Submarine Speculation on New PLA Navy SSK

When I first saw these pictures of the new PLA Navy SSK, my first thoughts were of the old Golf class conventional ballistic submarines like the K-129 discussed in Norman Polmar's latest book Project Azorian. But as I look closer and think about it, I think what I am seeing is something of an evolution leveraging a similar design concept.

You may have to open the third picture up and look closely to see what I'm talking about, but there appears to be some sort of large hatch built into the sail. If I was to guess based on what I am seeing, I think China has developed a special operations SSK to augment their Yuan class SSKs.

I haven't seen this idea floated around anywhere except on an old Russian navy forum back in the late 90s, but the concept is very similar to what the US Ohio SSGNs do today with special operations, but instead of using a large SSBN type hull, one would accomplish the same thing on the cheap using a SSB type design similar to the old Golf class.

Just as the old Golf class used to launch ballistic missiles out of the sail, the special operations SSK would require a larger sail to act as stores for a special operations capability.

Another thought... look at the size of that submarine. For a SSK, it is flat out huge, and likely runs somewhere between 3000 - 3500 tons displacement when fully loaded (if not more). Is it even possible the Chinese are fielding SSBs for the purpose of taking their anti-ship ballistic missile like the DF-21 to sea as a way to make that capability mobile, or as a way to extend the range from the Chinese coast even further?

From a naval tactical theory perspective, it would be very similar to old Soviet tactics where SSNs and SSKs functioned as US fleet hunters for Soviet SSGN shooters, and it might actually work if indeed the anti-ship ballistic missile homing system was effective enough to organically detect and strike at the largest target in a general area as is claimed.

Like I said, I am guessing. It looks like a big ole fleet SSK with some extra features, but that is the analysis from my untrained eye. I'd appreciate the opinions of more experienced observers.

PS: In the second photo, the submarine in the water is a new Yuan class. According to some sources, both submarines in the top two pictures (photos that are now several days old) are claimed to have recently moved to a naval base near Shanghai for sea trials, which may explain why we now see this latest photo of this new SSK in the water.

HT Kursed

Rules of Engagement Change for Piracy

This Navy Times story about a helicopter from USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) engaging pirates attacking a crude carrier is excellent reporting.

The crew of a Navy helicopter launched from the destroyer Bulkeley fired upon and is believed to have killed four pirates who were in the process of attacking a crude oil carrier while it was transiting the Gulf of Oman on Monday, according to Combined Maritime Forces.

The interdiction took place at 10:35 a.m. local time. The Norfolk, Va.-based Bulkeley, assigned to Joint Task Force 150, had received a mayday call from the German-owned, Panamanian-flagged crude carrier Artemis Glory, which said it was being chased and attacked by pirates.

Bulkeley responded to the mayday call, first heard by a Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship and relayed to Combined Maritime Forces, by launching an SH-60B Seahawk helicopter assigned to Helicopter Squadron Light 48, Detachment 4, to investigate. When it arrived on station — a command spokesman could not provide the distance or transit time — the crew saw four individuals in a skiff firing at Artemis Glory, using small arms.

The helicopter crew opened fire on the skiff under what command spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Sam Hearn of the Royal Navy said was the principle of “extended unit self-defense” on behalf of the crude carrier. All four pirates are believed to have been killed, Hearn said. Hearn said he did not know which weapon system was employed but noted that the SH-60B is equipped with a single M-240 machine gun.

"Extended Unit Self-Defense?"

Give that a ponder, because that sounds to me like we are observing an evolution in the Rules of Engagement regarding piracy where a helicopter can now treat an attack on a merchant ship the same as if it is an attack against the helicopter. That is a big deal, because it means that helicopter pilots can engage any pirate target that is attacking a commercial ship.

This could be a game changer in the fight against piracy, because now it makes armed helicopters and armed UAVs more useful as an active deterrent when responding to mayday calls from merchants.

Roles and Missions Press Conference

The purpose of the press conference on Wednesday by Defense Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to discuss the Roles and Missions debate the President called for earlier this year. The following is from the transcript of the press conference.

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon.

