Ever since the Naval Institute meeting Friday morning I've had a hard time focusing because something happened I could not quite make sense of at the time. Someone lied for 1 million dollars.
Several months ago I recruited a post command CDR to join the US Naval Institute, before the mission statement change became an issue. The CDR had written articles for my blog and was actively engaged as a writer in other places online, so I kept encouraging him to engage with the Naval Institute. Since joining last year he has been one of several officers who has consulted with several USNI staff offering ideas towards helping facilitate outreach and participation among more of the younger officers in the Navy that folks inside USNI have long recognized they have had a problem reaching.
During the Q&A period of the meeting, this post command CDR held what is best described as a Captains Mast during the meeting with the Board of Directors. He asked a relatively open but specific question:
Was there ever any discussion or money spent towards divesting the US Naval Institute of the Naval Institute Press. He phrased the question multiple ways and asked multiple times. It was the first time I had ever attended a Captain's Mast.
Steve Waters said no, and in Captain's Mast style, the CDR pointed and asked several folks around the room including legal counsel and other Board of Directors present. All of them replied they have never even discussed nor looked at nor funded any effort to divest USNI of the Press. Then CEO Tom Wilkerson chimed in saying that Tom had gone out and raised $1 million from investors towards protecting the Naval Institute Press, with donors including 2 Secretary of the Navy's and Tom Clancy.
I have heard rumors and have seen emails from members stating that the Naval Institute Press was indeed being looked at by the Board of Directors as being outsourced or otherwise sold off. I called Tom later on Friday to confirm exactly what the $1 million was for, and asked him if at any point he told any of these people donating money that the Naval Institute Press was under threat by the Board of Directors while raising money. Tom replied he had done exactly that.
So here is the problem USNI faces. Either Tom Wilkerson has lied to 2 Secretary's of the Navy and important past contributors to USNI like Tom Clancy in an effort to raise 1 million dollars to protect the Naval Institute Press from a threat that never existed, or Steve Waters, legal counsel, Nancy Brown, and Don Brennan all lied to the CDR holding Captain's Mast on the member meeting floor in front of all of the members present when they said they had never even discussed it at any time.
Who is telling a 1 million dollar lie, because this is a serious problem.
I feel very disturbed by this. Someone at the very top of USNI leadership is telling a lie worth a million dollars. It troubled me when I heard the question and actually distracted me badly standing in line waiting to ask my question and quite frankly, I haven't been able to think about much else sense.
I called Tom Wilkerson on Friday with this concern, and he provided me proof that he was being honest about the threat by the Board of Directors to the Naval Institute Press and he was honest with the donors. I'm not going to be his attorney though nor speak for him, so I'll let other members learn the truth and ask for evidence themselves. The important point I will make is simple: Tom feels very comfortable that he is on the right side of this issue.
After this weekend, I will be scaling back my working relationship with USNI considerably, as most of it is volunteer work anyway. I honestly believe Steve Waters, John Morgan, Nancy Brown, and the other Board of Director members are dishonest and potentially deceitful, and I have been provided enough evidence to convince myself that legal counsel flat out lied to the membership today and to the face during a direct question from of one of the very few Naval Officers in attendance at the annual meeting. Until those people are no longer running the organization as members of the Board of Directors, I see no reason to volunteer my time supporting that organization, because USNI isn't going anywhere anyway.
In hindsight I can't recall a single shred of empirical data offered in the meeting to support the claims by Steve Waters on any issue, and now I have evidence he and his legal counsel was being dishonest to members. Without any evidence provided, membership is being asked to trust what Steve Waters is saying about USNI despite evidence a million dollar lie involving former Secretary's of the Navy and important authors like Tom Clancy was told out in the open during the members meeting.
Something is very wrong at USNI. How much money is USNI paying legal counsel to lie to the membership? Some of the other BoD members may want to look into that.
Saturday, April 30, 2024
Friday, April 29, 2024
CDR Turk's Link Library
Det. Ryan: [about Turk 182] There are two theories. The first is that this is an organized conspiracy. The other more bizarre theory is that this is the work of one man - Superman, apparently!This post is multipurpose. First, knowing I will be in a meeting Friday morning, this post is for the CDR Turks in the room so they can pull links quickly and as necessary should it be required to correct the record.
