Chinese Strategic Force

This is kind of an interesting news that I saw today. In case you don't know, the 4 major branches of PLA are the army, navy, air force and 2nd artillery. The 2nd artillery basically controls all of PRC’s land-based strategic missile assets as well as the majority of its land-based conventional theater missile assets. It is probably PLA's most secret branch. The article posted on Xinhua is as follows:

Top nuclear generals: "strategic deterrence" enhanced in information age
Source: Xinhua | 02-02-2024 14:01
BEIJING, Feb. 2 (Xinhua) -- China's top two nuclear forces generals said that their troops had successfully built up "strategic deterrence" by enhancing capability of intercontinental strike and creating a versatile missile inventory.

General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of the People's Liberation Army(PLA) Second Artillery Corps, the missile force which controls China's nuclear weapons stockpile, and the forces' political commissar General Peng Xiaofeng co-authored an article on one of China's most authoritative publications.

The two generals wrote on the Sunday edition of the semimonthly Qiushi (seeking truth) Journal that the Second Artillery has developed itself from nuclear forces to versatile ones that combine both nuclear and conventional missiles.

The Qiushi Journal, affiliated to the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, often publishes articles written by ranking Party or government officials and influential scholars.

In the past three decades, General Jing and General Peng wrote, the Second Artillery participated in several major tri-service military exercises which were aimed at reiterating the firm resolve of China to maintain its territorial integrity and guard national security.

The Second Artillery has transformed itself into the most intelligent contingent among the PLA, with 78.2 percent of officers holding at least university degrees. The missile force also has the country's leading missile experts, including several members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) and capable commanders, the article said.

Deng Xiaoping, main architect of the country's economic and social transformation which began in 1978, pointed out three decades ago that China needed to develop "capable nuclear shield" to "earn more say and a higher international status in a coming new world order."

In the 1990s, Jing said, the central leadership emphasized that China should build nuclear missile forces that were "in proportion with" the country's placement in the world power hierarchy as wellas a "sufficiently effective" conventional missile defense.

In the 21st century, the two generals said, the Second Artillery Corps has taken new steps toward the construction of "information technology-dependent strategic missile forces".

They concluded their article with five points to be worked on for the future of the Corps, including further development of the strategic missile forces under the leadership of the CPC, encouragement of new initiatives and technological innovation.

The two generals said, "We will accurately follow the policies and guidelines of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission."

They also noted the Corps would advance cultivation of high-level talents and better military preparedness for shaping both conventional and nuclear missile forces that might get the upper hand of possible conflicts in the age of information.

I think it was interesting that it mentioned 2nd Artillery is 78.2% college graduate, which is quite high. I wonder how that would compare with US and other Western nations. I would guess lower, because China only recently started this process of getting higher educated armed force. Strategic forces, for obvious reasons, need to be operated by more intelligent and competent soldiers/officers, so it's not a surprise that it is ahead of the other 3 branches.

It is noteworthy that China is trying to increase its nuclear force to be "in proportion with" the country's placement in the world power hierarchy, but from the pace of induction of DF-31/A and JL-2, it doesn't look like it's trying to challenge the strategic force of USA and Russia. That would not stop the China-blue group from freaking out, but it should be evidence that China is not seeking nuclear parity. What should be noteworthy is 2nd artillery's continual improvement in its conventional strike force whether ballistic or cruise missile. With the continued improvement to the beidou navigational system, the conventional force will become more accurate and potent.

South Korean Navy Goes on High Alert

This kind of activity was easy to explain during the inauguration period after Barack Obama declined to invite anyone from North Korea to be in Washington, but it is a few weeks later and one wonders if something more is going on. We have another high alert in South Korea as tensions continue to rise.

North Korea issued another warning on Sunday, threatening South Korea of a possible military conflict as the former try to restructure its foreign policies against South Korea amid mounting tension in the Korean Peninsula.

The reports on Sunday said the South Korean Defense Ministry officials have indicated that the country's navy will remain on high alert along the western sea border.

