Fisheries, Piracy, and Stability in Somalia

Life in Mogadishu is returning to some semblance of economic normalcy as shown by this catch (hammerhead, mako, swordfish, and tuna) in the fish market. Thanks mostly to the dedication of AMISOM contributors Uganda and Burundi and the TFG’s unexpected staying power (a bit of Uncle Sam's money for ACOTA didn't hurt, either), al Shabaab has been driven from the Somali capital. The al Qaeda affiliate is not on the ropes yet, but has also been squeezed in the south by the incursions of Kenya and Ethiopia. More on that topic another time.

The importance of fisheries and their protection to coastal-based economies can’t be underestimated. As an example, revenues from the UK’s fisheries enforcement supported free university educations for Falklands Islands teenagers following the 1982 war. One of Somalia's other major problems (there are many) is of course, piracy. The negative economic impacts of piracy are often mentioned in terms of global shipping disruption, higher insurance and security costs, etc., but the price to law abiding Somali people is also tangible. There are indications that the populations in regions where pirates still operate are fed up with their criminality and that people realize the negative attention piracy has brought on these areas. Another good sign is that local policing and military efforts against pirates are picking up steam ashore.

The initial rationalization of Somalia’s pirates was that foreign fishermen and other vessels' disposal of hazardous waste in Somali waters had put them out of business. The narrative persists, but the reality is that the motivation of today’s pirates is based on outright greed and criminality. However, as evidenced by the number of Asian fishing vessels captured by the pirates', it's likely that illegal fishing continues in Somalia's waters, and will continue even after Somalia piracy dissipates.

I've mentioned many times in this blog as well as other forums that securing Somalia's waters -- and not just against piracy -- is one of the keys to long term stability in Somalia. To date, these efforts have come in fits and starts. One of the latest controversies involves UN opposition to the creation of the Puntland Marine Police Force. The UN must realize that their inability to drive enforcement of the various resolutions the body has passed is partially responsible for the mess in which Somalia finds itself in now and that as long as governments are not willing to directly intervene to train and equip Somalia's navy, coast guard, and marine police forces, indirect efforts involving private security firms funded by various entities will fill the void. Regardless, were any sort of U.S. or international cohesiveness on Somalia policy suddenly to materialize, maritime security capacity building efforts focused on fisheries protection should become a top priority. A properly regulated fishing industry could replace and more equitably distribute at least some of the income derived from piracy in Somalia's economy.

And speaking of piracy, the latest issue of USCG Proceedings is dedicated to the subject.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Platforms Without Payloads

Over the next decade, maintaining the Navy’s war-fighting edge and addressing fiscal constraints will require significant changes in how we develop the force. We will need to shift from a focus on platforms to instead focus on what the platform carries. We have experience in this model. Aircraft carriers, amphibious ships and the littoral combat ships are inherently reconfigurable, with sensor and weapon systems that can evolve over time for the expected mission. As we apply that same modular approach to each of our capabilities, the weapons, sensors, unmanned systems, and electronic-warfare systems that a platform deploys will increasingly become more important than the platform itself.

Navy 2025: Forward Warfighters, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Proceedings Magazine, December 2011

From page 110 of the recent GAO report (PDF) looking at Selected Acquisition Report for the December 2011 reporting period:

The Navy plans to purchase 24, and deliver 9, LCS seaframes by 2016; however, it will not have a single fully capable mission module at that time. As of September 2011, the program planned to conduct a key DOD review in January 2012; however, this review, which includes a program cost estimate and technology maturity assessment, has been delayed to an unspecified date in 2012.

In that Proceedings article published in December 2011 the phrase Platforms and Payloads was used to describe how the Navy, with a smaller fleet, can use payloads as a force multiplier to insure capabilities are sustained in difficult budget times. I like the phrase, but I do note the irony that according to the current plan for Littoral Combat Ship modules as discussed in this GAO report on the latest Selected Acquisition Reports, even if Admiral Jonathan Greenert is CNO for two consecutive terms - on his watch he will be fielding 0 platforms with zero mature payloads, which isn't exactly the same thing he wrote about.