On April 13th, President Obama announced his framework for tackling our nation's considerable long-term fiscal challenges. As part of that deficit reduction effort, he set a goal of holding the growth in base national security spending below inflation for the next 12 years, which would save about $400 billion, the preponderance of which would come from the Department of Defense. The president also made clear that before making any specific budget decisions, we must first conduct a fundamental review of America's military missions, capabilities and security role around the world.

Today I'm announcing the framework for the comprehensive review that the Department of Defense is launching to inform future decisions about spending on national security.

First, some context. For more than two years, the leadership of this department has been working on reforming the way the Pentagon does business to respond to the difficult fiscal situation facing the nation and to ensure that our military has the capabilities needed to protect our interests in a dangerous and unstable world. This effort began two years ago with an overhaul of the department's approach to military acquisition, curtailing or canceling about 20 troubled weapons programs. It continued last year with a department-wide campaign to generate savings from excessive overhead that was reallocated to the services for reinvestment -- new expenses as well as deficit reduction. The overarching goal of these efforts was to carve out enough budget space to preserve and enhance key military capabilities in the face of declining rates of budget growth.

The new comprehensive review will ensure that future spending decisions are focused on strategy and risks, and are not simply a math and accounting exercise. The overarching goal will be to preserve a U.S. military capable of meeting crucial national security priorities even if fiscal pressure requires reductions in the force's size. In my view, we must reject the traditional approach of applying across-the-board cuts, the simplest and most politically expedient approach both inside this building and outside of it. That kind of an approach preserves overhead and maintains force structure on paper. It results in a hollowing-out of the force from a lack of proper training, maintenance and equipment. We've been there before, in the 1970s and in the 1990s.

This review will be guided by the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the Chairman's Risk Assessment, and the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] to ensure appropriate focus on strategic policy choices first and corresponding changes in the DoD budget second.

The QDR provides today's basis for sizing the force, focusing its missions and shaping its capabilities. But there is not a strong analytical link between the QDR and the present makeup of our forces. This review will establish that linkage, so that we can see the impact of changing QDR strategy on force structure, missions and capabilities. And only once competing strategy options are identified should the review begin to consider fiscal implications and options.

To do this, the review should develop specific program options that can be categorized in four bins.

The first bin is additional efficiencies, continuing the efforts we launched last year. These changes would reduce DoD costs with minimal impact on military capability. We must be even more aggressive in curtailing bureaucratic excess and overhead before considering fundamental changes in national strategy or force capabilities.

And while I believe the department can identify additional significant efficiencies, they will not result in sufficient savings to meet the president's direction. Therefore, a second bin will involve a serious examination of established policies, programs, processes and mandates that drive the dramatic increase in defense operating costs, to include the way we deliver health care, compensate military personnel, provide retirement benefits, sustain our infrastructure and acquire goods and services.

The third bin will contain options to reduce or eliminate marginal missions and marginal capabilities, specialized and costly programs that are useful in only a limited range of circumstances or contingencies. They represent missions that the department carries out today that, while of value, are not central to our core mission or are of lower priority.

The final bin and the hardest category strategically -- and I would say also intellectually -- will be specific alternative modifications to the QDR strategy that translate into options for reductions in force structure or capability needed to execute the strategy. This latter bin will be informed by all the other activities in this framework.

In the end, this process must be about identifying options for the President and the Congress, where the nation is willing to accept risk in exchange for reduced investment in the Department of Defense. The defense comprehensive review will be jointly led by the director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the under secretary of defense for Policy and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I have written several times, I believe it is very important for the Department of Defense to hold a legitimate debate and address the budget challenges with a strategic approach rather than a math exercise. I applaud the Secretary and the Chairman for leading this process and starting it on the right note. The DoD media? Not so much. These were the only two questions in the press conference that actually discussed this issue, as everyone else was focused on Pakistan.

