The Littoral Strike Group: An Alternative to More Battleships

As I noted the other day on the USNI blog, Frank Hoffman's new CNAS report (PDF) is calling for a 1000 ton PC, while Dakota Wood's CSBA report (PDF) is calling for Marine attachments on the LCS. A new article in National Defense Magazine notes the Marines are now in serious discussions that there is "definitely some momentum building" for either a PC vessel or a 100 foot vessel for irregular warfare operations.

When I had a chance to sit down with Commandant Conway back in September, he emphasized several aspects of getting the Marines back to sea, but two comments he made stood out. First, the Marines are getting too heavy, and need to find a way to get lighter. That point was also made by Colonel David Coffman, Commanding officer, 13th MEU when I spoke with him last month.

Commandant Conway's second point was also interesting, he believes the Marines need to find ways to maintain organizational integrity when broken into smaller units at sea. That last part of the discussion was in response to a question about Marines returning to warships. I think you can link both issues, because the way I think the Navy and Marines can approach the organizational integrity issue while getting lighter is by building Navy platforms and LCS modules intended to support the existing organization of the Marine Corps, keep the vehicles close but separate, and start building with the squad and build up to the Company level.

The Navy has a long history of deploying squadrons of small ships in the littorals to deal with irregular warfare challenges, indeed the comments of this post and this post have plenty of links that recount the historical record. I think as we look at ideas being circulated, review our own Navy and Marine Corps history, and look at the current challenges one option for the way ahead with PC class vessels becomes apparent.

Right now our ESGs are designed to deploy a battalion of Marines. We are looking to build a Sea Base to support a brigade of Marines, and that requirement is actually being driven by a 2 brigade standard. As we look to smaller ships, perhaps we should approach it as part of the solution to deploying a Company of Marines, or perhaps a Platoon of Marines, or as Dakota Woods suggests, perhaps down to the squad level. A 100 foot armed vessel usually runs between 200-450 tons, while a 1000 ton PC usually represents something like a 250 foot vessel. I would suggest maybe we are looking for something between both of those metrics.

Building upon the historical view of deploying small combatant squadrons in the littoral, I think we should look at building squadrons that include 4 PC type vessels, each designed to deploy a squad of 12 Marines, but also designed to include a detachment of Coast Guard for law enforcement while operating the ship with a small Navy crew. I think we should also seek a few requirements for this PC including a $100 million price cap, minimum 10 days endurance, a 2000 nautical mile range at 15 knots, and I would include a small medical space on the PC and insure each PC has 2 corpsman. I don't care what the top speed is and I don't care what the weapon payload is, those can be an argument for someone else, because what I think is important is that we expect this PC to be the physical contact platform with other surface vessels and we let that reality drive requirements. In other words, the PC is sending the boarding party and will be the eyeball that determines friend and foe in confusing maritime environments. The PC becomes a manned engagement node in the deployable Maritime Domain Awareness network.

A 4 ship PC squadron where each PC supports a squad of Marines and a detachment of Coast Guard sailors opens up all kinds of littoral capabilities, but by itself falls just short of completing a Marine Corps Rifle Platoon while also introducing several C4ISR challenges. This is where the LCS becomes the C4ISR enabler, the support ship for the squadron, and where a Marine Corps module fills the gap and completes a Marine Rifle Platoon with everything but vehicles. Essentially, the LCS becomes the Sea Based HQ for the operations of all three services supporting the squadron requirements. With payloads of aviation unmanned vehicles for ISR, replacement RHIBs for the squadron, extra fuel and food for sustaining the squadron, not to mention other options that might include an air traffic controller and several other specialists that can be deployed with the platoon for ground operations. The LCS may even be required to act as a sea based temperary jailing facility during maritime security operations and Coast Guard interdiction operations. A full squadron would be 5 ships.

