Filling in the Gaps

CENTCOM has asked for and will be getting some money for increased capabilities specific to Iran.

In a “couple of cases,” Iran improved capabilities “faster than we anticipated,” he said.

The Command requested the additional funds because “our growing reliance on our maritime forces requires an ability to project power against asymmetric threats, particularly in the confined and crowded sea lanes” of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, Major David Nevers, spokesman for the Central Command, said in an e-mailed statement.

Funds were shifted from Pentagon biological and chemical weapons defensive programs and Navy and Air Force shipbuilding, satellite and aircraft programs deemed to have excess funds or experiencing delays.

Congress approved a $28 million shift to provide six U-2 spy planes with upgraded satellite links that increase their capability to “provide real-time, high bandwidth video feeds to ships, ground forces and command and control centers,” according to the reprogramming documents.

The article goes on to cover many, many of the reprogramming changes. Here are a few more.

Congress also backed the shift of $10 million to increase funding for a joint Navy-National Reconnaissance Office program to equip the service’s new anti-radar missile -- the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile made by Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK) - - with a “Special Target Engagement” capability that includes a broadcast receiver...

An additional $4.8 million was approved for integrating new sensors on a Navy underwater vehicle “for very shallow water- mine countermeasures missions,” according to the documents.

The Central Command also won congressional approval to shift $3.7 million to developing a defense against drone attacks. The system will cover “vulnerable areas below typical air-defense radar coverage areas,” according to the documents...

Congress also approved plans to accelerate installation on coastal patrol craft of the “MK 38 Mod 2” system, which includes the laser-tracker for precision aiming of machine guns. Lawmakers rejected the planned source of $4 million in funds so the Comptroller is looking to other sources, a document said.

As described by BAE Systems Plc (BA/) and subcontractor Boeing Co. (BA), the tactical laser system “brings high precision accuracy against surface and air targets such as small boats and unmanned aerial systems. The system also provides the ability to deliver different levels of laser energy, depending on the target and mission objectives.”

Interesting stuff. The Iranian Navy fights with a mix of low tech and high tech, and uses their low tech capabilities to hopefully disorient and distract US naval forces so that their high tech capabilities have a chance of success. The US Navy is trained and equipped to fight both, but US Navy warships are better optimized to fight the high tech threats than the low tech.

It is not difficult to interpret what the CENTCOM folks are thinking with each request. The U-2 modifications are intended to give the best information for strike packages. The Anti-Radiation missiles are to knock out radar systems that would be used from Iranian truck mounted and other mobile missile systems against ships within range from the Iranian coast (or islands). The Gatling Guns and other point defense system modifications like laser pointers are intended to increase capabilities dealing with low flying drones or small boat swarm attacks.

The swarm attacks are particularly challenging, because fighting them is much easier said than done. Iranian swarm tactics are designed to negate the LOS defensive weapon systems used on US Navy ships, which would allow the swarm to close to target rapidly at high speed - how high of speed depending upon sea state and other factors. From about 8 miles out, the Iranians use 107mm rockets to create LOS obstructions between their target and the swarm - essentially a wall of water - that makes it very difficult for precision targeting the obstructed small boats of the swarm - largely because speed and distance become difficult to track.

Once within very close range - say less than a mile - many of the larger defensive weapons have difficulty hitting very fast boats on the water due to their close range, which is exactly what the small boat swarm wants - an old fashion gunfight. The laser targeting systems on US Navy guns should help US Navy sailors target more efficiently in that close range gunfight where boats could potentially be moving around the ship at speeds of up to 60 mph.

Finding the swarms and preventing them from getting too close to US Navy warships is the desired course of action in any naval war against Iran, but it is much easier said than done. In many cases even today, US Navy ships may not even small, fast smugglers in the confined waters of the strait or other locations in the Gulf until they are already within that 8 mile zone. The small boats are stealthy and fast, and all kinds of various environmental or geographic conditions can make them very difficult to pick up on radar.

Even during the recent high profile transit of the USS Carl Vinson into the Persian Gulf earlier this year, reporters noted that small boat smugglers were able to get remarkably close to the US Navy ships. It can be a tough problem, particularly if the warships are dealing with anti-ship missile attack from more high tech capabilities fielded by Iran at the same time.

I don't know about you, but if I was the CO of a destroyer in the Persian Gulf when war breaks out, I'd want to have as many Marines on the ship as I could safely berth (including extra corpsman) with as many big guns as they can operate (and a few spares). When at sea my DDG would have the silhouette of a WWII destroyer with as many muzzles as possible sticking out of the ship. It might create more work for the safety officer, but based on all tactical writing I have seen related to Iranian low tech naval tactics, one can never have too many guns when fighting the Iranians.

Leaking, By Design

The sophisticated readers of this blog already know that leaks in Washington are sometimes controlled and vetted at the highest levels.  I think we have one of those right here, delivered unto the New York Times' crack military reporters and picked up by the wires (as was clearly hoped).  The Administration appears to be trying to foster a serious sense of foreboding, perhaps in order to isolate Israel.  I wonder which is more likely to strike Iran--an isolated Israel, or an Israel that feels secure? 

Bryan McGrath

Keepers

And this is why the Navy picked the cruisers for decommissioning.

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon wants the Navy to keep seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers the service planned to retire to meet congressionally mandated budget cuts.

McKeon, R-Calif., said in a March 14 speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Calif., that the ships are needed to secure U.S. interests in the Pacific, the focal point of the Obama administration’s new national security strategy. His plan would call for funding needed upgrades to keep the ships — all of which were commissioned in the 1990s — for their full 35-year service lives.

“Though the administration says we’re shifting to Asia, they’re actually reducing the number of ships and planes we have available to respond to contingencies anywhere,” McKeon said. “We will try to hold back cuts to the Navy’s cruiser force, finding the money for our cruisers to undergo proper upgrades, instead of mothballing vital ships needed to sustain the shift to Asia.”

The question I have been asking myself since the beginning is how many cruisers the Navy expects Congress to save. 100%? 75%? 50%? Both the House and the Senate has several members that would prefer to keep these vessels. It isn't just the capabilities of the ships, it is the workload for the yards and industrial base support that needs these ships to stay around.

The thing is though, I don't think the Navy will keep all 7. The USS Port Royal (CG 73) is a perfect example, ever since hitting the reef off Hawaii to become the first AEGIS ashore asset for the United States, that ship has reportedly not been right. Cracks in the hull are just the beginning, the bottom line is the SPY radar is built into the superstructure of these ships - a little damage from grounding can go a long way towards causing serious combat related problems.

So my guess is Congress will find a way to keep at least 2 and as many as 6 of the cruisers. It really isn't as much money as you think, and if modernization is fully funded for each of these cruisers, most of them should be able to serve 40 years with expectations of being viable and competitive naval assets.

Comparisons You Don't Want to Hear

The 4 cruisers being retired this year carry 520 VLS cells between them all. If each was loaded with half Tomahawks and half Standard missiles, and all 260 Tomahawks were fired at targets 750 nautical miles away from the ships and all 260 Standard missiles were fired against enemy aircraft 100 nautical miles away from the ships...

How many DAYS would it take for a single CVN with a modern CVW of 44 Super Hornets or Joint Strike Fighters to fire 260 AA missiles at targets 100 nautical miles away from the aircraft carrier and deliver 260 1000 lb bombs 750 nautical miles away from the aircraft carrier?

There actually is a right answer, with some margin of error in estimation. Don't forget logistics, reload times, and buddy tanking. The sortie rate for a CVW at range is a joke, because one has to pull in USAF tanking to make the numbers look even less uncompetitive.

I had to break out my little Harpoon 3.7 ANW simulator to do the math, keeping in mind CVNs only fly 14 hours a day - which is why the US Navy actually requires 2 CVNs for continuous 24 hour operations... for no more than 72 hours under optimal conditions. It is amazing how little people actually know about modern carrier operations, unless you have served on a carrier. Why SWOs concede the carrier as a dominant naval platform in the 21st century based on what I see today is a mystery to me, aircraft carriers aren't just expensive, they are on a steady flank speed course to irrelevance thanks primarily to the naval aviation community that has made land attack their primary capability - despite the fact it cannot even be done at long range by a carrier without land based tanker support.

People may look at the retirement of 4 CGs and think the worst possible case scenario is that the US Navy is retiring old battleships before Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, but if you do the math and compare value in terms of cost and capability, given the way war has changed at sea in the 21st century - there is a good argument for an analogy that the retirement of the 4 CGs in 2012 is akin to retiring Enterprise, Ranger, Yorktown, and Saratoga on December 8th, 1941.

Luckily we are holding tight to the Nimitz class - the proverbial Oklahoma, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee of 1941.

If it was even possible there is truth that CGs are a more critical, relevant asset to the 21st century fleet today than the big deck aircraft carrier, would you even admit it was true?

Is anyone able to accept that aircraft carriers in 2012 might be a wasted asset for the cost? Aircraft carriers come with a proven track record since WWII against major naval powers like North Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Iran, Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Argentina, and hot spots like Somalia - the historical record clearly articulates the infallibility of the modern aircraft carrier.

I dunno about you, but unless I am fighting small time military power with limited capabilities and training like Syria or Iran, I would rather have the cruisers than the aircraft carrier. It isn't the platform so much as it is the CVW we somehow pretend can field a magical mass of aircraft quickly - thus utilize the size and space of a big deck aircraft carrier when we need it. Where is the evidence that is possible? Where is even a single data point the procurement system could do it? MRAP is the biggest success in modern procurement history - and we think that kind of model can quickly populate carrier decks?

Until I see a US Navy CVW with a fixed wing ASW platform or a legitimate carrier based tanker capability tested and fielded, I am going to find it very difficult to take the naval aviation community seriously when all threat analysis from every corner of the globe highlights submarines as the fastest growing threat to the maritime domain, and the tyranny of range as the greatest threat to naval forces in the Pacific. The Navy is spending about $50 million more on the JSF than the F-18 to get less range with a moderate increase in stealth. And the CVW will still be left with no fixed wing ASW and no organic tanking.

And btw, you'll still need the 4 major surface combatants to protect the carrier, just so the Navy can hit targets at greater cost and at a slower pace. Some people say that because the Navy has a tighter budget the aircraft carrier needs to be cut. I don't think that's a valid reason at all, what I would rather see is a better debate between communities of the Navy why the aircraft carrier is a better investment than other aspects of the fleet - or a better investment than similar capabilities provided by other services. Show me that debate, and I'll show you an organization that is thinking. Until then, pass the hippy pipe so I can keep smoking the wacky tabacky that argues the infallibility of the modern big deck aircraft carrier in modern naval warfare.

More Littoral Combat Ships

Interesting this was released by the Navy on their website, but nothing from the Defense contracts page? Curious, I do not know why. Here is the official Navy release.

The Navy issued contract modifications to Lockheed Martin Corporation and Austal USA under their respective littoral combat ship (LCS) block buy contracts to add funding for construction of two fiscal year 2012 littoral combat ships each, March 16.

This is the third funding increment for each contractor under their previously awarded, fixed-price incentive "block buy" contracts for the design and construction of up to 10 LCS Flight 0+ ships. The two block buy contracts provide for the acquisition of a total of up to 20 littoral combat ships from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015, subject to availability of appropriations.

Under the block buy contract with Lockheed Martin Corporation, $715,000,351 was added for construction of two fiscal year 2012 LCS ships. Under the block buy contract with Austal USA, $691,599,014 was added for construction of two fiscal year 2012 LCS ships. These ships will be built at Marinette Marine Corporation in Marinette, Wis., and Austal USA in Mobile, Ala., respectively.