Q: Let me ask about the budget rollout that just -- you announced here. Can you give the public a sense of what one or two missions will definitely be reviewed? You know, COIN [counterinsurgency], NEO [noncombatant evacuation operations] operations -- what will be reviewed? Can you give one or two examples, and the resource implications to some of these missions?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me give you an example of the -- of the hardest bin, the third bin, in terms of the strategic alternatives. We have had the -- it has been our strategy for many years now to be able to fight two regional -- two major regional conflicts simultaneously. If you were to tell yourself the likelihood of having two such fights simultaneously is low and you could therefore plan to fight sequentially, that would have huge implications in terms of the size of force that you need to maintain. But the other side of that is the risk involved if you're wrong. And the other guys always have a vote. So that's the kind of strategy and risk that we want to surface for the president and for the Congress.

You know, I mean, what I am really working against here is what we did in the '70s and in the '90s, which was these across-the-board cuts that hollowed out the force. We have got to avoid that, no matter what happens in this process. But the consequence of avoiding that is everybody -- from the services to the chairman to the secretary of this department -- making tough decisions, and then the president and the Congress making tough decisions, because they have to accept responsibility for risk.

And I want to force that kind of a discussion. If we're going to cut the military, if we're going to reduce the resources and the size of the U.S. military, people need to make conscious choices about what the implications of that are for the security of the country as well as for the operations that we have around the world.

And I just -- that's why I want this review in place, to provide the substance for making those kinds of conscientious decisions where the political leadership of the country, in essence, says: We are prepared to accept this risk in return for reduced investment in defense.

Q: One of the big programs is the F-35. It overlays many of these scenarios, many of the rules and missions of the military. To what extent will this large -- the Pentagon's largest program and its 2,400 airplanes and about $11 billion a year investment over the next decade -- to what extent will that -- will that quantity be reviewed to see whether the program should be scaled back accordingly?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, the country needs the F-35. We need a fifth-generation fighter and -- in addition to the F-22. And so we must have that. Obviously, if you're going to change strategies or missions, that has implications for the amount of equipment that you buy. And I would expect that to apply across the board, not just to the F-35.

But everything in terms of looking at these strategic equations, if you will, has to do with the amount of capability that you buy or that you invest in. But I would just make the point -- and here's where this -- where the rubber meets the road on this -- we must buy a new tanker. We must buy a fifth-generation fighter. We must replace the ballistic missile submarines toward the end of this decade. There are -- there are a number of things -- the Army must reset after Afghanistan, and Marine Corps as well, just -- but to a lesser extent.

So the point is, there are some significant new investments that must be made. So how do you pay for that in the context that we're talking about? Those are the kinds of hard choices that I want to surface and have people address, and I -- because, frankly, as I said in my opening statement, both within this building and outside it the easiest thing is to say cut defense by X percent. And I think that would be the most dangerous approach of all.

Q: What does the $400 billion represent --

SEC. GATES: That’s enough (inaudible). (Cross talk and laughter.)

Everything else asked by the media was related to Osama bin Laden or Pakistan. The media is mostly incapable of covering a strategic debate inside the Pentagon (with a few exceptions), so it is very difficult to expect even the DoD press corps to take this process seriously.

It will be interesting if anyone inside the DoD actually takes this process seriously, particularly as Secretary Gates steps down in just over a month. I do not have much faith.

Observing the PLA Navy Hawkeye Clone at Xian

David Axe, writing for the Diplomat Blog, is discussing a picture that has recently been floating around the internet. A few weeks ago, while everyone else was discussing the stealthy blackhawks that supported the operation to kill Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, nerds like Feng and I had our eyes on this very fuzzy photo suggested to be some sort of PLAN imitation E-2 Hawkeye.

It is very hard to tell anything from this photo, but there is a lot we know if indeed it is some sort of Hawkeye imitation. First, David Axe misses something important with this suggestion.

In any event, if the Xian photo indeed shows a naval radar plane, then Shi Lang will be a much more capable vessel than originally projected.

Not quite. There is no chance this aircraft will ever be deployed on the Shi Lang, and I believe it is the same reason why we don't have a good, clear picture of this aircraft. The issue is an imitation E-2 would struggle to take off on the Shi Lang, because any aircraft as big and heavy as an E-2 would absolutely require a catapult launch - and Shi Lang doesn't have catapults.

