Wikileaks and North Korea

I try to keep things topical at WPR, and so wrote today's column on Wikileaks and North Korea:

In the context of any discussion about negotiations, the release of the cables brings up some relevant issues of diplomatic secrecy. As Pei suggests, not thinking about a North Korean collapse would be the height of irresponsibility for policymakers in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China. Since the final status of North Korea effects the interests of all four powers, policy coordination will be necessary. However, none of the states involved can publicly discuss contingency plans for a North Korean collapse. Evidence that South Korea and the United States were actively colluding in planning for the aftermath of such a contingency would probably quash any hopes for the Six-Party Talks. Open Japanese participation in such talks could inflame opinion in both Koreas and in Japan. Perhaps most important, evidence that China had broached the topic of a North Korean collapse with the United States and South Korea might serve to make Pyongyang even more paranoid and reckless.

I should also note that I hew much closer to the view that North Korea should be viewed as a troublesome, sometimes useful Chinese client than a herald of the PRC's impending effort to conquer the world. That China can destroy North Korea whenever it wishes through economic sanction doesn't actually mean that North Korea will do what China wants; clients often stray very, very far from the preferences of their patrons, even when those patrons enjoy overwhelming positions of power. This is not to say that North Korean intransigence can't be strategically useful for China, especially in situation of tension with either the United States or China. However, I'd go so far as to say that analyses that don't take seriously the fact of intra-party conflict in the CCP should probably be ignored.

Submarines, More Submarines

This is a very interesting link on the decision process in India for the next 6 AIP submarines they intend to buy. The Amur submarines at the bottom of the page caught my attention.

In November 2010 it was reported that Russia's Rosoboronexport will offer Amur-1650, its 4th generation diesel powered submarine against the Indian tender.

Amur-1650 Capabilities
Developed by Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, Amur-1650 has acoustic field rate that is many times lower than that of Project 877/636 diesel subs.

Armed with 6 torpedo tubes, the Amur-1650 can go to a depth of 300 meters. It is manned by a crew of 35 hand has an endurance of 45 days.

I believe the "acoustic field rate" being discussed here is being discused in the noise level of the Amur class submarine. According to Yang Xiushui, who might be the Chinese version of Norman Polmar, Project 877/636 (Kilo class) diesel subs noise is 105 decibels.

For comparison, ocean background noise is 90 decibels, and according to Yang Xiushui in the same article linked above, in his opinion the quietest submarine in the world is the Seawolf class with a reported noise level of 95 decibels.

I am not sure I believe the Amur-1650 is significantly quieter than the Kilo class, indeed perhaps only 2-3 decibels quieter at most. When it comes to submarine sounds, there are a number of ways that submarines can be made quieter, but as part of that discussion size does matter. These folks who talk about sound underwater and focus on propulsion really don't know what they are talking about - there are far more significant factors than type of propulsion plant a submarine has that determines the decibel level of a submarine.

In the case of the Kilo, its larger size allows for more technology and design characteristics that make the class remarkably quiet. The Amur-1650 is smaller than a Kilo, and while I believe it is probably quieter, I don't think the difference would be much - and one would have to factor the smaller payload capacity and shorter range the Amur has compared to the Kilo in this decision.

Personally, I think India should go for the French DCNS Scorpene MESMA submarines, because there are savings in the support costs when operating 12 of one type of submarine vs six versions of 2 different types of submarines. The way the Indian Navy buys small batches of different types of ships makes logistics and maintenance look really ugly for the Indian Navy.

Strategic Communications and Information Operations

I have something on my mind, and open the topic for discussion in hopes the feedback is of professional quality.

Should the Navy conduct Information Operations?

I feel like they do every day, but they target the wrong people. There is an information operation taking place right now, supported by industry, and it targets Congress directly. The change to the Littoral Combat Ship program is a perfectly executed information operation intended to pressure lawmakers into a decision without debate or consideration of consequences. It really is clever, and only required a few steps.

1. Wait until after the election, the day after to be specific, to insure no public debate or discussion.
2. Apply industrial pressures on Congress, pressures the Navy forced on industry by waiting until after the election to make a selection for LCS.
3. Take advantage of the busy lame duck period to avoid public discussion and debate, which would highlight the complete absence of a TOC discussion the Navy has no answers for.

It is a clever little information operation and the target is Congress. Without showing any financial information, the Navy claims huge savings in buying 20 ships of two distinct classes with two distinct support and maintenance lines compared to the original plan of purchasing 17 ships with a single support and maintenance line. Even in Washington DC, that is unbelievable!

