What fundamental skills do today's midshipmen need to learn in order to lead the Navy three decades from now?

Today's guest is Vice Admiral Michael H. Miller, the 61st Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy.

The plebes entering the Naval Academy this year will be flag officers and general officers in the 2040’s and 2050’s. What fundamental skills do today's midshipmen need to learn in order to lead the Navy three decades from now?

One of the great strengths of the Naval Academy is our dedication to a relatively short - but incredibly important - Mission Statement. In just one sentence it lays out a three step process, essentially unchanged for 167 years, designed to produce leaders of character to serve the nation:

“To develop Midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor, and loyalty in order to graduate leaders who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential for future development in mind and character, to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.”

Whether our graduates are serving in the 2040’s/2050’s as flag/general officers, captains of industry, or leaders in government, this mission lays out the guiding principles of how we prepare them to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.  Central to this process, midshipmen graduating today must possess the integrity, imagination, and innovation to adapt to the ever-changing landscape of security challenges in the future.

First and foremost, we must graduate leaders with the proclivity for continuing development in mind and character.  Indeed, our ultimate goal must be to produce officers who embark on a lifetime of learning - the journey only starts at the Naval Academy. The successful delivery of this end product naturally requires that we look to more tangible metrics and near term objectives in the course of “building tomorrow’s leaders, today.” We are aided in this process by our customers, the United States Navy and Marine Corps, who charter us to commission roughly 1000 Ensigns/Second Lieutenants each year.  We have built a process that enables Fleet feedback, so that we are able to adjust the 47 month experience here at the Academy to meet the needs of the Fleet.  As a starting point, before they are ready to take command or wear stars, these young men and women must first succeed at the challenges they will first face as junior officers.  As a result, much of the four year experience at the Naval Academy is focused on building a “thinking warrior” with the adaptability to confront the conflicts of today while planting the seeds that will bear the fruits of victory thirty years hence. The fundamental skills needed to lead the Navy three decades from now are inseparable from those needed in this coming decade; it is a continuum of integrity, commitment, self-discipline, and a sense for when it’s time to “throw out the book.”  These are the traits that have been the hallmark of successful naval officers for over 235 years.

When asked about the foundation needed to lead in the naval service, I am often reminded of the dialogue we attribute to John Paul Jones regarding the qualifications of a Naval Officer. “It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.” I have no doubt that the next generation of Naval Officers must possess refined manners and punctilious courtesy, as well as a cultural awareness and understanding that was also expected of mariners during Jones’ era.

US Navy Photo

The challenges of today require that our officers possess a multi-disciplinary education, and all indications are that this broader vision will be only more greatly valued in the future. We must take the additional steps beyond the traditional model of a “liberal education,” and focus on the nuanced interrelationships of a variety of disciplines.  Naval Officers have historically held diplomatic roles, as they frequently would be the first to reach and interact with other nations and cultures. This remains true today in the sense that the nation continues to expect that our graduates will be global leaders. At the Naval Academy, this means we must have a continued emphasis on language and cultural experience for all midshipmen, so they are prepared to work with new and emerging partners, such as China, Russia, Brazil, India, and South Korea, as well as our traditional allies around the world. International immersion for midshipmen is one of our highest priorities here at USNA.

Perhaps the most pressing, multi-disciplinary threat we face today is cyber warfare. I am convinced that the officers we commission today will have to prove themselves as warriors against threats in cyberspace long before they assume flag rank. Cyberspace cuts across the traditional disciplines, and it is for this reason that we created the Center for Cyber Security Studies at USNA.  In point of fact, we have mandated this immersive experience for every student across the broad range of the curriculum. Our Center enhances the education of midshipmen, the research of our world-class faculty, and the training of our future officers with courses and affiliations across the academic departments, as well as internship opportunities at the National Security Agency and National Defense University.

Ethical leadership is the critical third dimension of everything we do at the Naval Academy and is what Jones meant when he referred to a Naval Officer having the “nicest sense of personal honor.” The distinguishing feature of our future naval professionals must be their ability to serve as ethical, covenant leaders. Producing honorable leaders who have the trust of seniors and subordinates alike is a timeless requirement, even more important today as the nature of warfare changes and the nation looks to our military for the defense of its people and principles.