I don't believe it is possible that the Chinese aviation industry has advanced far enough to build an E-2 clone that is both operationally effective and can take off from an aircraft carrier without a catapult. That doesn't pass the smell test.

If indeed China is building several of these "Hawkeye" imitations, then the key detail we would be learning is in regards to the kind of new aircraft carrier China would supposedly be building. We'll have to wait to see better pictures before we can say we know anything for certain, but while we wait for better understanding of new Chinese aircraft carriers, we can safely say that AEW for Shi Lang will be restricted to helicopters unless that ship suddenly has catapults installed somehow.

Observing H.R. 1540 as It Moves Through the House

I've been reading H.R. 1540, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as reported by HASC on Wednesday, May 11, 2011. As I go through it, I sometimes find myself looking at H. Rept. 112-74 (the committee report). There are several dozen things that stand out, but in H. Rept. 112-74 a few things in this section really stood out.

Navy Shipbuilding Program

The budget request contained $14.9 billion for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy.

The committee is pleased that the Navy has turned around the downward spiral in battle force ship quantities, and the plan to achieve the floor of 313 ships appears to be achievable. To obtain the required capability and to provide the required stability to the fragile shipbuilding industrial base, the committee believes the following programs are crucial.

CVN-78 is the lead ship of the Ford-class of aircraft carriers. The committee was critical when the Navy changed construction starts of these carriers from 4-year to 5-year centers. The committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to keep these aircraft carriers on 5-year centers at the most, with fiscal year 2013 being the first year of detail design and construction funding for CVN-79. The committee believes one key to success in this program will be to minimize changes from ship to ship in the class.

The Virginia-class submarine program has proven itself to be a model shipbuilding program. Cost reduction efforts and ever-decreasing span time for construction and delivery allowed the Navy to fund two ships a year starting in fiscal year 2011, 1 year earlier than previously planned. The committee believes that modularity of payloads and open interfaces for its weapons systems, including electronic warfare, will improve capability while being more affordable. To continue to get the most efficiency from this program, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that advance procurement for the next block of Virginia-class submarines is funded to required levels.

Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the shipbuilding program is that it will be difficult to fund and maintain the current plan once the Navy begins to acquire replacements for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine fleet. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Navy officials suggested that there may be options to fund these boats outside of the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account. The committee believes that the industrial teaming arrangement has been successful on the Virginia-class submarine program and would encourage the Secretary of the Navy to use the capabilities of both submarine shipbuilders in crafting an affordable acquisition strategy for the Ohio-class Replacement Program.

The re-start of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class of destroyers is an important step in maintaining highly capable surface combatants in sufficient quantities, especially given the increased reliance on these ships to provide additional ballistic missile defense capabilities. Elsewhere in this title, the committee includes a provision that would grant multi-year procurement contract authority for these ships. The committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to continue pursuing an open architecture, data sharing approach to the maintenance and sustainability of existing weapons systems. This approach will allow for more competition and affordable upgrades.

The committee received testimony that the Marine Corps’ requirement for amphibious ships is 38 ships, but that the number of ships that are absolutely necessary with acceptable risk is 33. The committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to continue pursuing a minimum of 33 amphibious ships.

I see three interesting details here.

First, Congress remains focused on CVN-79. This is not trivial, because there is real concern regarding how the transition to a 5 year cycle for construction will impact the industrial base. You lose the industrial base, aircraft carriers become cost prohibitive.

Second, the committee report explicitly mentions that there may be "options to fund these boats (SSBN(X) outside of the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account." This is a discussion the Navy must have with Congress every year this decade.

Finally, it is not good for the amphibious ship force when the committee explicitly says it "encourages the Secretary of the Navy to continue pursuing a minimum of 33 amphibious ships." The Marine Corps has lost the MPF(F), the 2.0 MEB assault metric, and the EFV over the last few years, and all they will have to show for it is new stationary that says "The Department of Navy and Marine Corps." That's token, if not insulting.

Finally, the House Republicans deserve a lot of credit for the transparency the public has into the FY12 defense budget process to date. Obviously there is still a ways to go before any of this becomes law, but the transparency into the committee reports and other aspects of the process from an online observer is a very nice new feature.