to wear them out.

There is nothing remarkable about the middle mission module bay, except there is more space. It is about the same size as the back mission zone, minus the doors and the ramp. The large hatch on the runway drops down into this mission zone. The third mission zone is slightly smaller, and does not have the same crane system the first two zones have. The elevator inside the hanger connects to the third mission zone.

The Navy intends to use this space for MIW, ASuW, and ASW mission modules. For deploying the robotic systems of the MIW and ASW modules, the ship should be able to perform that role without any issues. I have no idea how speed helps in either role, indeed I have a hard time seeing anything in the seaframe that really relates to either of these mission profiles. If the Navy is hanging their LCS hat on the ASW or MIW modules for this seaframe, even after spending 3 days on the ship I'm not sure I fully understand how the seaframe is a good match for the mission module profiles. For the ASuW module, I can see where speed would be useful, but we will discuss that later.

In my opinion, the seaframe capabilities and limitations tend to support mission profiles that involve manpower. I've seen a few slides that suggest manned mission modules can only support up to 25 people, but I don't think that is right. After sitting in the mission zones for awhile, my only advice to anyone developing alternative mission modules would be to never, under any circumstances, ever put land vehicles in that space, because it would be one of the worst uses of reconfigurable spaces in the Navy.

The real challenge for alternative mission modules with the LCS is berthing. Unless someone can come up with a creative way to dampen sound and create a habitat in the mission zone, the ability to put a Marine rifle company on a LCS is going to be strained at best, and probably not work out. Same with the Coast Guard, assuming you would create a Coast Guard VBSS module, you still run into problems unless you can address the berthing issue of the ship. The space best used for berthing is the third, smaller mission zone, but I imagine it can get pretty loud in there when moving at full speed.

As I have considered the LCS, I'm still stuck on several contradictions the platform needs to resolve. It is ultimately best suited to either be the shotgun platform for something smaller in very low intensity environments, or the LCS requires a larger ship to ride shotgun with to support it in maritime combat environments, and that platform needs to be centric to the littoral environment. I'm thinking of the DDG-1000 specifically, not the DDG-51, but in a very real sense considering the limitations, the larger LPD-17 hull might be a better match.

What do you do with space and speed? It is an interesting combination, but ultimately I don't see the seaframe/module combination as they exist today as the right combination. While I tend to think there are creative ways to use the combination of speed and space for dealing with a number of maritime challenges, those ideas are on the drawing board, not part of the ships current intent. One of the questions I have regarding the LCS going forward is whether the Navy's gamble to build a platform that could potentially do anything has ultimately produced a ship that can't really do anything really well. Put another way, the LCS is a laundry list of compromises, and after spending several days on the seaframe I remain concerned that regardless of configuration there will always be one compromise too many. Only time will tell.

The National Fleet and the Joint Services Approach

Currently, as just one of the ways we support U.S. strategic objectives overseas, we attempt to provide 370 cutter days per year to DoD Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) in support of naval operations, exercises, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). This allotment does not include deployments in the western hemisphere.

Our support to COCOMs is part of our contribution to the cooperative maritime strategy which integrates seapower with the combined elements of national power: diplomacy, information, economy and military. The cutters work for the respective COCOM to whom they are chopped. In many cases, they are attached to a naval group, such as ESG 5, but they also have the ability to operate independently. One of the strengths the Coast Guard presence brings is the ability to engage on a broad basis with the regional nations. Fact of the matter is, once you get below about the 20 largest nations, most countries of the world don't need a Navy, they need a Coast Guard. Their coast guard-like services often don't fall under their Defense department or ministry, but instead are under transportation, justice, fisheries, etc. Additionally, like our U.S. Coast Guard, they are simultaneously expected to provide both law enforcement and defense roles. These commonalities make U.S. Coast Guard contributions to TSC and the employment of soft-power to enhance regional and global security particularly effective.

Out of Hemisphere Deployments, Web Journal of Admiral Thad Allen, Tuesday, November 25, 2024

The above was a response to a request for information to the Coast Guard regarding the upcoming deployment of the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) with ESG 5, previously discussed here. When I made the request, it was mostly out of curiosity, a Coast Guard cutter will be deploying with an ESG... "cool" I thought, and at the time my thoughts really didn't go much deeper than that. Now with events like Somalian piracy and the terror attack in India, I keep thinking the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) deployment could be an amazing stroke of luck in regards to timing.