These leaders of the future will be challenged with ethical questions that would have sounded like science fiction only a decade ago. Drone warfare, cyber attacks, and other technological advances have changed our risk/reward calculations and must be balanced against issues of national sovereignty, moral imperatives, and human rights. Already, our graduates are returning to the field with complex prosthetic limbs to replace those lost after a decade of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan.   They will soon need to decide whether weapons with artificial intelligence will be permitted algorithms that enable them to decide to take human life.

I am confident that our graduates will be ready to answer these challenges when called. They are already thinking about these issues and others as part of our combined programs of honor, character, and leadership education; programs designed to instill in them the understanding that being a leader of character requires a lifelong commitment to personal development. It goes back to the Mission of the Naval Academy and the task to graduate leaders with the potential for future development of mind and character. They have more than the potential for future development; they are already in the development process, and know that they must continue on that path. The future of our Navy, Marine Corps, and Nation depends on them.

I think we can all agree with Jones’ sentiment that a Naval Officer “must of course be a capable mariner.” After all is said and done, a naval force is made of men and women who “go down to the sea in ships.” Our officers must be capable mariners throughout their careers - but over the course of decades, they need be so much more. The Navy/Marine Corps team is a calling as much as it is a profession, and as such the Naval Academy must produce leaders with the technological know-how, the cultural insight, and the ethical foundation that will stand the test of time.  Most assuredly, those tests are coming - and our young Midshipmen must be up to the challenge.  Given what I have witnessed here on the banks of the Severn, they will meet, and exceed, those expectations, thanks to their creativity in adapting skill sets from the past and applying them to the threats of the future. 

What is Air-Sea Battle?

Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers was a late scratch from the program, but as they say - the show must go on. Today's guest speaker is Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations. Below are his opening remarks at the Brookings Institution Air-Sea Battle Doctrine on May 16, 2012.  The entire Brookings Institution event can be viewed at this link.

What is Air-Sea Battle?

Thank you very much, General Schwartz. Ladies and gentlemen, you saw this morning an anecdote of the importance of Air-Sea Battle. General Schwartz was attempting to communicate with all of you and you saw something came up to try to eliminate that. We worked together; I gave a little head nod, we went in there, a little cyber control of the EM spectrum, and things worked out.

So I don’t know how much better we can explain how this works. General Schwartz gave us a nice description of the history and really the mandate of the compelling need for Air-Sea Battle.

I’d like to talk just a little bit about why we think it’s important, what it can do for us, how we think it can be a good enabler and an enhancer for threats to access, and what our efforts will be to implement this concept. Also, what’s been going on so far and what are we going to do here in the future?

We think there’s a good strategic operational, tactical, and institutional value for Air-Sea Battle. The anti-access area denial is not the only challenge to naval and air forces, but it’s probably the defining challenge today and as we view it in the near future.

Strategically, Air-Sea Battle can help us deter adversaries, reassure our partners and allies by demonstrating the ability to honor our security commitments and to be able to act worldwide for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It’s a spectrum of values.

It’s not about a particular country, as General Schwartz indicated. Anti-access area denial is proliferating. The Arctic is opening is an example. Climate changes take place around the world and we have to get where we need to get in order to act, to provide the effects that we’re asked to do.

Operationally, Air-Sea Battle provides us the ways and means to assure access. Some argue that look, we’re not going to fight those kinds of wars anymore in the future, but it’s not always a big war scenario. It might merely be a contingency. And it’s not always about conflict.

There are some natural or nature born or originated anti-access area denial that are a growing concern; earthquakes, the far north, fires on the West Coast, if you remember that. We had to get in there and it wasn’t easy to find those sources. And a nuclear disaster that about a year plus ago we had to figure out how to get to the source of this problem. And we were being denied that.