A Littoral Strike Group would include 4 squadrons, 4 LCS and 16 PCs, plus 1 HSV which carries the vehicles for the full Marine Corps Company that is built into the squadron. Pair this force with 1 LPD-17 with another rifle company of Marines plus detachments, 1 T-AKE mod mothership for the 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 1 T-AKE mod mothership for the 16 PCs, and 1 DDG-51 escort and you have a regional force that could be distributed along a very long coast line with Command nodes on the LPD-17 and all 4 LCS supporting the activities of 16 PCs. With the additional Marine Corps vehicles on the HSV, you could surge a LHA(R), some major surface combatants, and a submarine into this force and come very close to having a light and agile LSG MEU to compliment a traditional ESG MEU carrying the heavier, organic ship to shore deployable Marine Corps vehicles.

When I look at a force like this, I see 2 T-AKE motherships that focus on the Navy's squadron platforms and crews, I see a LPD-17 mothership model for supporting the Marine and Coast Guard detachment crews, I see a HSV for regional partnership with a Marine Corps company of vehicles to support that activity (and plenty of space for all kinds of NECC capabilities), and the LCS's themselves act as motherships for the unmanned systems to support operations on both sea and land. Depending upon the future development of the MIW and ASW modules, particularly if they end up using the same deployable underwater and surface vehicles, it may be possible to build rapid response capability with the tender to meet those challenges with this force.

Sound expensive? Not with the $100 million cost cap requirement. Do the math, a squadron of 16 PCs runs $1.6 billion, $600 million less than the $2.2 billion of a new Burke and if the ship is manned with between 14-18 sailors each, you end up with fewer total sailors in a squadron than a new DDG-51.

There are additional costs though. The LPD-17 and 2 T-AKE mods would cost about $1.8 billion and probably around 2 x $500 million respectively, which added together comes to $2.8 billion + the $1.6 billion, or roughly $4.4 billion total. Wait, that is how much the 2 DDG-51s per year the Navy will ask for starting in FY10!

Operational costs will be higher than 2 Burkes though, fuel consumption will be much higher, and there will be additional Navy (perhaps civilian on the T-AKE) crew costs associated with the LPD-17 and 2 T-AKEs, not to mention potential additional costs for both the Marines and Coast Guard for forward deployment operations. Unfortunately, this is the price of more, faster ships that puts additional manpower at the point of contact in forward deployed theaters, what I have mentioned many times that I believe will be a requirement for the Navy in following through in its effort to "preventing war" as outlined in the Maritime Strategy.

If we think of $100 million PCs in the context of aircraft like the MV-22, which at around the same investment also carries a squad of Marines into harms way, and apply that approach to the sea, the joint maritime services can create persistent sea surface networks better aligned for dealing in the irregular warfare space, the maritime security space, the self generated Maritime Domain Awareness space, and the regional partnership engagement space that better aligns the US Navy to the requirements of the ungoverned and contested spaces in the maritime environment today. This force isn't what we would want for major war, but it fills out peacetime requirements quite well and frees up major surface combatant forces for the responsibilities they are better suited to manage against major competitors.

To borrow another historical look at small combatants, given the cost and size of the force, it would not be inaccurate to call the development of 4 Littoral Strike Groups the 21st century Economy B force discussed only a decade ago, and all 4 LSGs that includes 76 new ships (4 LPD-17s, 8 T-AKEs, and 64 PCs) could be developed with the same SCN funds intended to fund just the 8 more Burkes the Navy intends to build over the next 5 years.

Boeing Gives Offer Congress Can't Refuse

In an age of weapon systems that never get less expensive, Boeing gives us a reason to believe inexpensive, yet brilliant defense systems can still be produced.

Boeing Co highlighted the affordability and capability of its F-18 fighter jets, saying Wednesday it had offered them at less than $50 million each to cover the U.S. Navy's expected "fighter gap" until the new F-35 fighter is available.

"We continue to work on F-18 to make it more affordable, more survivable... and more capable and offer that up as an alternative to some of the other programs that might be pursued," Jim Albaugh, the head of Boeing's defense business, told the Reuters Aerospace and Defense Summit in Washington.

That price is fantastic for a Super Hornet. We will never find a Navy fighter as capable as a Super Hornet this inexpensive again in our lifetimes. Enjoy the moment.

More UCAS-N

Check out the pics Guy Norris took.

China Will Fight Pirates Off Somalia

Feng, awesome find, this is perhaps one of the most interesting Chinese Naval developments so far this century. Some interesting quotes from the article:

"The fleet will leave the South China Sea and head to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters," the Global Times reported yesterday.

A Chinese journalist who is likely to accompany the naval fleet said the operation would last three months.

More details...

A military strategist told China Daily that joining other countries to fight Somali pirates would be a "very good opportunity" for the Chinese navy to get into the thick of the action.

"Apart from fighting pirates, another key goal is to register the presence of the Chinese navy," Prof Li Jie, a naval researcher, told China Daily.

China has never dispatched any troops on combat missions overseas. But in 2002, two Chinese vessels - a destroyer and a supplier - spent four months on a global tour, the country's first.

Li also would not confirm the mission but added that "if the navy's special forces join in, that will be in order to counter the pirates' attempt to board other ships".

This last point sticks out to me as a key signal.

"China's image as a responsible sovereign nation will improve by participating in such missions," he said, but noted he didn't expect the number of troops in any such mission would be high.

"It would be on a limited scale initially," Pang said.

Admiral Keating, call your office. Admiral Fitzgerald is on line 1. It really is a fascinating development, one that I personally think is a great thing and sends exactly the kind of signal we have been desiring from China for most of this decade. I don't think China misunderstands our desire is to work with them as a partner, and the signal here is they see themselves as part of the partnership.

This move really isn't unexpected though, indeed several China observers including myself have predicted this was likely, because the move is very much aligned with China's ongoing soft power strategy in Africa. There are 1 million Chinese living in Africa, Africa is where China is heavily invested for future energy supplies, and as the economic ties continue to grow between China and many African nations, a problem in Africa that has regional economic impact and creates regional instability can be seen as a direct threat to Chinese interests. Somali piracy, as an international problem in a region China is heavily invested, is a natural starting place for China to develop its forward deployed naval capabilities.

If China, Russia, India, other Asian powers, the European powers, and the United States are all working together in a common cause to fight piracy, the role for the US Navy isn't necessarily to lead the engagement, but more importantly, do what we can to be the enabler of cooperation between so many different nations. At this point is seems the next step is to determine how can we best fill that supporting role, as opposed to trying to take leadership or ownership of the problem. Do we need to dispatch a ship to act as a C2 enabler, a large ship that can bring the staffs of all the various partners involved together to insure better intelligence and communications?

If I was in Washington, I'd be buying Admiral Mullen a round, because in effect, the sometimes maligned 1000-Ship Navy is coming into its own right before our eyes. Are we ready to meet the Command and Control challenge that is almost certainly to be apparent quickly with such a large number of nations gathering in common cause? I hope we are thinking these necessary steps ahead, the success of the fight against Somalian piracy just became more important than the actual economic impact of Somalian piracy, because it now represents the symbol of whether the unified partnership model can be successful when applied under an international legal standard. We are approaching a rather remarkable time in modern naval history, hopefully we sense that and are ready to seize this moment and use it to leverage this international partnership as a model to shape the future.

Crossposted at the USNI Blog

Why January Will Be About Aircraft Carriers

So the other day Yankee Sailor wrote about an article written by Professor John Arquilla about the high cost of carrier aviation. I enjoy the topic, so I blogged about the article too. If you missed it, the gist of my argument is "what a weak argument from a guy trying to sell a book." Well, little did I know but it would appear Professor John Arquilla is very well liked by many of his former students, because after my posting on the subject ran in CHINFO's daily CLIPS on Tuesday, I got fragged by friendly fire in the inbox.

I love that this guy has former students scattered across the globe who will defend a former professor who they feel has been slighted, so in the spirit of their loyality, I accept the challenge from the CDR who suggested that I quit "dumping" on the messenger and see if I can put out a better message. You want to be pissed off about carrier aviation? OK, fine, chew on this...

My fellow USNI blogger Jim Dolbow and Heritage Foundation's Mackenzie Eaglen wrote a very interesting article back in April of this year titled SOS: Congress Must Save the Aircraft Carrier Fleet. The Navy requested a waiver from the requirement in 10 USC §5062 that it maintain an aircraft carrier force of at least 11 operational ships, and wanted instead to retire the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) early in 2012 to save a lot of money that will be required to keep the ship operational until the delivery of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78). It is hardly an unreasonable request by the Navy, just to make the next 2 deployments for the Big E, Peter Frost reported earlier this month that the Navy has spent $474.9 million during the current unavailability period.

The request to retire the Big E was included in the FY09 budget request, but what also became noteworthy during FY09 budget discussions was the necessity for the Navy to buy at least 69 new Super Hornets, a proposal expected in FY10. What is frustrating, at least from my point of view, is that the Navy wants to reduce the number of aircraft carriers and yet build more new fighters. Wouldn't it be nice if the left arm was talking to the right arm? If we are going to retire an aircraft carrier, do we really need to buy a new wing of Super Hornets?

But lets not stop there, has anyone noticed that the commissioning date for the USS George H W Bush (CVN 77) has been set for 3 weeks from Saturday? That's right folks, on January 10th, 2009 we will commission a new aircraft carrier. We are supposed to be very happy about this, except there is a small problem, the USS George H W Bush (CVN 77) hasn't conducted builders trials yet, it hasn't conducted acceptance trials, nor has it even been delivered to the Navy. Why the rush? Tim Colton thinks it is so President Bush can deliver the carrier named for daddy, a political stunt in the final days of office that I'm kind of surprised Democrats have ignored, after all, one would think the $8 billion price tag for the new aircraft carrier would make the platform serious enough not to be used for political games. Unfortunately, even if Tim Colton is right and this is a political stunt, it is one the Navy fully endorses.

Why? Because regardless of the condition of the never sailed USS George H W Bush (CVN 77), the Navy needs the aircraft carrier added to the Navy register before January 31, 2024 so they can decommission the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) on schedule. Nothing, not Congressional law, not operational availability, and certainly not a yet to be completed aircraft carrier is going to get in the way of the Navy retiring the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) on schedule. because with all the dates already announced the Navy is basically telling Congress "you ain't going to do shit about it."

So lets just think about this a minute...

The Navy is trying unsuccessfully to retire the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) in what is legitimately a cost saving move, but at the same time they want to buy a new wing of Super Hornets, which costs about 3x as much as operating the Enterprise until 2015. Aircraft carriers takes 5 years to build, we can build Super Hornets in less than 5 weeks. The Navy is also retiring the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and is even going to commission a ship into service that has never once been to sea to insure the schedule for retirement is met.

You see, Professor Arquilla is speaking WITH the Navy, not AGAINST the Navy when he calls for fewer aircraft carriers, because the Navy is pulling every rabbit out of the hat they can to keep to the law requiring 11 aircraft carriers. If it is solely about saving money, you could retire Kitty Hawk now and Enterprise after the next two deployments, and save money by not buying new Super Hornets. If the Ford is delayed, all that really means is that the Joint Strike Fighter can afford to have delays too, after all we are supporting one fewer air wing. If you really want to reduce costs, retire Lincoln when it comes her time to refuel, refit Stennis to be a Sea Basing aviation support platform instead of an aircraft carrier, saving on another fighter wing.

Clearly it isn't just about the money. If it was me, I'd simply drop the aircraft carrier requirement to 10 and call it a day. A commitment of 10 keeps the shipyard open, the platform in production, and allows the Navy to save money short term during this transition period to the new class. It also allows the Navy to either save billions on new Super Hornets or moving to the Joint Strike Fighter before it is ready.