I have been thinking alot about the idea of the National Fleet, partly because of the Orbis article by Bob Work, but partly influenced by sitting in the module bay of USS Freedom (LCS 1) wondering what the hell the ship can actually do given both its capabilities and limitations.

For those who aren't familiar with the concept a National Fleet, the National Fleet reflects an agreement between the Navy and the Coast Guard to plan, acquire, and maintain forces that support and complement each service’s roles and missions. The idea is to insure the services will be able to share assets, providing unique capabilities for expeditionary warfare, maritime homeland defense, and security missions. I am not really sure where in the National Fleet the Marine Corps is officially integrated, if at all, but one could assume the intent behind the Cooperative Maritime Strategy is an affirmation that Marine Corps is part of this cooperative initative.

The deployment of the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) with ESG 5 certainly promotes the idea that the National Fleet concept is still alive, but given the current maritime environment and the stated direction of the services articulated in strategy, the question is starting to be asked if more should be done. I understand the National Security Cutter will enable greater cooperation and offer more capability to the Coast Guard to forward deploy out of hemisphere, but is simply assigning a cutter to a strike group representitive of the National Fleet intent?

I am not convinced we are integrating our maritime forces enough to meet the challenges of this century, and I think both the Mumbai attacks and Somalian piracy represent examples why. Piracy is generally considered a criminal activity, but do we have enough maritime law enforcement forward deployed to manage that criminal behavior on the global commons? There have been two ships acting as primaries for the African Partnership Initative, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) and the USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716), It isn't an accident that we would send Coast Guard and amphibious ships for that mission, after all, almost every nation in Africa relates to our Coast Guard and Marine Corps more than they ever would the US Navy.

Should the concept of the National Fleet be expanded, or even persued as part of a joint maritime force, not only in operational cooperation but in force structure, and perhaps procurement decisions? I don't know, I tend to think yes, but I recognize it doesn't always apply. For example, the CG(X) is a Navy centric platform, while every amphibious ship should first and always be a joint platform. What about the LCS? We have already started discussing a Marine Corps mission module, but where is the discussion for a Coast Guard mission module to fight piracy?

I raise these questions in part to start the narrative of the National Fleet. Other than the joint policy statement by the Navy and Coast Guard in 2006, there hasn't been much discussion about it. However, as hybrid challenges in both war and peace become the rule rather than the exception, I'm starting to think this topic deserves more discussion than it is getting, including in regards to future procurement.

Piracy Exploits Our Strategic and Tactical Flaws

Bob Timburg may be out, but he left a gem of an issue of Proceedings well worth a read. I won't lie, the big black cover got my attention, and I read it cover to cover over the weekend enjoying every article. December Proceedings is interesting, timely, and diverse in opinion and content offering just about every angle one would want to the issue of piracy.

The two free articles, The Overstated Threat by Commander John Patch, U.S. Navy (Retired) and What Makes Piracy Work? by Virginia Lunsford are both excellent.

As someone who thinks we should always account for history before deciding the course to take in the future, I found Virginia Lunsford's article outstanding. I really have nothing to add, except put it on your must read list and enjoy.

The other article however caught my attention. It is one of those articles I completely agree with in principle, but think we need to be careful in consideration regarding the way ahead. Until an international framework is developed for fighting piracy, I see no reason for the US to engage in that fight. We are already fighting two wars and piracy is not a threat to our freedom of navigation in those seas, so there is no reason to either panic or rush into what will be a very difficult challenge. The ultimate solution, international cooperation, is very much aligned to our national strategy interest, so patience serves our strategic interests. However, with that said, I found something in Commander Patch's very interesting article that bothers me a bit.

Indeed, common misperceptions abound. While maritime piracy incidents capture media attention and generate international calls for action, the piracy threat is in fact overstated. It is nothing more than high-seas criminal activity, better addressed by law enforcement agencies than warships. As a localized nuisance, it should not serve to shape maritime force structure or strategy.

The distinction between piracy and terrorism is neither semantic nor academic. If piracy, the responsibility lies with local law enforcement officials, not the military. But maritime terrorism means scrambling the Navy.

I agree in both theory and principle that force structure or strategy should not be shaped by piracy, and I completely agree the threat is being overblown, but what bothers me is that the tactical nature of piracy is currently circumventing our tactical capabilities available for response. Somalian piracy by itself is certainly nothing more than a well organized crime syndicate, but because it is only piracy or because the nature of the activity is criminal is not a valid reason to be dismissive of the challenge to force structure or strategy here. The tactical capabilities pirates are using do scale, they are not simply limited to criminal activity nor should we expect them to always be, and at the end of the day we are still left with a menace that is exploiting our tactical weaknesses and we must approach that realization with our eyes wide open.