The Communist country warned that it will abandon all the peace agreements with its southern neighbor, adding that he is confident that it's army has grown to be "invincible"

There have been persistant rumors that North Korea is attempting to create an incident in the area of some disputed islands off the west coast of South Korea. South Korea to date hasn't taken the bait, but if by chance a South Korean ship goes into that territory, which South Korea considers its own, the North may attack it because they consider it their own. Something to watch for, an incident at sea is the most probable scenario right now in that region, and there is no telling where it might lead if something happens.

The British Military at a Crossroads

The Economist has a really important article on the state of the military in Great Britain, Britain's Armed Forces, Losing Their Way describes a military at the crossroads of history, with choices over the near term determining the long term standing of Great Britain regarding where they intend to be in the world.

British forces have been at war for the past seven years. But it is only recently that, following the example of American parades, the public has been encouraged to honour them. Such displays are a surprise to many soldiers who, for decades, were largely hidden from view in Britain, coming out of their barracks in civvies in order to avoid attack by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Television documentaries and a quick-fire burst of books with titles such as “3 Para: Afghanistan, Summer 2006. This is War” have also publicised the deeds of Britain’s fighting men and women. Despite the qualms about Iraq and Afghanistan, and instances of soldiers being abused, support for the troops is high. According to an Ipsos MORI poll published in November, 81% of Britons regard them favourably; most agree with their prime minister, Gordon Brown, that Britain’s armed forces are “the best in the world”.

But are they? For all the public recognition, the armed services are going through unusually difficult times. This is challenging Britain’s belief in itself as a fighting nation with an important role in the world. The severe strain of waging two wars in faraway countries has been aggravated by undermanning and equipment shortages. More serious still is a new mood of self-doubt. The invasion of Iraq was controversial and its occupation inglorious; the campaign in Afghanistan is going badly. British commanders have belatedly realised that they have much to learn, or rather relearn, about fighting small wars in distant lands. “We have lost our way,” says one general.

Read the whole thing.

Enabling Access for Non-Existing Systems

Admiral James Lyons (ret) does not appear to be very happy with the Littoral Combat Ship program. In an editorial titled Ship Shopping List, the editorial turns into a laundry list of specific items about the LCS he isn't happy about. He makes the case against the speed, stealth, aluminum construction, weight priority, cost, and capabilities or lack thereof. I have no intention of quoting the article, but you can read the whole thing at the Washington Times.

The problem isn't the ship, at least in my opinion, the problem is the expectations the ship can do too many things it is not built to do, and the belief by too many that the criteria of being seen a certain way is the only way the platform sells. Here is something people need to accept, the ship is already sold, there will be many built. The question is, why and for what purpose? It isn't a tactical question, it is a strategic and political question.

I think the Navy would be shooting themselves in the foot if they didn't buy at least 6 LCS in FY11, FY12, and FY13, and it wouldn't be an awful idea in my opinion to buy 5 instead of 3 in FY10. If the Navy bought 5, 6, 6, and 6 respectfully, add in the 4 already built/funded, that would be 27 total, replacing the 26 minesweepers all of which the Navy wants to retire, half of which have already been retired. Beyond building those 27, I've seen no strategic or political imperative that suggests why the Navy should keep going until they reach 55. Twenty seven Littoral Combat Ships would be a really good upgrade of the Navy's MIW flotilla, a political victory for the new administration, a political victory for Congress, and a step forward instead of backward towards sustaining the Navy's numbers.

While building more hulls and political victories for the Navy are important, as a minesweeper replacement the LCS becomes an upgrade in the fleet nobody can argue against except to complain about cost. Complaints about cost are nothing new, and because over the next 4 years there are no alternatives that could be inserted in the meantime, those critics have nothing to suggest replacing the LCS with anyway. However, when suggesting the LCS should replace something besides minesweepers, the critics are right. The LCS only addresses some of the requirements the Navy has in terms of fielding a more capable 21st century force, and pretending the LCS is a frigate does not in fact make it one.

LCS was never intended to be a stand alone ship. Originally, the LCS was intended to be part of a larger networked approach to the littoral battlespace and the unmanned systems carried by LCS were intended to enable scouting in that network. The DDG-1000 and LCS were intended to operate together, enabling the others weakness. The DDG-1000 was supposed to be the HVU littoral warfighter with the range necessary to cover a large swath of sea with deliverable munitions via AGS. The LCS was intended to be a screen for DDG-1000 and would create a broad information network around the DDG-1000 and into land, and using its unmanned systems would provide the information necessary to insure fires hit targets. Without the DDG-1000, the LCS ship is no longer creating an information battlespace in the littoral environment (including onto land) for another combat centric littoral platform. The total littoral network concept was sound at a high level, questionable in implementation with DDG-1000 but still viable, but now that half the network was removed from the concept when the DDG-1000 was cut the current plan isn't a network, rather it has become a single node.

I'm not the biggest fan of the LCS, and I think the comments on my blog represents the opposition community of the LCS more so than anywhere else outside the Navy itself, but I believe this platform has a role to play and just because the Navy doesn't explain it well doesn't mean the ship concept is a bad idea.

I don't know if it is accurate to suggest the big problem here is the technology, because I think the technology is merely a symptom of the problem. The problem is that the Navy does not have a littoral strategy that is articulated well, if developed at all. Until the Navy knows what the littorals are to them, until they have a strategic imperative regarding the littorals that can be articulated, until they have a good reason to be there (and it better be damn good because the littorals can be a nasty place), and until they can define the requirements; I am not sure we will see any sort of comprehensive approach to the littorals by the Navy.

While I have heard officers suggest the littorals are important, words are not reflected by actions. If the littorals were so important, why is the NECC underfunded and so remarkably small the Army and Marines still do most of the river patrols in Iraq? If the littorals were really so important, why have the Marines struggled to get more amphibious ships? If the littorals were really so important, where is the evidence?

I see no evidence, so perhaps the littorals are not as important as was stated a decade ago. Honestly, as much as I don't agree with the Heritage Foundation report we discussed a few days ago, I see no evidence from either the DoD, civilian leader, or from a politician that suggests the Navy should be anything other than a blue water force, so maybe Heritage is right. What is the stated strategic imperative to be in the littorals? It doesn't exist, so why should the Navy spend any money at all moving that direction, including with the LCS?

The LCS is an enabling capability for building a network inside the littoral battlespace, but now that the LCS is the only littoral platform, it is the only node in that network. What this ship is enabling the Navy to do besides scout the battlespace is very much unclear. As an enabling capability, it is supposed to be enabling something to do work in the battlespace. Unfortunately, the combat platforms it will now be supporting in the littorals have by default become 9000 ton destroyers, the same ships the Navy doesn't want to send into complex littoral environments.

The question the Navy needs to answer is what the littoral is to them, then develop the requirements. Once the requirements are developed, it will be easier to see where the LCS fits, and what changes if any should be made. Does it become the HVU of a littoral squadron, or does it become the screen for an armed frigate intended to fight in the littorals? Either way, if there is a strategic imperative to be in the littorals, I believe the LCS does fit somewhere because the unmanned systems it delivers are part of the requirement to enable information in that complex environment.

When people suggest the LCS is in search of a purpose, I don't think that is not accurate. The LCS has a purpose, but the purpose is to support another platform that doesn't exist. The LCS is still part of the littoral requirement set, but the other pieces of the original requirement no longer exist. What the LCS is enabling to do work in the littoral remains a huge question mark in my opinion, and absent something else, the LCS becomes the target of questionable requirements by critics, and assigned additional requirements it isn't designed well to do by supporters who simply want to build more ships.

The Navy should build up to 27 LCS through the first term of the Obama administration, but I hope while they do that, they immediately set about building a $100 million dollar platform the LCS can enable to do its work in the littoral, or perhaps a $600 million frigate if that is a better way ahead. Either way, attempting to turn an enabling capability into an engagement capability simply to sell the program is a poorly designed communication strategy. The LCS is needed if there is a strategic imperative to operate in the littorals, but the necessity for the LCS doesn't conceal the reality something else is still missing and is also needed to meet the requirements of the complex human terrain environment the littorals represent.

