Tuesday, July 3, 2024

Here Comes the Great Green Fleet

With the Great Green Fleet putting to sea for the upcoming RIMPAC 2012 exercise, and more specifically now that the USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T AO 187) has 900,000 of super expensive biofuel in her tanks ready to supply the Great Green Fleet - the public discussion (which is another way of saying the political food fight) over the Navy's green energy investment is breaking out across major media outlets.
The Pentagon paid Solazyme Inc $8.5 million in 2009 for 20,055 gallons of biofuel based on algae oil, or $424 a gallon.

Solazyme's strategic advisers, according to its website, include T.J. Glauthier, who served on Obama's White House Transition team and dealt with energy issues, but also former CIA director R. James Woolsey, a conservative national security official.

For the Great Green Fleet demonstration, the Pentagon paid $12 million for 450,000 gallons of biofuel, nearly $27 a gallon. There were eight bidders for that contract, it said.

Republican lawmakers are pushing measures that would bar the Navy from spending funds on alternative fuels that are not priced competitively with petroleum and are accusing Mabus of failing to provide Congress with a full analysis of the cost and time it would take to create.

"They couldn't answer some of the very fundamental questions that you would want on that issue," said Randy Forbes, a Republican on the House Armed Services Committee who says studies show that biofuels would always be more expensive than petroleum.

Mabus rejects the criticism, saying that as production rises, costs will come down. He notes that prices have fallen dramatically over the past few years, even with the Navy buying only small test batches of alternative fuels.

"Of course it costs more," he told the climate conference. "It's a new technology. If we didn't pay a little bit more for new technologies, we'd still be using typewriters instead of computers. ... And the Navy would never have bought a nuclear submarine, which still costs four to five times more than a conventional submarine."
Personally, I like seeing the Secretary of the Navy out fighting for the Navy in major media outlets, I'm just not sure this Secretary of the Navy has always picked the right fights. The real problem here is that the mainstream media is going to go very soft if not outright praise Ray Mabus regarding his green effort, and the biofuels industry is so cash starved right now they will be very slow to criticize as well.

I believe praise of the Great Green Fleet is warranted, but all criticism of Ray Mabus is also well earned. There is no future with Solazyme for the US Navy, because the only thing Solazyme can do is provide biofuel at a high cost for testing purposes, and I am not sure the company will ever be able to do more than that. Their process for making biofuel is that they basically cook sugar in a big vat - in other words they are simply a giant test tube company for biofuel. How does a company that makes their biofuel in a giant laboratory ever keep costs down? These are questions that nobody ever asked Ray Mabus as he embarked on his biofuel crusade pouring millions of dollars into the big vats at Solazyme. Why is that problematic? Because the actual Navy investment in biofuel makers who actually grow biofuels is very small relative to the huge contracts the Navy has issued to Solazyme, and that unbalanced investment really does nearly nothing for the advancement of the biofuels industry.

Ultimately the story of the Great Green Fleet will be one of such limited value the story likely won't be told beyond Ray Mabus being in office, and if it is told it certainly won't be a best seller and will likely be part of a joke. Ray Mabus will have proven that the United States Navy can use biofuel instead of traditional fossil fuels, but because of how he did his investment the Navy will ultimately have contributed very little to the Green Energy movement in America other than giving it limited visibility, and usually that visibility came in the context of framing green energy as so expensive it looked like nothing more than enormous taxpayer waste. It is legitimately difficult to describe what the Navy has done with biofuels as progress because the scale to date has been so small, but relative to what the rest of government has done - the Navy is a big player in overall alternative energy, and should be proud of that.

USS WASP and the Great Green Fleet

Kudos to the indispensable Chris Cavas for his reporting on the removal of the USS WASP (LHD 1) from the starting rotation of the deployable US Navy for what appears will be a term of at least nine years.  I'm sure WASP's availability as a JSF test platform was convenient for the test community; however, this strikes me as insufficient rationale for delaying necessary upgrades to her combat system. In fact, I believe her status was driven by the cost of the upgrade.   In the link above, one source indicates a cost of $170M to upgrade the ship to SSDS Block II.  The number "$170M" stuck out in my mind though, as it jogged my memory to an FY11 reprogramming request made by the Department of the Navy (in conjunction with the Departments of Energy and Agriculture) for biofuel development, which was turned down.

Budgeting is the process of rationalizing strategic choices.  For some reason, Administrations since 2004/5 have failed to prioritize the return of USS WASP to the line.  Indeed, officials from the Administrations of Presidents Bush and Obama would doubtless declare the importance of other priorities and the solemn responsibility of making tough choices.