An information operation is a form of information warfare, and if we simply use the definition of information warfare we can ask whether this is indeed what the Navy does when it comes with shipbuilding - the LCS being an example - when one considers Congress the enemy.

Information warfare is the use and management of information in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. Information warfare may involve collection of tactical information, assurance(s) that one's own information is valid, spreading of propaganda or disinformation to demoralize or manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of opposing force information and denial of information-collection opportunities to opposing forces. Information warfare is closely linked to psychological warfare.

It is my opinion that the only information operations the Navy, under current leadership, is effective in conducting are the information operations that are conducted on the American people and Congress. I believe the DDG-1000 program history on Capitol Hill is another perfect example of a successfully conducted IO campaign against Congress. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

Should the Navy conduct Strategic Communications?

The absence of strategic communications as a starting point, or even the subjects inclusion to any significant degree, is a tremendous weakness of the current Naval Operational Concept. Consider for a moment the deployment today of the USS Carl Vinson and associated strike group - here is the official Navy article in full:

SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, led by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

This deployment will be the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

"This will be Stockdale's maiden deployment," said Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Jeffrey Bennett. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to deploy, executing missions across all warfare areas and joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team to be prepared to execute a full spectrum of military operations from presence and security to humanitarian assistance and disaster response."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts, which help establish conditions for regional stability.

Media wishing to cover the departure of USS Carl Vinson can embark aboard Vinson for the day as the ship departs San Diego Bay; and be flown back to Naval Air North Island at approximately 4:30 p.m.

For more information on CSG-1 and the USS Carl Vinson, visit www.cvn70.navy.mil or www.facebook.com/ussvinson. For more information on USS Bunker Hill, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/cg52. For more information on USS Gridley, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg101. For more information on USS Stockdale, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg106 or www.facebook.com/pages/USS-STOCKDALE-DDG-106/128805733826735
>
For more news from Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet, visit www.navy.mil/local/c3f/.

Uhm, 3rd Fleet Public Affairs - do not take this criticism personal.

What is the strategic communication in this Navy.mil article? Who is the audience? What is the context? Lets review the talking points...

• This is Stockdale's maiden deployment
• The "team of awesome warfighters" are both "ready to deploy" and will be "executing missions across all warfare areas"
• The "team of awesome warfighters are "joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team" to "execute a full spectrum of military operations" like "presence" and "security" and "humanitarian assistance" and "disaster response."

The audience for this article is... unclear.
The context of this article is... not provided.
The strategic communication of this article... is not strategic.

We are left with information, provided for an unknown purpose to an unknown audience and with an unknown context. Is it even possible to be less informed by this information? Below is my version of the same article - an example of how I think the Navy needs to be thinking when deploying every single ship in the fleet.

SAN DIEGO -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

Carrier Strike Group 1 is departing on schedule despite a disruption in training schedules that occurred when USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and Bunker Hill (CG 52) supported disaster response and humanitarian operations in Haiti earlier this year. This deployment includes several firsts. This is the first major deployment for USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) after a three year nuclear refueling. Additionally, this deployment is the first deployment for Bunker Hill (CG 52) underwent Cruiser modernization, the first Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser to complete mid life modernization. Finally, this deployment is the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

This will be the third deployment for USS Gridley (DDG 101) despite the ship being commissioned less than four years ago.

"The Vinson Strike Group is a remarkable collection of warships containing the latest technologies and capabilities," said PACFLT REAR ADMIRAL I_WENT_TO_STRATCOMM_SCHOOL. "The sailors of the Vinson Strike Group are well trained to meet multiple challenges that may be encountered during their seven-month deployment."

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

"This deployment comes as tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula and our forces are engaged in heavy fighting in Afghanistan," said Commanding Officer, CAPTAIN I_KNOW_MY_STRATCOMM. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to meet these challenges, executing missions across all warfare areas. Carrier Strike Group 1 is fortunate to have Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, who recently took command of CSG-1 in late October. His experience as a former commander of the Japan based forward deployed Destroyer Squadron 15 will benefit the Vinson Strike Group as we cooperate with other US Navy forces already forward deployed, not to mention our South Korean and Japanese allies over the coming weeks and months dealing with tensions in northeast Asia."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to help establish conditions for regional stability.

I assure you 3rd fleet public affairs could do this better than me.

The audience for this article is informed citizens and foreign populations examining the purpose and intentions of a US Navy Carrier Strike Group deployment, primarily because the context of this article is current events. The strategic communication of this article is one of projecting American power abroad in support of our interests and resolve towards assisting our allies.