For the record, it looks like the ASW module has the least risk because the Navy intends to use technologies already fielded in other Navy's, but the MIW and SUW modules appear to be struggling for capability. The LCS can certainly be used with partial modules and with new modules not mentioned, but in my opinion the ASW, MIW, and SUW modules are the ones that matter most right now.

Looking at a recent article on US/China rivalry

The relationship between China and America has been characterized by many as complex. Even with the bitter partisanship in Washington, most democrats and republicans seem to have no problem looking at China as a threat and using China as a scapegoat for economic problems in America. I think it's also quite clear that the US military views China as its most likely foe in the future regardless of how many confidence building measures are proposed. Of course, the Chinese government officially try to avoid overly confrontational language, even though PLA generals and Global Time often voice strong opposition to America.

Recently, I read this article where it talks about how people in the Chinese ruling elite really feel about America. Here are a few really interesting snippet.

The senior leadership of the Chinese government increasingly views the competition between the United States and China as a zero-sum game, with China the likely long-range winner if the American economy and domestic political system continue to stumble

China views the United States as a declining power, but at the same time believes that Washington is trying to fight back to undermine, and even disrupt, the economic and military growth that point to China’s becoming the world’s most powerful country

the authors say the level of strategic distrust between the two countries has become so corrosive that if not corrected the countries risk becoming open antagonists.

In contrast, China has mounting self-confidence in its own economic and military strides, particularly the closing power gap since the start of the Iraq war. In 2003, he argues, America’s gross domestic product was eight times as large as China’s, but today it is less than three times larger.

the Chinese leadership, backed by the domestic news media and the education system, believes that China’s turn in the world has arrived, and that it is the United States that is “on the wrong side of history.”

China’s financial successes, starting with weathering the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, the execution of events like the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010, contrast with America’s “alarming” deficit, sluggish economic recovery and polarized domestic politics

None of these above views are surprising, since I've read all of these view points from different sources and at least partially agree with most of the above points. It's particularly hard to address all of them, so I hope I don't go completely off track with my thoughts here. I think this is an extremely important topic. I know this can be a sensitive topic and most of my views are probably not popular, but I can only state how I see things. I do apologize in advance if I offend anyone.

The first question is whether or not US is a declining power. I think if we compare where US is right now to where it was at the collapse of Soviet Union, there is no question that it has declined. More than anything else, I think the two prolonged wars in Middle East that are operated completely on debts have really accelerated the American decline. In the coming years, I think it will decline further when compared against the rising economies of China, India and Brazil. In several areas like financial prowess and manufacturing power, China has already caught up or surpassed America. In other areas like military, higher education/research and cultural influence, it's hard to see when China will ever catch up to America. The areas that China will likely to gain ground on America in the coming years is the overall economy and political influence around the world. Another thing to consider is that American allies in the Western world are also on the decline due to debts issues, decreasing productivity and population decline. So if we just look at the current economic and finance situation in America and the rest of the Western world, it would seem like China (and other rising powers like India and Brazil) are poised to take over.

The second question is whether or not the China is actually ready to take over from America. I think the answer to this is no. A lot of times, we are blinded by the 30+ years of economic growth in China and fail to see the problems in the country. The problems that China and America face are quite different. America is facing huge debts problems from years of excessive public and private sector spending. American Federal, state and municipal governments faces much financial problem in the coming years related to the runaway health care, social security and public sector pension costs. China's government is not burdened by these excessive public sector spending problems, but it faces a lot more social problems. I have always that pollution and corruption are China's biggest problems. Now, I have to add two more to the list: the extreme male/female population imbalance and the increasingly unsustainable wealth gap between the rich and the poor. The first problem results in a lot of frustrated single men, large prostitution industry and escalating home prices (from women demanding owning home before marriage), Having a lot of frustrated single men have historically been a really bad social situation (more conflict and wars). The second problem is exaggerated by the absolute wastefulness of many rich Chinese people and how these people made their money in the first place. These people make Wall Street bankers look like Mother Theresa's. So even though China has gotten a lot wealthier, there are serious social tension within the country toward the wealthy and the corrupted officials that are further exaggerated by frustration over male/female imbalance, lack of free speech, inflation and very polluted environment. The Chinese government really has more things to worry about at home. On top of all of this, China's banks and local governments are also grappling with debt problems from all of the recent economically unfeasible public sector projects. I think the Western bank and public sector debt problems are larger, but China's debt problems are ready to explode too. The Chinese leadership would be making a huge mistake if it overestimates itself and underestimates America.

The third question is whether or not America is really trying to hold back China. I think the answer to this is yes. China's goal is to create a multi-polar world where it assumes regional hegemony. American goal is to remain as the sole superpower in a unipolar world where no other country establishes local hegemony. Clearly, the two countries have different political goals and will clash against each other. Currently, this is playing out in South East Asia where China is trying to achieve regional hegemony, but America has managed to inject itself back into the region and prevent that. I think this will continue to play out in the future as long as the two nations have such polar opposite political vision. I think that once India grows powerful enough, it will also clash with America on the very same issues. Just think about what would happen if India becomes confident enough to assert its own view points on countries like Iran, Afghanistan and demand greater say in energy coming out of the Middle East.

The fourth question is whether or not this is a zero sum game. I think the answer is yes and no. The two countries can obviously work together to address a lot of the security threats that we face today. At the same time, China cannot achieve regional hegemony with America around nor can it be part of a multi-polar world without America loosing influence. There is also the scenario where both country looses influence if the social problems in China blows up and the debts problems in America blows up. We are already seeing EU declining significantly in the recent years due to its financial and debts problems. The other part of the zero sum game is economy. In the near term, the two countries need each other to have continued economic growth. If one country suffers a large slow down, it will have large affect on the other country. As I've said in the past, a trade war would have crippling effects on both countries. In the long term, I think it is somewhat of a zero sum game. The world has finite natural resources and energy sources. As we approach peak oil, the cost of energy will simply grow higher and higher. If all of the countries are battling for the same finite resources to keep economy going, then they will clearly be in competition with each other. We already see some of that with China signing deals around the world for oil reserves and mining rights to different natural resources. This is another area where India will also really be competing with China and America on. Just imagine the energy and natural resource demand of China and India if they all seek to live the same quality of life as Americans. As the world population expands, we will also be battling over basic necessities like water and food.

In the end of the day, I think both countries face a lot of challenges ahead. In their current path, China and America clearly has confrontation world view, but that may change in the future. If China goes through a period of social instability or economic meltdown, who knows how its foreign policy will change. Looking at its 5000 years of history, China has always been a country that concentrated on itself. If America goes through anything close to Greece style debts crisis, I think that would have to cutback on its role in the world affairs. I think India will be a very large player in the future as its population and economy continues to grow. I think Brazil will also have a very strong voice in the future, whereas countries like Japan, UK and the rest of EU will continue to be in decline. In 15 years, we won't just be talking about a G2 kind of world. With energy and natural resources become increasingly scarce, we could see conflicts over them in the future. More than anything, I think that's where I see the highest possibility of a major future conflict.

I'll Take DDG for 1000 Alex

So you want to talk about something Navy related and interesting? Let's begin with some excerpts from Additional Analysis and Oversight Required to Support the Navy's Future Surface Combatant Plans - GAO-12-113, Jan 24, 2024 as cited in Ronald O'Rourke's latest CRS report China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (PDF).

the Navy’s choice of DDG 51 as the platform for AMDR limits the overall size of the radar to one that will be unable to meet the Navy’s desired (objective) IAMD [integrated air and missile defense] capabilities. If the Navy selects a 12-foot AMDR—which may reduce the impacts on the ship and design—it may not be able to meet the requirements for AMDR as currently stated in the Navy’s draft capabilities document....

