Latest F-22P news

I will first start off by posting some recent pictures of F-22P. The first two are pictures of 253 (the 3rd unit of F-22P) in sea trials. And the last picture is of the 4th unit of F-22P that is currently under construction in Karachi.




And I also have seen a recent article that interviewed Captain Mirza Foad Amin Baig, who is the Commanding Officer of PNS Zulfiqar. Since I'm not sure about whether I'm allowed to post the article on here, I will just give a detailed summary in points:

• The First F-22P (PNS Zulfiqar No. 251) was commissioned on 30th July 2009. It arrived in Karachi on 13 September and was inducted into the PN fleet on 19 September.
  
• They tested the sensors + weapons of 251, including successful firing of C-802
  
• F-22P is 3,144 tonnes and 123.4 m long -> larger than what we thought and larger than Jiangwei class
  
• ASuW uses 8 C-802 missiles, Z-9EC for OTH targeting and Chinese version of AK-176M main gun
  
• ASW consists of ET-52C 324mm torpedo tubes, RDC-32 rocket launchers and Echo Type 5 hull mounted sonar
  
• Close in air defense with FM-90N SAM, AK-176M + 2 export version of Type 730 CIWS
  
• Combat system is based on Chinese ZKJ-3C
  
• EW suite uses Chinese RWD-8 intercept system and a NJ8I-3 jammer
  
• Non-FCR Sensors include a SUR-17 air-surveillence radar, an SR-60 air/surface search radar and a Kelvin-Hughes 2007 navigation radar
  
• Uses CODAD propulsion with two Tognum MTU 12V 1163 TB 83 diesel engines
  
• Top speed of 28+ knots + range of 6000+ nm at 18 knots
  
• Core crew is 188 with capacity for 212
  

From all report, it looks like PN is quite satisfied with the F-22Ps thus far. I have not kept up with PN current effort in buying an OHP. Last I heard, they were in the process of getting one. I do believe there have already been much talk regarding to PN buying 4 more frigates of China. The only question is what will be on that ship.

On the Cost of Protecting Oil Supplies

I am increasingly becoming a fan of both Foreign Policy magazine and its website.  Here's an interesting article by a New York Times Magazine writer that attempts to lay out the costs associated with the US military's obvious but rarely spoken mission of ensuring a steady world flow of oil.  I am no financial analyst, so I can't tell how close the numbers he cites are--but even if they were high by half, we're still talking a lot of money.  That's right--protecting the world flow of oil costs a lot of money, and American taxpayers are footing most of the bill.  For those of you on the left, that's money that isn't going to progressive causes.  To those of you on the right, that's YOUR money that has been separated from you.  Anyone familiar with my writing here or elsewhere should know that I'm not particularly bothered at the notion of spending even MORE on our ability to protect the flow of oil, among other Naval missions.  But the dirty little secret of my ardent navalism is that I would be hard pressed to justify more resources for the Navy if America weren't as addicted to oil as it is.

I make no value judgments on the use of oil in the United States.  Sprinkled among the ridiculous Israel bashing/loving found in the comments to the cited story, is one defense of oil that I found compelling--and that is, that oil has been and will continue for the near future to be that which drives our economy.  That the economy continues to be the world's largest, that it remains the engine for world economic health (China's economy is a fraction of ours, still), should be reason enough to tie the continued access to oil with continuing investments in naval power.  We're simply not going to wean ourselves from oil anytime soon, and if we want to remain a global ECONOMIC power, we need to remain a global NAVAL power.

But how different would our strategy, force employment and force structure be if we (the US) were NOT as addicted to oil as we are?  There's a PhD in the answers to that one.

For the moment though, I make the following observations:

1.  We are dependent on oil and will be for decades to come.  Continuing to invest in robust naval power designed at least in part to ensure the free flow of oil to world markets is a critical national security interest.

2.  In the pursuit of defending that flow, we are beholden to many countries with views of modern America that are at best, dubious, and at worst, hostile.

3.  Our addiction to foreign oil fattens regimes who are with one hand, accepting our cash, and with the other, funding the world-wide Islamic Jihad.

