Marine General Says LCS Needs Tweaks

Emelie Rutherford at Defense Daily reports (subscription only) on efforts by the Marine Corps evaluation of the Littoral Combat Ship. I particularly like the part in bold below.

A Marine Corps official said yesterday the requirements for the Navy's nascent Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) may need to be tweaked if it is used as "a more all-around ship" for use by his service and special operators.

Brig. Gen. Timothy Hanifen, deputy commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, told a National Defense Industrial Association gathering of industry and military officials that the LCS does not have all the features the Marine Corps would want in such a near-shore ship.

"We're joined at the hip with N86 [the Navy's surface warfare division] looking at LCS," Hanifen said at an expeditionary-warfare wargame in Quantico, Va. "But I have to tell you, the Navy purchased the LCS, Littoral Combat Ship, with three missions in mind--[anti-submarine warfare] ASW, anti-surface warfare, and maritime-intercept operations--not as a littoral-combat ship in the way that we describe littoral combat as Marines."

I don't think the General got the memo, or maybe he is simply a Marine and has a low tolerance for bullshit. The "Littoral Combat Ship" is the worst named warship type in US Navy history. The name itself is an oxymoron to the capabilities and purpose of the ship. It doesn't describe what the ship is at all, and who the hell ever heard of an L-- surface combatant anyway? Back when hull classification symbols meant something to Navy leaders, they were called APD. Personally, I think it should be something like DL or FF or DE or even APA if we needed the symbol to sound macho, but that type of thinking might match ship function to symbol description...

There are aspects of the LCS I really like, but this program as described is a disaster. It does not meet expectations because nothing about the platform is explained in a way that is remotely realistic. Where is the SWO in leadership today ready to bring common sense back to the SWO community? This ship trades payload for speed, so the US Navy is left with a 3000 ton ship designed intentionally to leverage high speed to overcome every other shortcoming. Square peg meet round hole, and obviously the Marines were not fooled.

Yep, the LCS looks cool, and actually the LCS is a clever concept worth developing in limited numbers. Unfortunately, the requirement to make the LCS a 3000 ton speedboat chaser pretty much killed the ship before it got to the fleet. After all, the Marines aren't going to be landing MV-22s on a LCS without reinforcing the flight deck, and that type of activity is sure to interfere with the stupid speed requirement.

The Navy needs to decide what the LCS is. Is it a 3000 ton speedboat chaser? Is it an unmanned platform mothership? Is it a naval truck for all missions? Is it a combat ship? Is it a 'plug and play' ship? There are questions what this ship is supposed to be, but ultimately it is a round hole and everyone with a square peg is having trouble finding how it fits.

One final thought though... noting the article is discussing quotes from a wargame, I was recently invited and participated in a professional wargame where the LCS was thrown into the mix. There is a serious need for a small, inexpensive warship that can support helicopters and unmanned aircraft, and the LCS can do that very well. It seems to me that if someone would look at the LCS from the perspective of meeting an aviation requirement, a RHIB requirement, a C4ISR requirement (w/ CEC btw), and an endurance requirement for sustaining continual operations the Navy would be a hell of a lot better off than showcasing 45 knot, 20' rooster tails on the high seas and calling that capability.

Russia Buys a Mistral

Wow.

Russia said Wednesday it plans to buy a new helicopter-carrying assault warship from NATO-member France in an unprecedented deal experts say reflects Kremlin efforts to accelerate military modernization.

The agreement for purchase of one Mistral-class naval ship also equipped with hovercraft and landing craft will be completed by the end of the year, the Russian chief of staff, General Nikolai Makarov, said.

He did not name a price, but the Russian government daily Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported this month that the ship, which can carry 16 heavy helicopters, 470 airborne troops and other gear, costs 700 million euros (995 million dollars).

Christian at Defense Tech jokes that the Mistral would be less than useful in another war against Georgia. I'm not sure that's even true; the contribution of the Russian Navy to victory against Georgia was detailed on this blog, and the presence of a modern, effective amphibious warship would have created even more problems for the Georgians. More importantly, a Mistral gives the Russian Navy a much greater capacity to conduct operations and project power in distant parts of the globe. This isn't to say that the Russians are about to conduct an expeditionary campaign in Somalia, but a Mistral certainly gives them options they didn't previously have.

Good or Bad Strategic Decision

The title refers to Afghanistan. I have not blogged much on the topic of the Afghanistan war, but it is one I am very interested in and continue to read. The Afghanistan debate is starting to heat up as a truly strategic discussion, which in itself is fascinating to me that an American war can be debated as something other than a purely partisan political object.

