071 deploying to Aden officially

According to this Xinhua article, China will be deploying 998, 170 and 887 to Gulf of Aden. It also reports that the flotilla will have more than 1,000 personnel, including Navy special forces troops. We also find out that 998's displacement is 18,500 tonnes in its mission configuration. It should be not a surprise that 998 is going on this mission. China has been sending all of its new naval toys out there. They waited until the LCAC is in service before sending 998 on this mission. The more interesting part are the photos that came out.

First, we have a really nice detailed diagram of 998. It looks like the well deck can only hold one LCAC, but it will also hold a couple of high speed patrol boat. I presume that these will all be used against the pirates. It also looks like the hangar is large enough to hold 4 Z-8s (assuming they do 2 side by side on top of 2 front and back). The Z-8s accompanying 998 were specially fitted with gun pods to assist in attacking pirates.

Here are some photos of the LCAC from the same magazine. Looks like the one traveling to Aden will be 3320. There is also a nice photo of LCAC going at high speed.



A picture of the well deck with patrol boat.

Finally, more pictures of 998 going on this mission.




Anyway, good to see we are finally getting more details on this ship.

HNLMS Johan de Witt and soft power

HNLMS Johan de Witt ended her tasks of the Somali coast on June 29.

Just before her return to Den Helder she did a little soft power.

First it's crew gave a training session on the 17th for 50 members of the Yemeni Coast Guard. The CO of the ship, Ben Bekkering, said that having the landing craft enabled them to let the Yemenites do things on their own.

On June 24 Somali elders from Xhabo met with Dutch navy personnel aboard one of the LPD's landing craft. They told that local villagers are also at risk from the pirates, who confiscate boats from the local fishermen and rob the locals.

The village of Xhabo does not have any medically trained inhabitants, so the crew of the Johan de Witt organised a possibility for the locals the get medical treatment aboard one of the landing craft. It had to be done this way because the EU mandate does allow for operations on land. So on the 28th 73 people went to the landing craft by skiff to receive medical treatment.

The next Dutch ship off the Somali coast will be HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën, a frigate, that is already on her way. She will lead SNMG2 in NATO operation Ocean
shield.
That means wainting for another LPD untill September, when the Spanish will send SPS Galicia, a sister of the Johan de Witt, to Somalia. We'll have to wait and see if they will use the same tactics with their landing craft as the Dutch have used.

And I'll also use this blogpost to give kudos to the PR department of the Dutch MoD for the amount of attention they generated in announcing the Netherlands will send submarine HNLMS Walrus to Somalia, following a NATO request. I'm still wondering why it is that newsworthy.

(And for tho who want to sea the landing craft in operation and hear an explanation from the CO and the Dutch Minister of Defence (in English!) about the tasks the LPD performed: a video.)

Chinese Fireworks on the 4th of July

On June 24th the Chinese government announced a live firing training exercise to be held in an area of Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province in the East China Sea from June 30 - July 5. The 6 day exercise warns all civilian vessels to stay out of the exclusion zone for safety purposes. With the decision to conduct a military exercise on the weekend of July 4th, the impression China is giving is that this exercise is intended to specifically target the United States.

The exercises are expected to feature numerous Type 022 Houbei fast attack missile catamarans in addition to other ships and submarines of the PLA Navy, as well as other branches of the PLA. The Department of Defense annual report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (PDF), the latest edition released in March of 2009, lists a count of 70 fast attack missile vessels currently in operation for the PLA Navy. The U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence report (PDF) (2010) notes there are over 50 Type 022 Houbei's in service, perhaps as many as 32 in the East Sea Fleet. The Type 022 is a relatively short ranged (500 nm) heavily armed stealthy catamaran that is thought to be utilized for swarming approaching warships and attacking from multiple axis with their 8 YJ-83 missiles. When I was at the Naval Postgraduate School last summer, Captain Wayne Hughes (ret) and I agreed that this vessel looks very similar to the "Streetfighter" capability discussion that he was centrally involved in on the pages of Proceedings magazine at the turn of the century.

As a technology the Houbei is not what US military observers will be watching, rather the command and control capabilities that are necessary to achieve a multi-axis coordinated joint forces integrated attack that also features Houbei fast attack vessels will be what experts are watching for. It would be no small feat for China to be able to demonstrate surface, submarine, and aviation capabilities in a coordinated multi-axis attack- because in tactical military operational planning such coordination done well is extremely difficult, and requires communication and coordination integration across services and commands that represents a capability many nations do not have today within their armed forces.

