Airpower Over Libya

My WPR column this week is an extension of this post from last week:

What has been absent thus far, however, has been the strategic use of airpower: airstrikes designed to induce the regime to concede or collapse without reliance on ground forces. The absence of a strategic airpower element to the Libya campaign is odd, given that most recent air campaigns have included strategically oriented targeting and operations. Air planners in the Vietnam War, Gulf War I and the Kosovo War all hoped that the enemy would concede without the deployment of ground troops. This idea still animates much thinking in the United States Air Force (.pdf).

Incidentally, John Andreas Olsen's biography of John Warden is really quite good. I particularly recommend the chapters on Warden's participation in air campaign planning during the Gulf War, and his tenure as Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College. When I get a chance, I'll have something productive to say about Tom Rick's series on education at the Air War College.

Cruiser Modernization Questions

A few weeks ago Navy Times ran a story about the failed INSURV of USS Mobile Bay (CG 53). This is the meat of what the Navy Times story was trying to say.

The failure is unusual because, one year earlier, Mobile Bay had completed a 10-month overhaul, billed by Naval Sea Systems Command as “the most comprehensive upgrade and modernization program in the history of the U.S. Navy,” according to a Navy newsstand story. The second cruiser to complete the modernization, the ship had a combat systems upgrade, installing the latest updates to the Aegis weapon system.

“Poor Aegis weapon system performance,” Wray wrote in the email. “Missile uplink failed the operational performance test in both deck houses; it’s likely any SM-2 would self-destruct shortly after launch on loss of uplink.”

Moreover, Mobile Bay was not overly burdened by a hectic deployment schedule, which has been a factor in past failures. The ship returned from its last deployment 2½ years ago.

I asked the Navy if this result was due to the continuing resolution. The answer was - no. That is actually too bad, because that means the Navy is dealing with a bigger problem.

The USS Mobile Bay (CG 53) went into the yard in June 2009 and came out in April 2010 for the AEGIS modernization. The Cruiser modernization is different than the Burke modernization, the cruisers go for one continuous modernization period in the yard that includes HM&E and AEGIS modernization at the same time. In total the yard period lasts about ten months.

The failed INSURV isn't the result of a maintenance issue, there must be more to it when the problems are so widespread and so soon after the modernization. I noted the CO of the ship rotated sometime during the ten month period the ship was in the yard, and I wonder how many other officers rotated on and off the ship during that 10 month period?

What about the rest of the crew, how many experienced chiefs rotated on and off the ship during the modernization?

The ship goes in and got a major upgrade, so how good was the training for all the new systems and hardware installed to the ship?

Is the modernization for these baseline 2 SPY-1A cruisers working as expected, or is the older radar systems contributing towards some sort of compatibility issue that makes it harder for these ships vs the later baseline 3 and 4 ships?

There are a lot of changes taking place at once during the cruiser modernization, and it isn't just the ship that is changing. Given the number of personnel issues related to the changes, is the Cruiser modernization funded well enough to include the necessary training for the crew to learn how to use all this new kit? The Navy states the USS Mobile Bay (CG 53) will be ready for the next deployment. I believe that, because it is already over a year since the ship has been out of the yard, but is it going to take over a year to prepare a cruiser and crew for a deployment following each cruiser modernized?

I note that no senior officers were relieved as a result of the USS Mobile Bay (CG 53) poor INSURV grade, which means everyone involved saw the bad INSURV day coming. I've heard this wasn't the first cruiser to finish modernization to fail the first INSURV out of the yard (there have only been 3). This gives me a sense that the cruiser modernization has run into some challenges.

Is the Navy addressing those challenges, and have the problems been identified? If so, did the Navy underfund the modernization in some way by failing to account for training and other costs associated with making a bunch of changes at the same time on a ship? I'm just curious, because it is hard to imagine the Navy funded all areas of the cruiser modernization properly if it is indeed true that 2/3s of the cruisers modernized to date have run into serious problems during the ships first INSURV after modernization.

The Politics of Libya Could Heat Up Friday

From the Library of Congress.

Overview

This guide is intended to serve as an introduction to research on the War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, passed over President Nixon's veto on November 7, 1973. The War Powers Resolution is sometimes referred to as the War Powers Act, its title in the version passed by the Senate. This Joint Resolution is codified in the United States Code ("USC") in Title 50, Chapter 33, Sections 1541-48.

The term "Resolution" can be misleading; this law originated as a Joint Resolution and was passed by both Houses of Congress pursuant to the Legislative Process, and has the same legal effect as a Bill which has passed and become a law. For more information on Bills and Joint Resolutions see this explanation of Congressional Forms of Action.