[The] Flight III [DDG-51] with a 14-foot AMDR will not be powerful enough to meet the Navy’s objective, or desired IAMD capabilities. The shipyards and the Navy have determined that 14-foot radar arrays are the largest that can be accommodated within the confines of the existing DDG 51 configuration. Adding a radar larger than 14 feet to DDG 51 is unlikely without major structural changes to the ship. AMDR is being specifically developed to be a scalable radar—meaning that it can be increased in size and power to provide enhanced capability against emerging threats.

According to AMDR contractors, the Navy had originally contracted for an investigation of a Variant 2 AMDR with a sensitivity of SPY+40,144 but this effort was cancelled. They added that the maximum feasible size of AMDR would be dictated by the ship and radar power and cooling demands, but that they had investigated versions as large as 36 feet. Leveraging AMDR’s scalability will not be possible on DDG 51 without major changes, such as a new deckhouse or adding to the dimensions of the hullform itself by broadening the beam of the ship or adding a new section (called a plug) to the middle of the ship to add length. Navy officials have stated that adding a plug to DDG 51 is not currently a viable option due to the complexity, and that a new ship design is preferable to a plugged DDG 51.

The Navy has not yet determined the size of AMDR for Flight III, and two sizes are under consideration: a 14-foot AMDR with a sensitivity of SPY+15, and a 12-foot AMDR with a sensitivity of SPY+11. According to a draft AMDR Capability Development Document, the Navy has identified that an AMDR with SPY+15 will meet operational performance requirements against the threat environment illustrated in the [destroyer] Radar/Hull Study. This document also notes that a significantly larger SPY+30 AMDR is required to meet the Navy’s desired capability (known as objective) against the threat environment illustrated in the MAMDJF AOA. The Navy could choose to change these requirements. The MAMDJF AOA eliminated the DDG 51-based SPY+15 solution from consideration in part due to the limited radar capability, and identified that a radar closer to SPY+30 power with a signal to noise ratio 1,000 times better than SPY+0 and an array size over 20 feet is required to address the most challenging threats. If a 12-foot array is chosen, the Navy will be selecting a capability that is less than the “marginally adequate” capability offered by a SPY+15 radar as defined by the Radar/Hull Study red team assessment. According to Navy officials, only through adding additional square footage can the Navy effectively make large improvements in the sensitivity of the radar the SPY+30 radar considered in the MAMDJF AOA could only be carried by a newly designed cruiser or a modified San Antonio [LPD-17] class [amphibious] ship, and only a modified DDG 1000 [destroyer] and could carry the approximately SPY+25 radar. According to the draft AMDR Capability Development Document, the Navy’s desired IAMD capability can only be accommodated on a larger, currently unspecified ship. As part of the MAMDJF AOA, the Navy identified that DDG 1000 can accommodate a SPY+25 radar. As part of a technical submission to the Navy, BIW—the lead designer for DDG 1000147—also identified a possible design for a 21-foot radar on DDG 1000. The Navy did not include a variant with this size radar in the Radar/Hull Study.

According to senior Navy officials, since the MAMDJF AOA was released the Navy has changed its concept on the numbers of Navy ships that will be operating in an IAMD environment. Rather than one or a small number of ships conducting IAMD alone and independently managing the most taxing threat environments without support, the Navy now envisions multiple ships that they can operate in concert with different ground and spacebased sensor assets to provide cueing for AMDR when targets are in the battlespace. This cueing would mean that the shooter ship could be told by the off-board sensors where to look for a target, allowing for earlier detection and increased size of the area that can be covered. According to the Navy, this concept—referred to as sensor netting—can be used to augment the reduced radar capability afforded by a 12 or 14-foot AMDR as compared to the larger radars studied in the MAMDJF AOA. For example, the Navy cited the use of the Precision Tracking Space System program as an example of sensors that could be leveraged. However, this program (envisioned as a constellation of missile tracking satellites) is currently in the conceptual phase, and the independent Radar/Hull Study red team stated that the development timeline for this system is too long to consider being able to leverage this system for Flight III. Navy officials told us that another option would be to leverage the newly completed Cobra Judy Replacement radar ship and its very powerful dual-band radar to provide cueing for DDG 51s. This cueing could allow the DDG 51s to operate a smaller AMDR and still be effective. The Cobra Judy Replacement ship is comparatively cheaper than DDG 51s (approximately $1.7 billion for the lead ship), and was commercially designed and built. However, it is not a combatant ship, which would limit its employment in a combat environment and make it difficult to deploy to multiple engagement locations.