US Navy Photo

Institutionally, the integration between the Air Force and the Navy staffs is a great opportunity. We need to gain efficiencies, build appropriate redundancy where it makes sense, and the means by which it will preclude an advisory from finding the one way to develop a solution to preclude or to enable them to provide that anti-access and area denial.

Now the how. The Air-Sea Battle leverages the enduring U.S. advantages that we know well, especially in our two services; the initiatives and skill of our sailors and our airmen, the value that we have under the sea, the ability under the sea, the stealth, the global reach, the cyber capability, and the advantage we have in our networks and networking capabilities.

The central idea here, ladies and gentlemen, is a tightly coordinated operation across warfare domains. Air supporting land in the Cold War, General Schwartz mentioned it and Pete mentioned it in the opening, that was there and some of that is in our current plans. It’s maritime supporting the land, which took place in World War II, it took place in the Korea conflict, in the West Coast operations, and in amphibious operations.

Electronic warfare supporting air in suppressing air defenses took place in Libya, jamming. These examples, though, either were put together in the past sort of ad hoc or they were included as part of a particular operational plan; not really part of the concept of operations. And it’s really taken what we have and adjusting is what we did in the past.

What we’d like to do is make this cross-domain operation more an assumption for the future. We’ll build the concept of operations so that as we organize, as we train, as we equip and do operations in the future we’ll think about electronic warfare defeating radars to protect surface and air operations.

We’ll talk about submarines defeating air defenses, maybe kinetically and maybe non-kinetically, cyber attack against command and control needs to enable air and surface operations or stealth global strike on an anti-air warfare destroyer to enable air ops. There’s a whole panoply of it. The idea is to broaden the aperture in these and make that the standard approach as we think about the concepts of the future.

To do this we’re going to need real time coordination across these domains. We do this now, as threats improve, tighter coordination will be needed in the future. One example is we’ve got to be faster thinking about anything from an anti ship cruise missile, the faster coordination of electronic warfare kill, a non-kinetic kill.

Today our maritime component commander and our air component commander, sometimes they come together at the headquarters, at the task force headquarters. We need to think about that and see if there isn’t a faster way to do that.

I’m taken back to my own personal experience in 2005. I’m working with General Deptula who’s the Air Combatant Commander on the maritime combatant commander. We’re doing an operation and I’ve got a submarine out there who’s saying ‘hey, I’m detecting a radar out here through my periscope and my ESM mask that it’s over the horizon. I vaguely have this acoustic contact and I know that it’s a threat out there. So how do I get this to the JFACC and then get this back to the air task in order to get it out there?’ It takes too long.

So we worked through -- we need to get people on the same net, and General Schwartz mentioned that earlier in that exercise; to getting that faster turnaround, get inside that loop. That’s the future. That’s what we need to think about. Cross domain coordination requires a new approach. Our links need to be similar or minimally compatible.

Our F-22, F-35, our F-18 Hornets, our RA 2-Ds, navy integrated fire control counter air, NIFC-CA, and our ships; right now some of these links are different. We need to look at coordinating that. Communications between submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles or unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft need to improve. Unmanned aerial vehicle based comms and links can be the gateways to bridge the domains and we need to get there. We need to have a visibility of the operations that are taking place in the EM spectrum.

Now on operational planning on our cross-domain actions are going to have to be more centralized. Command and control today, as I mentioned, you’ve got the JFMCC, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, the JFACC, the Air Component Commander, the Land Component Commander, and they’re in a structure of domains to deal with the problem.

US Navy Photo

In the future we need to look at should we be looking at missions, should we be looking at strike, at cyber, as something that crosses these domains in a command and control operation. And I say yes we do and our folks are. Air-sea battle provides that means to do that.

It’s providing -- it’s building cross-domain capability to improve our effects change and gives us more options. We can use an Air Force AWACS or an E-2 with cooperative engagement and share the tracks, what a concept, with our Aegis, with our Hornet, with the F22, with the Raptor, and other TAC air to engage. And it adds the redundancy, in some cases, to be more efficient and we can eliminate eventually some of that duplication as we work through this.