The Constitution of the United States divides the war powers of the federal government between the Executive and Legislative branches: the President is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces (Article II, section 2), while Congress has the power to make declarations of war, and to raise and support the armed forces (Article I, section 8). Over time, questions arose as to the extent of the President's authority to deploy U.S. armed forces into hostile situations abroad without a declaration of war or some other form of Congressional approval. Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in the aftermath of the Vietnam War to address these concerns and provide a set of procedures for both the President and Congress to follow in situations where the introduction of U.S. forces abroad could lead to their involvement in armed conflict.

Conceptually, the War Powers Resolution can be broken down into several distinct parts. The first part states the policy behind the law, namely to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities," and that the President's powers as Commander in Chief are exercised only pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization from Congress, or a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States (50 USC Sec. 1541).

The second part requires the President to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities or situations where hostilities are imminent, and to continue such consultations as long as U.S. armed forces remain in such situations (50 USC Sec. 1542). The third part sets forth reporting requirements that the President must comply with any time he introduces U.S. armed forces into existing or imminent hostilities (50 USC Sec. 1543); section 1543(a)(1) is particularly significant because it can trigger a 60 day time limit on the use of U.S. forces under section 1544(b).

The fourth part of the law concerns Congressional actions and procedures. Of particular interest is Section 1544(b), which requires that U.S. forces be withdrawn from hostilities within 60 days of the time a report is submitted or is required to be submitted under Section 1543(a)(1), unless Congress acts to approve continued military action, or is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Section 1544(c) requires the President to remove U.S. armed forces that are engaged in hostilities "without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization" at any time if Congress so directs by a Concurrent Resolution (50 USC 1544). Concurrent Resolutions are not laws and are not presented to the President for signature or veto; as a result the procedure contemplated under Section 1544(c) is known as a "legislative veto" and is constitutionally questionable in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Further sections set forth expedited Congressional procedures for considering proposed legislation to authorize the use of U.S. armed forces, as well as similar procedures regarding proposed legislation to withdraw U.S. forces under Section 1544(c) (50 U.S. 1545-46a).

The fifth part of the law sets forth certain definitions and rules to be used when interpreting the War Powers Resolution (50 USC 1547). Finally, the sixth part is a "separability provision" and states that if any part of the law is held (by a court) to be invalid, on its face or as applied to a particular situation, the rest of the law shall not be considered invalid, nor shall its applicability to other situations be affected (50 USC 1548).

U.S. Presidents have consistently taken the position that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement upon the power of the executive branch. As a result, the Resolution has been the subject of controversy since its enactment, and is a recurring issue due to the ongoing worldwide commitment of U.S. armed forces. Presidents have submitted a total of over 120 reports to Congress pursuant to the Resolution. Some examples of the Resolution's effect on the deployment of U.S. armed forces include:

1975: President Ford submitted a report to Congress as a result of his order to the U.S. armed forces to retake the Mayaguez, a U.S. merchant vessel which had been seized by Cambodia. This report is the only report to have cited Section 4(a)(1) (50 USC Sec. 1543(a)(1)) of the Resolution, triggering the 60-day time limit; however the operation was completed before 60 days had expired.

1981: President Reagan deployed a number of U.S. military advisors to El Salvador but submitted no report to Congress. Members of Congress filed a federal lawsuit in an attempt to force compliance with the Resolution, but the U.S. District Court hearing the suit declined to become involved in what the judge saw as a political question, namely whether U.S. forces were indeed involved in hostilities.

1982-83: President Reagan sent a force of Marines to Lebanon to participate in peacekeeping efforts in that country; while he did submit three reports to Congress under the Resolution, he did not cite Section 4(a)(1), and thus did not trigger the 60 day time limit. Over time the Marines came under increasing enemy fire and there were calls for withdrawal of U.S. forces. Congress, as part of a compromise with the President, passed Public Law 98-119 in October 1983 authorizing U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. This resolution was signed by the President, and was the first time a President had signed legislation invoking the War Powers Resolution.

1990-91: President George H.W. Bush sent several reports to Congress regarding the buildup of forces in Operation Desert Shield. President Bush took the position that he did not need "authority" from Congress to carry out the United Nations resolutions which authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to eject Iraq from Kuwait; however he did ask for Congressional "support" of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf. Congress passed, and the President signed, Public Law 102-1 authorizing the President to use force against Iraq if the President reported that diplomatic efforts had failed. President Bush did so report, and initiated Operation Desert Storm.

