In the Wake of Unified Response

My latest column at WPR nods at some of the difficulties of a soft power oriented military policy:

Washington's objectives in Haiti were fourfold: save lives, prevent a mass exodus, look good, and get out. The United States managed to accomplish the first, second and fourth goals, and for a while, it even appeared to make solid progress on the third. Preventing an exodus was probably the most important U.S. goal, and by all accounts the intervention appears to have succeeded on this point. Getting out quickly was also important in order to defuse criticism at home and abroad of another large-scale foreign deployment. However, while the United States may have done good in Haiti, the aftermath of the earthquake will be remembered more for the enduring chaos than for the quick and effective response of the United States military.

A day trip to Miyako-jima

In early December I had the opportunity to join a delegation of American and Japanese analysts on a day trip to Miyako-jima, one of Japan’s Ryukyu islands.

While one’s typical mental map of Japan has difficulty imagining the archipelago stretching south beyond Okinawa, Miyako-jima and the 19 other islands that make up the 900 sq kilometer southern “Sakishima” portion of the Ryukyu’s pepper the waters of the East China Sea from Okinawa all the way to the coast of Taiwan.

Following the Second World War, the United States governed the Sakishima’s and the entire Ryukyu chain under the San Francisco Peace Treaty from 1945 to 1972. The Sakishimas, which include the Senkaku islands, are now governed as part of the Okinawa Prefecture. Along with Ishigaki-jima and Iriomote-jima, Miyako is one of the largest in this chain. Located 145 nautical miles from Okinawa, its population of roughly 50,000 includes fishermen, farmers, and a services industry that supports Miyako’s many vacation destinations. Despite its small population, the island is also home to two vibrant newspapers.

(Kurema-jima)

Our delegation (I tagged along as an observer), sponsored by the American Consulate in Okinawa, set out on December 4^th for a day trip to Miyako to conduct a public panel discussion on U.S.-Japan alliance issues. We took the 40 minute flight from the Nahah airport in Okinawa to Miyako airport, arriving just before lunchtime. Before the panel we spent some time driving around the island and enjoyed an Okinawan meal featuring Miyakan noodles (slightly thicker than the average Japanese noodle as far as I could tell). The 2 hour panel - one of a series held in cities throughout Japan over the previous week - was the highlight of our day. As the first ever State Department-sponsored American delegation to Miyako, our group wasn’t sure what to expect. But to our pleasant surprise, at least 30 Miyakans showed up not just to listen but to challenge the panel with questions that everyone agreed were some of the most informed and probing that had been asked all week.

Some examples:

• What are some of the obstacles for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance?
• During the Cold War West Germany asked for nuclear weapons to be deployed on its territory. Is the U.S. prepared to deploy nuclear weapons to Japan?
• The Senkaku’s are very important to Miyako, especially its fisherman. What can be done on this issue?
• The alliance seems to be one sided, where the U.S. gives and Japan gets. What can Japan do to change this?
• Miyakans recognize the importance of the Marines in Okinawa. What does the future hold for this issue?
• National interests are most important for a country. When China reaches it's peak will the U.S. forget Japan?
• Although most people support the military presence in Japan, is it necessary for good relations with the U.S. to build a new base in Okinawa?

While brief, our afternoon in Miyako was a unique opportunity to see the island and meet with its engaging inhabitants. It was striking how at once Miyako was a paradise of resorts and beaches, seemingly far removed from the rest of the world, while simultaneously a geographic fault line whose position ensured it would be part of the Asia-Pacific strategic question in the decades ahead. Its residents appeared aware of their predicament in so much as it stood to affect their daily lives (fisherman, for instance). Recent PLAN exercises in the Miyako strait in April 2010 and the fallout from the Senkaku incident in September have also reinforced the rising danger of China’s military presence and the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. With Ground Self-Defense Force troops already scheduled to be deployed to the small southern island of Yonaguni, I was told in Okinawa that mayors from both Miyako-jima and Ishigaki-jima had eagerly requested the presence of more GSDF troops on their islands as well.

Since the Cold War little has been written on the strategic significance of the Ryukyu’s. save two articles James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara published on the island chain’s significance for China for the Jamestown Foundation this past summer.

