UK Libya Lessons Observed & Sea-based ISR

From Think Defense , a discussion of UK lessons from Libya and a detailed run down of some possible solutions to fill the gaps: two things the UK effort lacked was organic shipboard unmanned ISR and precision land attack. We've discussed the US shortages of those assets here and several times previously. As acquisition choices are made on platforms such as the F-35C versus say the Sea Avenger or other strike-capable ISR aircraft, it would be wise to heed these observations as well as our own recent combat experiences in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. We cannot kill what we can't find, and scouting in modern warfare -- IW and otherwise --is about finding discrete targets that are positioned in a way to exacerbate collateral damage and use our ROE against us. The global instantaneous news cycle permits little leeway from this truth. Targets hiding in plain sight in urban environments or among fishing fleets are now the norm as are those that do not otherwise seem as they appear (decoys and military units disguised as civilian platforms). High value targets in future asymmetric fights against state or non-state actors are as likely to be key individuals or civilian looking maritime collection platforms as they are tank divisions and enemy capital ships.

The way to overcome these challenges is through persistent stare intelligence -- and fast moving TACAIR just doesn't provide it. The foregoing isn't intended to come across as as an anti-CVN position. It is however, an indictment of the acquisition of new sea-based TACAIR for the mid-to-long term.

As we've noted before, these sorts of capabilities enable even smaller ships to participate in a larger fight by extending the range of sensors and an ability to engage what they find. As the author notes:

The need to extend the reach of surface vessels, I carefully avoid the use of the term major combatant because vessels lower down the flightiness ladder can equally benefit, with both ISTAR and attack capabilities is obvious.

We could still deliver improved land attack capabilities without an investment in maritime UAV’s because target identification and guidance can come from other ‘platforms’ but the availability of an organic UAV would greatly enhance the ability of a frigate or destroyer without requiring others or relying on a manned helicopter where it might be difficult to deploy.

The past decade of combat has created an insatiable demand for persistent ISR by our ground commanders. In a war at sea scenario, the demand for these platforms will be equal, if not greater due to the vast distances involved. We should err on the side of acquiring as many of these scouting platforms as we can afford, even if it means trade-offs such as buying fewer BMD platforms and more smaller, cheaper ships to house the UAVs, or eliminating other high ticket programs such as the F-35C.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

H/T Lee

Foreign Entanglements Episode II, and Airpower

A couple of quick notes. First, episode 2 of Foreign Entanglements is up; this episode feature Matthew Duss of the Center for American Progress against Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of FPI: Not much maritime content, but certainly some national security talk. In the near future I hope that have a more maritime-themed episode. Second, my WPR column last week was yet another unhinged screed against airpower. Check it out.

The Proof Is In The Pudding

The details of the FY13 budget are beginning to drift out, and it seems that the much ballyhooed "pivot" to Asia--and by inference, to Naval and Aerospace power--is more heat than light.  As I discussed on last week's Midrats internet radio show, there are two ways to demonstrate budget emphasis.  One is to spend more on something, and the other is to spend less, but have the magnitude of the cut be less than other priorities, creating an "emphasis by subtraction".  This is what it appears to have occurred in the FY13 budget. 

News reports and Pentagon statements indicate that the Navy will retire 7 cruisers and 2 LSD's early, while cutting its shipbuilding totals 28% from the FY12 estimate for 2013-2017 (57 ships) to 41 ships in the same period with this budget.  Retiring assets early from a Fleet already stressed to meet its commitments, and then eating your shipbuilding "seed corn",  strike me as odd ways to demonstrate an emphasis on Seapower.  I've talked to some in the Navy who suggest that under the new plan, we'll be able to field as many ships in 2020 as we do now, which is put forward as evidence of great progress and victories within the Pentagon bureaucracy. How this reconciles with the fact that the Fleet we have NOW does not meet the needs of the COCOMS--let alone the Fleet some project to be necessary to underwrite East Asian security in the face of Chinese expansion and modernization--evades me. 

For navalists, the current Republican Presidential primary has included several references to Fleet size, some of which have had issue taken with them in the press (NOTE:  I am actively supporting Mitt Romney for President).  In this one, Walter Pincus seizes upon what he believes is a lack of detail among the candidates when discussing the Fleet.  His suggestion that Romney's use of "9 ships is a year out of date" (to summarize yearly shipbuilding levels) ignores the basic fact that in the last year in which we have complete information (FY11), the Navy procured only 9 ships.  He then goes on to point to an erroneous figure of 55 ships over the next five years (the number in the FY12 budget was 57), while hedging his criticism by saying "...the fiscal 2013 budget due shortly could change things....".  Indeed it has, again, by dramatically cutting the number of ships to be built, by retiring useful ships early, and by deferring the acquisition of critical submarines.  This again--in a strategy emphasizing an immense maritime theater and the Seapower and Aerospace power necessary to dominate it. 

Clearly, the number of hulls as a measure of Naval power ain't what it used to be.  However, the suggestion that networks and precision guided munitions make hull counts unimportant points again to the basic physics problem that Naval planners have faced since the Phoenicians--a ship can only be in one place at a time.  Quantity does have a quality all its own, and as I've advocated many times on this site, networks and PGM's are of incalculable value when the Navy is fighting; however they are less important when the Navy is doing what it does the vast majority of the time--deterring and assuring.  We are sliding into the trap of sizing our Navy to fight and win wars only, de-emphasizing the critical role of what Tom Barnett has termed "system maintenance".  The more we move toward a force designed ONLY to fight wars, the more likely such a Fleet will be to become a magnificent anachronism--powerful, networked, and top-notch--but operating largely in the Virginia Capes and San Diego opareas. 

Bryan McGrath

Costa Concordia Reconstruction

For those interested in the seamanship aspects of the Costa Concordia disaster, this may be interesting:

Reconstruction of the Costa Concordia Tragedy, Narration by John Konrad from gCaptain.com on Vimeo.

Narration by John Konrad, CEO gCaptain.com and USCG Licensed Master Mariner Unlimited.

McGrath Guest on MIDRATS Internet Radio Show

While most of you were watching the Pats/Ravens game last evening, Sal and Eagle1 were kind enough to have me on their Internet Radio Show "Midrats" for the full hour.  We cover a lot of ground here, and I hope you find the dialogue useful.


Bryan McGrath