1993-99: President Clinton utilized United States armed forces in various operations, such as air strikes and the deployment of peacekeeping forces, in the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia and Kosovo. These operations were pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions and were conducted in conjunction with other member states of NATO. During this time the President made a number of reports to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" regarding the use of U.S. forces, but never cited Section 4(a)(1), and thus did not trigger the 60 day time limit. Opinion in Congress was divided and many legislative measures regarding the use of these forces were defeated without becoming law. Frustrated that Congress was unable to pass legislation challenging the President's actions, Representative Tom Campbell and other Members of the House filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia against the President, charging that he had violated the War Powers Resolution, especially since 60 days had elapsed since the start of military operations in Kosovo. The President noted that he considered the War Powers Resolution constitutionally defective. The court ruled in favor of the President, holding that the Members lacked legal standing to bring the suit; this decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from this decision, in effect letting it stand.

2001: In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress passed Public Law 107-40, authorizing President George W. Bush to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." For the first time, "organizations and persons" are specified in a Congressional authorization to use force pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, rather than just nations.

2002: Congress authorized President George W. Bush to use force against Iraq, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, in Public Law 107-243.

Friday the war in Libya reaches the 60 day mark as outlined in Section 1544(b) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and if the law is actually followed, the President would be obligated by law to begin withdrawing the US military from combat operations for Libya within 30 days unless Congressional approval was given to continue our nations participation.

It has been suggested that the reason President Obama believed that the NATO action in Libya would be over in 90 days is because he took action as allowed by law in the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It was convenient for the President to use the law for Libya at that time, but won't be come Friday.

Presidents have traditionally stated that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is unconstitutional. When President Obama was on the campaign trail, he suggested that he would get approval by Congress every time he sent the military to war. Given the number of campaign promises this President breaks as habit, I don't think even the Presidents strongest supporters would argue too strongly that this President's campaign promises mean nothing at this point. That often happens. Presidents say one thing in the campaigns then sing a different tune once in office, and I believe that is exactly what the President will do with Libya and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

Given the very divisive political climate in the United States today, it is very likely we will see the President challenged on the War Powers Resolution of 1973 if Congress does not take up the Libya issue by Friday. The United States has been at war since September of 2001. Speaking for myself, I think it would be a healthy thing for the United States to have a legal battle over the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and let us all find out if in the United States, one person (a President of the United States) can send the nation to war indefinitely without any support from Congress.

Our nation could really use this discussion after nearly 10 years of war. When the top news of the day is Senate politics regarding an oil company subsidy bill that is actually unconstitutional anyway, our nations elected leadership is so focused on political gimmicks that a court battle between the branches of government over a serious topic like war might be just what the doctor ordered.

Regardless of how this plays out politically, the war in Libya continues with no end in sight.

No-Fly Zone Exceptions?

One thing I don't quite understand...

The territorial waters off Libya are a declared a no-fly zone by NATO, which means there will be a distinct absence of poaching surveillance in the region. NATO is not interested in illegal fishing operations, and no European Union or International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) inspectors will be allowed into the Libyan zone.

The Greenpeace Foundation is not conducting a bluefin tuna campaign, meaning that the only protection for the highly endangered bluefin tuna will be at the presence of two Sea Shepherd’s vessels: the flagship Steve Irwin and the soon to be renamed fast interceptor vessel. The only non-military aircraft in this zone will be Sea Shepherd’s helicopter the Nancy Burnet onboard the Steve Irwin.

If the UN no-fly zone extends of Libyan waters, and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society is flying their helicopter, doesn't that make the helicopter in violation of the no-fly zone?

With all the littoral warfare we have seen in Libyan territorial waters, I think Sea Shepherd is in danger of getting in way over their heads. Not only is it a bad idea to stroll in unarmed during a gunfight, but how is it the Sea Shepherd Conversation Society can fly a helicopter in a UN mandated no-fly zone but no aircraft from the European Union or International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) inspectors will be allowed into the Libyan zone?

This sets up a awkward scenario where some hot shot pilot from Qatar or UAE starts an international incident with an air-to-air kill legal under the UN resolution.

Worth noting, a NGO is adding a new element to a modern maritime battlefield, and that element can be exploited tactically to kill people. The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society appears to be unaware of how the fog of war has a history of winning in the littoral, and no amount of new technology has changed that reality.

Guam on Pause?

Major natural disasters typically carry with them strategic consequences. With that in mind, I think this is interesting news out of Australia.

Japan has decided to put on hold $US3 billion in funding it had promised for the military expansion in Guam.

The US Navy says the suspension of funding means the bidding process for the contract, which involved establishing new headquarters for the naval base, has been suspended indefinitely.