Monday, August 3, 2024

Turkey and Somalia

Back on July 8th press reports indicated pirates had hijacked the Turkish bulk freighter M/V Horizon-1 right in the middle of the security corridor in the Gulf of Aden where shipping traffic usually avoids pirate attacks. To make things even more interesting, the hijacking reportedly took place in rough seas, usually a condition that prevents small pirate ships from operating effectively.

The attack had all sorts of strange, unconfirmed details associated with it, including the possibility that the Indian Navy shot 2 of the 5 hijackers, and that the pirates themselves were reported unarmed, even while being escorted by Turkish warships, according to the shipping company spokesman.

Turkey appears to be taking the gloves off a bit, and has become more proactive in taking on pirates. After capturing 5 pirates last week, Turkish naval commandos captured seven more pirates this week, but Somalia pirates have also been busy.

The same day this news report caught my attention, and although I have yet to see much news coverage of the incident, I find this one of the more interesting events off Somalia regarding piracy in awhile. Apparently, one of the Turkish crew members of M/V Horizon-1 has been reportedly shot while being held hostage.
The mother of one of the 23 crew said her son told them about the incident in a brief telephone conversation earlier this week.

"My son was weeping and asking us to save them... He said that they had run out of food... and that one (sailor) had been shot and wounded," the Radikal daily quoted Gulperi Sari as saying.

"I'm worried about my son's life... The government must resolve this issue," she said.
This Australian news report adds some additional information and context, which may or may not be speculation (you can decide).
However, direct information from Eyl reports that this story was most likely used to put pressure on the owner of the vessel to speed up ransom delivery. While one crew member had been slightly injured by broken glasses during the attack leading to the sea-jacking, the release of the vessel with 23 Turkish seafarers is said to be on track and expected soon, since talks have apparently been concluded in the Middle-East, though there was a conflict among the captors.
Piracy has been remarkably lower during the monsoon season, which will soon be coming to an end. It is hard to tell whether one should expect improvement over last year or not, given the vast distances to cover, the influence of weather, the increase in regional maritime security forces, and the historical trends.

One thing does concern me though... I expect to soon see visible signs of tactical evolution in Somalia piracy, and I am concerned what that might look like. It could be better motors for boats, or better boats in general, but it might also mean better weapon systems or a better intelligence network.

Piracy is not a problem that can't be managed by a disorganized hodgepodge of international naval forces as long as the Somali pirates operate as a hodgepodge of unorganized greed centric criminals. It isn't difficult to see how the introduction of only a handful of weapon systems, whether they be incendiary weapons of some kind or shoulder mounted anti-aircraft missile systems that can turn anti-piracy into a political and naval catastrophe, as both low flying helicopters and rubber inflatable boats are both susceptible to relatively small and concealable weapon systems that can force a huge warship to lose its two most important anti-piracy technology assets - RHIBS and RW.

I do hope our tactics and RoE are in line with insuring that the safety of our sailors remains the top priority, because any expectation that tactical evolution isn't coming would be inconsistent not only with the behavior of Somali pirates to date, but any foe our military forces have been dealing with over the past decade.

Sunday, August 2, 2024

Boring... But

In case you haven't seen them, there are at least two (one and two) videos of LCS-2 Sea Trials on YouTube.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Decatur (DDG 73)
USS Howard (DDG 83)
USS Gridley (DDG 101)
USS Thach (FFG 43)


Bataan Amphibious Ready Group

USS Bataan (LHD 5)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43)


EU NAVFOR

SPS Numancia (F83) (Flagship)
SPS Marques de la Ensenada (A-11)
HS Nikiforos Fokas (F466)
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F 209)
FGS Brandenburg (F 215)
FGS Berlin (A 1411)
FS Nivose (F 732)
FS Aconit (F713)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
HMS Malmö (K12)
HMS Stockholm (K11)
HMS Trossö (A264)


Combined Task Force 150

PNS Tipu Sultan (F185)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
FS Marne (A 630)
FS Commandant Bouan (F797)
HMAS Toowoomba (FFH 156)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)


NATO Allied Mission Protector

HMS Cornwall (F99)
HS Navarinon (F461)
ITS Libeccio (F572)
TCG Gediz (F-495)
USS Laboon (DDG 58)


Combined Task Force 151

USS Anzio (CG 68)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
PNS Badr (D184)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)
TCG Gaziantep (F-490)
RSS Persistence (209)


In Theater

Ocean 6
ITS San Giorgio (L9892)
KD Sri Inderapura (L1505)
INS Talvar (F40)
INS Brahmaputra (F31)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Shenzhen (DD 167)
PLAN Huangshan (FFG 570)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS James E Williams (DDG 95)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Kent (F78)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7)
USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)

Speicher's Remains Found?

Picked this one up off of Facebook (H/T Ken Adams), but haven't seen anything anywhere else. If true, this would be some measure of closure for the Speicher family.

