Warning Signs of a Coming Threat Off Somalia

The monsoon season begins in just a few weeks off the coast of Somalia, so expect piracy to drop off during that period even as both NATO and the EU may be preparing to increase operations.

It is unclear what the US Navy intends to do with the adjustment period that will most likely result in the pirates changing tactics, but this report suggests what some of the new pirate tactics might be, and what the South Koreans are worried about.

I was struck by reading last night that the South Korean navy wants to equip its Lynx helicopters with a missile protection system (flares and radar warning system) and is prepared to make the necessary modifications immediately, according to a South Korean defense ministry quoted by the Korea Times. The move comes after it received warning from the National Intelligence Service and the Defense Security Command that Somali pirates seem to have acquired Stinger anti-air missiles from Al-Qaida.

The article goes on to note the South Koreans may install the defense system to their helicopters in Djibouti, suggesting the threat is near term, not long term.

Any tactical evolution towards offensive weapons against naval forces will fundamentally change everything about Somalia piracy. One incident, particularly against a US ship or helicopter, is going to raise all kinds of questions regarding the littoral strategy of naval forces operating off Somalia.

And should Sailors be killed, it will unfortunately reveal in bloody detail why littoral operations in populated spaces against threats that conceal well in the maritime environment are manpower intensive operations requiring a physical level of tactical scouting with enough credible firepower and survivability to take a hit and dish out overwhelming firepower while under direct fire at very close range.

Exactly what the LCS is not.

Social Software Discussions

Twitter Tips: How to Catch Up After a Few Days Away - Still struggling with Twitter? I am, I noted Noah has 2000 followers and I have uhm... fewer. This is a pretty good tip guide for Twitter rookies like me. I need to learn how to use Twitter as a tool for something other than links and 'less than witty' comments. Any tip guides for that are appreciated in the comments. At least I'm using Tweetdeck now... Progress!

Why Washington doesn’t get new media? - There is an idea here that the author clearly understands, and I agree mostly with.

Those who think new media is about technology fail to grasp the significance of what is happening in today’s media environment.

Those who don’t get it will continue to assign new media to the IT division.

Those who partially get it will continue to appoint “directors of new media” — as if they had directors of television media and directors of print media and directors of radio media in their cramped communications offices. But none of them, in the end, will “control the message,” that rusted Holy Grail of a rapidly fading era.

But the author should never, ever underestimate what IT does as a value added capability to social social software. IT is the operational environment of social software, and is used to develop tactics.

Bringing Social Networking To Iraq? Could Work: In Context of Iraqi Culture, Not Ours - I am very much enjoying AFPADudes blog. Everyone in CHINFO should bookmark. This is where the ideas of STRATCOM meet public affairs and creative friction is born into ideas.

Dr. Rodriguez places a high importance on the need to understand Intercultural Communication and rightly so. Her thought is tied to the concept of the global village (which I believe social networking has a key stake in), she says;

“Never before did our world resemble so closely what Marshall McLuhan called ‘the global village.’ The economic functions around transnational corporations and international markets; peoples from different parts of the world migrate — for different reasons — to other parts of the world; the work-force has become diverse in many different ways: people of different ages, genders, ethnicity, race, religions, languages, have to live and work together. All this means that never before has good intercultural communication been so valuable.”

The whole post is a good read.

Social Networking and National Security: How to Harness Web 2.0 to Protect the Country - James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. is discussing social software and national security at Heritage. I disagree with the title, it implies a solution is contained within when in fact the article leaves the reader with many questions. This part stood out though.

Some argue that the benefits that result from the enormous number and diversity of individuals that can engage in global listening far exceeds the risks. Michael Tanji, a proponent of adapting Web 2.0 to national security decision making, argues that "in terms of intellectual capital, a virtual think tank can be at least an order of magnitude larger than any current think tank 1.0 in existence today.... [T]he more minds working on a given problem the better the solution. It is unlikely that a policymaker would care one way or another if a good idea was generated by an individual or a group, but as a friend who was an early adopter of the 2.0 approach explains: 'None of us is as smart as all of us.'"