But even that isn't why the Pentagon has both eyes focused on this exercise. The reason this exercise has many concerned is that China may test a DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. Andrew Erickson noted in his latest article that China has appeared to be getting close to their first DF-21D test.

Given the nature of the reported training, it is at least theoretically possible that it might incorporate tests by the Second Artillery involving missiles launched from land. Open source background and timelines on Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) development-as offered in my China ASBM Analysis and Archive post-suggest that this could even include some form of ASBM tests, based on China’s current state of ASBM development and stated desire to demonstrate the ability to threaten carrier strike groups (CSGs).

If so (and it may well not happen at this time), this would be the world’s first live public test of an anti-ship ballistic missile. There are a number of indications that China may have reached the point that it is able to conduct some fairly sophisticated ASBM tests, which would then make such tests a necessary step to reach the next level in the ASBM development that China has so clearly prioritized.

Recent indications include the reported completion of a DF-21D rocket motor facility in 2009 and the recent launch of 5 advanced Yaogan satellites, three of which were apparently placed in the same orbit on 5 March-thereby perhaps offering better coverage of critical areas along China’s maritime periphery. Another possible indication is a recent news release attributed to China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) citing Wang Genbin, Deputy Director of its 4th Department, as stating that the DF-21D can hit “slow-moving targets” with a CEP (circular error probable, meaning half of missiles fired will strike within) of dozens of meters.

The DF-21D is the subject of much speculation and discussion related to Chinese military capabilities, and there are several valid reasons why. The DF-21D represents the first military capability of any kind developed by another country since the end of the cold war that is believed by US defense officials to represent an asymmetrical technological advantage over the United States military. For over two decades the United States has enjoyed technological superiority on land, air, and at sea over any potential competitors - that technology superiority is the foundation of our nations military power.

The DF-21D represents an evolution of technology that gives China the ability to reach out at long range and directly target the single largest and most expensive symbol of the technology superiority enjoyed by the United States - the nuclear powered aircraft carrier. As a weapon system, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile can be launched from a concealed position on land in the general direction of a US Navy carrier strike group, and while in flight, adjust course as necessary to directly target the aircraft carrier.

The key point to why the weapon system does in fact represent a significant technology evolution and asymmetrical capability is the ability of the DF-21D to change course and identify its target in mid-flight. The current anti-ballistic missile defense system fielded by the United States is not capable of intercepting a ballistic missile that can significantly change course during flight and identify a target in mid-flight - and that capability to maneuver significantly in flight is what gives the DF-21D its asymmetrical advantage against existing US anti-ballistic missile defense systems.

Current US anti-ballistic missile technology, including the AEGIS anti-ballistic missile defense system, develops data during the launch of a ballistic missile to calculate course and speed. Factors that include the speed of the ballistic missile and the trajectory of the ballistic missile are part of the calculations that are made to develop an intercept track. Anti-ballistic missile interceptors can then be fired in the general direction of the calculated path of a ballistic missile - and when the anti-ballistic missile interceptor gets close enough, the terminal guidance and detection system on the anti-ballistic missile interceptor can then detect and intercept the ballistic missile target.

Because the DF-21D is expected to adjust course at high altitude and detect an aircraft carrier after launch over what could potentially be hundreds of square miles at sea, the calculations based on the launch of the ballistic missile could in fact feed an anti-ballistic missile defense system inaccurate data for intercept. A course change of only a few degrees by the ballistic missile to track a US aircraft carrier could mean that an interceptor launched to intercept a DF-21D could be hundreds of miles away from the DF-21D when the interceptor goes into terminal mode to detect the ballistic missile - leaving the interceptor unable to intercept. At speeds that will likely exceed 13,000 mph and on a direct flight path from near orbit, the DF-12D anti-ship ballistic missile will be extremely difficult for conventional anti-ship missile defense systems to detect and intercept - leading some experts to dub the DF-21D a "carrier killer."

China has designed the DF-21D to be an anti-access weapon with the specific intent of sinking a US aircraft carrier with a single shot. The DF-21D has been in development since 1996, but it wasn't until 2007 that US analysts began taking the threat seriously when Chinese rocket artillery and engineering publications were published that suggested the capability was advancing. It was at that point the DF-21D became a feature (instead of a footnote) in the DoDs annual Chinese military power report to Congress.