But there it was;  in 2011, the Navy had a critical capital asset essentially out of service for the want of combat systems upgrades.  Yet the Service felt it had money available to subsidize policy objectives appropriately  placed in other Cabinet-level departments.  This was a choice.  Good luck with the knife fights in the Pentagon when choices like this are made. 

Bryan McGrath

LockMart LCS Gets more Billets

Everyone knows the Littoral Combat Ship needs more people. I think the question has always been how many people would the Navy add? The answer to that question for the Lockheed Martin version of the LCS is being answered.
Twenty additional berths will be permanently installed onboard Freedom — two for officers, two for chief petty officers and 16 for other enlisted — but the final manning plan has yet to be decided, Rear Adm. Thomas Rowden, the director of surface warfare, said during a June 26 interview at the Pentagon. The ship right now has a core crew of 40, but because there is no manning plan, it’s still unclear how many sailors will be added to the crews.

The added billets “will run the gamut, from support to engineering to operations to boatswain’s mates,” Rowden said. “We’ve got to get the right skill set and the right seniority.”

Among the known manning deficiencies is the need for more junior sailors, Rowden said. LCS crews tend to be more senior, reflecting the need for sailors with multiple qualifications in a small ship.

Sailors also could be added to the mine warfare mission module, he said, in addition to the core crew.
20 is a lot, more than I would have thought. The LCS has several technologies that were supposed to reduce the core crew significantly. While one part of the story is that the Navy is adding billets, the other part of that story is finding out why technology was so ineffective in replacing billets? I think it is an important question, because it is the question that informs next time the Navy tries to do that to a warship - which will be next time the Navy designs a warship.

How does a 50% increase in billets impact the total cost-of-ownership for the Littoral Combat Ship? Manpower is consistently cited as the highest cost in the Navy. This addition of billets on half the total planned Littoral Combat Ship purchase will raise cost-of-ownership for the entire class significantly, and because a similar increase is possible on the Austal variant, another increase is coming.

I see this as the first of many, many changes to the Littoral Combat Ship program coming. My sense is these changes will require a bit of a redesign in the future ships of the class, and I do have questions where that will come from. You just added 50% more crew, did the ship just increase galley stores 50% as well or will the duration of galley supplies simply go 50% shorter than yesterday. Big changes typically have broad impacts across a ship, and while this is almost certainly a necessary change, it isn't a simple one and it will carry previously undisclosed costs.

Monday, July 2, 2024

HMS Iwo Jima?

Very interesting (apparently reported a month ago in the Telegraph, but I can't find the link):
Ronald Reagan made secret plans to loan Britain a U.S. warship if she lost an aircraft carrier during the Falklands War, it has emerged. The then-president was prepared to support Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher despite the U.S. being officially neutral during the 1982 conflict. The stunning revelation was made by John Lehman, the former U.S. Secretary of the Navy, to the U.S. Naval Institute on Tuesday. Mr Reagan would have loaned Britain the use of the amphibious warship USS Iwo Jima should harm have come to either HMS Invincible or HMS Hermes, which the Royal Navy had deployed to defend the islands from Argentinian forces... 
...These specifications made the USS Iwo Jima an ideal replacement as, although primarily a helicopter carrier, it was able to operate the U.S. version of the Sea Harrier. It is likely that the ship would have been manned by a mix of retired seamen and privately contracted Americans familiar with the ship's operating systems. Admiral James 'Ace' Lyson, commander of the U.S. Second Fleet in 1982, helped plan the possible deployment of a U.S. ship in the South Atlantic.
Curious about the timing. The first point at which the Argentines could plausibly have struck the Hermes or Invincible would have been around May 1. If damaging or sinking one of the two would have triggered the loan of Iwo Jima, it's hard to imagine her arriving on station before mid-June, with what I presume would be the complications of assembling the crew, training the RN officers and men, resupply, etc. Unless I'm drastically overestimating, this means that the US was willing to make a commitment to support the UK in what it presumed might be an extended war. I also have to wonder how much consideration was given to the possibility that the Iwo Jima might be lost; if the Argentines could sink one carrier, then they quite possibly could sink another. The legal implications of a US warship operating with what amounted to a mercenary crew under RN command would likely also have generated headaches.

Fascinating stuff all around.

Sunday, July 1, 2024

Airpower, Intervention, and Syria

Bernard Finel and I talk airpower in the context of discussion about intervention in Syria: