Crisis Time for US Seapower

In reading around the news lately, I've seen some silly discussions related to the Navy. There is a discussion over at DoD Buzz, for example, that asks if the Navy should be building frigates instead of the Littoral Combat Ship. Talk about a hypothetical discussion completely disconnected from the reality facing the Navy today. Lets do some simple hypothetical math to get people refocused on the real problem.

This was the original Navy POM12 baseline budget plan (all numbers below in billions):

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4
FY14 $168.9
FY15 $173.0
FY16 $175.9

This is the original Navy POM12 Assumption | Less OMB 5% | Less OMB 10%

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4 | (-$8.27) | (-$16.54)
FY14 $168.9 | (-$8.44) | (-$16.89)
FY15 $173.0 | (-$8.65) | (-$17.30)
FY16 $175.9 | (-$8.80) | (-$17.59)

So before we even deal with the current $350 billion in defense cuts as outlined by the Budget Control Act of 2011 that partially funds the government just until the end of the first term of the Obama administration - a process which includes the yet to be decided super committee plan; the Navy is facing heavy cuts quickly from OMB unless they can find some way to completely dismiss OMB guidance (which they might).

Now, I fully expect the DoD to be hit by big budget cuts in the neighborhood of $850 billion over 10 years, more or less the budget cut that comes if the super committee fails to produce an alternative (I believe all alternatives seriously considered will have the same defense cuts included). That means we will see cuts to the Navy like this based solely on the Congress plan, not the additional OMB additional guidance:

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4 (-$3.9)
FY14 $168.9 (-$7.54)
FY15 $173.0 (-$11.02)
FY16 $175.9 (-$14.79)

For those curious how I am drawing these figures, I'm basically assuming a flatline defense budget at $560B for FY13 numbers (which is a high number btw) for 10 years and presuming $850 billion in cuts over those 10 years, then extrapolating what the Navy's share might be if 29% of the total DoD cut is applied to the Navy.

If the Navy gets hit with both the Super Committee cuts and just the OMB 5% cuts (not 10%), this is what the currently planned POM12 budget | Post POM12 cut budget | Total Budget Cut looks like:

FY12 $161.4
FY13 $165.4 | $153.23 | (-$12.17)
FY14 $168.9 | $152.92 | (-$15.98)
FY15 $173.0 | $153.33 | (-$19.67)
FY16 $175.9 | $152.31 | (-$23.59)

In other words, if the Super Committee fails to find a deal and the trigger kicks in for the Budget Control Act of 2011, and OMB guidance for POM13 cuts the DoD 5% like it probably will for every other government agency, the Navy POM13 budget must be introduced with a budget that is ~$100 billion less than expected.

Who in the hell seriously thinks the Navy is going to immediately move to design a new frigate in this fiscal environment? The Navy will be lucky to afford a DDG-51 Flight III design, much less a frigate from scratch.

Lets get back to real issues, shall we?

How long before those 29 Perry class ships in active commission or active reserve status are decommissioned? The best bet is the Navy will retire every single one of them next year. The USS Peleliu (LHA 5) will be retired immediately. The USS Cleveland (LPD 7), USS Denver (LPD 9), and USS Ponce (LPD 15) will all be retired immediately. The USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) and USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20) will both be retired immediately. All of the Coastal Patrol Ships will be retired immediately. Those 10,000 sailors will be the tip of the iceberg in terms of pink slips.

Will the Navy also retire the first 8 Ticonderoga class cruisers because they lack the radar for BMD? Maybe. Will the Navy move all of the MCMs into reserve status immediately? Maybe. The F-35C will likely be immediately canceled. The impact to the Maritime Sealift Command won't be pretty, and those Submarine Tenders among other MSC vessels will be retirement targets.

