A Day in the Life of US Seapower

The following is the written testimony of Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces and Subcommittee on Readiness on A Day Without Seapower and Projection Forces.

The hearing was dull, as expected, but this written statement is very well done, and I quote it in full. I do like it when the Navy tells their story this way - this is the 3500 words a sailor should write every month and post to the Navy blog. This is also the monthly article in Rhumb Lines that I miss the most.

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Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, Ranking Member Bordallo and members of the Subcommittee, it is my honor and pleasure to appear with you, representing over 600,000 Navy men and women - active, reserve and civilian. Today, as we have done for over 200 years, our Navy is forward- deployed around the world protecting our nation. Our dedicated Navy men and women operate at sea, on land, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for our Sailors, our civilians, and their families.

Seapower in the Evolving Security Environment

The value of seapower cannot be fully appreciated outside the context of the evolving security environment, defined by a combination of recognizable trends and consequential uncertainties. The changing distribution of power in an increasingly competitive global environment poses challenges and opportunities for U.S. interests. Nation states with growing economic and political power such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey are continuing to field advanced military capabilities. Civil unrest is spreading throughout North Africa and the Middle East, fueling disorder and unexpected regime changes; and nations are employing all means of state power to restore order and extend both regional and global influence.

Rapid population growth, increased urbanization and migration into the littoral regions are exacerbating the impacts of multiple concurrent and diverse crises that challenge the capacity of nations to respond and threaten the continuity of global systems. Energy resources, precious minerals, fishing rights and food and water scarcity will continue to be the root of competition and flashpoints of conflict. Natural and man- made disasters, terrorist attacks, cyber warfare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and employment of advanced military technology by both state and non-state actors is causing disruptions that threaten global stability and increase the possibility of conflicts today and in the future.

These global trends in an uncertain world underpin an increasing demand for seapower. As a maritime nation, the United States is dependent upon the sea for both national security and economic prosperity. To this end, the Navy employs the global reach, persistent presence and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. Navy seapower to accomplish six strategic imperatives.

Strategic Imperatives

Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our allies and friends our commitment to security and stability, U.S. naval forces regionally concentrate forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In the Asia- Pacific region, for example, the U.S. is bound by defense treaties with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, Japan and Thailand. The U.S. Navy maintains forward capabilities in the Western Pacific to support interagency efforts to limit aggression by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as to respond to other assertive or coercive actions in the region. To this end, frequent interaction to maintain and improve interoperability with the ROK, Japan, Australia and our other allies and partners is critical to effective crisis response operations and limiting the potential for regional conflicts.

The U.S. Navy provides a broad range of offshore options to deter major power war that include a survivable nuclear strike capability and forward deployed conventional combat power capable of achieving and sustaining operational access in contested areas.

As U.S. ground forces reduce their role in active combat missions in Southwest Asia and transfer internal security responsibilities to Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s national forces, these new partners and residual U.S. joint security force assistance teams - akin to those working with numerous other partners throughout the world - will rely increasingly on offshore capabilities and support. Concurrently, the Navy will continue to work with interagency and international partners to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda, its affiliates and their support structures as our nation continues its war against violent extremist organizations.

Throughout the world, mission-tailored naval forces are distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises before they impact the global systems. The Navy’s most significant contribution to homeland security is identifying and neutralizing threats as far away from our shores as possible. When required, the Navy rapidly responds to threats approaching our coastlines and off-shore assets, primarily through maritime interdiction and air/missile defense missions. Closer to home, the Navy works closely with the Coast Guard to support domestic maritime security efforts while increasing Navy-Coast Guard interoperability. The Navy also maintains the capability to support civil authorities in times of emergency and in response to natural and man-made disasters, as well as working with the interagency to defend the nation’s cyberspace infrastructure.

Building and sustaining cooperative relationships to prevent disruptions of the interdependent global networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance is at the forefront of Navy international engagement initiatives. The Navy plays a significant role in preventing disruptions that occur if the flow of resources, commodities and components are interrupted; terrorist attacks undermine the rule of law; or natural or man-made disasters prevent economic activities. In fact, cooperative relationships play a critical role across all of the strategic imperatives and will be increasingly critical in the emerging security environment.

The Daily Impact of U.S. Navy Seapower

March 19, 2024 is representative of the daily impact the U.S. Navy has on achieving these strategic imperatives and protecting our national interests.