The evidence of how seriously the United States takes the development of the DF-21D is essentially the story of the US Navy "transformation" over the last 3 years. The decision to truncate the DDG-1000 in favor of more DDG-51s was stated to be for the specific purposes of increasing the nations anti-ballistic missile capability. The decision by the Obama administration to shift development of national ballistic missile defense towards the Navy's AEGIS solution aligned the investment of scarce financial resources towards the AEGIS capability that is most likely to be challenged. The financial investments of billions of dollars that Congress has supported to upgrade the AEGIS BMD system also represents a sign that the government is vividly aware of what the DF-21D represents as an asymmetrical advantage in favor of the Chinese. The continuous discussion within circles of naval observers and analysts regarding the future of the aircraft carrier in the 21st century is a reflection of the concern defense watchers have in large part due to the development of the DF-21D. The acceleration of plans regarding the capabilities of the AEGIS weapon system is largely due to recognition that the current system is not currently capable of addressing this emerging threat.

The Chinese DF-21D and US AEGIS anti-ballistic missile defense system represents the first major offensive/defensive military capability arms race of the 21st century. If China successfully tests a DF-21D ballistic missile specifically designed to kill 5000 US sailors on the 4th of July, then there will be no question the pendulum in that arms race will have shifted in China's favor.

The Balisle Report

The Balisle report is starting to gain traction with the latest reporting in the press. What has been reported in the press already is only a sample of the blunt nature of the report regarding all the issues surrounding Surface Force Readiness. This report is serious and all business, and I mean it when I say the language is blunt and direct. I also find the quality of the report to be very high - rich in detail, and with a quality of depth to many issues.

I currently have no intention to release my copy of this report to the public, although I have to admit that the casual dismissal as a response to the report as reported in Phil Ewing's first news article about the report has me thinking I should just print the whole thing in small pieces on the blog (or the USNI blog actually). The impression that the contents of this report can be casually or flippantly addressed by the Navy kind of ticked me off as a taxpayer. The contents are entirely too serious for such a response.

I'll add to the discussion of the Balisle Report started by Phil Ewing in his press reports to date by quoting from the Financials section which, in theory, should hold some value for our Congressional readers.

Observations/Findings. Surface ship maintenance has been significantly underfunded for over ten years. This is manifesting itself in the degraded material condition of the ships as reflected in recent INSURV reports, corrosion audits, and CASREP data. The decision to transition to condition based maintenance from an engineered operating cycle maintenance resulted in the reduction of over 500 man days per month of depot level maintenance from DDG 51 class ships alone and a corresponding reduction in programmed operations and maintenance dollars for ship depot level maintenance.

While the difference was intended to be compensated by an increase in funding and opportunities for continuous maintenance availabilities throughout the year, that never translated into reality. A clear indicator of the fallout of the lack of funding is the steady increase in TA-4 (ship force capable) level work.

It may legitimately be said that insufficient funding applied over recent years has not been the result of an unwillingness to fund to the requirement as much as the result of not having a properly identified requirement.

For example, as programmed, it may appear that overall ship maintenance is funded at 95-99%. In reality, since we don't know the true maintenance requirement for conventional surface ships (the "denominator"), it is reasonable to assume that our surface ships receive a lower percentage for maintenance funding when compared to a true requirement. Currently as maintenance dollars are allocated by the Fleets, public shipyards (where the majority of CVN and submarine work is performed) are funded at levels between 97-100%. That leaves the balance of the maintenance funding left to be allocated to conventional surface ship maintenance. Currently one of only two items in the CNO's Unfunded Requirement list to Congress is $200M for ship maintenance.

The end result is the surface navy is funded below their identified requirement at the start of the year with the goal of making up the balance as money becomes available during the execution year. This unstable funding environment almost exclusively impacts the private shipyards, where most of the non-nuclear ship maintenance is performed, and results in higher work rates aas jobs get screened into the availability package laer due to uncertainty of funding commitments. The end result is an understanding requirement that has been underfunded in the budgeting process that is frequently going to cost more in actual execution because of an unpredictable funding stream, in other words, a low return for maintenance dollar invested. To further impact material readiness, the surface Type Commander frequently has to make irrevocable mitigation decisions earlier in the fiscal year due to projected uncertain (or unfavorable) levels of funding. If a CNO availability is subsequently canceled, or de-scoped prior to a midyear money bring available, that maintenance most likely will not be made up later in the year. Alternatively, cash flowing throughout the year on the hope that more money will be available later is a tenuous business plan that can leave availabilities scheduled for the end of the fiscal year exposed and unfunded.

I was very tempted not to post or quote any part of the Balisle Report until I read the response given by the Navy to Phil Ewing in his first article. Now that I have read the report in full, this kind of answer doesn't satisfy me, as a taxpayer, none.

