The
June 2009 issue of Proceedings is out. Submarines. I haven't read most of the articles yet, but I did dive into this article by Barrett Tillman titled
Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era. There is a basic question that is asked, one that is less trivial than many Navy officers believe.
Why do we have a Navy? Actually, the article concludes by expanding that question into a better way to phrase the question.
"Why do we still have such a big navy when we hardly ever use it?"
Admittedly, I got stuck thinking about the title, asking the question rhetorically whether we are really in a Post-Naval era? I no longer believe we are living in a Post-Naval era, I believe we did but it ended sometime over the last year. It just looks like it based on what gets printed in the newspapers, and how slow we are to reacting to what the rest of the world is doing. What is often missed, primarily because we are a nation involved in two long land wars, is that every single rising major power is currently expanding their Navy. In the meantime we are struggling to identify the purpose of our Navy during these times, and articulate what our Navy is supposed to be doing during the rise of other Great Powers.
Look at the emerging regional economic powers of the 21st century; China, India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Russia, Saudi Arabia; and note that every one of them is rapidly increasing the capability of naval forces. The title is inaccurate, we are emerging from a Post-Naval Era and entering the next Pre-Naval Era, the first big naval era of the 21st century which will be all too obvious by 2020. Most interesting, the next naval era is shaping up to be expeditionary, underwater, and dependent upon space. The biggest question of the next naval era has yet to be answered, and it is the role of surface combatants in the next naval era? That is the big question I have yet to see well defined. With that said, that doesn't answer the question posed in the article. This section reveals the rhetorical question that never gets asked in the article:
No naval actions since 1945 have required combat fleets to protect sea lanes-the very reason navies exist. Instead, light forces have proved most useful, escorting tankers in the Persian Gulf and currently combating pirates off Africa. Meanwhile, only isolated engagements have occurred in odd places at random intervals. In 1967 the Egyptian Navy inaugurated the missile age in war at sea by sinking an Israeli destroyer, but there have been no naval surface-to-surface missile engagements since. In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani clash, the Indians sank a French-built Paki submarine, and one of her sisters torpedoed a British-built Indian destroyer.
More than ten years later off the Falklands, HMS Conqueror torpedoed the 44-year-old cruiser General Belgrano, which had survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as the USS Phoenix (CL-46). It was the second and last time since World War II that a submarine had sunk an enemy ship.
In 1988, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft conducted Operation Praying Mantis, sinking an Iranian frigate, a gunboat, and three speedboats. The captain of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) termed it "the largest American sea battle since World War II." Though a grandiose description, it was nonetheless accurate-and remains so today.
Actually, the largest sea battle since World War II is taking place today off the coast of Somalia, and the enemy is winning because we choose not to defeat them, but because naval power is an instrument of policy and the policy is to avoid direct confrontation, naval power is avoiding the direct confrontation necessary to win that fight. The Order of Battle for Operation Praying Mantis included:
OTC: Commander Joint Task Force Middle East
(Embarked on the Coronado) Battle Group Commander:
ComCruDesGru Three (Embarked on the Enterprise)
SAG Bravo:
OSC: ComDesRon Nine (Embarked on the Merrill)
USS Merrill (1 SH-2F)
USS Lynde McCormick
USS Trenton (1 SH-60B)
MAGTF 2-88 (4 AH-IT, 2 UH-1, 2 CH-46)
SAG Charlie:
OSC: CO, USS Wainwright
USS Wainwright
USS Bagley (1 SH-2F)
USS Simpson (1 SH-60B, I UH-60)
SEAL Platoon
SAG Delta:
OSC: ComDesRon Twenty Two (Embarked on the Jack Williams)
USS Jack Williams (2 SH-2F)
USS O'Brien (2 SH-2F, I UH-60)
USS Joseph Strauss
CVW-11 CAP/SUCAP Support
Sorry, but that is nothing compared to the
international collection of warships operating off the coast of Somalia. Fighting pirates may not be as sexy as destroying the Iranian Navy, but if the Navy doesn't come to terms with its role dealing with these challenges in the 21st century maritime environment, no one is ever going to articulate a meaningful, relevant answer to the questions posed in this Proceedings article.
While the core question
"Why do we still have such a big navy when we hardly ever use it?" is asked, the rhetorical question
what kind of Navy do we need today is specifically absent, and yet abundantly present in the details of the article. Lets answer the stated question first.