Research suggests that Tanji's observation is overly simplistic. Who interacts and how they interact can have a significant impact on the character of the ideas created. For example, Ronald Burt, a researcher at the University of Chicago, studied an online social network set up for participants in the supply chain of a major electronics manufacturer. Burt found that managers who had a broader perspective, who worked with and interacted with employees and individuals outside their department, provided better recommendations on how to improve business practices. He called this "bridging structural holes." Thus, in terms of using social networking to improve national security policy and programs, Government 2.0 needs to do more than simply "tweeting" (the action of sending a message using Twitter) in broadcast mode or trying to solicit millions of opinions. Social networking structures need to be designed and implemented to achieve specific measurable outcomes based on knowledge about how networks actually work.

I have never met Dr. Carafano, but I have read a lot of his work (including his knol, a good read on the same subject) and I think he is astute observer and researcher.

In the national security debate, the voices that matter in the decision process are the managers who have a broader perspective, but the voices that matter in the development of the decision process are most often not those managers, rather those in the field. In other words, one has to target where to get inputs and where to put outputs, which is why who interacts and how they interact can have a significant impact on the character of the ideas created as Dr. Carafano states.

But that idea is not mutually exclusive of what Michael Tanji is saying when he suggests None of us is as smart as all of us. I can honestly say I have never had useful inputs from anyone at the flag rank or higher of the military services, most of the inputs come directly from those in the field, the working class uniform and civilian Navy. On the other hand, the outputs are usually directed specifically to the think tank class, the political class, the General and Flag officer class, and the academic community who themselves utilize those inputs I pass on so that they can develop outputs for their content. The social network does not hold a uniform pattern, thus I see the blog not as a node, but as a switch on the network collecting inputs from nodes - delivering outputs to nodes.

That is where Dr. Drapeau's paper (PDF) is useful, as it describes the inward/inbound/outward/outbound nature of information leveraging the medium of social software. In my experience though, because the social network is fundamentally human and not technology, effectively developing specific measurable outcomes requires complementary tools and efforts. One point on this though, social networks leveraging social software allows for specific measurable outcomes to be achieved with a much lower requirement for coordination and cooperation. As I have noted many times, Andrew Exum and Tom Ricks do this better than anyone, because they act as the coordinator of information on the behalf of inputs they create on other mediums as well as inputs from others via any medium who may or may not have intended the information to be used in the way it is ultimately used. Inputs via email is no different than an input via a comment or tweet, and for the record, an output via a direct email can be just as important as a blog post, Listserv, Tweet, Facebook entry, or phone call if the desired outcome is produced.

In a nutshell, those CNAS guys take inputs from everywhere and control the presentation through virtually every form of output, and do so in a form folks in the military would call a shaping operation. Shaping the message may or may not be spin as Dr. Carafano suggests, because to the intellectually astute audience involved in the national security debate the output better be both interesting and intelligent to be relevant.

Some Thoughts On The Suggested PLA Navy Expansion

About a month ago I came across several PLA Navy sources suggesting that a major buildup of naval forces was coming after the 60th anniversary of the PLA Navy. Feng and I discussed the topic a bit in private, but instead of posting I decided to ask some questions of the folks at the Naval War College whom I have found to be the very best people in the US focused on PLA Navy shipbuilding. The answer was they had not seen enough evidence to support the theory that a major build up was coming.

I don't know what China is doing, the lack of transparency makes it difficult to see plans until 2-3 years later, but it wasn't an accident that the ex-Varyag was moved right after the 60th PLA Navy anniversary celebration, and there are strange photo's coming out of the Chinese shipyards suggesting very large hulls are being built that do not appear to match any existing design. With that in mind, we have the upcoming China Defense Mashup blog (I suggest if you have not, you add this website to your feed reader) with full details of what the Chinese shipyards are up to.