I honestly have no idea how the Marine Corps will deal with the cut. I can only speculate that there will almost certainly be no new medium vehicle nor an AAV replacement. The F-35B likely would survive, as would the Osprey and H-1 upgrades. The AV-1Bs would likely be retired immediately though, and the CH-53K would be pushed back indefinitely.

Think folks, think. The Navy will do what they have always done when budget cuts come - they will retire old ships quickly and throw everything they can towards building new ships. The LCS is one of the safest shipbuilding programs the Navy has, because it has known costs with fixed price contracts. There is ZERO possibility of a new frigate of any kind in this fiscal environment unless the Navy decides to drop the DDG-51 Flight IIIs, and Congress will absolutely insist the Navy protects the shipbuilding budget so the nation doesn't drop below 5 major shipyards. Surface ship and Aviation Maintenance will suffer as it always does in lean fiscal times, and deployments will drop significantly - as will training.

These silly discussions on LCS are a distraction, because they aren't rooted in either the history of how the Navy deals with budget crisis nor the realities of where the Navy is today. For all those folks who don't like the LCS, I'd suggest you find something to like or suggest affordable ideas to make it better, because the cold truth is those 20 LCS are likely to make up a significant percentage of the entire US Navy surface fleet by the time they are commissioned. If the Navy does in fact build 55 of them, as some still foolishly suggest, the LCS could represent 40% of the entire surface force by 2025. The only way that changes is if you have several hundred billion dollars laying around for the Navy over the next several years, and my guess is you do not.

The American taxpayer doesn't understand the value of seapower to them. That indifference by the American taxpayer who doesn't believe the Navy underwrites and secures the economic vitality of the worlds only superpower represents an existential threat to the US Navy today - and there is no evidence that US Navy leadership understands this. Specific programs in the Navy are not the problem, they are a symptom of a much bigger problem that likely won't be realized or effectively addressed until it is far too late.

The Fall of Tripoli is the End of the Beginning

This is the latest from Tripoli.

Libyan rebels claimed to be in control of most of the Libyan capital on Monday after their lightning advance on Tripoli heralded the fall of Moammar Gadhafi's nearly 42-year regime. Scattered battles erupted, and the mercurial leader's whereabouts remained unknown.

The international community called on Gadhafi to step down and moved ahead with post-war planning as euphoric residents celebrated in the Green Square, the symbolic heart of the Gadhafi regime. Colleagues warned he wouldn't go easily. Two of his sons were captured late Sunday.

Also noteworthy from the article.

A rebel field commander said reinforcements were arriving in Tripoli by sea from the north, south and southeast.

"Our fighters are coming from all directions and, God willing, today we will liberate the whole city," the commander, Suleiman Sifaw, told The Associated Press.

At the beginning of the siege on Saturday early morning, apparently there were several special operations group from Benghazi that landed from the sea as well. Still haven't seen much detail on that though.

This is the end of the beginning, not the beginning of the end. Apparently Tripoli has been mostly overrun by the rebels to the West who were armed up by France, which goes back to the theory that he with the biggest gun often wins. Those rebels have apparently been working with the rebels from Benghazi, which is a great sign of tactical coordination, assisted by NATO no doubt.

But here is the thing... Gaddafi will likely either be killed or captured soon, and the hunt for Gaddafi loyalists will result in a nasty bloodbath. It's revenge time, and lots of folks are ready to carry out vengeance.

But then what? How many tribes will be left competing for political power in Tripoli? It is worth noting that Libya is about to become the first legitimate revolution of 2011 where rebels have overthrown their hard line government. The flip side is that the moment of power vacuum from revolution has arrived, and everyone looking to take political power in that vacuum is holding a gun.

The military tactics used by NATO in Libya have not been impressive. The Air Campaign almost certainly helped the rebels, but it also extended the conflict longer than it needed to be and was only viable because the Libyan military was one of the smallest, worst trained, and worst equipped military forces in the world. Libya is not a model for the use of military power. The only lesson for the US so far is that Libya is an example how to do the least against the least while expecting the least in return - which may have been the political objective the whole time. Said another way, from the United States perspective, there is almost nothing noteworthy to take political credit for to date from the military aspects of Libya - all credit should be given to NATO and the Libyans.

On the political end, it is a different story. The President has been out front from the beginning calling for Gaddafi to go, and has put the government of the United States on a footing committed to the removal of Gaddafi in every way short of military power doing it ourselves. That might be something to take credit for, but the hard part of political support begins now. The future of Libya from now going forward will be how US political policy towards Libya will be judged. No one will care that the US committed barely any military power towards the removal of Gaddafi as long as the post-Gaddafi political support is productive towards a peaceful transition of government.

The two key questions I see moving ahead:

1. Can the State Department be effective in Libya without US military power to back them up?
2. Is the future on the ground in Libya one of peaceful political power sharing or insurgency?

My sense is Libya doesn't end well once Gaddafi is gone and the euphoria of that moment passes. Libya is still a tribal nation deeply divided and heavily armed with no central power structure or source of unity for the people. My advice on Libya is simple: hope for the best but prepare for the worst, and the lower one sets political expectations the better.

The legacy of Liu Huaqing

Recently, I've read a couple of books regarding the development of Chinese air force. More than anything else, this one book by a well known poster on Chinese bbs has really changed many perceptions I've had regarding the modernization of PLAAF doctrine and training. I would say that anyone who has frequented top Chinese language forums would know who I'm referring to. Over the next few weeks, I plan to write several entries on different aspects of PLAAF modernization. The first topic that I decided to make is the legacy of Liu Huaqing, since he is forever linked to the Chinese Aircraft Carrier program.

If you do a search of Liu Huaqing, you are most likely going to see articles describing him as the father of modern Chinese navy. His following quote has accompanied him everywhere

“Without an aircraft carrier, I will die with my eyelids open; the Chinese Navy needs to build an aircraft carrier,”

Liu served as the commander of the Chinese Navy from 1982 to 1987. After that, he served as the deputy chairman of the powerful CMC from 1989 to 1997. During his time as the commander of PLAN, Liu advocated acquiring a medium-sized and conventional-power carrier for operations over the Spratlys. At that time, Jiang Zemin's administration supported soft power in dealing with neighbours, so PLAN development concentrated mostly on the Taiwan scenario. More importantly, PLA budget simply could not support the cost of an aircraft carrier and associated air wing. At the same time, PLAN surface ship build up did not start until 2002, so having a carrier group was not possible. However, I think Liu did get PLAN thinking about expanding its reach from just the shores. Up to that point, PLA was stuck in the Mao era mindset of "people's army". The role of the AF was to achieve air denial rather than air dominance. The role of the navy was just to provide coastal defense. Even up to the start of this century, some in the army still thought that no nation can establish continued air dominance. That really is an astonishing thought when one thinks about how much US air dominance had determined Operation Desert Storm and over Kosovo.

What most people don't know is Liu's influence in the modernization of PLAAF after he became the deputy chairman of CMC. Liu was not only pushing for the modernization and increased power projection for PLAN, but he was also doing so for the air force. When Liu first got to his position in 1989, he was probably surrounded by many army generals in the upper echelon of PLA. Even though China's relationship with Soviet Union had warmed since Gorbachev took over, the army was still gripped with the threat of Soviet encirclement. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, the majority of advanced Soviet equipment became available for China. China had previously been offered Su-27 by Gorbachev's regime, but more weapons became available as the Russian military industrial complex faced the threat of collapse. In fact, the Russians brought T-72 MBTs, T-80U MBTs, SPH systems, SAMs, IFVs to display to PLA. PLA was probably 20 years behind Russia in ground weapon technology at that time. Considering these PLA generals spent the past 10 years developing plans against those front line T-80U tanks, it must have been a godsend for them to be able to buy these weapons. However, China had a limited military budget at that time, so they had to be picky about which system to get from the Russians.