For those of you who plan to be in the room today, unless you are walking in with a plan, I ask that you please insure the officers in uniform get their round with the Chairman. That will be must see TV for those watching on the webcast.
Roberts Rules of Order (PDF)First Announcements Over Email
Important information regarding the 2011 USNI Member ballot - March 2, 2024USNI Blog Announcements
March 2011 Naval Institute News - Web | Mobile - March 3, 2024
U.S. Naval Institute 2011 Member Ballot Announcement - February 25, 2024Information Dissemination
Independence, Systems and the Enlisted Voice - February 28, 2024
U.S. Naval Institute 2011 Ballot Update - March 2, 2024
A Statement from the U.S. Naval Institute Editorial Board: USNI independence - not USNI independence and advocacy - March 7, 2024
A Letter from Stephen M. Waters, U.S. Naval Institute Board of Directors - March 14, 2024
USNI Board Minority Report: Don’t Mess with the Naval Institute’s “DNA”! - March 15, 2024
U.S. Naval Institute Board of Directors Member Ballot Update - March 18, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution — The Fleet Speaks - March 27, 2024
‘You Are Cordially Invited’ - March 31, 2024
A Statement from John F. Lehman, Honorary Chairman of the U.S. Naval Institute Board of Directors - April 18, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter From Norman Polmar - February 24, 2024Ironic, in hindsight, how among all of these posts on this topic - the only items expressing my opinion on the actual issue are the March 9 and April 22 additions.
US Naval Institute Official Announcement on Mission Change - February 25, 2024
The Mission of the U.S. Naval Institute by Rear Admiral Tom Marfiak (ret) - February 26, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter From VADM Bob Dunn - February 28, 2024
US Naval Institute Mails Bad Ballots to Members - February 28, 2024
Open Letter From Dr. Jack London, Member US Naval Institute Board of Directors - March 1, 2024
The United States Naval Institute and "Advocacy" - March 2, 2024
US Naval Institute: The Genesis of Hostile Takeover - March 2, 2024
A Communication Demonstrating Failure to Communicate - March 2, 2024
Open Letter to the Board of the United States Naval Institute by John Byron- March 3, 2024
US Naval Institute: Communicating Cart Before the Horse - March 3, 2024
United States Naval Institute: Some Thoughts by Dr. Richard Kohn - March 4, 2024
United States Naval Institute: The Living Words of Luce - March 6, 2024
US Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Captain Victor Addison, U.S. Navy (Ret.) - March 7, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Henry J. (Jerry) Hendrix II, Captain, U.S. Navy - March 8, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Norman Polmar - March 8, 2024
My Thoughts and Concerns Regarding USNI Election Drama - March 9, 2024
US Naval Institute: CDR Turk's Facebook Insurgency - March 10, 2024
United States Naval Institute: New Mission Statement Branding - March 14, 2024
US Naval Institute: Navy Times Article - March 17, 2024
US Naval Institute: Open Letter by Norman Polmar - April 6, 2024
US Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Dr. Steve Kime- April 19, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Raymond Pritchett - April 22, 2024
United States Naval Institute: An Open Letter Michael Junge, Commander, US Navy - April 26, 2024
CDR Salamander
USNI Editorial Board - Nay - March 8, 2024Tom Ricks
USNI by the Numbers - April 4, 2024
The crazy plan to change the longtime mission of the U.S. Naval Institute - February 28, 2024SteelJaw Scribe
Proceedings editorial board takes on Naval Institute board over their mission - March 9, 2024
USNI: A Change In Mission Statement? - February 24th 2011
When Does Advocacy Become Lobbying… - February 25th 2011
USNI Ballot: Incompetence is One Thing — Deceit is Another - March 1st 2011
USNI: Getting It Right - March 1st 2011
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution - 7 Mar Update - March 6, 2024
USNI Update: Taking Back Our Institution — The Board of Directors Responds (15 Mar Update) - March 14, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution - Mission Change “Delayed” - March 19, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution — Guest Post (CDR Turk) - March 23, 2024
USNI: Taking Back Our Institution - Reprise and RSVP - April 24, 2024
Thursday, April 28, 2024
Sea Denial in Libya
With little more than 1960’s-era technology, Gadaffi’s forces have effectively disrupted the use of a key port to the opposition and their NATO allies. Misrata represents the rebels’ primary strong hold in Western Libya and holds a strategic position in relation to Tripoli. With regime forces solidly lodged in the airport and roads feeding out of the city blocked, Misrata’s SPOD provides the only point of access for humanitarian relief shipping, refugee and casualty outflow, and resupply of munitions and rebel fighters from Benghazi. 
