Review of Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles

I recently had a chance to read "Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles". This book is the fifth instalment in the series “Studies in Chinese Maritime Development” and can be found here on Amazon


In the past, I have found works by Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and the good folks at China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) to be of the highest quality and this book was no exception. This book not only includes contributions from professors at CMSI, but also serving/retired commander/officers, military attaché to China, policy makers and numerous China contributors from different think tanks. It does a great job of understanding China's motivations/intentions, while fairly examining PLA's capabilities and training. For those seeking for a greater understanding of China's air force, space development and Second Artillery Command, I think this is a must read. More than anything else, it drew from a wide range of primary research and Chinese sources which have not appeared in any other unclassified Western publications. I believe that this book shows that we can all learn a lot more about PLA and its intentions by going through thousands of Chinese publications and news articles.

I want to point out several sections that really stood out to be me. In part 1, this book took at really good look at the existing Chinese doctrine in gaining air dominance over Taiwan straits through PLAAF and 2nd artillery. In particular, Wayne Ulman's section on PLAAF strategy, training and modernization is extremely well done. I though Kevin Pollpeter and Anthony Mastalir both have very informative sections on PLA's desire to have stronger space presence and limit American space dominance. Garth Hekler's piece on Chinese EW effort was very well researched, because it really looked at all of China's open sources and summarized the parts that Chinese researchers have focused on. It really talked about what Chinese researchers think have contributed to US success and China's own research on those areas. Dennis Belasko's piece on helicopter provided a lot of solid information on PLA helicopter training. It is a very detailed piece on the areas that PLA helicopter force has grown in and also the areas that PLA still need more training/improvement. I also appreciated the extensiveness that Lanzit and Chen talked about the join operational training and exercises between naval aviation and PLAAF with PLAN ships. While we have seen a lot of pictures of such cooperation, the authors do a good job of describing the kind of maritime strike missions conducted in these joint operations. Ron Christman's section of China's Second Artillery Corps is simply excellent. The most interesting part describes SAC's operational doctrine, preparation and training facing an overwhelming opposition (US) in the Taiwan scenario.

On top of that, I was pleasantly surprised by all of the new information/analysis that I found in this book regarding to China's ASBM program. I have read many differently analysis on ASBM (including several by CMSI), but this book really provided a much more comprehensive look than anything else I have read. The discussions on subjects like conflict escalation of ASBM, hard kill vs soft kill and non-carrier targets were very refreshing.

So, for all those who are interested in learning more about China's Air Force, space development and Second Artillery, I think this book would be an excellent read.

Whither Patrol Coastals?

The Cyclone Class PCs have had an interesting service life beginning when the first ship (since transferred to the Philippine Navy) was launched in 1992. Consistent with history, the US Navy has been unsure how to best use these smaller vessels. Originally designed and operated for SOCOM, they proved inadequate for the task of supporting SOF, so they were transferred to the surface force in the late 1990s. Later, several of them were transferred to the Coast Guard for use primarily as counter-narcotics duty, but in another month or so, all remaining 13 PCs will be back in Navy hands.

The PCs’ mainstay mission the past decade has been protecting OPLATs in the North Arabian Gulf, but the ships have been plagued by hull cracks requiring extensive repairs in Bahrain. Previously, they performed a variety of fleet duties, including patrolling the coast of West Africa in what could be considered a predecessor to the APS. According to NAVSEA, these ships are scheduled to be in service through the mid-2020s. I find that estimate incredulous, especially in view of the above material problems and the contradictory quote of a 15 year life from another NAVSEA spokesman in the above article. Regardless, we seem to find excuses to decommission ships well before their estimated useful service lives (see SPRUANCE class for examples).

The PCs and similar sized naval vessels clearly excel at missions such as TSC and MSO. But with some creativity, they are capable of many other non-traditional operations. Consider that from an operational standpoint, the most valuable components of a multi-billion dollar nuclear submarine in an IW scenario are the sensors located on the last few feet of its periscope. Combining a UUV with these same sensors launched from a small surface mother ship provides a like surveillance capability for a fraction of the cost, saving submarines for higher-end missions. In other posts, I've mentioned the utility of small combatants combined with distributed firepower . What other roles should coastal patrol vessels play in tomorrow’s navy?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Robert Kaplan Sees the South China Sea as the "Future of Conflict"

A must read from Robert Kaplan.  Here's a key part: 

"As China's navy becomes stronger and as China's claim on the South China Sea contradicts those of other littoral states, these other states will be forced to further develop their naval capacities. They will also balance against China by relying increasingly on the U.S. Navy, whose strength has probably peaked in relative terms, even as it must divert considerable resources to the Middle East. Worldwide multipolarity is already a feature of diplomacy and economics, but the South China Sea could show us what multipolarity in a military sense actually looks like."

Someone is going to have to explain to me how what Kaplan rightly describes as the future we're headed toward--is more stable than the one we're in now.

Sounds like we ought to gin up one of those "strategy" things, huh?  Maybe, just maybe, the world's (still) most powerful economy can re-deploy its resources in a more intelligent manner to ensure that the Navy hasn't "peaked" in Asia. 

Bryan McGrath

West African Piracy Cooperation

This is important news.

Nigeria and Benin will cooperate to fight the growing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which has seen a number of attacks in recent weeks. Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan made the announcement during bilateral talks with Benin, which were convened to address the issue.