The US Navy is operating and in use every single day, and the citizens of the United States take that fact for granted. I'm not talking about the obvious use of the US Navy in the Middle East supporting war operations from aircraft carriers, interdicting pirates with a handful of ships and planes, nor operating in the defense of the Iraqi Oil Terminals, all of which represent daily functions of the US Navy obvious to any observer looking for an operational example today. More important is the strategic function of the US Navy today, the poorly articulated and largely misunderstood operational responsibilities that naval forces are engaged in daily supporting SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and EUCOM. The US Navy not only fails to articulate the security and support roles naval forces conduct in these regions, but intentionally conceals the strategic defense role the US Navy performs daily in PACOM.
Just because the New York Times doesn't run an article discussing the ballistic missile deterrence patrols the US Navy conducts every day of the year off the North Korean shore doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Did you know we have at least 2 AEGIS BMD destroyers on station every single day of the year off North Korea? I assure you, North Korea knows. Did you know that for well over a year the same is true off the coast of Iran? I assure you, Iran knows. The Stennis Carrier Battle Group pulled into Pearl Harbor last week as it is returning from a 6 month deployment exclusively in the Pacific theater. Do you honestly believe it was nothing more than a sailing exercise? Unfortunately, due to the complete absence of any strategic communication between the US Navy and the citizens of the United States, the vast majority of citizens can only assume the strategic purpose of that battle groups function as an extension of political policy in the Pacific over the last 6 months.
That, in a nutshell, is the real problem and why the Navy is in real trouble. The leadership of the Navy does not make the case why we still have such a big navy nor does the Navy provide a compelling narrative regarding how it is used. The Stennis CSG is really a perfect example, in this the US Navy has its largest conventional warfare capability and fails to provide a credible narrative regarding its operational use, purpose, or performance in a way that resonates with the taxpayer. No Flag officer should ever complain about the reduction of the number of aircraft carriers under those conditions. The problem is actually even bigger than simply providing a narrative, the credibility of today's Navy leadership is in the toilet thanks to a series of poor choices made in the public discussions of the Navy regarding shipbuilding. For the Navy, that means just to get to the point where a strategic concept can be articulated with a meaningful narrative, the Navy has to rebuild the image of the folks who speak for the Navy.
Which leads to yet another problem, the Navy doesn't have any credible evangelists who articulate a relevant strategic concept that is being sold to the public to start with. That suggests one of two big problems during the emerging Pre-Naval Era: either the evangelist doesn't exist, or the strategic concept doesn't exist. It is going to be very difficult to build a fleet able to meet the obligations of a superpower if one of those doesn't exist, nevermind if neither exists. Luckily, and I will discuss this on Wednesday, the Navy does have at least one active duty evangelist (at least among navalists), and if Ray Mabus decides to unleash Bob Work to the media, the Navy will have another evangelist with Bob.
If we are indeed entering a Pre-Naval Era, as I believe we are, lets look at the rhetorical question regarding what kind of Navy we need.
The first strategic question that must be answered is what roles will the US Navy need to perform. The correct answer is all roles, because superpowers have to be just about everything to just about everyone, which is also why superpowers are always unpopular with someone. In tangible terms that means the US Navy requires a balanced force for meeting the challenges at the high end of warfare all the way down to the global maintenance of peacetime, and must articulate the role of naval forces operating at every point in between. It begins by explaining the role of global commerce and maritime trade and works all the way to defending the country in all out nuclear war.
The necessity to articulate the strategic value of naval forces as an instrument of policy on land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace to meet the requirements of political policy is the single most important aspect of the Navy's strategic concept. If you can't articulate your capabilities in every situation, how can one be prepared to execute actions in support of meeting the political requirements in providing those capabilities?
The second strategic question that must be answered is how every role required of the Navy will be met. In alignment with the existing maritime strategic concept and the existing national defense strategy, Joint service, inter-agency, international partnership is always the desired course of action with an asterisk that reserves the right to act independently as necessary. The US Navy should never attempt to fill the role of global maritime sheriff, but should always sit on the global maritime city council while also executing national strategic interests independent of partnerships when necessary. This position is directly inline with the political policies of the United States over the last several decades, including the existing approach to managing unsecured maritime spaces like off Somalia today, or even tracking movements of submarines off the coast of China.
