Whose Fighting Off the Coast of Somalia?

There has been a battle off the coast of Somalia, but there appears to be a small mystery regarding who was actually involved.

At least one Somali pirate was killed and two others wounded after a naval vessel patrolling the Indian Ocean fired on their boat and destroyed their mother ship, witnesses said Thursday.

Local fishermen in the pirate den of Harardhere in northern Somalia said the incident occurred on Wednesday afternoon, but the naval vessel was unknown.

"One pirate died and three others were injured after they approached a navy ship. They were given warning signals but they ignored and kept approaching and their mother boat was destroyed," local fisherman Abdullahi Isa Mohamed told AFP.

Other residents who confirmed the incident said the men were on board small boats hunting for ships to attack.

But the US Navy Fifth Fleet command and the European naval mission off the pirate-infested Somali coast said they had no information regarding the sinking of a pirate mother ship.

China maybe? Japan maybe? Those are the only two countries I can think of that wouldn't immediately make statements.

Communications, Strategy, or Communication Strategy?

I ended my short tour of our nations capitol city by attending a very clever and well run barcamp, which is the official way of saying I attended an unofficial and somewhat informal convention. It was quite interesting actually, a good networking experience and a way to take perspective on the various approaches government is taking towards managing their social media engagement. From my own perspective, after back to back to back meetings discussing social media strategies for 3 straight days with a few dozen organizations, this was a cool way to get some perspective of how others are doing it. In the end, I found myself in conversations with a very small group of folks just like me who actually develop and implement social media business strategies for others, and ironically we found ourselves listening to sessions run by people who have only found success in social media by touting social media.

That isn't intended to be an insult, rather imply their are a lot of opportunities in DC for folks who have experience building social media business strategies, particularly folks who can address the IT side of things and can debate business cases while understanding project management in government.

Government 2.0 Camp was, for the most part, very interesting. As I am reading the reviews, I noted that one of the suggestions for next year is that there should be more critics. Well, I was clearly in the wrong sessions, because I thought for a moment I was going to get tossed out of that session for being too critical. Actually, I think the Air Force is doing something interesting, but I'm still on the fence whether or not I think it is smart or not.

The US Air Force has a slogan that captures the essence of their new media approach: "every Airman is a communicator." They even have a really slick 8 minute video that discusses their social media approach, which as of Tuesday night, is still not actually available to be seen through social media websites like YouTube. I particularly liked the way the Air Force video frames the "Carrier" PBS series in the video, which the Air Force celebrates as a success, even though the Navy did not.

The point is that "every Airman is a communicator" is as best I can tell not only the slogan, but the business strategy of the Air Force, and because I had no problem playing the role of the critic, my question is whether or not that is a smart communication strategy? I would suggest it could be, but it may also be the perfect example of why the military services, other than the Coast Guard, are struggling to find their voice with new media.

For example...

If the purpose of "every Airman is a communicator" is to get Air Force personnel involved in new media, have them engage the tools and become comfortable with the technologies and options available, then this is a real strategy. Does it have value? It might, the ability to communicate with family while on deployment for example could be a way to maintain morale among those forward deployed. Connectivity online in new media is social communication that younger generations are comfortable with, and in many ways expect access to. In that regards, the simple engagement philosophy behind "every Airman is a communicator" may work under the theory that encouraging everyone to do it is simply enough, and that any communication is better than a default of no communications.

The downside of "every Airman is a communicator" being the social media strategy itself is that the Air Force does not actually have a strategic communication strategy associated with its social media strategy, meaning there is no congruency in the message being generated or integrated into their communicator networks. The phrase "it's personal, not business" would apply to the Air Forces social media strategy, and under the theory "it's personal, not business" one might raise the simple question what the business function new media is actually providing for the Air Force?

In other words, does the Air Force lack a strategic communication strategy with social media because they have decided they want their airmen to use it for personal use, and indirectly garner the benefits of this indirect approach, or does it reflect something broader like...

When an agency or enterprise lacks a strategic communications strategy that builds through social media, does that reflect a business that doesn't have anything of value to say to the public? Be it known I asked that question to several different organizations while I was in Washington DC, including directly to several employees of 4 very prominent think tanks that are part of the national security discussion.

And it is the first question I would ask the Navy.