4.  (Here's where things take a course change--stay with me)  Continuing to beat the American public over the head with the science of climate change is not going to drive people to change their habits.  Too many people are aware that the dinosaurs lived in a warmer world than we, and that there have been ice ages.  They believe that CLIMATE CHANGES whether humans contribute or not--irrespective of the evidence.  As a behavioral change model, CLIMATE CHANGE is a loser and it will not result in the policy aims it is put forward to support.

5.  National Security however, is an effective model for behavioral change.  Effective leadership in this country would talk about our dependence on oil as a NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE--citing the bad actors on the other end of the transaction, their stated aims, and their ideological bent.  Might we have spent $7.3 trillion on defending the flow of oil from 1976-2007?  Maybe--who knows?  But we all know we're spending SOMETHING to do that, and we all know it must be a considerable sum.

So--in summary.  We spend a lot of money on (predominately naval) forces that are employed to protect the flow of a commodity that undergirds our prosperity.  In the meantime, we fatten the coffers of those who would do us harm and even as we drain our own accounts in protecting that flow.  Were we to communicate more directly with the American people--the real costs of the dependence on oil--we would go much farther in generating the behavioral changes necessary to end it, and there would be more support for government policies designed to usher in that end.


But instead, we try and convince Americans that if we don't switch to solar energy, in 600 years someone living in Salem, New Jersey might not be able to live in Salem, New Jersey. 

Moving toward energy independence is the grand unifying theme of the future of American politics.  It is a defense issue, an environmental issue, a technology issue, a commerce issue and an educational issue.  Hanging its pursuit on ephemeral slogans like climate change is inappropriate to the magnitude of the challenge and the sacrifice needed to achieve it.  Energy independence is primarily and most importantly, a national security issue, and it should be spoken of as such by our leaders at every opportunity.  If in the process of moving toward renewable and non-carbon based fuels, we arrest man's contribution to climate change, that's all the better.

Cross-posted at The Conservative Wahoo

Bryan McGrath

Optimizing APS

GAO has produced a new report on various interagency issues in AFRICOM including a focus on the Africa Partnership Stations. One item of interest is the table on page 54 listing the ships used over the 14 iterations of APS, which include US CRUDES and Amphibs, USCG cutters, and allied ships. Given the enduring nature of this mission, and others like it around the world, one wonders when the Navy will procure a vessel optimized to engage nascent navies. Certainly DDGs are overkill. If the primary goal is a platform that can hold the various training teams and interagency reps, then a JHSV will probably fit the bill. But if it's to give partners a realistically attainable platform to emulate for operations and training, then the USCG cutters, or better yet, a new green water vessel (something between a PC and FFG/LCS) would be appropriate. Maybe the right answer is a mix of the two.

Also worthwhile is the discussion of challenges involving various flavors of money in support of partner capacity building efforts, which include spending details from Nashville's APS deployment. The problems inherent with complex and inefficient funding and authorities for security force assistance have been reported consistently by multiple COCOMs for several years, yet OSD, Congress, and other relevant agencies have done next to nothing to address this critical shortfall to security cooperation.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Did US Aerospace Hire George Costanza to Manage the USAF Tanker Contract?

This is almost surreal. The company that's trying to put forward a Ukranian Antonov aircraft as the new USAF tanker is protesting a decision to reject its bid on account of tardiness. Here's the story:

At issue is when USAF took control of the proposal documents submitted by U.S. Aerospace. All of the following detail was provide from an industry executive who wished to be anonymous due to the sensitivity of the issue.

The company claims its messenger, which was delivering the proposal was at the Wright-Patterson Area B gate before 1:30 p.m. July 9. The deadline was 2 p.m. that day.

According to the company, Air Force personnel at the gate "initially denied the messenger entry to the base, then gave incorrect direction to the 1755 Eleventh Street Building 570," where the proposal was headed. The messenger apparently became lost, and Air Force personnel told him to wait while they came to him.

By the time the papers reached their destination, the Air Force stamped the proposal as being received at 2:05 p.m.

U.S. Aerospace was notified July 22 via a letter from the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patt that the company's bid was late and would not be considered as part of the source selection.