Air-sea battle uses integrated forces for what we like to think as three main lines of effort. It’s integrated operations across domains to complete, as I said, our kill chain, but it’s also Air-Sea Battle lines of effort to break the adversary’s kill or effects chain. We want to disrupt the C4ISR piece of it; decision superiority.

It may be good enough alone if they can’t communicate or if something is causing an effect, if some signal is causing a nuclear disaster -- our reactor to operate, how do we go in there and shut that down if the place is empty. How do we get into that information superiority area? Defeat of weapons launch, get to the archer, or defeat the weapon kinetically to defeat the arrow. And so looking at those three lines of effort, kind of summarizes how we approach that.

Now what we’re doing to implement Air-Sea Battle. We’ve got more than 200 initiatives that our respective teams getting together with the Marine Corps and with the Army put out there. A third of them are non-material, from policy to the concept of operations in componency that I mentioned earlier, data link, protocols, information sharing, and the majority of these are in progress.

We’ve stood up the Air-Sea Battle office last November with Army representation and Marine Corps representation, and of course, our respective services. We’ve championed initiatives out there. We’re pursuing more exercises that -- you’ve seen an example that General Schwartz -- how do we get more of that? What training opportunities are we not investing in that we really should?

We’ve weighed in on the investments. Where can we -- why should I be buying this if the Air Force is buying it? Well, maybe we should buy it together. Maybe we should let them operate, or the Army, or the Marine Corps. Where does this make sense?

We’re pursuing the relevant scenarios that may be -- that we may be using sooner than we think. Homeland defense, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, support of civil affairs in the homeland, natural disasters, just some I mentioned earlier. And we’re investing in Pres Bud 11, we’ve invested, Pres Bud 12 we’ve invested, particularly anti- submarine warfare, electronic warfare, air and missile defense, and information sharing.

Our Pres Bud 13, the one on the Hill today, sustains these investments and really provides more resilient C4ISR investments. We have accepted less capacity in some cases, in order to enhance capability to get better capability out there.

Going forward, we will jointly evaluate naval and air investments together through the office, looking at the long range bomber, the data links, like I said, looking for the common or the compatible data links; looking at SSN capability and capacity, looking at tankers, anti surface weapons, surface to surface delivered or air to surface delivered. What’s the best way? Cyber, electronic warfare, including electronic attack.

So Air-Sea Battle is a framework for us to organized, to train, and equip our efforts. We will continue to refine it and we’ll continue to apply it. And at this national security inflection point, that the defense strategic guidance has laid out for us, it’s essential that we have an effective and an efficient way ahead. We think this is one means to get that. Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.

How can the concepts articulated in writing by transformers/innovators get translated to action?

Today's guest is Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, United States European Command.

How can the concepts articulated in writing by transformers/innovators get translated to action?

Obviously, to see a concept translated into action, it must be presented to a decision maker with time to analyze it and the authority to allocate resources to its fulfilment.

That is hard in any system, as there is tremendous competition for those resources.

Good ideas have to be short, to the point, and practical for a decision maker to want to allocate resources towards it.

They must also fit the perceived need for improvement (what’s broken?) in the eyes of the decision maker.

There is nothing complicated in this.  It amounts to:

1. Seeing a problem that needs correcting.
2. Determining a reasonable solution.
3. Packaging the solution, idea, or concept with a concrete proposal.
4. Understanding that to see your ideas achieve traction, you have to be willing, in almost every instance, not to get all the credit for the concept.

That final point may seem counter-intuitive, of course.  But think about it: in today’s connected, hyperactive, endless conversation no single idea goes from the mind of the creator to fruition unchanged.  All ideas become part of what might be termed the “universal blog.”  The ideas are pushed, pulled, torn apart, reassembled, and—hopefully—improved. 

Read...Think...Write

How an idea begins, of course, affects the journey it takes to action.

If you propose a concept on Twitter, you’re going to see blogs written from the Twitter conversation, followed by articles in journals, and eventually a memo on the desk of a decision maker that may be many levels removed from your position.

That’s fine—as long as you are willing not to have all the credit.