To bring people up to speed, several Chinese shipyards have recently completed some investments and are upgraded, open for business. One problem, the global demand on the private sector has all but dried up, with supposedly hundreds of ships massed in the South Pacific empty, waiting for the global economy to rebound so they can get back to work. Capacity is well above demand, and the number of orders for new ships is down. Speculation has been that this means that for the next three years, to keep the Chinese shipyards at peak performance, military orders would make up the difference. This article is suggesting this theory, but well grounded theory, is in fact what is happening.

Nobody deny that Chinese Navy will definitely be a powerful marine force with the rising of China. But the question is the time line and scale of the ambitious building plan of PLA Navy. Varyag Aircraft Carrier, Type 052C “Chinese Aegis” and Type 093/094 submarines are always the focus point of western analyzers. However, will China depend these ship to get the advantage position in western pacific. The answer is obviously “No”.

Some resources in Chinese Defense Industries indicates that China will continuously push its huge Navy construction in world economic crisis. In next 3 years (2009-2012), the hardware construction of Chinese Naval Force is going to enter an higher climax.

It goes on to lay out in detail what will be built in each yard. For the record, I have seen other information that matches up exactly to everything mentioned here, so this could just be a well organized post of bad information. The following is suggested to be expected new work orders for the shipyards over the next 3 years.

Dalian Shipbuilding Corporation
ex-Varyag upgrade
1 New Aircraft Carrier
Large Air-Defense Destroyer (rumor is Type 051D)

Shanghai Jiangnan Changxing Shipbuilding Base
1 new Aircraft Carrier
Large Air-Defense Destroyers

Huangpu Shipbuilding Corporation
Large Air-Defense Destroyers (rumor is Type 052D)
Type 054As

Hudong Shipbuilding Company
Landing Transport Docks
Type 054As

Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co.(formerly known as Huludao)
Nuclear submarines

Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Co.
Type 041 improved conventional submarines (Yuan class)

I don't want to leave the impression I believe this is 100% fact, only that the information posted to the China Defense Mashup blog is information that is being discussed in other places. The same information can be found through other sources although some of those sources are not always reliable sources.

Will official confirmation be coming out soon? I doubt it, the Chinese are not transparent about their naval shipbuilding, even in the big parade they made a big deal about showcasing their nuclear submarines only to produce all of their old model nuclear submarines. The 2009 DoD report on the Chinese Military (PDF) goes so far as to ignore ships under construction where pictures confirm the data in the DoD report is old, although I do think the 2009 Chinese defense report was better than in previous years.

In the end, following the Chinese PLA Navy shipbuilding programs comes down to how much you believe open source sources until you see photographic evidence yourself.

Based on the numbers provided by China Defense Mashup blog, it looks to me like the PLA Navy will be building at least 10 major warships and submarines annually for the next 3 years. That would assume 3 aircraft carriers (1 is ex-Varyag), 7 LPDs, 14 destroyers and frigates, 3 nuclear submarines, and 3 conventional submarines (an all-time low production of only one nuclear and one conventional submarine a year). In other words, it could be more like 12-13+ ships per year if submarine production is higher and depending upon the number of logistics ships built.

There are several ways to look at a rapid PLA Navy build up. One is to suggest this marks the beginning of a cold war between the US and China, and that would suggest the US needs to look at the PLA Navy buildup in a way that compares what we are doing to what they are doing. In a budget year, that can be expected of China hawks.

For example, for the three years FY08-FY10 (FY10 is this budget year), the US Navy would build 1 CVN, 3 SSNs, 1 DDG-1000, 1 DDG-51, 5 LCS, 2 LPD-17s, 4 T-AKEs, and 2 JHSVs (+1 more JHSV for the Army) for a total of 19 total ships. That isn't great, that comes in at only 6 capital ship combatants with the other 13 ships being of the flotilla. When those numbers are compared to the PLA Navy, China is producing 3x as many aircraft carriers, 2x as many submarines (potentially 3x or even 4x), 7x as many frigates and destroyers, and before we start celebrating the LCS construction it should be noted the DoD report lists as many as 70 missile armed fast attack craft including several dozen Type 022s to offset the LCS/JHSV construction the US is undertaking.