Strategic Communications content that is published consistency in social media (including comments) is considered branding. For example, a disclaimer that gives name or rank would represent a brand. If the services want to build an online brand through social media, they have to know how all their activities work together. There needs to be a consistency and congruency to these activities. Each part of the social media puzzle builds into a picture people have of the brand, how they imagine the brand to be as it relates to how the agency or enterprise really is will be determined based on how well this stuff is done right. Best of all, these activities don't require micromanagement to get right, they can be done effectively if the big ideas are done right and executed properly.

I would use the example of the USNI blog, where the authors do not actually coordinate topics nor does the Naval Institute put out guidance regarding content. We all understand the big idea though, and each have a good idea how to execute it. This allows the individual authors, without coordination, to represent the brand with integrity while producing content that can carry multiple points of view, including opposite points of view in posts.

From an organizational perspective, the complexities extend to how the services brand comes together when multiple individuals are posting topics for discussion. The impact of consistency and congruency on any topic centric strategic communication effort can and will often have a shaping effect. This is an important concept for military organizations today, because as part of our wars, we also find ourselves in an information war.

Information warfare through social media is often described as asymmetric warfare. For example, identity is information, a shaping operation for information context, so the identity of a military service blogger in cyberspace is part of a tactical shaping operation for the information being transmitted. By saying you are the US Navy for example, the Navy would be taking a symmetric warfare tactical approach in information shaping operations with their strategic communications. By using an alias when posting a comment, it is essentially taking an assymmetric warfare tactical approach in information shaping operations. As an example, I blogged under the call sign Galrahn for nearly 18 months primarily as an assymmetric tactical approach in information shaping operations, the intent of the shaping operation being to establish my credibility as a serious study of naval issues prior to people realizing I am actually a 33 year old IT nerd from New York.

I expressed these ideas many times while in DC, as it is part of my gig in explaining social media to organizations looking to better understand how it works, and how it might work within the context of their organization. When I brought this up in the Air Force session, the look on the folks in the "every Airman is a communicator" session left me thinking the Air Force doesn't actually have a strategic communications strategy with social media. I don't think they have given this as much intellectual rigor as their slick video suggests, but I do think they are on the right track with the slow approach.

Strategically, it may not matter if the Air Force is looking at social media as strategic communication yet. The only presence the Air Force had in the blogosphere of any consequence as of last year was In From the Cold, and given how widely reported that blog's analysis of Minot's nuclear problems were last year, it is entirely possible that blog contributed more than a little to the pair of high profile firings we saw from Air Force leadership last year (which suggests the influence social media is having, perhaps indirectly, on the national security debate). In other words, the Air Force has no blogosphere it can call productive for them anyway, so under the theory something is better than nothing the "every Airman is a communicator" strategy might be a good way to move ahead today while developing a comprehensive approach for tomorrow. In the end, they have time to wait and see what bubbles to the surface of social media as a successful example while developing a more unified strategic communications strategy.

I will say this though. If a military service or organization has something important to say, content they believe in; it doesn't make much sense to me for that organization not to have a blog to build a strategic communications network with. I don't think it is an accident that neither the Air Force or the Navy, organizations having a hard time explaining their strategy at a time the nation is at war, doesn't have a social media strategic communications strategy. After all, talking about their strategic vision and purpose is usually a prerequisite to strategic communications that presents an organizations vision or purpose.

With that said I will add that not talking, through social media or otherwise, also sends strategic communication signals.

For more thoughts on social media and government, check out Matt Armstrong's latest.

Surge of the Intellectuals

This morning I read Bryan McGrath's reflections of the Navy as he looks back one year since retirement. He sounds frustrated. Bryan had an up front and personal view of the Navy for 21 years, and as a going away present, Bryan was one of the key contributors to the final version of the Navy's maritime strategy. The results of his work has been mostly unidentifiable.

Unlike Bryan who sits in the expensive seats among former peers when viewing the Navy, I sit up in the peanut gallery and watch from the high view. I sometimes think this gives me a better advantage than those who are close to the Navy, because I get to see a bigger picture enabled primarily from the position of being networked globally, and positioned externally. There are serious changes taking place right now, and I think Bryan is too close to the field, even in retirement, to see these changes unfolding.