By taking this route, you are having others fill in the large conceptual gaps that are inherent in communicating via Twitter.  Odds are, and if it matters to you, that concept will no longer be your exact idea by the time it gets to a decision maker. 

Again, there is nothing wrong with this method, and many good concepts are fleshed out over Twitter on a daily basis; the discourse there is important and I enjoy following it very much.

On the other end of the spectrum, one can write a long-form piece for a prestigious journal.  The vaunted status of such journals adds authority to the concept, but the concept still has to make its way through the bureaucracy.  However, it is still the give and take amongst the staff that fleshes out ideas.  But, the more idea that is there to work with, the better--as a greater amount of content has a higher chance of making it through a staff’s collaborative process.
   
Timing is nearly everything. I’m sure you have all read that one article that fits perfectly into your current world-view.  Such articles are the ones that lead to action the quickest.  But, timing can only be anticipated so much.  A lot of timing is left to chance, and even if your timing isn’t perfect, being close may still be good enough. 

Taking the resources required for your concept into consideration is important because it is in this criterion that what you’re doing either becomes idle supposition or the start of an earnest discourse.  The relationship between the resources required and the difficulty in bringing a concept to action is directly proportional.  Be sure to articulate your concepts with this in mind. 

But, articulating concepts with all I have outlined still does not make certain that your idea will ever be implemented.  In all likelihood, once some action is taken based upon a concept you introduced, what results will differ from what you envisioned.

You have to write while being mindful that your concept almost certainly will not ‘survive’ first contact with another mind.  When the concept is reblogged, editorialized, retweeted and the like, your audience will focus in on different aspects of what you’ve written based on their own biases and experiences. 
   
Above all else you have to have grit.  You must be willing to take criticism and countervailing views in stride while you watch your precious idea be changed—and hopefully improved—on its journey to action.  Not for the faint of heart: but worth the voyage.

Good luck!

How would you describe the evolution of social media in the Navy?

Today's guest is Rear Adm. Dennis J. Moynihan, U.S. Navy Chief of Information

How would you describe the evolution of social media in the Navy?

There have been profound changes to the way that the U.S. Navy approaches social media since Gahlran first launched his blog five years ago.  In 2007, the Navy had a scarce social media presence.  Besides a few disparate early adopters like @flynavy or @NavyNews on Twitter, or Naval Station Rota on Facebook, the Navy had no real organizational appreciation or approach to social media.  Many within the Navy were generally aware of the potential of social media, but effectively articulating the costs or return on investment were stumbling blocks to gaining institutional buy-in.  Since I became the Chief of Information in 2009, my perspective has also changed.

Every few months, I travel to discuss Navy public affairs with prospective commanding officers.   During the first few visits, I asked them to consider whether or not their command should have a presence in social media as they considered their responsibilities of command.  However, during those same visits I pose the question much differently today.  The question is no longer whether a command should have a social media presence, but how they are going to engage in social media.

Three events over the last three years have illustrated the importance of social media.  The first example was when Haiti was ravaged by an earthquake in January, 2010.  The national media and really the world wanted to know the extent of the damage, and what was being done to help the Haitian people.  During the humanitarian assistance disaster relief operation, more than 22,250 military personnel provided support to those in need. The Navy sent 23 ships, and more than 300 military aircraft were used to assist.  The public and our extended Navy family especially families and loved ones of those dispatched to provide relief - shared an instant and insatiable appetite for real-time information.  The traditional ways of communicating - press releases, web postings to www.navy.mil, and phone trees, were no longer good enough.  Using social media, the Navy was able to extend to anyone and everyone as much information we had as soon as we had it.  

YOKOSUKA, Japan (Nov. 24, 2009) Chief Mass Communication Specialist Palmer Pinckney makes updates to the official U.S. 7th Fleet Facebook social media site. U.S. 7th Fleet began using social media in the Spring of 2009 to promote interaction with the people who have an interest in the U.S. Navy. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Gregory Mitchell/Released)

The second example occurred later that same year when the city of Millington, Tenn., home to 28 Navy commands and over 7,000 Navy families and Federal government employees, experienced widespread flooding on a weekend.  Dispersed on weekend liberty, unable to reach desktop computers, unsure of where to travel for assistance, Sailors and their families turned to their mobile phones for information.   At the touch of a button they were able to get - and share - the latest and most up-to-date information on the status of the base through regular updates from the base commanding officer and their respective commands through Facebook and Twitter.  The old ways of doing business simply weren’t fast enough or good enough.