I don't like this type of comparison though, because it doesn't really tell the story. It is an industrial centric view that ignores operational readiness, skill, experience, existing capabilities, emerging capabilities, strategy, doctrine, and tactics. For the record, I am not a 'China hawk,' although I do subscribe to the theory it is entirely possible the US and China will have a skirmish in the next few decades, but my thoughts on this is historical in nature. The War of 1812 was necessary to bring about a partnership between the US and Great Britain who at the time, were major trading partners. It is entirely possible a similar 'feud' will be necessary for the US and China to find their mutual interest. Churchill likened the War of 1812 to a spat between brothers, and that may be how the US and China finally get on the same page. For my part, if any such 'spat' is to occur, I'd much rather play the role of the existing superpower (Great Britain) than the rising power (the US of 1812). It doesn't have to be that way though.

My concern is what a major naval buildup means for people like Taiwan, India, Japan, and/or South Korea. We have already seen Australia make their decision, and I think they are making the right decision but solely for their interests, regardless of China's direction. I have no idea what the future holds, but the relationship between the US and China must steadily improve for the next few decades regardless of whether the US decides to match China's naval power development or not.

If someone was to ask to me to list the potential adversaries of the US in the 21st century, I still believe we are more likely to go to war with several countries, including some existing NATO allies, in the 21st century before I think we would go to war with China. Lets face it, we are a commercial people and so is China. We are their biggest customer, and they are our biggest customer. I thinkTom Barnett is right on target with his "transaction" narrative that describes the China-US relationship. This relationship is unlikely to change anytime soon if our economic policies are smart, particularly when we see companies like GM run to China to survive. Economically, we have more in common with China than we do with the Europeans today.

The 'fear communist' narrative suggests China is the red menace out to get us, but I don't see this as anywhere near the reality of the US-China relationship. The irony is the conservative capitalists in the US will be the first ones who make this point to "China Hawk" the US into preparing for the next cold war, when in fact, China is one of the premier capitalist societies in the world today which is why we are so tied to China in terms of economy.

In other words, I see China's rise as a reflection of our own rise, and the coming China rise could very easily be a combination of their Mahan moment with their own Great White Fleet, but also their Teddy Roosevelt moment of great expansive influence without war. I've been reading a really good book called Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century on that time period written by CDR Jerry Hendrix, and I hear Evan Thomas is soon to publish a book about the Spanish-American war that looks at the same time period. Both of these books are timely, because that time period reveals the lessons of the past needed to guide us through the present.

If you want to understand why China is developing itself into a major naval power in the 21st century, know your history, because China's coming rise and the dynamics involved and challenges we are likely to face as a result can be found in history... our national history just over 100 years ago.

Is This For Real?

I can neither confirm nor deny this report, but it is quite interesting nonetheless. As you may be able to tell, I have been somewhat distracted and am still catching up on the news. From our brothers to the north.

Dave Shirlaw of Seawaves publication emailed me with further information on the post I had a couple of days ago about Russian aircraft and submarines purchased by Vietnam.

He pointed out that the KILOs (the subs) destined for Vietnam were originally to be purchased by Venezuela but that deal collapsed after a fistfight on board the Russian cruiser “Peter the Great” when it and other warships were visiting Venezuela.

Venezuela’s leader Chavez was in the process of visiting the Russian flotilla but his bodyguards were prevented from boarding. A fistfight then broke out between the Russian sailors and the bodyguards. The nose of one Russian was broken.

That ended the sub purchase.

No wonder Chavez jumped the cameras, he definitely needs President Obama to sell his book when billion dollar submarine deals go down to emotional tirades.

H/T: Eric Moore

Confirmed

Bob Work was confirmed as "Under" by the Senate last night. Should be announced today. Today is a good day. I was so pleased last night I opened a bottle of 95 score (from Parker) and drank the whole bottle in celebration, thus my writing time went to hell.

The wine was worth it, and the news couldn't be better in my opinion.