Note the strategic communications to Asia in this fictional article is delivered in context of current events even though the deployment was scheduled long ago. The strategic communication is targeted - projecting confidence for the domestic population, projecting strength towards adversaries, and demonstrating our national resolve and support for allies.

A study of the details, something we know every naval analyst in the world does, would reveal an ultra modern collection of warships in Carrier Strike Group, and also note CSG-1 commander came on late but is apparently a perfect fit for operations during a period of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. These details, by being touch early on, allow the Navy to further develop strategic communications in the future in directing messages to specific audiences. For example, projecting confidence towards Japan should the Vinson Strike Group exercise with the Japanese Navy sometime in the future is an option because Rear Admiral Perez lived and served - in Japan. Familiarity and experience represents a context that can be leveraged to engage audiences.

Want to send a signal to North Korea? Run a simple information operation by discussing the new sonar tail on Bunker Hill. This stuff really isn't complicated, and if the operational side doesn't know how to do it - they can ask OPNAV in the Pentagon for assistance - after all, they've become great at it on Capitol Hill.

I see the absence of strategic communication in official Navy information equivalent to the absence of value in official Navy information. How much value is lost when a Navy ship or fleet cannot communicate effectively at the strategic level every time the ship conducts any action, including movement? As a taxpayer and a citizen who studies the history of naval power, I think there is tremendous value in thinking about that question. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

What I see today in the US Navy are information operations that target domestic audiences and a complete fail by the Navy when it comes to strategic communications. If a question gets asked about shipbuilding, the answer reads like a smoke grenade thrown by the Navy. If a question gets asked about a deployment, the answer is packaged and shipped like a brochure and often is completely void of context.

This is an organization that coined the phrase "Information Dominance?" Perhaps the scope of what is covered by such a profoundly ironic description should be examined more closely.

Keeping the Fire Hot in the East

Yonhap news service in South Korea reported today that "South Korea and the United States have been in consultations to hold more naval drills this year or early next year in a message to North Korea."

"We have been in consultations with the U.S. to carry out several rounds of joint military drills to deal with a limited provocation by the enemy," said Col. Kim Young-cheol of the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The allies were due to end ongoing high-profile military drills in the Yellow Sea later in the day.

"The timing and participating military assets have not been decided yet," the official said.

Can I make an obvious suggestion? Invite China. The article goes on to say the "South's military plans to hold live-fire artillery drills next week."

I suspect we will see a pattern like this develop. South Korea, Japan, and the United States are operating under a theory that they cannot do the same thing they have always done when the North behaves badly and expect a different result than the failures that has occurred in the past. It is a legitimate position, but it implies an alternative exists.

I remain unconvinced an alternative actually does exist at this time, rather I believe that the desire for an alternative exists. Guess we will have to wait and see.

In the Spirit of Lies and Secrecy

I've been thinking about this discussion on Wikileaks by Glenn Greenwald all day. I was unimpressed with the personal attacks and respectfully disagree with several points, but in general I think that article makes several compelling arguments regarding the abuse of power behind the veil of secrecy, and might be one of the best contributions in support of Wikileaks in the discussion I have seen yet.

I particularly enjoyed the part where Bill Keller is thoroughly mocked, shamed, and disgraced. That alone makes the article worth reading.

These things were on my mind when I read Bill Gertz tonight.

The Obama administration, despite public denials, held secret talks with Russia aimed at reaching a ballistic missile defense agreement that Moscow ultimately rejected in May, according to an internal State Department report.

Disclosure of the report to The Washington Times comes as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Tuesday pressed for a new anti-ballistic missile treaty, warning that a failure to reach an agreement would trigger a new strategic arms race.

The four-page document circulated on Capitol Hill stated that administration officials held four meetings with the Russians and last spring presented a draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement (BMDCA) to Russian negotiators.

The internal report contradicts congressional testimony by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in June denying a missile defense deal was in the works.

So Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates lied under oath in testimony to Congress. This revelation carries almost no significance anymore though, because being dishonest under oath has become common place on Capital Hill and no one - ever - gets called out for it.

Whether you are the Secretary of Defense or a major league baseball player - committing perjury isn't enforced on Capital Hill. If the people who write laws do not enforce laws like perjury committed against them - then what exactly is the value of a nation that claims rule of law when the law is selectively enforced - and often excused - when the lawbreakers are the rich and powerful? Good thing US Navy Admirals never lie to Congress under oath.

Oh, wait, damn!

No problem, in the 21st century tradition of Navy accountability ashore - that particular Admiral was promoted.