As a newly-minted Lieutenant, I remember reading message traffic aboard USS THOMAS S. GATES (CG 51) while on watch one night early in the first Gulf War. In my stack was a very odd message, one that seemed to convey a good deal of information about a LT Michael Scott Speicher. The Captain happened to be in CIC at the time (Hank Giffin, all honor his name), and I asked him what I was looking at. He explained that it was a message sent out after a pilot had gone down containing personal information that search and rescue forces could use as low-level challenge and reply when they were attempting to rescue the pilot.

When you're on a cruiser in the Northern Red Sea (one without TLAM, mind you), your connection to the events ashore is a bit less than for others in the conflict. At that moment, with that message, a 25 year old realized that his country was at war and good people were going to die.

Saturday, August 1, 2024

More Good News from Sea-Based Missile Defense

Great news from the Pacific Fleet after Thursday's successful BMD event near Hawaii. According to the linked-to story, this was the first test event to feature two different versions of the BMD software. This is an important statement. I'd be interested in knowing how "interoperable" the two versions were, and to what extent (if any) interoperability problems were engineered into the system. Clearly this was a successful event, but it would be interesting to know what data (if any) was not not jointly held and evaluated by the shipboard combat systems involved. Moving to a paradigm in which the "shooters" all see/evaluate/and process the same data and reach the same conclusions--even with different "software versions" is a "Holy Grail" state of affairs that those of us who've worked in missile defense worked hard to bring about. I'm not current on these matters, so those who are please pipe up.

This and other Navy BMD successes raises once again the extent to which the Navy ought to be invested in missile defense. This is a huge issue at a strategic level and as a question of resource priorities. Some in the Navy fear a broadened role in missile defense, and much of that fear is (in my opinion) a manifestation of the fear of control. The story goes something like this...So the Navy spends all this money to build ships, very, very scare (and getting scarce-er) money, and then because of the critical nature of the mission, that ship gets to sit in a very small operating box waiting to shoot down missiles. It doesn't do engagement/shaping, it isn't a Strike Group asset, it isn't out chasing Han submarines....it essentially becomes a national or theater asset. So we spend the money and then don't get to optimize hull use for the many other things we need ships to do. This is a sane and honorable argument born of Washington area budget realities and experience in operating within the DoD bureaucracy.

But in my view, it is a path to declining relevance if the Navy isn't careful. Because of the successes of our BMD program, sea-based missile defense is one of the programs out there that seems to have consensus support. And while I understand that our National Missile Defense system consists of an architecture of land, sea, air and space-based assets, the manner and priority in which that architecture is constructed is in no small way a reflection of the importance the NAVY places on its part of the architecture. Put another way, if the Navy stepped up and made the case that 1) we do this well--our processes and military-industrial relationships are successful and proven and 2) the political cost of land-based sites (radar and missile) overseas may be too high a burden for politicians to bear 3) the Navy should move toward the capability to destroy a ballistic missile throughout all phases of operation (pre-launch, boost, ascent, mid-course and terminal--I think I got 'em all), it could change the nature of the entire missile defense debate in this country and create a new and lasting relevance for its operations.

Without a more aggressive stance on missile defense, the Navy is in a difficult position with respect to resources. The QDR will to a large extent reveal the effectiveness of the argument put forward by the Maritime Strategy for the role the Navy has in sustaining the global system, and whether global system sustainment really is a national priority. But the critical role of missile defense as a contributor to that stability must not be underestimated.

Would this "grab" for missile defense primacy have a cost? Yep. Big time, and not just in money. The law of unintended consequences would dictate that such a move--if adopted--would be funded primarily by cuts in virtually everything else the Navy does, something that few would advocate (what the folks I speak of above fear). Clearly, the Navy would have to argue that this mission is not unlike the strategic deterrent provided by the ballistic missile submarines, and that much if not all of the funding for the mission should come out of "OSD" lines (or at least not out of present day views of Navy TOA).

Would the Navy be on solid strategic grounds if they made this argument? I think so. Classic deterrence theory basically says, "if you do this, I'll do that, and what I'll do to you is much worse than what you did in the first place." Missile defense changes this dynamic to say "don't even think about doing what you're about to do. Not only will we retaliate, but the chances that your initial attack will succeed have greatly diminished to the point where it is fool-hardy." This adds another layer to the decision making process of the other side of the equation. More importantly though, it adds to the decision making space of our leadership--and here's how. Should the Norks, or the Iranians or anyone else for that matter--shoot a ballistic missile at us or an ally today, it would likely cause us to respond. We don't like things like that, especially if lots of people die. The National Command Authority could come under considerable pressure to "do something", and the options for what to do may not be immediately apparent. What missile defense does is buy decision space for political leaders to escalate (or de-escalate) in a more prudent and considered manner--no one has died, life goes on where the missile was headed (albeit under a more anxious manner).

I don't know what the right answer is on this one, and I know that it is argued vociferously at the highest levels of the Navy. But my suspicions are that the Navy should consider a more aggressively forward leaning position on missile defense, to the extent that it comes to be considered the Navy's missile defense provider.


Bryan McGrath