Here is the big problem. The tactical nature of piracy requires the US Navy to reevaluate both the shape of maritime force structure and the way we look at our force structure in the context of strategy, and if we fail to do so, we will not be prepared for the challenges of the 21st century. Allow me to expand on these points.

Shaping Maritime Force Structure

It is pretty easy to see how to adopt pirate tactics for wartime, the tactical changes are simple and would be very effective. Rather than trying to capture commercial traffic, the only change necessary to inflect serious damage on the enemy is to set enemy shipping on fire rather than try to capture the ship. Start several fires, prevent the crew from putting them out by applying pressure through force, and you can create major havoc on the high seas. How cheap are incendiary bombs and devices? How difficult is it to start a fire on a ship? How often do ships carry cargo that is flammable? See the problem? The tactics used by pirates scale very well to the disruption of commercial shipping, and could be effective against warships in littoral spaces, but only if you can't directly address the tactics utilized by pirates. If you can't stop the tactics of pirates today, how do you expect to secure shipping in a time of war?

This is even more troubling when you consider this is a likely problem facing maritime forces in the future, because such tactics are more readily available to the nations the US Navy is likely to fight in the future. The necessity to saturate the maritime domain with enough manpower to inspect, deter, and enforce strict protection of the maritime domain without destroying the local maritime industries is essentially the same challenge faced by land forces conducting a COIN operation. Has the US Navy even considered the necessity to operate in the maritime domain similar to the posture one would find in Afghanistan? Naval forces will require similar characteristics in the maritime domain to what you find with a widely dispersed Army populated across a large physical area, but I don't see evidence the Navy recognizes that future requirement.

We consolidate capabilities into larger and larger ships that number fewer and fewer, and thus reduce our capability to disperse enough ships to enforce security. What is the small deployable vessel that can sustain itself for a week at sea conducting security operations off an ungoverned coast? That manned node in the networked force doesn't exist today, and without it the US Navy has left itself open to the irregular capabilities of a dispersed enemy force best represented tactically by the camouflaged, blended local population pirate vessels operating off the Somalian coast. Piracy may be criminal in nature, but in that regards we are lucky, because the criminal activity currently not a strategic threat is giving us important insight into our tactical shortfalls in capabilities.

I don't want to give the wrong impression, I'm not saying widespread adjustment is needed. I am suggesting that this is an evolution of the strategic concept of Sea Basing that is not trivial. The necessity to deploy large numbers of manned vessels that can sustain themselves up to a week is the game changing capability requirement for the 21st century. It is similar to the game changing requirement we came across in the 20th century, the necessity to field large numbers of small aircraft from the sea to fight war. Well, I would phrase it slightly different, the necessity to field and sustain large numbers of small vessels at sea is the game changing requirement necessary to maintain the peace in the 21st century. I truly believe this btw, it is why I compare the mothership in the 21st century to the aircraft carrier of the 20th century, and also why I compare the Freedom to the Langley...

Strategic Realignment

Oh you think we would be able to solve the problem of small boat attacks on commercial ships with a kinetic force of unmanned platforms instead of manpower? Think again. Lets face it, 21st century strategy is not offensive in nature, it is defensive in nature. The kinetic solution at sea only works under a rules of engagement policy that allows for the death of any target, without clear identification. Which rules of engagement policy would that be? Mike Burleson best represents this type of false hope strategic logic, for the most part, I disagree with Mike on just about everything he advocates for because his strategy for a precision weapon centric tactical focus works only if offensive action is permitted under any circumstances. The way I see it, Mike's vision is dead right for how to fight major war, but couldn't be more wrong when the goal is to maintain peace.

Maritime Strategy isn't just military strategy at sea. Military strategy is centric to winning war, but maritime strategy must appreciate the requirements of both war and peace.

While it is true the Navy's maritime strategy accepts the realities of an irregular warfare campaign, the organization and force structure of the US Navy largely does not. We see tactical capabilities through the prism of destroying an enemy platform designed for war, but the challenges at sea facing the US Navy in the 21st century have largely been specific to the platforms utilized during peacetime. Our tactical capabilities are brilliant when used in an indiscriminate destruction centric campaign for eliminating known threats, but which campaign would that be? The problem facing the US Navy is that force structure is not aligned with strategy, because our national strategy is not permissive to an environment of war that includes the random killing of innocents, even accidentally. Our national strategy is specific to the preservation of life, thus restrictive RoEs, and until that changes we must realign our tactical capabilities accordingly, and that in itself is a strategic adjustment.