Capt. Cate Mueller, a spokeswoman for Fleet Forces Command, said Balisle's report didn't tell the Navy anything it didn't already know.

"Fleet leaders, based upon their own prior analysis, believed that many of the problems that the panel subsequently identified - including manning shortfalls, inadequate shipboard and shore maintenance, and insufficient training - were taking a toll on surface force readiness," she said. "In that regard, the fleet review panel confirmed, in context and in detail, what fleet leaders had suspected."

She also reaffirmed what senior Navy leaders have hinted for the past few months: They're swinging the pendulum in the other direction by looking to increase crew sizes, improve training and re-teach the fleet to maintain its ships and equipment.

If any leader wants to strut around with a position that the findings "didn't tell the Navy anything it didn't already know" then I see serious problems. I understand that some of the issues raised in the report are well known and had previously been identified - ADM Harvey himself has discussed the manpower shortfalls and insufficient training issues on several occasions, and has been direct when discussing solutions. The report is so much more than that though, and if Navy leaders already knew what the report would find - you've been intentionally covering your ass by not disclosing this information to Congress or the taxpayer. The American public deserves a better answer than a 'nothing new here to see' type of response.

The part of the Balisle Report I quoted identifies the absence of a "properly identified requirement" for maintenance funding going back over a decade - meaning that every single Admiral who is also a surface warfare officer has only known the broken system of maintenance that has existed for over the same period of time every single Flag SWO was in major Command.

This report is seriously troubling, and raises legitimate questions regarding the quality of the fleet in reality vs paper, and an even more serious question whether the US Navy is a good steward of taxpayer investment. There are so many areas to discuss that I understand why Phil Ewing is putting out a new article that only covers part of the Balisle Report every week.

If you didn't read Phil Ewing's contribution this week, take a look. That is such an enormous issue it deserves its own blog post, and absolutely should have every Congressman on the HASC demanding to get an informed and impartial brief on the Balisle Report.

I don't see how Gene Taylor avoids a hearing on the findings of this report - because it raises serious questions regarding the quality of testimony the US Navy has been giving the HASC Seapower Subcommittee over the past few years on questions related to maintenance and the quality condition of the surface fleet. The Navy has stated in testimony they are going to extend the surface fleet out to 40 years life, and yet the report makes clear that under the current maintenance condition of the past decade, ships would be lucky to make it past an average of 28 years - below the prior expected life of the ship. WTF? The report also raises serious questions regarding new maintenance concepts in development - LCS comes to mind.

The Balisle Report is too blunt, too detailed, and too revealing of serious problems to go ignored or be casually dismissed as 'something the Navy already knows.' That is an unacceptable dismissal of a rather lengthy and damning report on the status of the surface fleet with detailed analysis of numerous problems.

6th Fleet Focus: Port Search

There are all kinds of good reasons why Rota, Spain would be a great place to forward station AEGIS BMD ships - the main reason being Spain deploys AEGIS ships and Rota can support that. Location, location, location though... From Navy Times.

The Navy is in talks with European countries about where and when it could forward-deploy the surface ships that will be assigned standing patrols to defend the continent from ballistic missiles, the commander of 6th Fleet said June 14.

But Vice Adm. Harry Harris, the Navy’s No. 2 commander for Europe, said that because the negotiations were still taking place, he would not name the countries under consideration.

“Many locations are being looked at,” he said. “I can’t go into the locations because we haven’t decided on one yet; there are location and country-to-country issues and all that, but certainly we’re looking at it — and no decision has been made yet, but it’s certainly something that’s on the table.”

But where exactly?

So, where could the Navy be looking? One spot likely high on commanders’ list is Gaeta, Italy, which is already the home port for Harris’ flagship, the amphibious command ship Mount Whitney, and has hosted U.S. and NATO warships since 1967.

Another contender could be Rota, Spain, where the U.S. Navy has shared a base with the Spanish navy since 1953. Although it’s less geographically convenient than Italy, Rota has the advantage of having more repair facilities, which American ships could share with their Spanish hosts.

If it was me, I'd advocate like hell for Rota and tell Congress that we also need a BMD tender to provide forward capability to the Eastern Med. It is probably more expensive, but maybe by not as much as you think, to build onto the existing facilities at Rota and build a tender for forward support. While the operation of the tender will probably be expensive, someone please explain why we won't absolutely require a BMD tender in the Pacific at some point in the future anyway.

Might as well start discussing it now.