Senior Navy officials told us that the concept of sensor netting is not yet well defined, and that additional analysis is required to determine what sensor capabilities currently exist or will be developed in the future, as well as how sensor netting might be conceptualized for Flight III. Sensor netting requires not only deployment of the appropriate sensors and for these sensors to work alone, but they also need to be able to share usable data in real-time with Aegis in the precise manner required to support BMD engagements. Though sharing data among multiple sensors can provide greater capabilities than just using individual standalone sensors, officials told us that every sensor system has varying limitations on its accuracy, and as more sensors are networked together and sharing data, these accuracy limitations can compound. Further, though there have been recent successes in sharing data during BMD testing, DOD weapons testers responsible for overseeing BMD testing told us that there have also been issues with sending data between sensors. Although sensor technology will undoubtedly evolve in the future, how sensor netting will be leveraged by Flight III and integrated with Navy tactics to augment Aegis and the radar capability of Flight III is unknown...

The Navy’s choices for Flight III will likely be unsuitable for the most stressful threat environments it expects to face....

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following three actions:...

2. Report to Congress in its annual long-range shipbuilding plan on its plans for a future, larger surface combatant, carrying a more capable version of AMDR and the costs and quantities of this ship....

DOD concurred with our second recommendation that the Navy report to Congress in its annual long-range shipbuilding plan on its plans for a future larger surface combatant carrying a more capable version of AMDR. Given the assessments that the Navy is currently conducting on surface combatants, the Navy’s next submission should include more specific information about its planned future surface combatant acquisitions.

The AMDR is going to determine what ballistic missile defense capabilities the surface Navy will have in the future, there is apparently still some confusion on the AMDR within the Navy. It is very much unclear what the future will hold as funding gets tight, because there is clearly no policy from the Obama administration right now that is informing a strategy that would then inform the DoD how to make decisions - FY13 is purely a budget shell game in the DoD, not a capabilities driven assessment. For example, that X-Band radar recently deployed in the Pacific to monitor the upcoming North Korean rocket launch is not funded in the FY13 budget, so even the technology we apparently need right now isn't protected for next year. For more on the latest budget news related to ballistic missile defense, see Chris Cavas's latest here.

The biggest question though is AMDR and the DDG-51 Flight III. To follow up on that topic, I highlight this Janes Analysis from February 3, 2024 titled Analysis: Arleigh Burke update costs and challenges mount up (subscription only). Pay attention folks, this is probably the most important article written about DDG-51 Flight III to date, and yet another reason why a Janes subscription is worth paying for (if you can afford it).

Efforts to adapt the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (DDG 51) hull design - now more than 30 years old - to support the US Navy's (USN's) next-generation ballistic missile defence (BMD) radar are becoming costlier and more complicated than the service initially advertised.

A Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) report has indicated that space and cooling limitations within the hull mean that complex design changes will probably be required if the proposed Flight III Arleigh Burke design is to accommodate the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).

FYI, the report is called DDG51 Flight Upgrade Study Year 1 Technical Report.

Officials at NAVSEA have suggested that a 'high-end' Flight III destroyer could cost USD1 billion more than the navy's USD2.6 billion estimate for the lead ship. Furthermore, potential for growth will be severely limited and the new ship may have to lose weapon systems to comply with navy requirements, according to an internal NAVSEA study obtained by Jane's. The service declined to comment on the report.