Win Our Nation’s Wars

On March 19, the Navy was engaged on the ground in Afghanistan and in Iraq with 8,066 Sailors, among them 1,428 mobilized Reservists. Many of these Sailors were applying core Navy competencies such as medical, construction, explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence exploitation/analysis, electronic warfare, base operations, military police, maritime and port security, airlift support, Joint Task Force (ISAF, MNF- I, USF-A)/COCOM staff support and Navy Special Warfare expertise to make significant contributions to the successful accomplishment of our joint operations ashore. Still others were applying their initiative, creativity and adaptability to

perform tasks outside Navy’s core competencies, leading and contributing to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, Embedded Training Teams, customs inspections, counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploitation and combat support. In total, nearly 13,000 Sailors were employed throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) conducting ground-based combat, combat support and combat service support missions.

On the same day, more than 13,000 additional Sailors were conducting naval missions afloat in CENTCOM’s AOR. Sailors from Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 5 were providing security aboard vessels supporting the rotation and sustainment of the joint force operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Carrier Air Wing 1 embarked in USS ENTERPRISE completed 28 sorties from the Arabian Sea in support of U.S. and coalition ground forces conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations throughout Afghanistan. USS CARL VINSON, having just completed a month at sea conducting similar flight operations, was heading to Jebel Ali for a short maintenance availability in preparation for follow-on tasking to support Operation NEW DAWN in Iraq. Within the week, the USS CARL VINSON/Carrier Air Wing 17 team would fly 13 sorties in support of Operation NEW DAWN, contributing to the Navy’s share of air support for Multi- National Forces-Iraq which averages 30 percent of the fixed-wing sorties and almost 60 percent of the electronic attack sorties flown over Iraq each day.

On March 19, Navy also conducted 54 flight hours of manned Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission support for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that included seven Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (P-3/EP-3) sorties. Elsewhere throughout the world, six P-3 ISR missions, three EP-3 missions and 230 hours of ISR coverage from 17 forward-deployed unmanned systems (BAMS-D, Fire Scout, Scan Eagle and Shadow) were provided by the Navy, some of it in the continuing fight against violent extremist organizations. On this day in particular, surface combatants and both manned and unmanned ISR were pursuing high-value terrorist targets in both Somalia and Yemen.

Limit Regional Conflict

March 19 marked the beginning of ODYSSEY DAWN, an operation initially mounted to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya to protect its citizens from potential genocide perpetrated by their own government. Subsequently, the mission was expanded to support the internationally recognized transition government and its ground forces as they endeavored to displace the Qaddafi regime. On the first day of ODYSSEY DAWN, the U.S. Navy launched 122 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles from two surface ships and three submarines, including the USS FLORIDA. This strike marked the first time an OHIO-class guided-missile submarine launched TLAMs during hostilities. Navy E/A-18G Growlers ground-based in Iraq were retasked to support ODYSSEY DAWN, and within 44 hours of completing a combat mission over Iraq were engaged against hostile forces in Libya. Other ODYSSEY DAWN highlights in the days after March 19th include the engagement of the Libyan Coast Guard vessel VITTORIA, suspected of laying mines, with a AGM-65 Maverick missile fired from a P-3; and the employment of a MV-22 Osprey from the deck of the USS KEARSARGE in a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission that successfully recovered an Air Force pilot who had ejected over northeastern Libya.

On March 19 in the Asia-Pacific region, both a Carrier Strike Group and an Expeditionary Strike Group were underway, visibly demonstrating to North Korea that belligerent acts like the sinking of South Korea’s corvette CHEONAN, which had occurred almost a year prior, could invite an immediate proportional response to prevent potential ‘anniversary’ aggression from spiraling into a regional conflict.

Deter Major Power War

On March 19, 23 submarines were forward deployed around the world conducting missions vital to national security, including ballistic missile submarines on strategic nuclear deterrent patrols. Moreover, four carrier strike groups, three amphibious ready groups, 23 independently deploying surface combatants and amphibious ships, nine fleet oilers and 15 P-3s from three Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft detachments were forward deployed, prepared to aggregate credible combat power capable of generating decisive effects in response to a crisis.

Contribute to Homeland Defense-in-depth

Among the forward deployed forces that the Navy employs to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, surface combatants with AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability are increasingly in demand as the range of ballistic missile systems increase and the systems proliferate. On March 19, USS MONTEREY deployed to begin the enduring presence of Aegis BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean as part of the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe as directed by the President. MONTEREY joined the USS STOUT conducting Operation SHARP SENTRY in the Eastern Mediterranean supporting ballistic missile defense of Israel; and USS FITZGERALD, USS TRUXTON and USS PICKNEY and three alternate ships were providing similar defense of Japan and defense-in-depth for the United States.

Ballistic missiles are not the only proliferating threats that pose a growing challenge to the United States. Numerous state and non-state actors are developing and employing cyber capabilities to exploit intellectual capital and military capabilities, as well as mounting attacks that disrupt or damage networks, data repositories, automated control systems and hardware. To deal with this growing threat, the Navy re-established the U.S. 10th Fleet. Cyberspace has become an important warfighting domain, and 10th Fleet's mission is to integrate cyber capabilities into naval operations to achieve information dominance. On March 19, 10th Fleet and its subordinate commands countered approximately 150 malicious attacks.

Foster and Sustain Cooperative Relationships

The Navy's premier maritime security engagement program employs "Partnership Stations" to strengthen the maritime security capacity of partners by developing maritime professionals, infrastructure, domain awareness and response capabilities. It is designed to be a multi-national security cooperation initiative that involves allies and able partners in planning, training and other aspects of the endeavor, ultimately building national and regional capabilities that can be aggregated to achieve global maritime security. To this end, on March 19 USS CLEVELAND was in the South Pacific conducting a Pacific Partnership Station with numerous Pacific island
nations; Sailors and Marines from High Speed Vessel SWIFT were performing community relations projects in Honduras; USS OAK HILL was conducting Southern Partnership Station to counter transnational organized crime in the Caribbean Sea; USNS COMFORT was participating in CONTINUING PROMISE, providing medical care to the citizens of various South American countries; and USS ROBERT G BRADLEY was in Freetown, Sierra Leone, conducting Africa Partnership Station West maritime security training events.

In other engagement efforts on March 19th, Virginia Class submarine USS NEW HAMPSHIRE and the Seawolf Class submarine USS CONNECTICUT commenced Ice Exercise 2011 in the Arctic Ocean with other U.S., Canadian and United Kingdom units. Seabees from several Naval Mobile Construction Battalions were building schools in Djibouti and drilling water wells in Ethiopia, as part of our humanitarian civil assistance efforts in Africa to help our partners prevent the establishment of violent extremist safehavens.

Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions

On March 19, the REAGAN Carrier Strike Group responded to one of largest humanitarian disasters in recent memory as the earthquake and tsunami in Japan affected our strongest ally in the Pacific region. Navy was on-hand immediately to provide critical humanitarian assistance in the face of widespread devastation from the opening hours of the tragedy. REAGAN was transiting the Western Pacific en route to conduct combat air operations over Afghanistan and quickly altered course. Within hours they were headed to Japan where they used much of the same training practiced for Afghanistan to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, the ESSEX Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), normally stationed in Okinawa with USS HARPERS FERRY, USS GERMANTOWN and with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), continued their transit to the Sea of Japan near Honshu, to be in position to launch Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions over land. Military Sealift Command's dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS MATTHEW PERRY conducted replenishment-at-sea operations with the USS ESSEX ARG, sustaining their support of what eventually became known as Operation TOMODACHI. Additionally, USS TORTUGA, with two embarked heavy-lift MH-53 helicopters, on-loaded approximately 300 Japanese Ground Self Defense Force personnel and 90 vehicles in Tomokomai, Hokkaido to transport them to the disaster area. USNS SAFEGUARD, along with Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit 1, Companies 1 and 2, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan, to begin on-loading HADR supplies for transport to devastated regions throughout the country. Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 62 transported 10,375 pounds of radiological control equipment and 18 members of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s Radiological Control Team to Atsugi, Japan, to assist with HADR and nuclear monitoring efforts.