On 14 and 15 April, multiple salvos of rockets targeted the Nakl al Theqeel road leading to the port. On 26 April, several Grad rockets hit the port forcing an International Organisation for Migration ship, Red Star I, to remain offshore. The same ship was delayed leaving by additional attacks until 28 April when she evacuated 1,000 migrant workers and 25 wounded.
Gadaffi’s indirect fire, consisting of Grad multiple launched rockets and probably some amount of mobile artillery, is extremely difficult to counter. Mobile launchers can be rapidly relocated, concealed by terrain (urban or otherwise), and hidden among the population. Counter-battery - from the sea or air - is difficult given these circumstances.
Outside of a full blown ground assault, the best counter to this threat is multiple lines of armed ISR. The first US Predator strike in Libya appears to have been focused on this target set. If we are still involved in this operation several months from now (if not sooner), I’d expect to see more armed Preds shifted from Iraq as the drawdown there continues.
The lessons learned here aren’t new. First, sea denial (or A2AD for you CSBA folks), doesn’t require high end ASCMs or ASBMs. Low tech/low cost options such as IDF, mines, or swarming FIAC can be equally effective in denying the use of a port. These threats can't be taken lightly. We should remember that during Desert Storm, we were merely a CEP away from a major disaster involving USS Tarawa and a pier full of ammunition at Al-Jubail.
Secondly, our amphibious lift and expeditionary forces are as relevant as ever. The strategic flexibility to land and sustain forces where the enemy isn’t using tools like JLOTS is just as important as the ability to engage the enemy. Coincidentally, AFRICOM's annual North African JLOTS Exercise, AFRICAN LION, is underway. (and for you conspiracy theorist, this exercise has been scheduled for some time and isn’t a dress rehearsal).
Finally, the demand for persistent, armed ISR will continue to grow and the Navy should invest heavily in this area to complement our strike capabilities.
UPDATE: This war could get a lot more naval, very quickly. Here is the best open source reporting I've seen on the mine layers. If the regime were to similiarly close Benghazi's port with mines, that could be all she wrote for the opposition.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
On 14 and 15 April, multiple salvos of rockets targeted the Nakl al Theqeel road leading to the port. On 26 April, several Grad rockets hit the port forcing an International Organisation for Migration ship, Red Star I, to remain offshore. The same ship was delayed leaving by additional attacks until 28 April when she evacuated 1,000 migrant workers and 25 wounded.
Gadaffi’s indirect fire, consisting of Grad multiple launched rockets and probably some amount of mobile artillery, is extremely difficult to counter. Mobile launchers can be rapidly relocated, concealed by terrain (urban or otherwise), and hidden among the population. Counter-battery - from the sea or air - is difficult given these circumstances.
Outside of a full blown ground assault, the best counter to this threat is multiple lines of armed ISR. The first US Predator strike in Libya appears to have been focused on this target set. If we are still involved in this operation several months from now (if not sooner), I’d expect to see more armed Preds shifted from Iraq as the drawdown there continues.
The lessons learned here aren’t new. First, sea denial (or A2AD for you CSBA folks), doesn’t require high end ASCMs or ASBMs. Low tech/low cost options such as IDF, mines, or swarming FIAC can be equally effective in denying the use of a port. These threats can't be taken lightly. We should remember that during Desert Storm, we were merely a CEP away from a major disaster involving USS Tarawa and a pier full of ammunition at Al-Jubail.
Secondly, our amphibious lift and expeditionary forces are as relevant as ever. The strategic flexibility to land and sustain forces where the enemy isn’t using tools like JLOTS is just as important as the ability to engage the enemy. Coincidentally, AFRICOM's annual North African JLOTS Exercise, AFRICAN LION, is underway. (and for you conspiracy theorist, this exercise has been scheduled for some time and isn’t a dress rehearsal).