Said another way, NAVSEA's own estimate for lead ship of a potential Flight III destroyer is $3.6 billion, and according to NAVSEA, the growth margins for this new class of ship will be zero - meaning the ship has no room to adapt to new technology throughout it's potential life well into the 2050s and 2060s! It is more than a little frustrating that according to NAVSEA, based on current plans to use the DDG-51 hull - the only surface combatants likely to have growth for future technologies anytime over the next several decades are the three DDG-1000s.

Notionally the AMDR requires five times more power - 2,684 kW - and 10 times more cooling capacity than the current SPY-1D (V) radar on a hull that is already among the most tightly packaged in the navy. According to the report, a suite of X- and S-band radars will consume almost half the power generated by a Flight IIA destroyer cruising in winter conditions. The deficit will require at least the installation of a fourth auxiliary gas turbine generator to allow the AMDR to operate.

Even with the additional generator, the 450 V electrical system in the Flight IIA ships would be too stressed to handle the increased loads, would suffer a high risk of failure and would be "highly unlikely" to be able to support future high-power weapons and sensors. A change to a more robust 4160 V system would require a comprehensive redesign. NAVSEA has studied a hybrid electric drive (HED) using a bidirectional electric rotating machine (ERM) that could power the main reduction gears from the electrical grid and provide power via the ship's prime movers to the grid in a Propulsion Derived Ship Service (PDSS) scheme. The installation of ERMs would mitigate the need for a fourth auxiliary generator but the PDSS variants would face a "complex integration problem in all HED variants" and be "technically risky", the report said. Having also evaluated an integrated propulsion system (IPS) similar to that in the new Zumwalt-class (DDG 1000) destroyers, NAVSEA found that the maximum speed achievable was below the required 30 kt and that it would have involved major equipment arrangement issues. The IPS study was put on hold pending technology developments.

You know it really is amazing to me the Navy is facing so many challenges related to power and energy today, and yet the focus and investment of Ray Mabus on power and energy technologies is related to fuel sources rather than actual propulsion systems. The difference is simple, Ray Mabus has spent his time as SECNAV trying to solve issues related to the US public transportation system rather than investing in the types of energy challenges the Navy faces related to driving ships and fielding unmanned underwater systems. Sorry Mr. Secretary, but Algae fuel and solar power aren't addressing the Navy's energy challenges, those initiatives are distracting attention and dollars away from the real energy challenges facing the Navy.

Mike Petters, the chief executive officer at shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), told Jane's in December 2011 that additional changes to the Flight III would add cost and time. "My view is if this Flight III destroyer comes out and it's radically different [to the existing variants] then we will have missed the boat," Petters said.

I usually agree with Mike Petters, but passing up on a bad deal is not 'missing the boat.'

Meanwhile, inclusion of the AMDR and necessary power and cooling equipment to allow normal operation would push the Arleigh Burke hullform to near its practical limits and far surpass the USN's requirement for hull expandability.

Service Life Allowance (SLA) requirements call for a ship growth potential of 10 per cent by weight and an additional 30.5 cm of length in the ship's center of gravity while complying with survivability rules.

NAVSEA determined that in order for the Flight III to completely meet SLA requirements the ship's beam would have to be increased by 1.22 m, which would reduce the maximum speed by 1 kt and reduce its range by five per cent. The navy examined constructing the deckhouse from aluminum or composites, which would add an extra two per cent of SLA weight and an additional 8.5 cm to the ship's centre of gravity threshold - still far below navy minimums.

These concepts were among the costliest, with a lead ship price of USD3.58 billion, although a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in January said the USN was unlikely to pursue a non-steel deckhouse.

Compromising on SLA requirements has plagued the USN in the past: the Ticonderoga-class cruiser lost weight from the deckhouse - to accommodate the Aegis combat system - and this led in part to severe hull-cracking problems that have shortened the life of the ship.