On March 19, USS HALYBURTON, USS BULKELEY, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN, USNS ARCTIC and USNS ALAN SHEPARD conducted counter- piracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa to prevent the disruption of the free flow of resources and trade through the Gulf of Aden. HALYBURTON responded to a bridge-to- bridge call from a pirated vessel, M/V IRENE, requesting immediate medical assistance for a suspected pirate. HALYBURTON agreed to provide medical assistance and requested that the pirates release their hostages, to which the suspected pirates agreed. Though the injured pirate succumbed to his injuries, the pirates released 13 hostages to HALYBURTON where they received food and medical attention and were ultimately repatriated.

On March 19, USS DOYLE was at sea conducting counter- illicit trafficking operations with its embarked U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment. Three E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and crews from Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 77 (VAW-77) flew three missions for a total of 13 flight hours in support of counter-illicit trafficking operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. Meanwhile, the Reserve crew of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 53 delivered 20 personnel and 10,000 pounds of maintenance support equipment for VAW-77 from Naval Air Station New Orleans to El Salvador, allowing VAW-77 to continue uninterrupted anti-drug/stability operations.

A Day Without Navy Seapower

In total, 152 of the Navy's 288 Battle Force Ships were underway or forward-deployed on March 19, along with a similar percentage of our other capabilities - training for or engaged in missions focused on accomplishing our strategic imperatives and advancing our national interests. Without the seapower the Navy uniquely provides our nation, not one of the activities undertaken on the 19th of March would have been accomplished; nor would a similar number and range of activities be accomplished every day of every year.

Impact of Budget Control Act

Even with all the activity taking place on March 19, the Navy was still not able to meet the global demand for naval forces requested by the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Throughout fiscal year 2011, the Navy was only able to source an average of 59 percent of the Combatant Commander’s requirements.

Without question, the Fleet is operating now at an unsustainable level. To best meet the Combatant Commanders' need for deployed Navy forces since September 11, 2024 and to respond to emergent requirements, we have increased the frequency and average length of unit deployments. This has resulted in reduced training time; reduced maintenance availabilities; a narrowing of pre-deployment training for certain units to mission-specific tasks; and an accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft. As our ground forces draw down from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, every indication is that demand for naval forces' presence, deterrence and engagement activities will increase.

The impact of the cuts directed by the Budget Control Act is still being determined, and so a detailed discussion of how those cuts might affect the Force and the allocation of Navy resources to the Combatant Commanders would be premature. Clearly, each of the Services stands to be affected by the budget decisions made in the weeks and months ahead--and Navy, with its capital-intensive shipbuilding and aircraft procurement and maintenance accounts, could potentially be the Service most adversely affected. The Navy has postured itself over the past decade to meet its requirements in the most efficient manner possible, but not without assuming some manageable risk in the process. Careful consideration will be given to decisions meant to keep the fleet at a high state of readiness while investing in future capabilities and building the ships, submarines and aircraft that will patrol the seas in an increasingly lethal environment during the coming decades. We anticipate that a Navy top-line decrease as a result of the Budget Control Act will reduce the capability, capacity and proficiency required by the fleet to accomplish our global missions; reduce the operational availability of those forces that we retain; and increase the risk to mission success and our naval forces to the maximum acceptable limit.

Should additional cuts beyond those expected from the Budget Control Act be imposed on the Navy, we anticipate confronting stark choices with further reductions in our ability to perform our most vital missions. While we would continue to make informed decisions with regard to prioritizing those missions and managing the associated risks, the impacts of potential Navy budgets resulting from sequestration will drastically affect the readiness of all of our Sailors and platforms as well as their ability to successfully perform their vital missions as part of the Joint Force tasked with guaranteeing national security.

The Navy will manage the risks of reduced resources by continuing to put our core war-fighting responsibilities first - ensuring we are ready to fight and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow as resources allow. Operating forward, we will continue to provide offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty and harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force to employ resources responsibly in order to be ready to fight.

Enduring Value of Navy Seapower

In an ever-changing and uncertain global environment, one fact remains clear. The United States is, and always will be, a maritime nation. Vast quantities of global goods--over 70 percent of the total of all trade value are moved by sea, mandating a dedicated and vigilant force to safeguard maritime routes and promote economic prosperity and security. When one considers that almost 90 percent of the earth's population lives within 500 miles of the sea, it becomes clear how much humanity still relies on the freedom of the oceans as a medium for trade and sustenance. Our maritime forces not only contribute to national and global economic health, but also provide Combatant Commanders with flexible and rapid response options that include sustained high-intensity operations without the need for a sizeable footprint ashore or permission from any other nation. The Navy’s global presence in defense of free access to the global commons by all nations is vital to our national security and prosperity. The Navy’s preeminent role in this regard is unique among the Armed Forces and cannot be replaced.