The prices for the fiscal year 2012 ships were determined based on the competitive, LCS dual block buy contracts awarded Dec. 29, 2010, and also includes values associated with the incorporation of approved change orders funded for the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 ships previously awarded in the block buy contracts.

"The Navy is successfully driving down costs in the Littoral Combat Ship program," said Rear Adm. James Murdoch, program executive officer for Littoral Combat Ships. "We are continuing to execute the dual award strategy for these ships. Efforts to stabilize design, improve production planning, invest in shipbuilder improvements and leverage long-term vendor agreements all within the framework of a competitive fixed-price contract have returned this program to the level of affordability necessary for the Navy to move forward with construction at efficient rates in support of the 55-ship LCS requirement."

The funding obligated is for the ninth through the twelfth ships in the LCS class.

Worth noting, back on March 14th (last Wednesday) these two contracts moved through the DoD.

Lockheed Martin Corp, Baltimore, Md., is being awarded a $33,649,198 modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-11-C-2300) to exercise options for special studies, analyses, review and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services. This effort will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs. Work will be performed in Hampton, Va. (32 percent); Marinette, Wis. (27 percent); Moorestown, N.J. (22 percent); and Washington, D.C. (19 percent). Work is expected to be complete by March 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.

Austal USA, Mobile, Ala., is being awarded a $19,692,295 modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-11-C-2301) to exercise options for special studies, analyses, review and class service efforts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. This effort will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs. Work will be performed in Mobile, Ala. (72 percent) and Pittsfield, Mass. (28 percent). Work is expected to be complete by March 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.

If you scroll down to March 14th on Tim Colton's website, he asks some interesting questions with a bit of commentary:

The funds are to be used to assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs. Oh, goody. How about just not spending the money? That would save $50 million right there. Hey guys, these are fixed-price contracts: the contractors should be doing everything they can to reduce costs and schedule at their own expense. It's in their interests. This way the Government pays them to reduce costs and the contractors keep the savings. Sometimes one wonders if there's anyone in NAVSEA with even half a brain.

It is a fair question, the Navy is spending $50 million on LCS production changes, and expects to save how much money as a result?

A little math. The unit cost of the Lockheed Martin ships would be $357.5 million apiece. The unit cost for the Austal ships would be $345.8 million apiece. The combined total for both contracts is $1,406,599,365. There was $79.5 million in prior-year advanced procurement funding for each one of these four ships. According to the FY2012 budget, the estimated procurement cost including prior-year advanced funding was $1,881,600,000. That leaves $395,500,635 which I presume is government furnished equipment. While those costs aren't equal between the two ship classes, divided by four that averages out to $98,875,158.75 in government furnished equipment cost per ship.

So... for the Lockheed Martin version of the Littoral Combat Ship, we are talking about $357.5M + $19.9M advanced prior year + $98,875,158.75 for a final total cost of $475,375,158.75 per ship in FY12 dollars.

For the Austal version of the Littoral Combat Ship, we are talking about $345.8M + $19.9M advanced prior year + $98,875,158.75 for a final total cost of $464,575,158.75 per ship in FY12 dollars.

If my notes on how Section 121(c) and (d) of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2024) worked for the Littoral Combat Ship cost cap, it was agreed in that the $480 million cost cap in FY2005 dollars was something like $538 million in FY11 dollars.

With the latest set of contracts, the Navy appears to be at least $60 million under the cost cap with the Lockheed Martin version and at least $70 million under the cost cap with the Austal version. Combined, for the four ships, that is some $260+ million under the cost cap for the fiscal year. My point is simple - that $260 million needs to be putting out at least 4 quality Littoral Combat Ship modules - at least 1 for each ship - or the Navy is wasting taxpayer money.

All of this suggests the shipbuilding side of the Littoral Combat Ship seems to be getting on track. It is past time to start seeing something interesting, useful, productive, and noteworthy on the module side. Without high quality modules to field, the ships are worthless.

PS: USS Little Rock (LCS 9)? Go hogs! WPS!