People like Mike don't seem to understand that, and in order for him to advocate his conceptual idea of war at sea that could be effective in the 21st century, he would first have to make the political argument that all out war is a permissible activity in the hybrid warfare challenge usually found in peacetime. I don't see this strategic, and very political viewpoint adjusting anytime soon. In that regard, I differ very much from the position articulated by Commander Patch, the enemy has found a tactical weakness in both our strategy and force structure by exploiting our preservation of life and capitalizing on our absence of a meaningful maritime force structure capable of managing dispersed threats at sea that requires clear identification.

While piracy may not be cassius belli to adjust accordingly, the tactics represented by piracy give us a glimpse to a future we are not prepared for. Instead, we expect the glorified camera on a UAV to instantly distinguish friend and foe, and the attached weapon system to solve the problem. False hope.

Observing Calls for Unreasonable Security Expectations

Rod Nordland of Newsweek has historically been a very good military reporter, but clearly his knowledge doesn't extend to Naval tactics, nor Navy history. In an editorial over the weekend, Mr. Nordland suggests that the international community should blockade Somalia, which on its face isn't a bad suggestion, but I don't think he quite understands the difficulty, nor the scale.

"The one way to prevent all this would be to make sure pirates never set sail in the first place. That may sound like a daunting task. Yet Britain successfully blockaded France, with a coastline 400 nautical miles longer than Somalia's, for more than a decade—and that was 200 years ago, using sailing vessels and signal flags. The allied fleet off Somalia today has nuclear-powered warships, aircraft and unmanned drones, radar and sonar at its command. So how hard could it be?"

If we assume Mr. Nordland is informed, we must also assume he is advocating blowing up every speed boat in Somalia. The difference between the English blockade of France and any blockade of Somalia is that major ships of sail required ports, which allowed the Royal Navy to blockade known locations to prevent French commerce activity by sea. In the case of Somalia, a Naval force has to blockade the longest coastline in Africa at every point there is sand, because that is all it takes to launch a speed boat that is refueled by a hand held gas tank.

Editorials, including Mr. Nordland's, are noting that there are only 12 to 15 warships in the area to potentially fight piracy. Time for perspective. Somalia has an extensive coastline of some 1700 miles, extending the entire length of the Gulf of Aden and around the Horn of Africa. Coalition naval forces are responsible for over 2.4 million square miles of open sea in the region, and piracy is only one of the problems in that region. For context, Iraq has 167400 square miles of physical area.

If someone was to suggest the US should be able to secure a country the size of Iraq with a single Bradley Fighting vehicle that is not allowed to travel faster than 35 mph, we would rightfully call such a person a damn idiot. But that is exactly what Rod Nordland is suggesting we do with naval forces against piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and he is seriously asking the question "how hard could it be?"

I don't know Rod, but I'm going to assume you never really pondered your own question.

Decision to Keep Gates Could Hurt Navy Leadership's Credibility

I've been following with interest the reporting following the decision by the Obama administration to retain Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, because of all the events over the last month, this one ranks higher than the election itself as one of the most important events to impact the Navy. A lot of the analysis regarding the Gates decision has focused on the war, but I am yet to see any analysis regarding what that might mean for defense acquisition, and in particular, what that might mean for the US Navy.

Ever since the late July hearing in the House Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, the Navy has given every impression of a changed direction. It is unclear what direction that might be exactly, indeed the release of the NOC that was first reported to be released as early as October (we are now entering December), and was supposed to explain the new direction. At the hearing, the Navy insisted the maritime environment had recently changed, that blue water submarines, anti-ship missiles, and ballistic missile defense had all become the new priorities for the Navy. Analysis that justified this change has been unavailable, and ultimately every argument has essentially been discredited over time. This has left the Navy in a mess, and absent evidence of leadership willing to take control of a ship without a helmsman.