Once again, I thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee and I appreciate your support for those who sail in harm’s way.

Looking for Proof of Big Ideas in Discussion

This article from John Bennett from Monday updates the strategic review that is supposedly taking place in the Pentagon. Keep in mind, if there really is a strategic review - and I still have doubts this is even possible without OSD arbitrarily making all decisions - we may never actually hear much about it until after we see the FY13 budget.

The Pentagon is considering investing more of its funding in military platforms for the Asia-Pacific region and less on tools for counterinsurgency, defense sources say.

The change in thinking is being spurred by a soup-to-nuts strategy review at the Pentagon that was initiated last spring to help the Defense Department navigate budget cuts.

Several defense insiders said the review has led officials to downgrade the importance of conducting large-scale stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The review’s early findings are the latest signal that the Obama administration is recalibrating its foreign and national security policy from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific.

But here is where it gets interesting. The article goes on to say:

This will have “negative implications” for the Army’s slice of the Pentagon budget pie down the road, one defense source said, while making the Navy and Air Force more relevant.

Then goes on to quote Loren Thompson:

“Programs that are not suitable for the Western Pacific environment, such as heavy armor and the lightly armored Littoral Combat Ship,” said Lexington Institute analyst and industry consultant Loren Thompson, “are getting a close look as possible sacrificial lambs in the push for savings.”

Is the LCS really a sacrificial lamb? I wouldn't get your hopes up. There is a group within the Pentagon that argues, at any cost, in favor of the major programs and say everything else is on the chopping block. All I have learned is that Loren Thompson appears to be one of the folks in that group who is out making that argument. It's like the folks who say an aircraft carrier will be retired early. Sorry, no chance, not unless the budget process results in sequestration, again - that's just the talking point of one side of the debate. We all know what the Navy will cut - the same kind of stuff they always cut (unless it really is different this time, which is unlikely).

Time will tell.

This article discusses the "strategic review" process in the context of a programs competition rather than a process that asks what the military should be capable of doing tomorrow. Where is AirSea Battle? Where is the one document that is supposedly guiding future military doctrine for the Asia-Pacific region if in fact the Asia-Pacific region is really getting so much attention during the "strategic review" process?

On Thursday the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces will hold a hearing that examines A Day Without Seapower and Projection Forces. The House folks are really excited about this hearing... for some reason. Personally, I'm having trouble getting excited. The problem I've been having watching the DoD on Capitol Hill this week is that I have no faith in the system - and it begins with a lack of faith in political leadership to ask relevant questions but there is also an observed absence of relevant comments by top military leaders. Come on - when the worst case scenario for the DoD is that their budget gets reset to 2007 (PDF), it is very hard to take all the doom and gloom seriously unless we are also admitting up front that the current DoD budget is already broken. I didn't hear the CNO say that Tuesday, and what isn't being said by military leaders is often more important these days than what they are saying.

All we are getting is fear, which means all we are getting is political rhetoric that really doesn't hold as much value as people think it does. Knowing that political rhetoric is the way ahead for military leaders is useful though, because it makes it entirely predictable how tomorrow's hearing will go down, or at least easy to predict what the Navy will say.

My money is that Vice Admiral Bruce Clingan is going to do basically do what CHINFO already does - produce a Day in the Life of the Navy similar to what we have seen in the past with Rhumb Lines where the fleet activities across the globe are outlined for a single day. It will be a story of global naval power, and if VADM Clingan is any good at public speaking, it will be a well told story of naval power. I enjoy stories about naval power, so I am hoping for a great story... but is it really going to be relevant to the broader situation the nation finds itself in early in the 21st century?

Vice Admiral Clingan is the N3/N5 - which means he runs the shop of big ideas in the US Navy. Tomorrow's hearing will only be useful as an argument for seapower (in my opinion) if the hearing exposes some big ideas the Navy's top big idea shop has been discussing lately during the hearing, because when you are a nation that is working under the Budget Control Act of 2011 - which basically says the nation is broke - it's time to think and come up with ideas. Show me big ideas are at least out there in OPNAV.

