Governance Assistance

My latest column at WPR is about the difference between security assistance and "governance" assistance:

In March, the Stimson Center released a report (.pdf) by Gordon Adams and Rebecca Williams reviewing U.S. security assistance programs. Titled "A New Way Forward," the report argued that the United States should restructure its security assistance programs away from "security," as defined in Cold War terms, and toward "governance," which more accurately reflects U.S. interests in the post-War on Terror world. The difference is hardly trivial. "Security" assistance focuses on improving the tactical and operational capabilities of fielded armed forces, whether against domestic or international foes, while "governance" assistance aims to "strengthen state capacity in failing, fragile, collapsing and post-conflict states." Potentially at stake are the resources dedicated to security assistance programs, which involve training, facilitation of doctrinal learning, and very often the transfer of military equipment.

NECC Tests With Amphibious Ship

Building on the post yesterday, the Navy is starting to test the concept of integrating Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) with Amphibious ships, in this case Riverine.

Tuesday, the Navy tested the ability to dock and secure the RCB and the smaller riverine patrol boat in the well deck of the anchored dock landing ship Oak Hill during a proof-of-concept test held at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.

Riverine force leaders gave the demonstration a thumbs-up. If senior Navy leaders agree, the riverine force could find itself with a new post-Iraq war mission set outside the green-water arena for which it is designed, and the Navy with yet another capability for the flexible and heavily deployed amphibious force.

“I think we had a successful test today,” said Capt. Chris Halton, commander of Riverine Group 1, during a high-speed ride on an RCB from Oak Hill back to Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, where the ship and Halton’s parent command, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, are based. “We showed that one, we can do it, and two, we’ve got some stuff to work on. But the bottom line is, I think our concept is sound.”

I highly recommend reading the entire article as it covers the challenges. This was a first step in testing, and there will be lessons to learn as the article makes clear.

There are several reasons why this type of integration is important. First, once integrated it will become part of the capability requirement for future Riverine equipment. That's important, because right now Riverine mostly uses some very old equipment. Second, once the offload and onload procedures are worked out, a culture of innovations that comes from actually using these forces from an amphibious ship will begin.

I suspect we will see creativity not only from the NECC side, but also from the Amphib side with the amphibious ship COs. One thing I've noticed being around the Navy for the past several years is that amphibious ship COs tend to take more risk than their cruiser and destroyer cousins, but that's probably a product of the promotion system that tends to trend heavily towards cruiser and destroyer captains vs SWOs of amphibious ships.

It may also have to do with some amphibious ship COs being aviators instead of SWOs, and looking for ways to stand out against the backdrop of Carrier officers in the aviator community. This isn't scientific by any means, just an impression I get based on observation.

I think the Navy will find tremendous value in the integration of NECC and amphibious ships, and I actually prefer this approach to building specialized ships for NECC. However, I also think there is an opportunity for the JHSV to be used in support of Naval Special Warfare assets.

Those of you familiar with leesea in the comments may know he has quite a background in both NECC and amphibious ships, and he has been pointing out for years how the JHSV, while not perfect, has the utility to provide the NECC with an afloat offshore staging base capable of fast response and logistical support. I think leesea will ultimately be proven correct on this once the JHSV and NECC get teamed up.

The key distinction between the JHSV and the MLP or amphibious ships (or LCS for that matter) is that the JSHV is designed with capacity in mind, where these other platforms considered in the context of modularity are designed with capability in mind. Capability minded design approaches end up leading to trade offs and sacrifices that ultimately reduce flexibility and add cost, but I will agree there are positives in the capabilities built into the design spec (sea state operational parameters and survivability are often cited examples). As the Navy ventures further down the road into modular vessels, I believe it is going to be important for NAVSEA to think about modular platforms in the context of capacity during initial design rather than capability, a subtle but important change early in new vessel concept design and development.

After all, the CVN is a great example where the Navy has long designed the platform with capacity in mind, instead of capability. That approach has been a winning design methodology, and if you look at the evolution of aircraft carriers you will note that the evolutions comes from systems capabilities added to improve upon the base large capacity platform which over time, gives the Navy the best of both capacity and capability on a Navy ship.