· The Japanese Archipelago Through Chinese Eyes

· Ryukyu Chain in China’s Island Strategy

Holmes and Yoshihara summarize the Ryukyu’s place in Chinese thinking as follows:

As China continues its ascent to great sea power, Chinese strategists increasingly view Asia’s complex maritime geography as a barrier to their nation’s rightful maritime ambitions. A glance at the map of the Western Pacific rim shows that PLAN formations cannot reach the Pacific high seas—whether to menace the east coast of Taiwan or for some other purpose—without passing through the islands that enclose the Chinese coastline. Japanese territories comprise the northern arc of this lengthy island chain. Geography, therefore, has situated two great seafaring nations in close quarters, leaving one astride the other’s access to the maritime commons. China cannot fulfill its maritime destiny without breaching this natural barrier.

Mahan wrote how the importance of “portions of the earth’s surface, and their consequent interest to mankind, differ from time to time.” The strategic value of any position, he contended, depends upon its situation (with reference to sea lines), strength, (inherent or acquired) and resources (natural or stored). Whereby strength and resources can be accumulated, a locations situation cannot be changed. Indeed, while an island long known in Japan and South East Asia for its beauty and warm weather, the situation of Miyako-jima and the greater Ryukyu chain all but guarantee its “consequent interest” to Japan, China, the United States and broader maritime Asia.

As for Miyako’s military strength, it is the home to a Japanese Air Self-Defense Force radar station (pictured below) and a new, state-of-the-art signal intelligence facility. Miyako has hosted Japan Ground Self-Defense Force training missions in the past and Air Self-Defense Force exercises from Okinawa occasionally utilize a small runway on the tiny coastal island of Irabu-jima. Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines also further shifted the nations' defense focus to the Ryukyus. Japan plans to decrease its GSDF end strength and reduce the number of tanks in its arsenal, while increasing its submarine fleet from 16 to 22, and procuring more fighters, air defense systems, and surface-to-ship missiles to defend the southern islands.

While Senkaku dominates the headlines and much of the analytical debates over Japan-China relations, it is but one in a series of islands whose situation places it astride Taiwan and as an archipelagic border along the northern portion of China’s first island chain. Recently identified as a “defense vacuum” by the Ministry of Defense, Miyako-jima, along with Ishigaki-jima and Iriomote-jima and the other smaller islands of the Sakishimas are poised to gain a new importance in Japanese and alliance defense planning.

Mistrals for Peace?

Dmitry Gorenburg on the Mistral sale, and on the more general topic of Western arms sales to Russia:

Major arms sales by NATO states to Russia would increase Russian dependence on the West, decreasing the likelihood that Russia would take unilateral military action contrary to Western interests. Such sales would also enhance regional security by improving the ability of Russian forces to cooperate with NATO against threats to their mutual interests.

Maybe... I can certainly understand the logic of the argument that arms sales should create dependence, which should lead to reluctance on the part of Russia to irritate the West. However, there are problems both logical and empirical. First, "France" and "the West" aren't identical; it may be possible to engage in certain adventures that bother Washington, but not Paris. Second, I'm not sure about the empirical question. We can certainly identify cases in which an arms transfer relationship did not prevent war. Type 42 destroyers, for example, fought on both sides of the Falklands War. Cassady Craft wrote a book about this ten years ago suggesting that the relationship was really pretty complicated, although unfortunately it's hard to track down any good reviews or synopses of Weapons for War, Weapons for Peace.

Update on Supermanliness

Over the weekend I received an e-mail from the grandson of Lieutenant Cyrus Hall, whose WWI prisoner-of-war interrogation I shared here. Lieutenant Hall, a Canadian serving in the RAF, was captured following the crash of his aircraft in no man's land in 1918. The documents I had access to (at the National Archive near Kew Garden) gave no indication of his eventual fate. His grandson sent me an obituary, indicating that he returned to Canada, had a successful career, and made a good contribution to the second war:

He flew with such famed aces as Nigger Horn [ed. his real nickname, apparently], Elliott White Springs, Jimmie McCudden, Billy Barker and of course the legendary Bishop against Baron Richthofen's Flying Circus. He is mentioned in many books about those early flying days including Springs' "Above the Bright Blue Sky" and Bishop's biography, The Courage of the Early Morning". In April, 1918 his SE 53 suffered engine failure and he was forced to land in no-man's land where he waS taken prisoner. Wounded twice, he spent the remaining seven months of the war as a P.O.W. in Germany...

When hostilities again broke out in September, 1939, he immediately volunteered for active duty but was rejected at first because of a hearing disability. He then spent the first two months of the wa~ recruiting the Cameron Highlanders up to strength on his own time before being accepted for active duty with the rank of Major. His greatest disappointment was that he was not able to go overseas with his regiment because of his hearing problem. Thousands of Canadian servicemen who passed through the District Depot in Ottawa on their way to and from overseas will remember him as both 2nd in command and acting Officer Commanding at Lansdowne Park. Many enlisted men who served under him will remember the cigarettes and parcels that he sent to them overseas. Major Hall was one of the few soldiers in the Canadian Army who was priveleged to wear Royal Air Force Wings on his army uniform in World War II.