For example, lets start asking the hard questions about seapower in public so we start getting better answers about seapower in public.

The future Carrier Strike Group will consist of a Ford class carrier ($15B to build, $??? to operate and maintain annually over 50 years, + $??? to build and operate the air wing over 50 years), and the CSG also requires a certain number of large surface and submarine escorts ($2+B to build, $??? to operate and maintain annually over 50 years). What is that total budget number over 50 years for a single CSG? Whatever that number is, multiply it by 10, because in order to sustain the industrial capacity to build Ford class CVNs, we need to build 1 CVN every 5 years for an average of 10 CVNs over 50 years - which means 10 Carrier Strike Groups.

Remember - 1 ship, the big deck nuclear aircraft carrier - also drives requirements for the air wing and the escorts just so the nation can get the realistic capability out of that 1 ship. How much does one CSG cost over the next 50 years? How much does ten CSGs cost each year?

I'd like to see someone in the Navy asked whether today, facing the emerging A2AD networks that all planning is currently centered around, whether or not that 10 CSG force structure model is the most cost effective use of funding for naval power in the 21st century, or if an alternative force structure at the same cost would be more effective. What other force structures have been looked at but dismissed as not providing the same combat power as our 10 CSG force? We are planning for a future of sophisticated peer competitors where precision weapons strike targets from thousands of miles away - and as a nation we are making enormous investments that drives all high end requirements across the board just to protect 10x4 acres of CVN property. Why is that the best option for the future in the 21st century?

I'm not saying all existing force structure plans aren't the best plans for the future, rather I'm just asking why we think big deck CVNs are the best choice when it also means that almost the entire Department of the Navy budget gets focused in supporting and making survivable 10 versions of that CVN capability.

If Vice Admiral Clingan, as N3/N5, cannot responsibly discuss that topic in an open Congressional hearing - which for the record absolutely is A Day Without the US Navy's Version of Seapower and Projection Forces, then there is no such thing as a strategic review taking place.

I tend to think that the "strategic review" from a Navy point of view is going to be little different than AirSea Battle development - an argument that begins and ends with the invulnerability of aircraft carriers, the eternal wisdom of investing all surface forces investment into AEGIS defensive screens, and an argument that articulates the superiority of Virginia class submarines - and how that trilogy represents the zenith of naval power in the 21st century.

If the US Navy's force structure is indeed optimally planned, then surely the Navy would have done analysis to be able to prove it. That analysis would, in theory, reveal the red line in cost where the CSG is no longer the most superior option.

And that is the question that any "strategic review" during a time of budget austerity surely needs to determine... What is the red line where an alternative force structure that is not centered around 10 big deck nuclear powered aircraft carriers becomes the better option? Why does the Navy believe that 50 years from now a big deck aircraft carrier would somehow be survivable in a war against a peer adversary? After all, the US Navy looks at other naval warships - including aircraft carriers - as dead on arrival in a shooting war. Why not ours? Are CVNs too expensive to imagine ever losing in a shooting war? If not, then why is 10 the right number when that number is determined solely by the minimum industrial capacity? Should we not have 12 aircraft carriers instead of 10? What about only 6 CVNs but 20 CVEs? What ever happened to single mission surface combatants? Why are we building 4 LCS at the cost of 1 LPD-17 in the spirit of quantity for ships where volume matters most, but building $2B - $3B on surface combatant quality when in theory - larger numbers of smaller surface combatant shooters would be more survivable? What ever happened to tough questions in a HASC hearing?

So what am I looking for in Thursday's hearing? A sign that big ideas exist, and are part of the discussion. That doesn't mean they are the best idea, just that ideas exist in the form of options being legitimately evaluated. Maybe the ideas are lighter than air lift, or how naval power is looking to support USMC Company Landing Teams in the context of irregular warfare, or whether or not the emerging 21st century environment is forcing the Navy to look at what kind of surface/underwater/aviation force is necessary to compete in the 21st century. I'm looking for signs of thought, imagination, and competition.

Why? Because those are characteristics of a healthy organization - and if the nation is truly taking a strategic turn towards seapower - visible, public signs that the seapower service is engaged in a healthy internal debate would be a good thing.