Operation Tomodachi was the third event that generated intense interest from a variety of interested stakeholders and audiences, and showed us that operating in full visibility in the social media environment is inescapable in today’s landscape and society.  The world wanted to know what was being done to assist the people of Japan, and Navy families stationed in Japan needed information to make decisions on whether or not they should return to the United States.  Commands throughout the U.S. Pacific Fleet used their social media sites to assist families in providing them information they needed to make the important decision on whether they should depart Japan and U.S Seventh Fleet’s Facebook page was the place where media could turn to get the most up-to-date and comprehensive information on Navy efforts.

The choice in whether or not to participate in social media is a false choice.  Choosing not to participate in social media cedes the conversation to others.  People will be talking about your command and forging your public reputation - just without you.  Choosing not to participate simply means you surrender your stake in the outcome.

Not every leader is comfortable using social media.  Some leaders think that social media is just a public affairs tool or a way to communicate with external audiences.  It’s not.  It has, can and should be viewed as a powerful tool for leaders to communicate to Sailors and their families.  

In my view, there are three key watchwords which guide our engagements in social media: 

Risk.  Yes, there are risks to engaging in social media.  There are bad guys looking at our stuff too.  As with any communication tool to be anytime security is paramount.  We don’t talk about classified information on a phone, a fax machine, or unclassified email.  Security at the source remains paramount in this medium.  There is also real risk in not participating.  The Navy’s brand, and that of every command within the Navy, should not be left to others to define for us.  That is the risk we suffer when we don’t engage. In any crisis in this environment, this risk compounds dramatically.

Transparency.  In large organizations there’s a tendency to communicate only when we have all the answers, and only when the news is good.  It’s ok to tell people what we know as soon as we know it, even when we might not have all the answers.  By the time we have all the answers, the public understanding of the issue is already being shaped profoundly by others.  As for bad news, word travels fast - geometrically fast - in social media.  “Hiding” information and hoping it’s not exposed is not a viable course of action.  It erodes faith in our Navy and its leadership, and when the truth is revealed by someone else it is never as we would have it characterized.

Speed. Every week we learn something new and become more proficient in social media.  The speed of moving information and the pace of new techniques make this an incredibly intellectually challenging and agile medium to operate.  At 12:15p.m. on April 6, 2012, an F/A-18 Super Hornet crashed into a civilian apartment complex just outside Naval Air Station Oceana.  Within the first hour there were over 70,000 tweets sent on Twitter, ranging from eyewitnesses to national media.  If we weren’t participating in the environment immediately, public perspective and understanding would have continued to morph in unhelpful ways.

Compelling.  Time and attention are in short supply.  People are bombarded with messages and demands on their time.  What we communicate in social mediums must matter.  I believe every communicator must, “Produce as they would consume.”  As government leaders and communicators, if we wouldn’t click or share the content we produce ourselves, why should we expect someone else to do the same?  What we produce must be compelling.  Our ideas and products must rise above the noise, information and demands we confront in our personal lives.  Sometimes that means taking risk in the marketplace of ideas.  Once again, there is risk in being mainstream and predictable --no one will listen.  Then who will be left to understand our institution or follow in the footsteps of those who are currently serving?     

In summary, the means by which some people come to understand the world around them has changed because increasingly their view is shaped by what they consume in social media. We have recognized that in the Navy, and are all in on ensuring they understand - and value - their Navy by sharing our story in that environment.

US MARSEC Capability Development Programs in West Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects

US Navy Photo

The following contribution is from N.R. Jenzen-Jones &  LT Chad R. Hutchins, USN.