After the war, Mr. Hall rejoined the Government Annuities Branch, Ottawa, then in 1950 moved to Grimsby Beach vihere he and Mrs. Hall became fruit farmers. However, he retained his association with the Annuities Branch and worked out of both the St. Catharines and Hamilton offices. He then moved to Hamilton in 1957 and finally retired permanently in 1965 at the age of 71.

And a bleg; embarrassingly, I failed to write down the details of the folder where I found the German POW report. I have an idea of where it is, but I'm not 100% certain. If any readers are planning to visit the National Archive anytime soon, I know that Major Hall's family would greatly appreciate a copy of the report. Please drop me an e-mail if you get a chance.

Why The Best Officers Are Leaving? Well, Not All of Them Are....

This series has been a great read, and a number of interesting points have been raised.  I won't turn this into an overly long post (I can hear the cheers), but I will review some of the points I made on the One Year Anniversary MIDRATS Internet Radio Program.

The article that got this all started concentrated on the Army.  Putting aside for a moment that it was a thoroughgoing retread of a similar article that got play four years ago or so, there are the small matters of causality and evidence to be considered.  Does anyone really think that after nine plus years of war there wouldn't be a cost?  That good people wouldn't vote with their feet because of extreme burdens on families and the like?  Come to think of it, bad officers are leaving the Army for the exact same reasons, as are average officers.  There's nothing that ails the Army that ten years of relative peace won't cure.

Secondly, what evidence is there to back up the initial argument?  Better yet, how seriously are the numbers put forward questioned?  Like the Navy, the Army is a pyramidal structure, with considerably fewer people needed at the top than at the bottom.  So what if lots of good people get out...the Army CAN'T POSSIBLY KEEP THEM ALL.  Are Army General Officers complaining that the group of Colonels sitting for one-star looks are somehow not up to snuff?  Heck, it was only a year or so ago that Tom Ricks was dining out all over town  crowing to the world how smart and strategic senior Army officers were, unlike their counterparts in other services.  Can it be had both ways, that the Army is hemorrhaging its best and brightest yet it continues to crank out a series of strategic geniuses?  The answer is that it just isn't so on either count--plenty of great officers stay in the Army (as a matter of fact, at least enough to populate the Army with a corps of competent, smart senior officers) and Army senior officer are no better or worse than their other Service counterparts.

In 21 years, I watched a ton of great people leave the Navy, some of whose departures hurt on a deeply personal level.  I tended to ask myself, "what is it about my chosen profession that they find wanting"?  But I also moved forward surrounded by superbly competent men and women, many of whom are on the cusp of their first stars--selection boards that I thank the Lord I am not a part of, as choosing among them would be a grind.  Did I wish more good ones stayed?  Of course.  Did I find that the ones left behind were substandard?  Not by a long shot.

Admiral Harvey (below) speaks eloquently to the restrictions Congress places on our system of promotion.  Tis true--but it is not the whole story.  How many selection boards have gone by where the full quota of potential "deep selects" was not made?  If we truly believed that our hierarchical system was inhibiting our organizational progress, it seems to me we'd be "more nimble" "less bureaucratic" and "more like industry" and promote more people below zone.  But we don't--because to now, it just hasn't been that important to us.

The system I am offering a qualified defense of treated me well; I was in command at 16.25 years of service, which seemed fast then.  Ten years earlier however, a CO put on one of my fitreps that I was "...ready to command my (his) ship today!".  Fitrep hyperbole?  Of course.  But deep down, I sorta believed it.  I thought, "heck, I'm a TAO, SWO, OOD, EOOW, CDO, etc.....there's nothing left, he's right--I can command this ship now."  Ten years later in command, I was thankful for the seasoning I had in the interim, for the Washington tours that taught me how Big Navy worked and that gave me the ability to more professionally render advice and counsel to my wardroom. 

I'm not trying to say all is well, and I'm not trying to say there aren't places where the system could be made more effective.  I'm just trying to add a bit of balance to the notion that all the good ones are leaving.  They're not.  Look around the waterfront, look at the person next to you at the Pentagon.  These are truly talented people, not the leavings of a process that removed the truly gifted.


Bryan McGrath