Armchair Generalist recently summed up the latest round of appointments by Gates for the COCOM positions. His list is:

• CENTCOM - Army General David Petraeus
• PACOM - Admiral Robert Willard
• EUCOM - Admiral James Stavridis
• NORTHCOM - Air Force General Victor Renuart
• SOUTHCOM - Air Force Lt Gen Douglas Fraser
• AFRICOM - Army General William Ward
• JFCOM - Marine General James Mattis
• STRATCOM - Air Force General Kevin Chilton
• SOCOM - Admiral Eric Olsen
• TRANSCOM - Air Force General Duncan McNabb

I am not really surprised by either the promotion of Admiral Willard to PACOM or the move of Admiral Stavridis to EUCOM, and I want to suggest that both moves are intentional as part of a long term plan that appears to be unfolding. I want to note they both have something in common, both of them are still innovating and both are described by those who know them as mavericks. I am getting a sense, and I may be incorrect, but a general sense that Admiral Willard is being positioned to be the next CNO, and Admiral Stavridis is being groomed to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

After reading Thomas Ricks book I have begun asking a few questions regarding what ties together the odd but deliberate personnel moves I have been getting information about within the Navy. In general terms, at the 0-5 and 0-6 level there has been quiet movement of some the real intellectual power in that group to position very smart people into places that appear, from this outsiders point of view, to be where they can influence real change in the Navy. There also appears to be some Admirals involved in this quiet transition, and for the lack of a better term, I'm going to call it a surge of the Navy intellectuals.

When I saw this list today, I realized that there is realistic movement on the civilian side that is starting to add up with what is happening on the Navy side. The Army has seen the intellectuals, also made up of mavericks, rise up and grab Iraq by the reigns after being in a haze. The Navy has its own version of a haze right now in Washington, and my sense is that the Navy's own intellectuals, those who write and publish but also either have extraordinary credentials or a sense of maverick in them, are being moved around a bit quietly behind the scenes. Those in the fleet may have noticed this.

I don't have a feel for whether ADM Mullen or ADM Roughead is involved in this quiet shift taking place in personnel, but I do get a sense that ADM Stavridis has some sort of connection in the movements being observed, most likely by recommendation and guidance as opposed to placement. I will not name specific names of the mavericks, because I might hurt someone if I do, but if you are one who has been wondering if it is even possible for the Navy to evolve itself during this period of prolonged peace my answer to that rhetorical question would be: yes.

Given the recent appointments we will have to wait and see what the promotion boards decide, but my sense is we are soon to see major shifts in the Navy, with everything pointing to real change beginning either next year or the year after. A crusader movement of mavericks and intellectuals ready to compete their ideas is building inside the Navy, and no one is going to be able to stop it.

I for one am becoming more encouraged by what this means long term for the Navy.

Notes From Last Thursday's House Subcommittee Hearing

America must significantly widen its definition of strategic allies going forward. As the combination of an over-leveraged United States and a demographically moribund Europe and Japan no longer constitutes a quorum of Great Powers sufficient to address today's global security agenda. In short I want allies with million man armies who are having lots of babies, rising defense budgets, and are willing to go places and kill people in defense of their interests.

Testimony by Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett, HASC Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, March 26, 2024

With that statement by Dr. Barnett, Maine Congresswoman Chellie Pingree (D) gave a face like she had just swallowed a giant spoon full of wasabi with her eggroll. It was one of several memorable moments in the very clever hearing scheduled by Representative Gene Taylor (D-MISS), who really deserves a lot of credit for putting together the hearing. The subcommittee hearing turned out to be very different from my expectations, and yet very informative to see a variety of opinions emerge that would otherwise never see the light of day in the Navy discussion on Capitol Hill. Anyone suggesting this hearing wasn't a useful exercise or very insightful simply wasn't paying attention.

I thought Dr. Thompson eloquently set the context of the moment in his opening statement (PDF) when he said:

The biggest concern will be that our economy is in decline and the federal government is out of money.

How broke is the federal government?

-- So broke that during the two hours we are meeting this morning it will spend $400 million it does not have.

-- So broke that the federal debt has doubled to $11 trillion in just eight years, and threatens to double again in the next eight.

-- So broke that we are sustaining our defense posture in part by borrowing money from the same country our military planners are preparing to fight.

There is no time in living memory when US finances have been in such bad shape, and therefore all the things we thought we knew about the future availability of funding for the joint force are suspect.