Your War Plan Orange is My War Plan Red

There are numerous similarities between China's and Japan's rise as naval powers. Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward isolated and impoverished China--leaving it with a technologically backward military--as two centuries of Tokugawa rule had isolated and impoverished Japan. Both countries looked abroad for help. China depended initially on Russian naval technology. Japan looked to Holland, France, and especially England to acquire large modern ships as a precursor to developing their own naval industrial base. Both countries depend heavily on the seaborne delivery of critical natural resources. China and Japan--at different times, of course, and at significantly different degrees of national assertiveness--looked to naval forces as the symbol and instrument of broader regional and international ambitions. Japan built a world-class navy in three and a half decades with large strategic consequences for America and the world. China is well on its way toward a similar accomplishment, with the potential for similar consequences.

I participated in a little fun on Saturday, learning a little bit about new media and new technologies. I'll have that stuff available at a later time, but during my experience I screwed up in a pretty obvious way while discussing War Plan Orange and China, and I don't believe i ever really recovered my train of thought to explain it well. Seth Cropsey appears to be a War Plan Orange believer when it comes to China. I'm not, if we are seeking War Plan color codes, I think China represents a modern day War Plan Red. This post is intended to correct my screw up.

The above quote is from We Should Build a Bigger Navy, China is, by Seth Cropsey published last week in the Weekly Standard. I think this is a creative view of China, but it has significant omissions and I disagree with the analogy used.

Prior to 1939, the United States developed a series of war plans for dealing with the most likely adversaries. These war plans were associated with a color. War Plan Orange was the war plan for Japan, War plan Gold was France, War Plan Green was Mexico, War Plan Red was Great Britain, and there were several others. These plans assumed unilateral conflicts between just the two nations, but after the German invasions of 1939, the United States began to develop rainbow plans, which were more centric to allied warfare.

Until WWII, the Royal Navy was the undisputed king and queen of the sea having dominated the maritime spaces for over a century and a half. The reason they continued to have the reputation through WWII is because no other nation had demonstrated they were superior, including when the Germans were given a chance at Jutland. Since WWII, the United States has replaced Great Britain as the Navy dominating the seas. Following the War of 1812, the United States has not been to war with Great Britain, despite spending over a century preparing for one. How ever did we avoid it when we spent most of the time between the War of 1812 and WWII planning for it?

Easy, the US and Britain became linked economically, and that linkage always promoted diplomatic solutions to complex and serious disagreements. War is an extension of politics, and nothing quite influences politics like money does.

What Seth Cropsey has failed to mention in describing China is alternative realistic intentions and factors that are more likely to influence politics of both countries in any sort of scenario for war. I see only two viable long term scenarios that could lead to war between China and the US, and both require serious political miscalculations that include the intention to destroy our economic relationship. The first factor is the cross-strait scenario, which is the one Seth Cropsey envisions in his article. The fact is, relations between Taiwan and China are improving, and China has signaled the issue doesn't need to be solved militarily. The search for solutions other than a military solution suggests that despite complex and serious disagreement, China would rather work out the problem without war.

The other scenario I could see revolves around Africa. Chinese policy towards Africa is good for Africa, but it has a lot of baggage. Africa is seeing economic growth in ways never seen in that part of the world. China's soft power strategy includes infrastructure investment, and has created a lot of jobs adding stability to the continent. China's approach comes with baggage though, and over time the resource 'rape' of Africa is sure to generate a backlash, or so some experts have predicted. If that backlash leads to widespread economic pain throughout China by drying up market access into Africa, I think there are scenarios where that could turn into a military confrontation.

All in all though, I disagree with Seth Cropsey's War Plan Orange scenario for China, and rather see it as War Plan Red. While Seth Cropsey describes China's naval expansion as 20th century Japan, I see it as something else entirely. China is living their "Mahan" moment, and if you are looking for parallels in history in regards to the rise of China as a military power, you start by looking at the United States.