West Africa[1] today is plagued by a variety of serious maritime security (MARSEC) concerns. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of persons, arms, and drugs, oil bunkering, illegal migration, and piracy have contributed to a maritime environment characterized by crime and corruption. The costs of these illegal activities are significant; the cost of illegal fishing alone is over $1 billion US Dollars annually, and an estimated 600,000 people are trafficked illegally each year[2]. Pirate attacks targeting oil product vessels in West Africa are occurring with increasing regularity, and are becoming increasingly violent[3].

Like much of the rest of Africa, the nations of West Africa have traditionally held a land-centric view of security. National navies, as well as other maritime entities such as coast guards and fisheries patrols, have never been in the vanguard of training or financial investment. Despite this, recent years have seen a renewed focus on maritime security in West Africa, driven by concerns of piracy, threats to oil production, and international programs of assistance. Many nations and organizations have strategic interests in building strong MARSEC partnerships with West African nations, most in the hopes of protecting or establishing maritime enterprise relationships. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Doctrine for 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, discusses the importance of partnerships around the world, including those in Africa. This document sets forth a goal to “become the security partner of choice” in nations of interest, and advocates an “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approach”, with an emphasis on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities[4].

West Africa holds particular strategic significance for the United States, and European partner nations, and not only for its vast reserves of energy resources. The region is also an advantageous safe haven for terrorist and transnational criminal groups, a transhipment point for drugs being trafficked to Europe and further, and its ports are key components of the global maritime transportation network.

Capacity building is the most effective approach to building a sustainable, self-reliant maritime security environment in West Africa, whilst keeping to the small-footprint approach outlined by the DoD. These partnerships and training efforts allow regional nations to directly counter MARSEC threats within their domains, leveraging the vast experience in maritime operations provided by partner nations. They encourage a two-way exchange of ideas and skills, and allow participants from U.S. and European nations to get a glimpse at the problems plaguing the region first hand.

Africa Partnership Station (APS) is a U.S. Navy (USN) initiative designed to facilitate events that foster cooperation between African nations, the U.S., and European partner nations with the goal
of developing maritime safety and security capabilities on the African continent. The partners of APS work together through both sea and land based engagements, focusing on a broad range of MARSEC-related operations, joint exercises, and professional training programs. These endeavors focus on four main pillars of capability: Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Professionals, Maritime Infrastructure, and Maritime Enforcement[5].  A highly unique and advantageous aspect of APS is that it requires no permanent land base, as the ships participating act as the ‘base’ for engagements and training. This allows the USN to follow the small-footprint approach outlined in the Sustaining Global Leadership document, and leaves assets available for re-tasking if high-priority situations arise in the region.

The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) is a US Africa Command (AFRICOM) program that focuses on assisting partner nations within Africa with a view to building stronger maritime security through cooperative real-world law enforcement operations[6]. Partner nations work directly with the U.S. Coast Guard and/or U.S. Navy whilst conducting operations to counter common security threats such as IUU fishing, trafficking of weapons, people, or narcotics, and so on. This decreases the reliance of West African nations on foreign assistance to counter common MARSEC threats in the region, as well as enhancing operating cohesion, and fostering trust and confidence between partnering nations.

Private Security Companies (PSCs) also play a role in capacity building operations in Africa. One such company, Triton International Ltd., has conducted extensive training of the Somaliland Coast Guard, developing their capabilities to respond to a variety of threats in their area of responsibility[7]. Similarly, PSCs are participating in training local navies and coast guards in West Africa, and are even augmenting local coast guard and fisheries patrols in some cases. PSCs can play an important role in building maritime security capacity in West Africa, lessening the burden on the world’s navies, and allowing programs such as APS and AMLEP to target areas of specific interest or concern.