Liu showed his foresight at this point. He believed that the gap between China and the leading standards in the world was the smallest in the army. He also got support from China's industrial complex, who did not believe China needed to import whole systems from Russia. Liu received support from Li Peng and Jiang Zemin to go for fighter jets, SAMs and Smerch MLRS instead of tanks and IFVs. Liu and others also realized that China's aerospace industry needed advancement. So instead of just buying Su-27s, he pushed for licensed local production and transfer of technology.

Looking back on it now, Liu was absolutely right in his vision. The Chinese industrial complex managed to advance to the point where it can produce numerous world class weapon systems despite not reaching ToT for T-80U, BMP-3 and numerous other systems. On the other had, the Chinese military aerospace industry has advanced quite far. Not only was PLAAF able to obtain the rights to produce a 4th generation fighter locally, but it has obtained experience in developing heavy fighter jet. I would say that China would not be able to develop a heavy fighter jet like J-20, if it did not first learn how to locally build Su-27s. At the same time, SAC have been able to develop J-15 based on the Su-27 platform. So Liu's push not only produced tremendous benefit for the air force but also naval aviation. Of all of the military leaders of his generation, Liu stands alone in his role in not only the modernization of PLAN, but also PLAAF.

Meanwhile....in Syria

Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson's column this morning asks the question, "Where's the Syria Plan?"  Proving that many slopes are indeed, slippery, Robinson brings up the uncomfortable reality that Assad is just as bad as Gaddafi, and that he may ultimately kill even more people in his bid to remain in power.  Robinson reaches a reasonable conclusion, that he can't see how--with forces as thinly stretched as they are and budget cuts looming--we can intervene militarily in Syria.

He goes on to state "What we need is something the president has refused to provide: an Obama Doctrine governing the use of force to defend civilians against their own despotic governments, or at least spelling out how the United States views its role in the unfolding Arab Spring." He goes on to question whether "...Our approach seems to be that we seek to oust dictators only when their rule is seriously threatened."  Hmmm....sounds reasonable to me. 

So in an effort to help out President Obama and Eugene Robinson, I offer the following framework for an Obama Doctrine Governing the Use of Force to Defend Civilians Against Their Own Despotic Governments (ODGUFDCATODG).

1.  The default position of the United States Government is that it will not become involved militarily in defending civilians against their own despotic governments.  While these events are tragic and regrettable, the support of armed struggle of another people against its own government is not BY DEFINITION in the national security interests of this country.

2.  There will be times when such support IS in the national interest of the United States.  That determination will be made based on a combination of the following factors:
     A.  The existence of a real and demonstrated threat to the lives and or property of American citizens.
     B.  The imminence of such a threat.
     C.  The likelihood that such a threat would spill across an international border in which these factors would then be re-applied.
     D.  The existence of legitimate economic, military, or geo-political interests (worthy of separate excursion in and of itself).
     E.  The absence of capable military forces of neighboring nations willing to do the job themselves, or participate in the effort.
     F.  The likelihood that such an effort would be successful in toppling the regime with minimal military effort.
     G.  The existence of some other nation or nations willing to step up to post intervention responsibilities.

Critical to this approach though is the recognition that Responsibility to Protect (RTP) is a norm, not a law or a mandate, or a tar-pit for great power resources.

Applying this framework to Syria--I believe Mr. Robinson correct in eschewing military intervention.

Bryan McGrath

New OMB Directive Cuts Defense Beyond Budget Control Act Agreement

The White House has published this OMB directive (PDF), which comes as guidance on top of the debt discussions agreed to in the Budget Control Act.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C . 20503
THE DIRECTOR
August 17,2024
M-II-30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FROM: Jacob J.Lew
Director

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Guidance

The President has defined our fiscal challenge as demonstrating that we can live within our means so that we can invest in job creation and economic growth now and in the long term. In April, he proposed a balanced framework for $4 trillion in deficit reduction that would put us on path to achieve fiscal sustainability by the middle of this decade. Over the summer, in negotiations with the Congress, the President pursued deficit reduction of this magnitude. Once it was clear a bipartisan agreement could not yet be reached, the President signed into law a down payment toward this goal: the Budget Control Act of 20 11. This legislation set ceilings on total discretionary spending and a target of $2.4 trillion in total deficit reduction over the next decade.