I am very excited to see the Navy testing Navy Expeditionary Combat Command integration with the surface fleet, and I truly believe good things will come from this. We will all know the Navy is really making progress with these concepts when we start seeing Marines involved and integrating into this mix of capabilities, although I also believe there is a real opportunity to get a Navy SOF RW unit up and running in support of these integrated capabilities as something like a Navy version of the Army's 160 SOAR (A), or put in a Navy context - the Top Gun of the RW side of aviation.

(this post was updated because the author screwed it up)

Features! Weapons!

Phil Ewing:

The ship that Lockheed could sell to the navy of Saudi Arabia or another foreign client might have many more features and weapons than the ones flying the Stars and Stripes.

Bob Riche, Lockheed’s vice president for seaframe sea-based missile defense, said the company has looked at designing an LCS like the Fort Worth equipped with the Aegis system, including a SPY-1F radar and sets of vertical launch tubes for SM-2, SM-3, Evolved Sea Sparrow or other missiles. (Neither version of the standard U.S. LCS has any of that stuff.) Riche acknowledged that the additional sensors and weapons would require a lot more power, which would probably mean the Aegis-equipped LCS couldn’t shred the ocean at 45 knots like its American counterpart. But a Saudi or other navy wanting a small air and missile defense frigate might not need the high sprint speed that U.S. Navy asked for.

I'm not really the LCS guy around here, so pardon me for asking, but if LockMart could build an LCS that sacrificed some speed for various spiffy bits, why wouldn't it makes sense for the USN to consider it? I suppose that you would have some squadron inter-operability issues, but even with the decision to buy both LCS types, the purchase still seems sufficiently large to allow some specialization.

A Naval Special Warfare Ship

Proceedings subscribers (USNI members) have won again. The rest of you need to become a USNI member so you stop missing out on excellent content like the June issue of Proceedings Nobody Asked Me But... section by Rear Admiral George Worthington, U.S. Navy (Retired).

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces need to operate from the sea. For long-range open-water transits they depend on the Navy. But they rarely practice with blue-water ships, which are not outfitted to support U.S. special operations forces (SOF) with space for staff planning; troops; stowage for ammunition, small arms, and demolitions; a diving-recompression chamber; or dedicated communications terminals. Worst of all, amphibious ships are earmarked full time for Marine embarkation and not available to SEALs, especially with the 2006 establishment of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) need dedicated open-ocean ships.

NSW comprises several SEAL teams, a single SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) team, and special boat teams. These commands are blended together for deployments as a squadron, and all report to the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command through the NSW Command headquartered in Coronado, California. Overseas, they report to the geographical combatant commanders.

The teams—supported by various units and U.S.-based groups—catch rides in whatever surface ships or submarines are allotted for a given operation. But, as noted previously, the surface ships are not oriented to special operations forces that could be Army Special Forces, Marine Special Operations, or (most usually) Navy SEAL and SDV teams.

NSW craft include the 82-foot MK V special-operations craft, now approaching 20 years’ service. This has an aluminum hull, water-jet drive, some crew-served weapons, and is capable of 50-plus knots and a 600 nautical-mile range. Next down, the 36-foot rigid-hull inflatable boat, a workhorse capable of 40 knots, has a crew of three SWCC and can transport eight SEALs. At the bottom of the list is the 15-foot combat rubber raiding craft, made by Zodiac of North America. This carries nine passengers at 30 knots for 60 nautical miles. SDVs are specialized, free-flooding underwater insertion vehicles.

So why do SEALs need a dedicated blue-water support craft?

Rear Admiral Worthington goes on to answer the question in quality detail. I thought it was particularly interesting that he rejects the LCS and suggests the old Newport class is closer to the mark. I'm not sure I either agree or disagree with his points, but I think it goes to the heart of a serious limitation of LCS in that the platform lacks the endurance to be a credible afloat forward staging base.

The MLP might actually a good fit, but with only 3 planned there will never be enough MLPs to meet the demand.

By the way, last week at GenNext Rear Admiral Worthington discussed this topic among others, and below is listed the key takeaways from his presentation:

• The SEALs have come a long way since their formation in the 60’s. Vietnam was the trigger—they became an instrumental part of the armed forces for covert action. After Vietnam funding dried up until the 80’s and the SEALs had a revamp
• In Rear Admiral Worthington’s opinion, too much has been leaked already regarding the killing of Osama Bin Laden. Identifying the SEALs at the Special Forces team responsible for the raid only puts them in more danger. The SEALs are responsible for the most elusive and dangerous jobs in the world, their privacy and ability to execute can potentially be affected by too much exposure.
• The OBL operation was a complicated one but something the SEALs could “do in their sleep”. Rear Admiral Worthington noted, “I bet their heart rate didn’t go above 92 when they stepped in that compound. “
• Mobility issues for the SEALs remain. They need dedicated helicopter squadrons for special operations and dedicated surface ships. He also touched on the shortfalls of the current Newport Class LST/Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

That last key point is covered broadly in generic detail in the Proceedings article, but I admit to liking the idea of comparing the Newport Class LST/Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in the context of a dedicated special operations surface ship design starting place.

A Fleet Of No New Ideas

The article by Chris Cavas at Defense News discussing the revised 30-year shipbuilding plan - a plan I have not seen - has some interesting details. You can read the whole article by following the link above, and below are my thoughts on some of the details discussed.

Extending the lives of the Command Ship replacements to 2039 is a paper pushing exercise also known as punting a problem. I think it is noteworthy the Navy is going to allow the LPD-17 hull gap from FY12 with the last LPD-17 and FY17 with the first LSD(X), and in a time of sky high defense budgets, not to mention out of control federal spending on jobs programs, neither Congress nor the Navy ever found a way to fill the workload gap on the Gulf Coast with Hospital Ships or Command Ships. It may be that more than anything else, that will be the legacy of the LPD-17 problems that were ignored over the last decade, and we should appropriately hold accountable every Navy leader who ignored the problem before ADM Harvey. Looks like some of those who punted the problem down the road may continue to be rewarded instead.

NASSCO is going to stay busy. 3 MLPs followed by a very long run of oilers beginning in FY14. The 4th MLP reportedly remains in the plan, but also will reportedly be canceled. I'm hoping it will not be canceled, because the more I have learned about the MLP the more I am very excited about this platform. It isn't perfect, but it is smarter than people think and the details matter. More on that later.

The discussed plan related to surface combatants is not credible, and hardly believable. That reason alone is why I like it. Look, there will never be a Flight IV Burke built in 2032, commissioned in 2037, and retired in 2077. In order for this plan to be realistic, then we would have to believe the Great White Fleet deployed by President Roosevelt in 1907 would still be credible combat power at sea today.

Put simply, Congress is asking the Navy to look into their crystal ball and determine what the 21st century looks like, and the Navy rightfully answers they have no idea. The Navy is simply extending current plans out 30 years while intentionally avoiding any technology innovations that will take place between now and then, and presumes nothing will change. It's smart. If Congress desires an annual dog and pony show with the 30 year plan, the Navy is smart to give them one.

Realistically, Congress should be focused on 5 year, 10 year, and 15 year plans so that more realistic examinations can be made regarding the incorporation and fielding of new technologies, because after about 15 years it becomes impossible to see how technology may evolve. If one focuses on the first 15 years of the new 30 year plan then one can make the following observation:

• The MLP for FY13 remains in the Navy plan, even if Congress is not excited about it.
• The Navy never found a way to replace the Command Ships or the Hospital Ships.
• The Navy does not have any new ideas regarding the surface force, amphibious force, carrier force, and submarine force.
• The Littoral Combat Ship is the Navy's answer to quantity questions.

Finally, the SSBN(X) impact to force structure is significant, and is the only apparent reason for a serious lack of innovation everywhere else in force structure. The uncertainty combined with the requirement is driving the choice for the the Navy to stay with safe options everywhere else. Congress needs to get on top of the broad impact the SSBN(X) is having on the rest of Navy force structure sooner rather than later, because lack of Congressional action now is stunting what is otherwise a long term action in shipbuilding as the Navy tries to plan the future.

It takes 15 or more years to design, build, and field a quality ship on cost. The most important detail we learn from the current 30 year shipbuilding plan is that the SSBN(X) has apparently stunted any possible force structure development or evolution for at least 2 decades because of the SSBN(X) programs hold on the SCN budget. Strategically the timing couldn't be worse as almost all of our allies are downsizing their naval forces while at the same time every single major competitor or potential competitor except North Korea is substantially increasing the size, reach, and capability of their naval power.