Acceptable Asymmetry

I have some thoughts on submarine proliferation over at WPR:

As the threat of war with the Soviet Union faded and then vanished, many of the platforms necessary for ASW also disappeared, as did the tightly integrated systems of cooperation necessary for sharing information. As the theater of operations became increasingly undefined, the knowledge of local ocean and weather conditions crucial to locating and attacking submarines became harder to access and catalogue. The relationships tying organizations and nations together also weakened as hunting submarines became a less pressing priority. As the “system of systems” on which ASW depended disintegrated and uncertainty took its place, the balance of power shifted in favor of submarines and access denial. In the absence of an effective ASW capability, preparing to control a battle space in the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan or the Arabian Sea became a daunting prospect.

But the perceived effectiveness of submarines as an area-denial weapon in some ways led to their emergence as power-projection platforms. The threat of enemy submarine attacks can make a navy wary of dispatching aircraft carriers or surface warfare vessels on strike missions. In such an environment, however, submarines can still carry out strike missions at relatively little risk to themselves. The conversion of four Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines into cruise-missile platforms represents one manifestation of such a shift to conventional offensive strike capabilities, whose effectiveness was demonstrated by the performance of USS Florida during the Libya operation. This shift means that even as countries like Iran build their anti-access capabilities in part through expanding their submarine forces, the United States and the United Kingdom retain difficult-to-counter strike assets.

Chinese Hospital Ship.....in Jamaica

Nothing to worry about here, folks.  Just move along.  Peaceful rise in progress, China has no pretensions to global influence. 

Bryan McGrath

Rethinking Amphibious Assault

For USNI subscription members only (behind the paywall), this article by Noel Williams titled The Next Wave: Assault Operations for a New Era is a really interesting read. Here is a sample:

Perhaps the most promising technology area is unmanned systems. In the 2020s and beyond there will simply be no reason to place 20 Marines in a steel box and drive them through mined waters to land on an area-denied beach. An unmanned breacher vehicle (UBV), or family of unmanned systems, could clear and mark the assault lanes ahead of any manned surface movement. These UBVs could be launched from surface, subsurface, or airborne delivery means—overtly or covertly. UBVs could be given large magnetic and acoustic signatures to trigger influence mines and could be equipped with cameras, remote gun systems, plows, cutters, and/or line charges to clear beach obstacles. Additionally, it would be possible to transition the UBV to convoy reconnaissance and clearing missions once manned vehicles are ashore.

Introducing an unmanned system breaks the tyranny of the hybrid vehicle that we have found to be so costly and that inevitably results in compromises in both operating domains—afloat and ashore. Since current plans call for landing existing manned breacher vehicles roughly 30 minutes after the first amphibious tractor landing, the time frame requiring a vehicle that transitions seamlessly from sea to shore is roughly 30 minutes. If the joint force is able to achieve beach superiority for this brief period, there is no need for a hybrid vehicle at all. Introducing an unmanned initial assault wave completely eliminates the requirement.

Unmanned systems can provide improved operational capability and enhanced force-protection at significantly reduced cost. Unmanned breachers allow the introduction of ground-fighting vehicles to shore via surface-effect and displacement connectors. By thus avoiding the requirement for a hybrid vehicle, the Marine Corps can focus its limited resources on producing a new fighting vehicle optimized for operations ashore.

This combination of unmanned systems for the initial surface wave and non-hybrid wheeled fighting vehicles for ashore provides a real opportunity to lighten the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), while drawing a clear distinction between Marine Corps and heavy Army units. Additional savings might be realized by participating in a joint venture with the Army to produce a next-generation fighting vehicle (a Stryker successor) with riverine capability. The latest generation of light armored vehicle, or its commercially available equivalent, would provide operational flexibility, training, maintenance, sustainment, and affordability benefits. Determining the actual material solution should be facilitated by additional wargaming and analysis based on threat and operational-concept considerations.

If the USMC did something like this - going unmanned with their breach vehicle from the sea - that would have a trickle down impact on several things including the MPC (Marine Personnel Carrier) requirements, because the MPC would become more important as the primary mover of Marines. There are a lot of things you can do when you remove the EFV/AAAV role and replace that with an unmanned system, but it is also obvious it adds additional impacts to other areas of the USMC ground vehicle force that would require additional study.

I like this idea a lot, but need more time to consider the degree to which it impacts other things.