In light of the tight limits on discretionary spending starting in 2012, your 2013 budget submission to OMB should provide options to support the President's commitment to cut waste and reorder priorities to achieve deficit reduction while investing in those areas critical to job creation and economic growth. Unless your agency has been given explicit direction otherwise by OMB, your overall agency request for 2013 should be at least 5 percent below your 2011 enacted discretionary appropriation. As discussed at the recent Cabinet meetings, your 2013 budget submission should also identify additional discretionary funding reductions that would bring your request to a level that is at least 10 percent below your 2011 enacted discretionary appropriation.

By providing budgets pegged to these two scenarios, you will provide the President with the information to make the tough choices necessary to meet the hard spending targets in place and the needs of the Nation. These 5 and 10 percent reductions from the 2011 enacted level should not be achieved by proposing ~cross-the-board reductions or reductions to mandatory spending in appropriations bills, reclassifications of existing discretionary spending to mandatory, or enactment of new user fees to offset existing spending. The latter types of proposals may be included in your package as separate proposals on their merits or for consideration as alternatives to other cuts proposed in the main request. You may also submit priority add-backs with your request.

At the same time as your submission shows lower spending overall, you should identify programs to "double down" on because they provide the best opportunity to enhance economic growth. Finding the savings to support these investments will be difficult, but it is possible if budgets cut or eliminate low-priority and ineffective programs while consolidating duplicative ones; improve program efficiency by driving down operational and administrative costs; and support fundamental program reforms that generate the best outcomes per dollar spent.
Consistent with these guidelines, I ask that your 2013 budget and management plans address the following mechanisms for efficiency increases:

• If relevant, identify priority investments related to economic growth which the Department proposes to expand or protect, stating the strongest possible case for the positive economic impact.
• Identify and include in the budget submission cost-saving efforts that will improve operational efficiency and improve the rate of return to taxpayers, including more program integration, reorganizations within and between agency components, and realignment of resources (such as information technology, facilities, and staff) to improve service delivery to the public.
• To drive long-term productivity increases, your 2013 budget and management plans should explain how your agency will acquire, analyze, evaluate, and use data to improve policy and operational decisions, and how you will reallocate and strengthen your analytic and evaluation capacity to set outcome-focused priorities, identify the most effective and cost-effective practices and programs, and speed their adoption.
• Finally, agency submissions should take into consideration areas of duplication or overlap identified by the Government Accountability Office, as well as others.

I expect this year's budget formulation process to be a collaborative dialogue between OMB and agencies that emphasizes the best options for improving the Government's effectiveness while lowering costs. OMB will strive to offer ideas and assistance to agencies where we can, and to facilitate problem-solving on issues that cross agencies. In addition, I invite agencies to recommend ways that OMB or other Government-wide processes or requirements can be modernized and improved to help your agency meet its objectives more cost -effectively.

I know this will bc a difficult year, but it will also offer an opportunity to make the hard decisions to invest where we can get the most done and pare back in other areas.

I have already seen one source saying the DoD is not immune to this. The FY11 enacted DoD budget was $530 billion (includes military construction), so a 5% reduction would make the FY13 DoD budget $504 billion. The 10% reduction would place FY13 closer to $475 billion. Remember when Secretary Panetta said that more defense cuts would seriously hurt defense? The President wasn't impressed. The budget savings across the board are likely being made to free up FY13 budget money for the President to roll out his new jobs program set to be announced in early September.