The third strategic question, which people mistakenly try to make most important, is the question regarding emerging powers... specifically China. What is the strategic threat posed by China to the United States in the 21st century? Given the economic relationship, all out direct nuclear war seems remote, unlikely, and even absurd to suggest as of today. China is not a direct strategic threat to the United States today, and I see no evidence China is developing itself into one. What China does represent however, is the biggest threat to the interests of the United States globally, although that threat is largely regional to the Pacific. The strategic defense relationship between the United States and China is exactly the same as the relationship being executed from the point of view of China towards the United States; it is a relationship based on the strategic theory of dissuasion. Just as China is developing a military capability to dissuade the United States from conducting military operations against China, the United States Navy must develop and maintain the capabilities necessary to dissuade China from acting militarily against regional countries China has territorial or economic disputes with.
China seeks to replace the US as the global hegemon in the 21st century, but China is also yet to prove it has the maturity to do so as they continue to attempt to redefine the global international legal frameworks, particularly at sea, to meet what has clearly become an expansionist ambition towards previously governed territories. Until China proves that the relationship with the world is purely non-military competition, the relationship between the US and China will feel contentious, often strained.
Dissuasion of territorial expansion while working towards increased global maritime security cooperation is the strategy for dealing with all emerging Great Powers, including China or Russia. The strategy must align the direction of the US Navy towards meeting both objectives. Articulating both objectives clearly is important because in this way, dissuasion of emerging Great Powers is the high end force development just as maritime security cooperation is the low end force development in executing a balanced strategy, and simply saying
peace through strength no matter how accurate the phrase may sound, is simply not enough to be clear on the requirements to meet both ends of the strategy simultaneously.
The fourth strategic question asks how we manage the maritime security challenges of the 21st century during a period of rapidly growing global maritime populations. It is no longer enough to note how many people live within 200 miles of the sea, no matter how large that population may be, because the population on the sea itself is rapidly expanding as part of the effort to feed a rapidly growing global population on land. China will have 220,000 registered fishing boats by 2010. Off Somalia, there are around 6000 fishing vessels at sea every day, and over 600 foreign fishing boats illegally fishing in Somali waters annually. These are just a few examples of how the littorals are becoming a complex human terrain that will substantially increase the difficulty of dealing with Hybrid Threats at sea. The trends for the number of fishing and other boats populating the sea globally are all going up, and nothing short of disaster resulting in enormous loss of human life globally will buck these trends.
The rapidly growing population on the sea is the single greatest challenge to maritime security in the 21st century maritime domain, and on a planet that is 70% covered with water, we are going to need an enormous number of operational platforms, mostly smaller, to meet the security demands of this globally expanding population. This point is never articulated well by the Navy, but the day it is will be the day naval leadership embraces the necessity of Sea Basing as a strategic naval concept for logistically supporting littoral operations as opposed to just as an expeditionary operations logistics concept for moving amphibious forces to land.
And more importantly, that will also be the day the Navy can explain why they need a bunch of capable, albeit smaller vessels to disperse and operate in the global ungoverned maritime spaces where security is required to protect our national interests, and why all of our emerging partners do as well. In fact, one of the huge missing capabilities of US Naval forces today is the ability to rapidly stand up an effective Coast Guard in another country. Building partnership capacity is part of the end of strategy, and sometimes that model will build existing capability, and sometimes it may include building from a non-existing starting point.
Partnerships alone will never meet the growing global demand for presence, but as we develop new partners who we can develop capabilities in any specific region, we will be more effective in organizing our own forces globally.
A shift, or balance, of US naval capabilities meeting these security challenges as well as dissuading emerging Great Powers must align to answer all four strategic questions facing the demand for naval forces today. If today's US Navy leadership can't articulate a coherent answer to the questions posed in this Proceedings article in less than the 60 second attention span of Joe or Jane American citizen,
the self licking ice cream cone of an "I exist, therefore I should exist" mentality will eventually result in a Congressionally sponsored rapid decline of the US Navy regardless of whether or not we are entering the first Pre-Naval Era of the 21st century.
A handful of House lawmakers are playing hardball with the Pentagon regarding the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. No question about it, this is a political trap for the Navy. It is also an opportunity.