I find myself increasingly in the camp better articulated by Stephen Walt. I am not convinced that safe havens inside Afghanistan will ever be eliminated, nor do I believe the strategy being implemented is having the effect intended. I am also not compelled by the moral arguments.

I am starting to believe that the counterinsurgency activities and perhaps even the civilian infrastructure support activities in Afghanistan are wasted efforts. Where does it go, and what is the strategic object of the war? At least in Iraq there was consistent evidence of a strong positive regional economic growth that was resulting from our military activities there. What exactly is the positive regional influence the US is contributing towards by fighting in Afghanistan?

How does this end?

Update on Piracy

This is a very interesting link to a piracy timeline at Lloyds. Also worth noting, the lawfare of piracy may get interesting as human rights groups target the Kenyan legal system established to fight piracy.

I don't mean to be a jinx, but we should be giving a ton of credit to international naval forces off the Horn of Africa as well as shipping companies that have acted to protect ships and crews. While the weather has certainly been the primary factor prohibiting pirate activity in the area, the international naval forces policing the area are also a major contributing factor. In July of 2009 there were 2 vessels fired upon and 2 vessels hijacked. In August of 2009 there have been 4 vessels fire upon, and no hijackings off the Horn of Africa.

For perspective, it is important to remember that 2009 is already a worse year for piracy than all of 2008, but the vast majority of pirate activity in 2008 occurred beginning in September. We are about to find out what the impact of violence in Somalia has had on the activity of piracy, and get a much better sense of how effective the international naval forces operating off the Horn of Africa is in curbing piracy.

For those who are following the legal activities related to Somalia piracy and EU policies, this is a very interesting read.

Foundations of Power Projection

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting,—in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage,—a lesson in itself of no mean value.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, by A. T. Mahan

Ever since Secretary Gates announced in April of 2009 that the US Navy will reduce the number of large deck nuclear powered aircraft carriers from 11 to 10, a reduction intended to begin in about twenty five years, I have been contemplating the pros and cons of large deck nuclear powered aircraft carriers. For the last several years, as something of a starting point - I have believed US naval power executes maritime strategy in support of the national interest of the United States with a power projection Navy that starts from a foundation of at least 10 large nuclear powered aircraft carriers.

While this is my premise, I am not sure this belief is a clear consensus anymore, even if the theory may remain a majority opinion. Specifically, I continously find myself in disagreement with the random assertions by Mike Burleson regarding big deck carriers, some of which are blatently inaccurate.

For example, Mike frequency suggests smaller aircraft carriers are cheaper than bigger aircraft carriers. This is a false statement. Naval studies conducted in planning for the follow on class of the Nimitz class CVNs consistently revealed the most economic bang for the buck solution was the big deck carrier. At $3.5 billion, the America class LHA(R) is one example. The America class LHA(R) will be able to support no more than 23 F-35Bs. A Ford class CVN will be able to surge support nearly 60 F-35Cs, plus other supporting aircraft. If we then compare 3 America class to 1 Ford class, the Ford class wins in a cost comparison in every single category.

Mike, like many critics of big deck aircraft carriers, base their opposition to the big deck aircraft carrier on a belief that technological progress has evolved the independently launched guided weapon system beyond the capabilities of the large deck aircraft carrier supporting multiple fighter aircraft. The emerging belief is that very expensive large aircraft carrier model is obsolete compared to the significant capabilities of long range independent precision weapon systems distributed to smaller platforms, thus suggesting that multiple smaller platforms capable of engaging with long range guided missile systems is the tactical idea of our time.

The more and more I study the evolution of guided missile systems and naval tactics, the more I simply disagree with the conclusions of the small ship missile crowd. I also think the technological trends, as well as the long term strategic and tactical trends, favor the big deck aircraft carrier. However, to make the argument for the aircraft carrier, which I will do in a post later this week, first we must step back and consider the strategic considerations that apply to the US Navy specifically as well as the tactical requirements that will determine the dominant force on the 21st century maritime battlefield.

Strategic Considerations

Mahan’s thesis in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 is that control of the sea can be decisive in both peacetime and wartime, and has far-reaching military, economic and geopolitical ramifications. U.S. naval dominance allows the United States to keep the costs of projecting hostile military force by other nations prohibitively high. This forces countries to confront geopolitical challenges in their neighborhood, unable to militarily challenge the United States in our neighborhood. By conducting operations daily on the front porch of other global competitors, the US Navy secures its geopolitical position. This is why the US Navy is foremost and should always remain a power projection force.

Fleet Constitution of a power projection Navy must, in my opinion, begin with the ability to sustain global operations, which suggests the emphasis of such a fleet must begin with endurance and logistics. Naval dominance is often determined by capacity just as much as capability, which suggests the strategic value of quantity must be balanced by economy with the strategic value for quality.