So, one of the questions that is likely to be addressed as GAO reviews the protest is at what point the USAF had "control" over the proposal.

Was it when the messenger stepped onto the base? I'd suspect that when it comes to matters of security, the Air Force would say its personnel have control over all people on their bases. When it comes to a contracting matter, it may be different.

Apparently, Air Force officials subsequently told a company representative that delays at installation gates are common (and they are -- I've been subject to more than a few), and that the company should have anticipated this potential snag and planned appropriately.

The Afloat ISR Imperative

This award is very good news, but a bit little and a bit late. I’ve harped on the need to deploy more ISR at sea before and will continue to do so as it remains the single greatest shortfall impacting future naval war fighting. The theater-level manned and unmanned ISR platforms and their associated PED architecture that have been deployed the past three or four years is nothing short of amazing. But like any other land based aircraft, Predators, BAMs, Reapers, and the like require ashore basing rights. These rights often come with considerable financial and political quid pro quo, operational caveats, and constraints. It takes time and money to establish landing and recovery elements, and provide the accompanying infrastructure and force protection. Conversely, afloat-based ISR can be quickly remissioned or repositioned, giving operational commanders the flexibility to move from scouting to offensive operations without shore-based renegotiation and infrastructure build up delays.

Future expected conflicts cannot be fought without significant quantities of intelligence platforms. Available ISR is the pacing function in offensive irregular and hybrid warfare. Needless to say, surface ships, aircraft, and special operators cannot engage targets they can’t locate and differentiate from among a larger group of people or vessels. In irregular warfare, prosecuting the wrong target is a recipe for IO failure and subsequent negative strategic consequences. Persistent and pervasive ISR is the primary path to avoiding these mistakes.

In a hybrid fight, relatively easy to locate targets such as corvettes or frigates will likely be nothing more than distractions as part of the enemy's deception campaign. A navy trained and equipped to scout exclusively for other combatants will not do well against surrogates who blend in with commercial, recreational, or fishing traffic. While a larger combatant might seem like the highest priority target, the reality is that the enemy’s most valuable vessel is probably an innocuous looking dhow or fishing boat providing target cueing for coastal anti-ship cruise missiles.

Current Capabilities, Future Options

The Sea Hawk family of helicopters provides the Navy's surface combatants a wonderfully flexible capability, covering missions from ISR, to offensive ASW and ASUW, to logistics support. But helicopters are expensive to acquire and operate, require expensive manning and training, and a fairly sizeable flight deck to deploy. The USN’s helo fleet should be immediately augmented by a variety of less capable UAS. In fact, every single combatant and amphibious ship should be deploying with organic ISR of some variety.

As we’ve often argued here before - the future US Navy will need to include a balanced surface fleet with more numerous affordable green water ships to complement high end capabilities. One way to enhance the utility of these smaller vessels across the spectrum of warfare is through the use of UAS.

The navy has had proven operational success with the fixed wing scan eagle, which can be launched and recovered from craft as small as a MK V. Scan Eagles are being produced in increasingly robust multi-int variants, including the Integrator referenced above. Unfortunately, scan eagle detachments are few and far between. The VTOL Fire Scout also shows promise, with the ability to carry armament and demonstrated success in operational experimentation. But compared to other VTOL alternatives, they are limited in overall capability and flexibility. The Boeing A-160 (MQ-18) is a tremendously capable aircraft, and could easily perform multi-mission VTOL roles including ISR, autonomous resupply, and strike. A smaller, less capable (and less expensive) VTOL, the Schiebel S-100, is in service in many foreign navies today, and could provide multi-int ISR from green water combatants and other smaller surface ships.

The Navy’s choice on procuring ISR should be clear: await the outcome of additional ICDs and commission more contracted studies to validate what the war fighters already know... or, make a bold and decisive move to rapidly invest in the ISR capabilities demanded by current and future conflicts at sea and ashore. The Navy’s mantra for acquisition of afloat ISR should become buy, try and decide rather than the analysis paralysis that characterizes today's byzantine procurement processes.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.