Since the NAVSEA report was written a year ago, technology developments have occurred that could increase some of the Flight III's margins.

Raytheon has announced it will use gallium nitride semi-conductors for its S-band AMDR bid. According to the company, the change would allow the same level of capability for one fifth of the power consumption. The USN has also suspended development of the X-band radar for AMDR, which could add short-term power and weight gains to the early Flight IIIs.

In other words, the Navy is cutting requirements to fit a square peg in a round hole. No matter how one looks at the problem, the best ship today for moving the Navy into the future with AMDR is DDG-1000, and if the Navy doesn't like that option - the Navy needs to design a new hull to carry the technologies of DDG-1000.

I find it pretty incredible that in 2012 one can credibly, supported by facts, figures, and analysis; make the argument that the F-22 is a less expensive, more capable option for the Air Force than the Joint Strike Fighter and that the DDG-1000 is a less expensive, more capable option than the DDG-51 for the Navy. I wonder what the cost of adding AEGIS BMD to DDG-1000 is, and if the costs of doing that are less than the costs of insuring the first block of Flight III destroyers still float in 2030, or the costs of insuring those same ships are militarily relevant in 2040.

There really is no way anyone could have known at the time that Admiral Roughead was potentially making the wrong choice when truncating the DDG-1000 in favor of the DDG-51, but it does appear the biggest mistake he made as CNO was betting against the solid work done by Jim Syring who set the DDG-1000 program on the road to success. In the end, Jim Syring was the only guy in the room who continuously beat the drum suggesting the DDG-1000 was the best option for the Navy in the future, and in hindsight Jim Syring was clearly the smartest guy in the room.

Look, if we know the fleet is going to be smaller in the future, the Navy might as well insure every plan insures the fleet fields the technology most likely to be relevant in that future. Stuffing the capabilities of today into every space possible just to produce a DDG-51 Flight III with full knowledge there is no growth margin on the ship is not a credible approach to 21st century seapower by any definition. Is the Navy truly paralyzed when it comes to making shipbuilding decisions because the last CNO had a gut feeling about DDG-1000 (that turned out to be wrong) and set about the Navy on the wrong course? Is there no such thing as a course correction anymore? Fitting square pegs in round holes is perhaps the worst way to plow ahead into the future - and yet, when it comes to AMDR and DDG-51 Flight III - here we are.

Sending a Clear Message to Russia

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul conducted an interview on Monday with RIA Novosti. This is the right person adding clarity with what I believe is the right message.

The United States will accept no limits on its missile defense plans but will work with Russia in the coming years to assuage Moscow’s concerns over the project, the U.S. envoy to Russia said.

“We are going to accept no limitations on that whatsoever because the security of our people, of our allies, is the number-one top priority,” U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul told RIA Novosti in an interview Monday.

McFaul downplayed an assurance from U.S. President Barack Obama to his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, that Washington would be more “flexible” on the missile defense issue after U.S. presidential elections next November.

Asked about the meaning of that assurance, overheard by reporters in what Obama apparently thought were private remarks to Medvedev as the two leaders met last month in South Korea, McFaul said: “It means we are going to build whatever missile defense system we need.”

This is exactly the right message to Russia, but it does raise an important question that I do not think the Obama administration has answered since changing ballistic missile defense policy towards the "Phased, Adaptive Approach.

Can the Obama administration clearly articulate what exactly is the missile defense system we need? Can his Republican Presidential challenger define exactly what missile defense system we need? Where is the clarity that guides decisions for ballistic missile defense in the Navy - the clarity that shapes the future Navy and defines what will be done with the existing force through modernization? Where is the clarity on missile defense that defines what kind of AMDR is necessary specifically because the threat is clearly articulated? This is not a trivial discussion, ballistic missile defense is shaping the entire high end of current and future surface warfare, so defining the requirement would apparently be step number one.

Regardless, a hearty well done to the administration for adding clarity to this issue. This is exactly what needed to be done.