Foreign Entanglements: Iran Sanctions Twofer

Late last week Foreign Entanglements hosted a two part discussion on Iran sanctions issues. In the first part, Matt Duss debated Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy:

 In the second, I conversed with Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies:

#SAS12 - Countering 300 Ship Shipbuilding Plan Talking Points

This week is Sea-Air-Space. That means we are going to get all kinds of interesting Navy news all week, and it should be partly interesting to see what folks say that's new, and partly interesting to see what folks say that's ridiculous. I expect there will be plenty of both. As we prepare ourselves for the talking points, I have some talking points of my own that may help cut through the fog of talking points at SAS12.

First, go back and look at the 313-ship fleet and look at what ships added up to be 313. Now go look at the new approximately 300 ship fleet of the future and look at what ships will be needed to reach that number. It is worth noting there are several ship types that weren't counted to reach 313 that are now counted to reach the 300 ship total number. Given the way the approximately 300 ship plan leverages fuzzy numbers, the Navy might as well count ships like USNS Zeus (T-ARC 7) as a battle force ship. This week, when an Admiral mentions the "approximately 300 ship" fleet of the future, if you don't want to swallow the talking points - ask that Admiral to explain what ship types outside of traditional carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines are included to reach that number. The Navy is cutting shipbuilding and retiring ships early, so maybe they should be more up front and honest how they are reaching their stated 300 ship target.

Second, we keep hearing this is only 1 FYDP of a 2 FYDP plan, primarily because if you look at the 2 FYDPs (FY13-FY17 and FY18-FY22) the Navy reaches 300 ships starting in FY23. There is some irony in that, because if you take a closer look at the major surface combatant force after the 2nd FYDP, and suddenly you find the Navy is really building up the large surface combatants force. There are a lot of ways to read it, but if we note that the approximately 300 ship plan has 15 extra large surface combatants compared to the old 313-ship plan, we should also note it looks like someone went 11 years out (past the 2 FYDPs) and just started adding an extra ship 15 times in the last 20 years to give the Navy those extra 15 large surface combatants.

Finally, in what is planned to be the 2nd Obama administration term from FY14-FY17, the Navy intends to build 31 ships; 7 in FY14, 8 in FY15, 9 in FY16, and 7 in FY17. According to the approximately 300 ship shipbuilding plan, over the same 4 fiscal years the Navy intends to retire 37 ships; 14 in FY 14, 11 in FY15, 3 in FY16, and 9 in FY 17. In FY13 - this fiscal year - the Navy intends to build 10 ships but retire 11 ships.

The US Navy has 282 deployable battle force ships today, and expects to grow to 300 ships by FY23 (10 years from now) despite retiring 7 more ships over the FYDP than building. Worth noting, the Navy is retiring 3 Cruisers, 16 frigates, 10 submarines, and 5 amphibious ships - 34 total combatants, over the same period the Navy is building 31 total ships that includes combat logistics and support vessels. While it is perfectly viable to note the Navy has a very good chance of reaching 300 ships as advertised, the devil is in the details that are not being advertised, like what types of ships make up the new plan and how the new plan is not sustainable primarily because there is clearly a questionable commitment by the current administration towards sustainability through the time period this administration specifically intends to be in power.

This week has the potential to reveal a lot. Hopefully people at #SAS12 ask good questions. A lot of people have the opinion the 313-ship plan was never an executable plan. I am under the impression the 300 ship plan is not an executable plan. It seems to me the question that needs to be asked is - when are we going to admit to ourselves there really is no plan?

I find the Navy's leadership very convincing that there is no plan for how the US Navy will be used to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States - primarily because no one can define what those strategic objectives are. Until there are strategic objectives, any fleet will get the nation where it is going since the nations leaders have no idea where they are trying to go anyway. The order of the day, everyday, is the same: All ahead full, any course is fine.

MSDF Helicopter Down

News article here.

A Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol helicopter with seven crew members on board crashed into the sea off Aomori Prefecture on Sunday after hitting a destroyer, leaving the captain of the aircraft missing.

Six other crew members were rescued and listed as being in not life-threatening conditions, the MSDF said, adding it and the Japan Coast Guard are searching for the 37-year-old captain, Lt. Cmdr. Masahiko Miyanaga.

The crash occurred around 11:05 a.m. in Mutsu Bay when the SH-60 helicopter hit the portside of the MSDF destroyer Matsuyuki, according to the MSDF. The chopper had left its base in Mutsu in the prefecture earlier in the morning to see off an MSDF training fleet, including the Matsuyuki.

I think it is interesting the news is reporting the name of the missing pilot so quickly. This incident is being described as a training accident.

The Dutch To Fight Pirates On Shore

On March 23 the European Union decided to extend operation EU NAVFOR until December 2014. At the same time the AOR has also been extended to include Somali coastal territory and internal waters. 

On April 3 their operation plan has been adjusted accordingly.Soon after that, the Dutch government has decided that they will act according to the new operational plan. The Dutch have wanted this extention for quite some time now.

And to be effective against pirates, the Dutch had also agreed last year to put helicopters on every ship they would send to the Horn of Africa.

Because the NH90 has been delayed and the Westland Lynx' are end-of-life, instead of the frigate HNLMS Tromp, the Dutch will now send HNLMS Rotterdam, a LPD. In 2010 they also sent a LPD and used LCU's and LCVP's to block the Somali coast. But HNLMS Johan de Witt didn't have a helicopter on board. This time the Dutch will be sending 2 Cougars (that have been training for this during excersice Cold Response 2012), along with a Scan Eagle.

And they will send in another submarine. And some extra marines. 

So from September-December the Dutch presence is substantial.

But the kicker.....from September-December the Dutch will be leading a Standing NATO Maritime Group for Operation Ocean shield from their LPD, and the sub is also in the area after a NATO request.

So will the Dutch do what they did when freeing the MV Taipan, and temporarily put their ship under national command (or EU command), so they can tackle those pirates ashore?

Navigation Plan

Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has updated his blog with what is being called the “Navigation Plan," a follow-on document to his previous guidance titled “Sailing Directions.” It is a very interesting read, and can be described as the CNO's perspective looking at the Navy's Five-Year Defense Plan.

The document reminded me a lot of the once famous (and now cursed) Seapower 21 document released by Admiral Vern Clark, except this document isn't being touted as strategic while that one was. Everything listed in the Navigation Plan, which is specific to taking a budget perspective, is an existing program within the FYDP - indeed this document doesn't even mention AMDR or the DDG-51 Flight III it is so focused on existing programs within the FYDP.

With one exception... What is this Large Displacement UUV mentioned in the document, and where can I find more information? Sea-Air-Space I hope.

BZ to the CNO, this document is well done.