Finally, the demand for persistent, armed ISR will continue to grow and the Navy should invest heavily in this area to complement our strike capabilities.
UPDATE: This war could get a lot more naval, very quickly. Here is the best open source reporting I've seen on the mine layers. If the regime were to similiarly close Benghazi's port with mines, that could be all she wrote for the opposition.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
United States Naval Institute: Letter to the Board of Directors by Raymond Pritchett
Russians don't take a dump without a plan. And senior captains don't start something this dangerous without having thought the matter through.The following letter was sent today to the United States Naval Institute Board of Directors.
- Admiral Josh Painter, The Hunt for Red October
To the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Institute.
As members of the United States Naval Institute, we feel obligated to highlight that Article VIII, Section 4 of the US Naval Institute Constitution that governs Nominations and Elections; Annual and Special Meetings has been violated by this most recent election.
Article VIII, Section 4 reads:
Section 4. Elections shall be held annually. A ballot shall be sent to each member entitled to vote at least sixty days before the date set for the Annual Meeting. The ballot may include any question that requires approval of the membership or with respect to which the Board of Directors considers it advisable to have the views of the members. To be valid, the ballot shall be signed by the member. The nine candidates for Director and the nine candidates for the Editorial Board receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared elected at the Annual Meeting, assume the duties of their respective offices from that date, and hold office until their successors are elected and qualify.The official physical ballots were not sent to each member entitled to vote at least sixty days before the day of the Annual Meeting. While it is possible to argue that the online ballot system which became available on February 25 was available 60 days prior, the first announcement by the United States Naval Institute of the election to members came in an email dated March 2, 2011. The only ballots mailed prior to 60 days of the annual members meeting were the ballots mailed out with Naval History magazine, all of which were judged invalid for lacking the mission statement issue within.
We also believe the online ballot vote is invalid because...
The online ballot used does not contain a signature as required by the Constitution of the United States Naval Institute. Voting using the online ballot never required any piece of data unique to a member to represent as a signature. The online ballot used requested only a member’s ID number beginning with a C. The fatal flaw in this approach is that this system of verification was unsecured and subject to tampering and forgery. Indeed, the online ballot as delivered to members was demonstrated unprotected and subject to forgery early in the online voting process to USNI, proven to be unprotected to and by USNI employees, and never addressed. This acknowledgment of the problem with the online ballot by USNI employees has been documented and those documents can be made available at the members meeting if required.
Basic electronic security requires two-factor identification, something you have (member ID) and something else that only the user and the institution readily knows, such as a name, email address, or telephone number, for example. Absent that second authenticator, spoofing was indeed possible by simply guessing an ID number, and in fact guessing member accounts was proven by officers of the United States Navy and USNI staff, and the United States Naval Institute CEO was alerted to this ballot problem.
The United States Naval Institute and the Board of Directors never took action to secure the online ballot nor to deal with the absence of a signature as required, thus the requirement for a signature that is clearly stated in Article VIII, Section 4 of the US Naval Institute Constitution has been ignored.
It is our belief that all of the online ballots are invalid due to lack of proper procedure to secure the mechanism in some way as to carry the authority of authenticity a signature would normally represent. It is further our belief that because the legitimate ballots used to tally all votes were mailed late, indeed mailed too late to be 60 days from the annual meeting, the entire vote including the election of all officers is invalid.
We formally request that at the US Naval Institute annual members meeting, legal counsel weigh in on these ballot issues prior to allowing anyone elected by these ballots - all of which appear to be invalid based on Article VIII, Section 4 of the US Naval Institute Constitution - to assume the duties of their respective offices.
Finally, while we believe all of the ballots for the recent election are invalid, we would like to add that we strongly protest the actions by Board of Directors to remove an initiative from a "legitimate" ballot during any election of the US Naval Institute. We strongly urge legal counsel to address at the annual members meeting the issue related to the Board of Directors authority to recall any measure that is already being voted upon by members.
Very Respectfully,
Raymond A. Pritchett III
Proud Member of the United States Naval Institute
What's China Doing?
This is a very interesting read discussing the RUMINT of China's latest 5 year plan.
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