Lets face it, the Navy is a huge mess right now, and the inability to cancel the DDG-1000 is about as good of an illustration why as any evidence you can come up with. First, the Navy submits a plan for DDG-51s to replace the DDG-1000s that is more expensive and hurts the shipbuilding industry, then the Navy tries to work with the DoD regarding a legal trick to insure fewer destroyers are built in Mississippi, Gene Taylor's district (whoever included that information with the submission is the Navy's village idiot). Then earlier this month, right before the election, John Young comes out and says the Navy's argument to truncate the DDG-1000s is based on weak analysis. That is a huge deal, because there is no way John Young goes to the press with such condemnation of the Navy's plan without support from Secretary Gates, meaning the current position of Secretary Gates is to keep the DDG-1000.

And the really sad part is, given the Navy's absolutely abysmal argument against the DDG-1000, it is really hard to fault Gates for that position. The DDG-1000 is still the best move for the industry, the shipbuilding budget, and it is actually better aligned with strategy than the stated new position that supports more DDG-51s, unless you favor building a Navy specifically for an all out war with China. To compound the issue, the NOC is still nowhere to be found, the LCS is being supported despite the fact the LCS concept only works with a platform to ride shotgun, which I will talk more about in the future. For a service really proud of their maritime strategy for the last year, there is certainly a lack of coherent strategic thinking coming from Navy leadership right now in regards to acquisition.

Think about all of the decisions that have been punted to the next administration, and ask yourself if the Navy has demonstrated the leadership, articulation, and sound strategic logic necessary to manage the challenges. There is a fighter shortfall looming, the Navy needs to fill the gap between now and the Joint Strike Fighter, which has a bunch of questions itself. The Navy is spending billions to maintain the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) for what amounts to 1 more deployment. The Navy is spending billions to retain amphibious ships long after their scheduled retirement because not only is LHD 8 late, but LHA(R) will be late as well, while the LPD-17s are all arriving late due to problems with the first in class, which itself is inspiring absolutely nobody. Hurricane Katrina is a factor in the amphibious ships. It is actually worse than you think, consider for a moment that the US Navy hasn't built a surface combatant awarded since the first Bush administration. Sure there has been Freedom and Independence, but the LCS is not a surface combatant using a modern rating system. The first two DDG-1000s have yet to begin construction, despite being given names that are important.

Then this new strategic environment, which drives me crazy to be honest. The Navy is saying we need to expand ballistic missile defense for the future, but do so on our 1970s AEGIS technology.

Then the Navy hypes the anti-ship missile threat, with a favorite SWO talking point being the Hezbollah attack on the INS Hanit. This argument goes unchallenged against the Navy, which sort of gets on my nerves. Have you ever really studied the history of anti-ship missiles? Have you noticed the vast majority of successful anti-ship missile attacks have been against targets not defending themselves, and in most cases anti-ship missiles are defeated by indirect means like chaff. Just saying, the Navy is over hyping the anti-ship missile threat, the statistical evidence clearly shows that world wide, any ship defending against anti-ship missiles is more likely to defeat the missile than be hit, just like any ship not defending against the missile is more likely to be hit than not.

Then we are supposed to get worked up over the blue water submarine capabilities of... who exactly? Even if China is beginning to build up their nuclear submarine fleet it will still be years before they have a credible capability, particularly since the number of deployments by nuclear submarines is fewer than the number of deployments by just our 3 forward based nuclear submarines in Guam! Are these critical near term threats, or are we confusing future threats and current threats?

Don't get me started on the mythical ballistic missile that turns into an anti-ship missile. I don't know if you have heard or not, but there is a rumor China already has a weapon that launches from a ground based ballistic missile, and in flight transforms into a super-sonic anti-ship missile and blows up aircraft carriers. Sounds dangerous, but it also sounds too good to be true. After all, if the Navy was serious about countering such a weapon, wouldn't the Navy be advocating the construction of more submarines, not more surface ships?

The US Navy is a mess right now, and Obama's decision to retain Secretary Gates can't be seen as a good thing for US Navy leadership. Think about the gamble facing the Navy with the Obama administration, the argument to change plans just for the DDG-1000 with the current argument expects the Obama administration to come in, override the recommendation of Secretary Gates, hurt the shipbuilding industry (piss off or on the Unions, however you want to call it), spend more money on the alternative Navy plan, build a fleet for a strategic environment best represented by a nuclear war with China, and finally, take action counter to the majority Democratic Congressman and Senators who are supporting the DDG-1000 plan.

Where is the NOC? If the Navy is smart, it is in revision to come up with better talking points than the nonsense we have seen over the last 6 months. Otherwise, the first year of the Obama administration and the last year of the Gates term is going to be brutal for a Navy that can't seem to articulate a believable reason to cancel one of the most unpopular programs in the DoD today.