"Criminals don't respect political boundaries in their nefarious activities, so we will cooperate with one another to find lasting solutions to the problems they pose," Jonathan said on Thursday. He was speaking to Benin’s President Boni Yayi during bilateral talks in Abuja, Nigeria. The talks came after Yayi called for a regional summit on the issue of piracy.

Yayi said that pirates and bandits were threatening the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and called for action, led by Nigeria, to check the menace.

Jonathan said that the relevant Nigerian officials will work with their counterparts in Benin to find ways to deal with the problem.

On Thursday, Chief of Staff of Benin’s Navy Maxime Ahoyo said that, "Dozens of ships are already fleeing our shores due to fears of these pirates."

The tiny nation has been hit by a series of attacks on ships in its waters in recent weeks, forcing London's maritime insurance market to add Benin to a list of areas deemed high risk.

The recent spike in attacks has not gone unnoticed, for example Lloyd's now lists Benin in the same category of risk as Somalia in terms of piracy. This announcement follows a gathering of naval leaders from both nations on HSV Swift.

Unlike Somalia, this region does have a local maritime security presence. How quickly and effectively the piracy problems can be addressed and dealt with by local authorities is what needs to be followed closely here.

There is one more issue... is there a relationship between increased activity of AQIM and the maritime piracy? So far no links have been established, but there is a great deal of concern regarding AQIM and the narcotics trade, and the coincidence both AQIM and piracy become more active at the same time can't be ignored.

Al Qaeda's Seapower Strategy

Last week CDR Chris Rawley published a journal article with the Small Wars Journal titled Al Qaeda's Seapower Strategy. Small Wars Journal has been going through a software upgrade so I decided to wait a bit to let them work out the bugs before linking, but with those bugs worked out I want to highlight this article and a specific aspect covered within.

For hundreds of years, Arab traders in sailing dhows followed the seasonal monsoons in the Indian Ocean to move spices and other goods from the Orient to European markets. Today, diesel powered dhows with very similar designs move cargo - both legitimate and illicit - along many of the same routes. Criminal networks, insurgent groups and transnational terrorists utilize these routes to ship fighters, weapons, and other commodities across the sea. AQ can easily outsource its facilitation to human smugglers and drug runners who own these rat lines.

AQ has also moved key leaders across these routes as the indictment unsealed in July 2011 against Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame revealed. Warsame was an al Shabaab facilitator who had traveled to Yemen to coordinate logistics and operations with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and was captured by U.S. forces at sea while attempting to return to Somalia.2 The same route across the Gulf of Aden is utilized by human smugglers who annually transport thousands of refugees paying anywhere from $30 to $120 per person to make the perilous 30 hour journey from Somalia to Yemen in less-than-seaworthy vessels. Al Qaeda’s affiliates, whether by conscious decision or happenstance, have secured access to a number of important ports along these shipping lanes.

CDR Rawley goes on to note several aspects of how Al Qaeda is leveraging the sea for income. For example, he notes Kismaayo now provides what is likely al Shabaab’s primary source of revenue, via taxes on imports and exports, but also notes the smuggling routes and sea lines of communication out of Karachi, Zinjibar, Port Sudan, and Benghazi. With increased activity from AQIM, it is logical to presume Al Qaeda is leveraging a port in Western Africa as well.

The western preference to leverage economic sanctions on Iran and North Korea quickly forced both countries to leverage the sea as a shadow zone for economy, and I think it is logical to presume Al Qaeda is doing the same. We know that the sea is heavily leveraged by narcotics smugglers globally, but it is still relatively unknown to what extent Al Qaeda leverages the sea as a source for income. As pressure tightens on land, leveraging the sea for income would in theory become a better option for Al Qaeda, as there is more freedom of maneuver and action at sea than there is on land.

When thinking about how Al Qaeda relates to the sea, it is easy to get caught up focusing on the potential for Al Qaeda to strike targets at sea, but the hard work is denying Al Qaeda the ability to leverage the sea for economic benefit. Denying Al Qaeda sea lines of communication is unsexy work by naval forces designed with superior combat power against other maritime opponents, but it is vital to strangling Al Qaeda's ability to expand and connect their influence throughout the Middle East and Africa.

One of the recommendations by CDR Rawley towards denying Al Qaeda the sea is to recapture ports. He describes it as a whole of government the effort would enable partner nations with training, intelligence sharing, and when necessary, fire power and direct combat support - to take back this key terrain from al Qaeda. I think the US needs to think about this one step further, indeed I think one of our problems as a nation is that we seem very willing to take a whole of government approach to fighting wars, but are very unwilling to take a whole of defense approach without thinking about a whole of defense approach as a full scale occupation.

In my opinion the US government needs to rethink our concepts of reliance on air power to fight wars across the globe and start incorporating more tactical capacity for limited ground power when and where it can be very effective in delivering blows to the enemy. For some reason, our political leaders seems to think of air power with drones as very low level of warfare, the next step up being war with the full spectrum of air power, and then we skip our ability to escalate warfare all the way to massive Army Corps buildup as the only option for leveraging land power. What is lost in that vast middle are options like the amphibious raid, which can be conducted successfully to move in, insure destruction of enemy capabilities and the collection of important intelligence on the ground, and the most important step of withdrawing without leaving a shore based footprint.

Amphibious raids are not the deployment of occupation forces, and I believe in both Somalia and Libya amphibious raids could have been used under existing UNSCRs to significantly damage the ability of the enemy to operate effectively. This option has likely been passed up due to perceptions of risk, but the idea of committing any combat power to war - even if it is all up in the air with drones - and believing one isn't taking a major risk is the height of human folly.