Both Dr. Barnett and Dr. Thompson agreed on two interesting points. First, if we build an interoperable national fleet in the spirit of the Navy's maritime strategy we will get good results. Second, the fleet is not likely to get larger without smaller, cheaper warships. I enjoyed the way Dr. Barnett puts it in his written testimony:

To conclude, the U.S. Navy faces severe budgetary pressures on future construction of traditional capital ships and submarines. Those pressures will only grow as a result of the current global economic crisis (which—lest we forget—generates similar pressures on navies around the world) and America's continued military operations abroad as part of our ongoing struggle against violent extremism. Considering these trends as a whole, I would rather abuse the Navy—force structure-wise—before doing the same to either the Marine Corps or the Coast Guard. Why? It is my professional opinion that the United States defense community currently accepts far too much risk and casualties and instability on the low end of the conflict spectrum while continuing to spend far too much money on building up our combat capabilities for high-end scenarios. In effect, we over-feed our Leviathan force while starving our SysAdmin force, accepting far too many avoidable casualties in the latter while hedging excessively against theoretical future casualties in the former. Personally, I find this risk-management strategy to be both strategically unsound and morally reprehensible.

As this body proceeds in its collective judgment regarding the naval services' long-range force-structure planning, my suggested standard is a simple one: give our forces fewer big ships with fewer personnel on them and far more smaller ships with far more personnel on them. As the Department of Navy finally gets around to fulfilling the strategic promise of systematically engaging the littoral … from the sea, doing so in complete agreement—in my professional opinion—with the security trends triggered by globalization’s tumultuous advance, I would humbly advise Congress not to stand in its way.

Say what you want, but the man is consistent. I am a GenXer, so I tend to love the bold attitude that sounds macho when folks like Dr. Thompson and Dr. Barnett say what they believe and believes what they say. Alpha male types who see black and white while telling people what is and isn't in their opinion are so uncommon these days. I'm tired of the more common CYA approach of hedging comments and trying not to say anything that isn't quite filtered through every screen in the kitchen, which I think is what had me enjoying both Dr. Thompson and Dr. Barnett so much in this hearing. These are men who tell people what they think for a living, all you have to do is ask. The opposite of coarse is the average American politician, who doesn't tell you what they really think without first taking a poll.

In his testimony Dr. Barnett makes two good points in addition to what is quoted above.

First he suggests we need to be building capabilities at the low end that can be given away, an idea that was floated by Bob Work with the Littoral Combat Ship in his recent CSBA report (PDF). This idea is making the rounds, and it is a very good idea. In my opinion, if we are going to build towards protecting against an unstable maritime domain where irregular challenges can disrupt the global commercial system, the necessity to build the global coast guard needs to be integrated into our nations maritime strategy. I don't necessarily agree with Bob Work that the LCS is the platform for this, but I am open to it if the LCS costs come down. Seems to me a small ship that can be developed for $100 million, operated by the US Navy in conjunction with regional coast guards as part of a global fleet station squadron or other influence squadron for 10 years (which makes our investment $10 mil a year), is an idea whose time has come. I think a 10 year old small but capable $100 mil new PC is a fantastic investment. Several have been quietly pushing these ideas around the email, it will be useful to publicly push these ideas more often for consideration as part of coherent strategic packages.

Second, Barnett describes maintaining development, at a slow pace he suggests, the very high end capabilities to hedge against potential threats. This is an idea that used to be popular in Navy's, but appears to have lost favor, although give the Navy some credit because building 2-3 DDG-1000s would represent a modern version of this idea. I am talking about the idea of real prototypes and test vessels.

We have not built a nuclear powered surface combatant in a very long time. Perhaps before forcing the Navy to execute the laws that have forced nuclear power upon the Navy, Congress should fund, as a prototype, one of these giant 22,000+ nuclear powered cruisers for ballistic missile defense as a test platform rather than moving quickly for an entire class. Use the LPD-17 hull if necessary to do it, the point being lets actually test the theories before we make them standards.

I am looking at the next decade, and quite honestly I don't see good things for the DoD unless someone in government finds a reason to protect our strategic interests. The priorities on new domestic programs and the seeming acceptance that we will fund all these new domestic programs with even more borrowed money suggests that something has to give. It is unclear just how much creative bookkeeping will be needed to fool the world into believing we can afford all these new programs through their loans, but my guess is we will borrow too much too quickly, get told no sometime over the next few years, and the results will be devastating for the United States economy and people.

