Bringing the Burke Back to Life

From today's contract list.

Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors, Moorestown, N.J., is being awarded a not-to-exceed $49,600,000 fixed-price contract for the advanced procurement of long lead materials, non-recurring engineering and critical work center efforts in support of production of the DDG 113-related Aegis weapon system. The scope of the non-recurring engineering efforts shall include, but is not limited to, supplier/production line restart, critical work center efforts, and diminishing manufacturing support surveillance to allow for continuity of the Aegis supply base and original equipment manufacturer work centers. Work will be performed in Moorestown, N.J., (85 percent) and Clearwater, Fla., (15 percent) and is expected to be completed by August 2010. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-09-C-5110).

I saw a solicitation for gears not too long ago. The Navy is looking to reset the supporting industrial base for the new Burkes. Expect a bunch of the contracts to end with foreign companies.

BTW, a bit of humor - sortof - the first contract on that list today made me laugh anyway.

That is what is called the "Blackberry bill."

Future Royal Navy Boomer in Trouble

This is interesting:

The Ministry of Defence has also ruled out cancelling the replacement for the Trident nuclear weapons system, although there have been suggestions it could be scaled back from four submarines to three, he adds.

The campaign group Greenpeace has said in a report scrapping Trident would save £34bn - the government estimates that replacing the submarines and warheads would cost £15bn - £20bn.

I'm wondering whether this backhanded vote of confidence in the Trident replacement program doesn't sound the death knell of the UK's sea based deterrent. I suppose it's possible to run a full deterrent patrol with only three boomers, but it wouldn't be easy, and would lead to enormous wear on both crew and equipment. I wouldn't be surprised if the replacement program goes down something like this: An official determination is made that the Royal Navy can get by on three SSBNs, followed in a couple years by a determination that three boats can't do the job, followed by the termination of the program.

More details on the difference between the Greenpeace estimate and the government cost estimate can be found here. You may be inclined not to trust Greenpeace on this point, but you should also be very reluctant to accept the numbers set forth by Her Majesty's government, which has a strong incentive to deceive...

In Case You Missed It.

If you didn't read it, Secretary Gates NY Times Op-Ed was somewhat important. The public debate isn't really about the technical nature of the decision, but it is important to get the Secretary's opinion when he offers it.

Last week, President Obama — on my recommendation and with the advice of his national-security team and the unanimous support of our senior military leadership — decided to discard that plan in favor of a vastly more suitable approach. In the first phase, to be completed by 2011, we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missiles — weapons that are growing in capability — in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.

The second phase, which will become operational around 2015, will involve putting upgraded SM-3s on the ground in Southern and Central Europe. All told, every phase of this plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles, as opposed to the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors. This will be a far more effective defense should an enemy fire many missiles simultaneously — the kind of attack most likely to occur as Iran continues to build and deploy numerous short- and medium-range weapons. At the same time, plans to defend virtually all of Europe and enhance the missile defense of the United States will continue on about the same schedule as the earlier plan as we build this system over time, creating an increasingly greater zone of protection.

Steady technological advances in our missile defense program — from kill vehicles to the abilities to network radars and sensors — give us confidence in this plan. The SM-3 has had eight successful tests since 2007, and we will continue to develop it to give it the capacity to intercept long-range missiles like ICBMs. It is now more than able to deal with the threat from multiple short- and medium-range missiles — a very real threat to our allies and some 80,000 American troops based in Europe that was not addressed by the previous plan.

If you read into page 2, he addresses the political debate. I think the President made the right decision and think there is an overreaction taking place on the political right. My only concern is one nobody in the debate is talking about, and that is how does the Navy afford this. So far the Navy is reducing aircraft carriers, building fewer Littoral Combat Ships in future shipbuilding, and taking on a greater role in BMD.

In other words, so far it is about fewer ships and more obligations. It will be interesting how this balances out.

Does Continuous BMD Presence in the Med Raise Homeporting Questions?

An interesting question arises from an increased reliance on sea-based BMD resulting from the President's recent controversial decision.

Given the requirement to maintain a handful of ships continuously on station, would creating a BMD homeport somewhere in the Med (or Black Sea) be worth talking about? The force structure necessary to do this mission isn't going to materialize from thin air--we are going to have to use the ships we have (albeit in an upgraded fashion) in the short term while the Navy makes a case for top-line increases based on the variety of other things it is already doing with those ships. To make a declining number of ships go further (toward mission availability) wouldn't maintaining a "BMD" squadron (CDS 60?) in the Med have merit?


Bryan McGrath

China and Russia naval drill

In the last couple of days, the PLAN and RuN fleets held a naval drill next to the Gulf of Aden. You can actually see a video of it here.

Here is the article associated to the video:

The Chinese naval escort task force has carried out a joint exercise coded "Peace Blue Shield 2009" with the Russian navy in the Gulf of Aden.

Two guided-missile frigates and one supply ship took part in the exercise. The Russian navy dispatched a large anti-submarine ship, a comprehensive supply ship and one towing ship.

The exercise included communications and liaisons, assembling of the two naval escort task forces, and sailing maneuvers.

They also cooperated in examining suspected ships with helicopters and naval ships.

It's the first time the Chinese naval escort forces has conducted joint exercises with a foreign navy, in the mission area since the end of last year.

From the article, this certainly looks like the first joint exercise of this kind that China has had with any navy in its Somali patrols. On the PLAN side, they are involving 529, 530 (054A frigates) and 886 replenishment ship. The Russians are providing BPK 564 (Udaloy class) of Pacific fleet with tanker “Boris Butoma” and tugboat “MB-99”.


Looking at these pictures, I thought it's kind of interesting how nice and clean the PLAN ships are and how rusty and run-down the Russian ships look. I know that the Russian ship has been there maybe a month longer, but it's still looking far worse than it should. Of course, even after all the money and ships being diverted to PLAN, it still has not done as much long distance missions as the Russian Navy has in the past year. So, I do think there are a lot PLAN can learn from the Russians when it comes to long distance missions.

Recently, we also heard about the possibility of a joint exercise between PLAN, USN and RAN. That would certainly be a good learning experience. At this moment, I think PLAN is at least competent enough to not have to worry about embarrassing itself.