All of the above initiatives, as well as a handful of others falling outside the scope of this article[8], are innovative approaches to engaging with African nations in efforts to develop stronger local maritime presence, self-reliance, and response capabilities. However for these partnerships to be effective, especially in Africa, there exists a need for carefully structured milestones, robust oversight and accountability, and end state definitions that outline success. More can be done in order to prove that investment in African nations can provide a truly sustainable, self-reliant, and effective maritime presence. There is a common need for nations, commercial interests, private security companies (PSCs), and non-profit organizations to build cooperative partnerships with the nations of West Africa in order to develop MARSEC capacity in the region. US involvement should follow an interagency (‘whole of government’) approach, synergising the efforts of the DoD and the various services (particularly the USN and USCG), Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other USG stakeholders. Such interagency programs have enjoyed regional success in areas such as Colombia[9], and would be ideally suited to tackling the multifaceted challenges presented by the West African situation.

The numerous challenges of building a sustainable partnership and self-reliant West African maritime capability are widely recognized and understood. Most West African nations have a widely-acknowledged problem with corruption and nepotism, and the efficiency of military and civil command structures are often in question. Additionally, there is the challenge presented by integrating the efforts of the wide range of stakeholders seeking to promote enhanced MARSEC in West Africa. Nonetheless, much of the groundwork for achieving these goals is already in place, and it would require a comparatively modest investment to begin making a real impact. The lacking pieces of the puzzle are a unified strategic plan, and a designated body to coordinate various agencies’ and nations’ efforts.  

The U.S. State Department has already established a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, an ad-hoc discussion group of international representatives that could provide a blueprint for the sort of collaborative body that could be established in order to implement maritime security development programs Africa-wide. The USN’s Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) has also implemented a monthly series of meetings focusing on piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings provide an opportunity for stakeholders from worldwide militaries, law enforcement agencies, and industry to coordinate counter-piracy efforts in the region. Such collaborative initiatives should be combined with the US interagency approach, in order to maximize the effective participation of all stakeholders in the region. We recommend a tiered approach to integrating these efforts:

The tactical level: Develop a cooperative training and engagement program consisting of navy, coast guard, and private security experts from around the world to continue building upon previous and current training in maritime operations, education, administration, and other relevant areas. 

The operational level: Develop a cooperative assistance program aimed at upgrading and maintaining maritime infrastructure in critical West African ports. Establish an interagency body tasked with coordinating maritime capacity building operations throughout the region, and recommending the best distribution of surplus US and European materiel gifted to nations in the region.

The strategic level:   Engage with individual West African nations, as well as ECOWAS and the African Union, through high-level exchanges across the interagency. Establish an interagency framework to organize MARSEC development at the strategic level, directly supporting U.S. and partner nations’ foreign policy goals. These engagements should focus on laying out a framework to work towards a sustainable end-state; the development of an effective, self-reliant maritime capability in West Africa.

If the U.S.’s strategic plan is to consider the benefits of West African partnerships seriously, then creating an international group that mirrors many aspects of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to fill the role as the ‘Contact Group for Maritime Security in Africa’ would be an admirable first step. Such a body should be responsible for the tiered approach outlined above, coordinating both interagency and international participation in programs to strengthen the MARSEC capabilities of nations throughout Africa, tailoring exercises, training, and operations to suit US and partner nations’ foreign policy goals, and reducing confusion and overlap between programs from different countries and agencies.




Sources
[1] Generally accepted to be the 15 nations comprising ECOWAS, plus Mauritania.
[2]http://www.ejfoundation.org/page275.html
[3]http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-24/global-pirate-attacks-becoming-more-violent/3967950
[4]http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
[5]http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/about%20us.html
[6]www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20100503145240
[7]http://pmso.net/PMSOSpecial%20Report_AnIndustryApproachToMaritimeSecurityInWestAfrica.html
[8]Including but not limited to the US DoD’s Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative, Maritime Liaison Officer (MARLO) programs, the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa), and programs administered by the EU’s CSDP.
[9]http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/run-through-the-jungle-colombia%E2%80%99s-jungla-commandos

Short Bios
Nic Jenzen-Jones is a security and defence industry consultant, writer, and analyst. He is the co-editor of Security Scholar and can be found on Twitter (@RogueAdventurer).
Chad Hutchins a Lieutenant in the United States Navy, currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School. He has previously served aboard ships participating in capability development operations in Africa. The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any other agency.