Assuming the rest of the world climbs out of the economic hole by 2011, which is what all signs point to right now, the global middle class is going emerge larger than ever. At the same time, energy is going to be at its highest demand in human history. It is noteworthy that countries like Russia are retooling their military industry so they can implement enormous numbers of projects when that time comes. As all the little men globally find themselves swimming in cash from enormous energy demand of the resurgent global economy, we will find our defense budgets in free fall and our domestic debts mounting at record speeds during a time everything costs more thanks to higher energy costs. Any casual study of little men in the energy economy nations globally will find they tend to spend their excess cash on military systems, and rarely reinvest it into their other domestic economy sectors. My prediction is next decade will be defined by two things:

1. The largest global growth of military construction and exports since the 1930s
2. The most painful period of domestic economic turmoil in the US since the 1930s

Everything is pointing to next decade being definitive for the next several generations in terms of the future strategic environment. Despite the views of theorists attempting to caution our political leaders of the near term future, it is clear we are bogged down strategically on the present (Iraq and Afghanistan) with no real congruity in our strategic vision and political policies looking to the future. Indeed, domestically, our minds are collectively on borrowing more money, raising more revenues with individual and creative tax and income concepts, all so we can create even more expenses in a federal budget that is already swimming in interest payments it already can't afford, and that is before the Baby Boomers start collecting social security money the federal government has already spent.

The Obama administration has kept two primary policies of the Bush administration: the current war policy and the "over borrow/over spend" economic model policy. If this continues, my prediction is Obama becomes a one term president because he intentionally kept the two worst possible policies one could pick from the Bush administrations bag of broken ideas. For its part, the Navy needs to get what it can while it can, because the money for the fleet we need simply won't be there.

The Navy's Secret Aircraft Carrier Problem

After all the heat and smoke last year, conventional wisdom would suggest that the CG(X), or DDG-1000, or LCS, or LHA(R), or even the Sea Base will be the hot shipbuilding topic of FY2010. Well, conventional wisdom is not correct, the shipbuilding topic for FY 2010 will be the CVN-21 program. Not only are we going to get an announcement from the Navy about the reduction of aircraft carriers from the Navy in FY 2010, there is also a secret problem with EMALS that the Navy has not explained. That EMALS problem raises questions regarding contracts like this:

Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., Newport News, Va., is being awarded a $42,994,547 undefinitized modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-2110) for the procurement of long lead time material to support production of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) for CVN 78 (Gerald R. Ford) construction. Under this modification the contractor will procure material for Energy Storage Subsystem (ESS) Induction Motor Stator Assemblies, ESS Induction Motor Rotor Assemblies, ESS Exciter Stator Assemblies, ESS Exciter Rotor Assembly, ESS Rectifier Assemblies, ESS Main Rotor Assemblies and Power Conversion Subsystem Rectifier material components to support the production of EMALS. Work will be performed in North Mankato, Minn., (74 percent); Mt. Pleasant, Pa., (17 percent); and San Diego, Calif., (9 percent), and is expected to be completed by Nov. 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., is the contracting activity.

Peter Frost knows there is a problem with EMALS too, and my guess is he is having trouble finding good details. Still, he steals the show with this article though.

But shipyard and Navy officials — as well as a cadre of industry observers — have questioned whether the unproven system will be ready for implementation on the first ship of its class, which is due to be delivered to the Navy in September 2015.

The Navy confirmed Monday that it is conducting a formal review of the program to determine if it will proceed with its plans to build the system into the Ford.

Then Peter gets LCDR Chen to give a ringing endorsement of EMALS.

"We're still conducting a review to assess and mitigate risks in the program cost, schedule and performance of EMALS," said Lt. Cmdr. Victor Chen, a Navy spokesman. "At this point, EMALS is still the launching system of record for (the Ford)."

"Still" is an interesting word, and I interpret the comment suggesting the Navy has not figured out what to do about the EMALS problem that is under "review." Peter goes one better getting a ringing endorsement from Northrop Grumman.

Shipyard officials have said if the new system isn't ready for the Ford, it will be implemented on following ships.

Signaling the shipyard's concern about the launch system, the GAO wrote that Northrop "anticipates changes to (the Ford's) design based on the results of EMALS testing."

Northrop maintains that EMALS is still government furnished.

Note how Northrop is saying "this is a Navy problem." Peter Frost's article is a good read in full, be sure to read and understand the first paragraph because Peter clearly knows, like I do, there is a problem with EMALS that has not been laid out in detail yet. The rumors are everywhere, but the details remain nowhere.

No one wanted to comment on the GAO report, which can be found here (PDF), so I will. The GAO report suggests the following, and this is before the problems with EMALS I am talking about.