Taking a strategic view, it is not the most probable dangers, rather the most formidable dangers, that Fleet Constitution is measured against. Navies are poorly developed when measured against the size of rivals, and should be measured instead by whether the force is adequate to meeting the obligations of the political interests and civil powers of the state the Naval force is subservient to. Ultimately, a force must find balance between the quality necessary to meet formidable dangers in forward locations and quantity to meet the broad global requirements of political masters under the appropriations of economy and within the context of the geopolitical condition our nation holds with both partners and competitors. These strategic considerations hold significant relevance for the development of fleet constitution strategy, and should be clearly identified as to be articulated plainly for maintaining support for naval forces.

Tactical Considerations

Mahan described the dividing line between Tactics and Strategy as contact between hostile forces. Whether in peacetime or wartime, I believe the word is well suited for the purposes of this discussion. In the 21st century, I believe there are three decisive, thus critical, tactical elements that will determine success on the maritime battlefield: sensors, stealth, and strike in that order.

I list sensors first because it is the means by which contact with the enemy is conducted. Whether the MK 0 eyeball, the global satellite system, or any means and mechanism inbetween, improving the quantity and quality of detection systems that are capable of determining intention is the critical evolution necessary for naval forces to maintain the advantage in the information age. Whether an attack is physical or virtual, which is to say whether the engagement is kinetic or cyber, the quality of the total sensor system is determined primarily by the options available to quickly disseminate intent of a contact. This suggests that tactical evolutions necessary in the 21st century will be both manned and unmanned, above the atmosphere and below the water, and every point available within those spaces. The sensor solution will not always be technological, as the determination of intent is the determination of a human factor.

The necessity to remain concealed by enemy sensors is a key factor to successful contact. Exploiting the terrain of the sea, sky, or space to remain undetected will factor heavily into the success of any engagement. Stealth for maritime forces is defined as concealment of detection, and should not be confused with the definitions of stealth that the Air Force uses as a technological factor. Hiding in plain sight in a good tactical position is just as useful as being unseen in a good tactical position on the maritime battlefield. The ability of irregular forces to leverage stealth at sea is at least as great of a challenge facing 21st century maritime forces as the detection of warfighting equipment of enemy regular forces, and should not be underestimated or undervalued as a tactical challenge.

Since WWII, the advantages submarines and aircraft have had in striking the enemy has been greater than the advantages of surface warships to strike the enemy, and no technological evolution in the 21st century has changed this condition. Indeed, the continued evolution of precision weapons has increased the lethality of aircraft and submarine strike capabilities, and the most important factor in striking enemy forces with precision weapons is range, with strike lethality increased as the level of concentrated payload increases.

Combining these strategic and tactical considerations for the development of fleet constitution suggests the US Navy needs numerous and high quality platforms with good endurance and robust logistical support capable of detecting hostile forces and determining intent at long range; capable of striking as necessary with credible force relative to the type of force necessary for any specific target; while remaining undetected by hostile forces. Obviously, with such a broad set of requirements, only a network of forces will be able to meet the strategic and tactical obligations suggested to be required by the US Navy in the 21st century.

In 2009, when looking at the 313-ship fleet and considering the various rumors coming out of the QDR discussion, I question whether the networked approach factoring strategic and tactical requirements are being factored into a 313-ship plan replacement. Based on what we know, the surface fleet as of the plans made public suggest the Navy believes two specific surface combatants, the LCS and DDG-51, represents the best way ahead for the US Navy in factoring strategic and tactical considerations. The current plans also suggest that the Virginia class, absent a SSGN replacement option, would represent the best way ahead. Finally, I question whether sufficient attention is being paid to the E-2D, the P-8A, or BAMS as they, and not fighter aircraft, represent the platforms providing the significant tactical advantages to the US Navy over competitors.

In an era where the value of networks is evident at every level of society, I believe it is appropriate for Congress and other civilian leaders to openly question whether the armed forces are exploiting the interoperability and advantages of networks in their force structures. For example, is the Navy building bandwidth (logistics) into their fleet constitution to meet the obligations for both quality and quantity, or is the future fleet being forced to sacrifice sufficient quantity to insure sufficient quality, or sufficient quality to insure sufficient quantity? I still see no evidence the Navy is factoring the most important and significant factor of this era, specifically that the Navy is not using the current unique US geopolitical position of unchallenged Command of the Sea for a specific strategic purpose. Since we know that competition will eventually catch up, I for one hope elected leadership is not allowing the Navy to waste a golden strategic opportunity.

I hope to further discuss the network, and why I believe at least 10 big deck aircraft carriers form the foundation of a 21st century power projection fleet network of naval forces, as the theme this week on the blog.