I have read some comparisons of China sending their ships to Africa to escort ships and protect them from pirates discussed in the context of the US dealing with Tripoli. Maybe, but I see it more like the deployment of the Great White Fleet. The deployment of the Great White Fleet was intended to tell the world the United States had arrived on the international scene, but due to communications of the era, the only way to do this was to send the fleet around the world, stop in many ports, and generate as much public attention as possible globally. We sent the ships we did because they were our best, or so we thought. The deployment was about us, it wasn't about the nations who would be fighting in WWI less than a decade later, and it wasn't aimed at anyone, rather everyone including our own people.

The PLA Navy, by deploying 169, 171 and 887 with 169 and 171 to be replaced by 168 and 170 later, is basically taking advantage of the centralized media attention at sea specific to the one location in the world all eyes are looking, the coast of Somalia. You can't buy better global attention regarding Naval activity than what Somalia represents today, and the whole world is watching. So what has China done? They have sent their naval forces to where everyone is watching, and sent their very best ships so the whole world can see them, including the Chinese people. This is their breakout moment, and they are sending the signal they have arrived. To believe this is aimed at any one specific country, whether it be the US, India, or even the domestic Chinese population is to ignore how this is aimed at everyone. Just as Americans felt pride and developed confidence in their Navy following the Great White Fleet deployment, the Chinese are essentially finding that same feeling regarding their naval deployment.

So what does it mean? It means China may very well build aircraft carriers, and my response would be 'so what' if not 'good.' This is what rising Great Powers do, have always done, and probably will always do. Who are the Great Powers today? Top 12 countries by GDP:

1. United States
2. Japan
3. China (PRC)
4. Germany
5. France
6. United Kingdom
7. Italy
8. Russia
9. Spain
10. Brazil
11. Canada
12. India

Only 1 country has an aircraft carrier that is not on that list: Thailand. Only 3 countries on that list do not have an aircraft carrier: Canada, Japan, and China. If we count amphibious ships and large helicopter carriers, we can scratch Japan off the list and add South Korea to the list of countries missing, and potentially Australia sometime in the future. If we focus on just the top 12 countries by GDP though, the question isn't why is China building an aircraft carrier, the question is why haven't they until now.

How can a country so dependent upon the maritime domain NOT buy an aircraft carrier? At least with Canada, they are land neighbors with their largest trading partners, who btw, has the largest navy in the world and is also their closest alliance partner.

The act itself of China building an aircraft carrier signals maturity as a nation understanding it has a role to play in the security of its own interest. If there is anything we should be learning from the uncertain economic times today, it is that the our economic security and stability is not exclusive to us, it is also tied to a number of other nations, but particularly China.

In his upcoming book, Great Powers and the World After Bush, Thomas Barnett describes the transaction taking place between China and the United States. Essentially, as the consumer of their production, we are growing their economy. It is by design China has experienced rapid economic growth, and the design is ours.

Following the War of 1812 the United States and Britain became linked economically, the goods were in high demand in Britain and as a result, they grew our economy and the market between both the US and Great Britain became a link that tied the two countries together in interest. War Plan Red still existed, and the Royal Navy was always the enemy our naval forces prepared to fight. I certainly could be wrong, but if one was to suggest to me that the relationship between the US and China today represents the necessity to develop a War Plan Orange strategy for defeating China, I would suggest we definitely continue to develop plans, but don't be surprised if it ends up War Plan Red.

I observe early 21st century China as a country that very much resembles an early 20th century United States, and our relationship with China in the early 21st century very much resembles the relationship we had with Great Britain in the early 20th century. Given the right political choices in both countries, given the economic ties that exist today and assuming the links remain intact despite any stresses that come along, I think it is entirely probable that the US and China end the 21st century with a relationship that resembles the relationship between the US and UK at the end of the 20th century.

And I think that can be a good thing, something worth achieving.

* note: It has been pointed out I completely missed Germany. Guilty. It has been suggested I count Varyag. I can't think of a single reason why unless it ever goes to sea. Paint and steel alone does not have an aircraft carrier, under the logic of counting Varyag, we would have to count Kitty Hawk and JFK until they are disposed.