Problems during EMALS development have already resulted in cost growth and schedule delays. In order to meet CVN 78’s delivery date, the Navy adopted a strategy that will test, produce, and ultimately install EMALS with a high degree of concurrency. In September 2008, the contractor completed the first round of high- cycle testing, gaining confidence in the performance of the generator—a source of past problems. Contractor-led integrated land-based system testing will not be complete until the end of fiscal year 2011—2-years later than estimated in December 2007. Assuming no further delays, EMALS will not demonstrate full performance of a shipboard ready system until at least 7 months after installation on CVN 78 has begun.

The report goes on to say:

The program has faced challenges in maintaining its design schedule due to delays in the receipt of technical information on EMALS and the advanced arresting gear; however, the Navy believes this issue has been largely resolved. The shipbuilder anticipates changes to CVN 78’s design based on the results of EMALS testing.

Then goes on to say more:

A February 2008 program assessment recommended a number of changes to the EMALS program to improve performance. The Navy re-planned the test program and changed the management approach. The CVN 21 program office is now responsible for overseeing EMALS production and ship integration, rather than the Naval Air Systems Command. In addition, EMALS will no longer be provided as government-purchased equipment. Instead, the shipbuilder will purchase EMALS, giving it a more direct role in managing the integration on CVN 78. The cost impact of this change has not been finalized.

Bottom line, the Navy doesn't want to talk about the problem until they have decided officially what to do. Here is some of what I do know. The larger opinion is that General Atomics may know how to make UAVs, but they have no idea how to make ships systems. The first Ford class carrier is going to suffer a delay and a pretty significant cost hit, somewhere in the neighborhood of $600 million is the number I am hearing thrown about. Shit happens, and on $11 billion aircraft carriers, when shit happens it is usually dinasour sized piles of it.

Some have suggested the first Ford may end up being redesigned for steam. I've also heard everywhere from a 1 year to 3 year delay as a result, with more informed people saying at least 1 year.

As the GAO report notes, steel has been cut on the new aircraft carrier, and if the decision is made to go with steam, a significant redesign will be required. Steam will add weight to the new ship as well as more crew, and will make the first Ford class a unique design, as EMALS will not be canceled thus making the EMALS version of the Ford, CVN-79, another first in class ship.

The other option could get even more costly, and would be to wait for EMALS to get fixed for the first Ford class ship and take an even larger cost hit if the problem doesn't get fixed quickly. As the GAO report notes, the schedule has already been pushed back as far as possible.

The question is, why is the Navy not talking about the EMALS problem? Simple. In a budget year where the budget axes are being sharpened, the last thing the Navy wants to talk about is an enormous soon to be costly delay for its most expensive platform, the new aircraft carrier. For as long as possible, the Navy is going to not talk about this problem, because only by getting as much money into the program as possible first can the Navy insure it doesn't take a budget hit. In other words, the Navy appears content to say nothing until the budget hearings, and even then I question whether they will bring it up, or be forced by Congress to answer the rumors that are now just about everywhere.

What the Navy should be doing instead is explaining the problem. Hell, run it by me, I'll explain the freaking problem in a way anyone who wants to know can understand, that is what blogs do.

Be honest, talk about the problems with the press and explain them in detail. Aircraft carriers are national capabilities, and no matter what weapons China is producing to attack them, there is still no evidence that missile technology nor the submarine threat has rendered the aircraft carrier obsolete. The aircraft carrier is a platform of national interest, paid for with an enormous investment in national treasure, and a unique capability that has, every single day since the very first day the United States entered WWII with Pearl Harbor been the most powerful warfighting capability at sea.

The biggest mistake the Navy can make is to be intentionally deceptive or dishonest regarding the most expensive single platform acquired by the Department of Defense. The House or the Senate, particularly a representitive from Virginia or perhaps Jim Webb, might want to get to the bottom of this issue under oath. After the last few trips to the Hill, does Barry really need that headache? Can someone give that guy a break for a change, instead of making him the mule for everyones problem...

Before that happens and the Navy makes negative headlines for itself during a budget hearing, the Navy might want to get out in front of this issue. They might find the American people finally give a shit about something related to the Navy. After all, to the Navy's detriment, the aircraft carrier, not any single person, is the symbol of the sea service today. Yes, it is sad but true that a picture of a piece of technology and not an individual represents the Navy of the 21st century.