The End of the Beginning for LCS

I've been waiting for someone to talk about this.

The original idea for the littoral combat ship (LCS) envisioned modular mission packages that could be rapidly swapped, so one ship could change missions easily from mine warfare, for example, to anti-submarine warfare over the course of a single deployment.

But instead of taking just days to make the switch, it’s now apparent it could take weeks. An LCS assigned to a particular operation will likely operate in a single “come-as-you-are” configuration, requiring additional ships equipped with other mission modules to provide the flexibility the concept once promised.

That’s one conclusion among many following a series of Navy exercises and reports intended to take stock of LCS. Other conclusions criticize the ship as failing to match capabilities inherent to the ships it would replace. The assessment aims to figure out what the ship can and can’t do, how it should be employed, what kind of support it will need, and what changes must be made to man and fight the ships without wearing out their small crews.

These include a classified study ordered by Adm. Mark Ferguson, the vice chief of naval operations; two war games carried out by U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) in Norfolk, Va.; and the ongoing operating experiences of the two ships already in service.

The assessment comes as LCS transitions from an acquisition and shipbuilding program into a deployable fleet asset. The first two ships are now ensconced at their home port in San Diego, and the third LCS is about to be delivered. A fourth ship arrives in 2013.

The classified study, known as the OPNAV report (referring to staff reporting to the chief of naval operations), was headed by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez. Beginning in January, Perez and a 10-person team looked at all aspects of the fleet’s “readiness to receive, employ and deploy” the LCS.

The report being discussed here is better known as the "Perez Report," and it is important. Basically the report is the first of it's kind produced by the Navy that comprehensively highlights everything wrong with the Littoral Combat Ship, but it also goes on to inform solutions towards those problems and how to make LCS work. The report is important because it knocks down a lot of the straw man arguments about LCS and gives a fair assessment, warts and all. The Navy has been sitting on the report since March, probably for good reasons from their point of view, but I tend to think it is one of those reports that needs to see the light of day, because I tend to think once it is recognized what the LCS cannot do well, the LCS can be used for things it can do well.

Depending upon what you think of LCS, the Perez Report is either the death nail into the coffin of this program, or what finally got the program moving forward in a more realistic way. I tend to be in the second group, but there will be plenty of folks who think the report represents the first group.

Long term I believe the report will have several impacts:

First, It will stop the program at 24 ships, which is where I believe it should be stopped. I'm now convinced the only reason the Navy talks about 55 Littoral Combat Ships with this program is because by doing so they can maintain the fixed contract prices as part of the FYDP and avoid triggering a Nunn-McCurdy issue.

24 Littoral Combat Ships has always been a reasonable number for moving the most important concepts of the LCS down the road - like learning lessons about smaller crews, developing interchangeable (modular) payload system interfaces, understanding operational and deployment capacities with smaller ships with small crews, getting the training right for ships with rotational crews, and getting a solid understanding of what the operational challenges are when fielding distributed unmanned systems networks at sea.

Second, the Perez Report will clarify the art of the possible in shipbuilding, and in my opinion added a great deal of clarity into both the role and capabilities desired for future motherships and future small combatants, and what makes them similar and different. The report breaks the camels back on Seapower 21 with CG(X), DDG-1000, and LCS all now having proven critics of US Navy shipbuilding right from the beginning. Transformation is a failure - whether it was worth it or not can be decided by others.

Third, it is very good news for the future of motherships generally and the future of LCS specifically. The report makes clear what can and cannot be done, offers options for how to add or improve capabilities, and generally puts the LCS on a road toward successful operation and innovation specific to the capabilities the ship does have for the fleet, and stops the efforts to pigeon hole the LCS into being something it is not.

 Just because a ship cannot realistically have a mission module swapped out in 24 hours doesn't mean the Navy hasn't made significant progress in modularization, indeed LCS still delivers a single hull capable of multiple configurations. These kinds of distinctions matter, and help clarify the art of the possible for LCS and future programs.

Hopefully the report does focus the Navy on what is most important, which in my opinion is delivering a good MIW and ASW mission module package for the LCS and get the ball rolling for the Navy on networking numerous distributed systems into the larger battle force. When those ends are achieved, LCS will be getting somewhere - everything up to that point is simply part of the learning curve.

Chinese Frigate Runs Aground

This is the latest news from the South China Sea.

A Philippine military aircraft confirmed Saturday that a Chinese naval frigate remains stranded in disputed waters of the South China Sea, a military spokesman said.

The Chinese frigate and smaller craft were sighted by a Philippine Islander plane, said regional military spokesman Colonel Neil Anthony Estrella.

"During the aerial reconnaissance mission, they were able to confirm, based on photographs, that there is indeed a ship with bow number 560 aground at Half Moon Shoal," he told AFP.

He said five more vessels and a number of smaller boats were assisting the grounded ship.

A navy ship and a coast guard vessel had been dispatched to the area to monitor the Chinese operations, he added.

He stressed that the shoal was just 60 nautical miles from the western Philippine island of Palawan, well within the country's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, as recognised by international law.

That would make the ship that ran aground the frigate Dongguan (560), a Jianghu-V class frigate. Welcome to the South China Sea littorals.

While the Half Moon Shoal is within the Philippine EEZ, the Chinese frigate has every right to be within the waters of the EEZ; although not necessarily on the shoal itself. With that said, this wasn't intended to be an amphibious assault.

What is noteworthy here is that the Philippines are well within their right to confiscate the warship. has few options here. The shoal is not habitable, and not within 5 miles of a habitable island. Funny thing about being the weaker power in this kind of power struggle though, the Philippines really can't do anything except what the Chinese allow them to do even though this is within the EEZ of the Philippines mainland, and in the end all we'll do is nothing but watch (which is probably the right move politically).

Autonomy, Offense-Defense, and Naval Power

Inside the Pentagon has reported (gated) that the Navy is considering exploring autonomy in robotic systems to deal with the anti-access/area denial threat (A2/AD):

The Navy is eying potential investments in revolutionary unmanned systems
with greater autonomy than today's drones to counter advanced Chinese
weapons capable of threatening U.S. warships, according to draft guidance
for a new assessment.

The report goes on to note that Naval leaders are looking for autonomous solutions to functions including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, information management, decision-making, logistics and weapon systems.  Killer robots on the loose? Well, no. "Autonomy" is a vexing term, and as a Lawfare research paper notes it is difficult to conceptualize autonomy vs. automation in an absolute sense. Instead, autonomy and automation should be thought of as a sliding scale. Moreover, an autonomous system should be regarded as a component of three interlocking characteristics: frequency of operator interaction, ability to cope with an uncertain environment, and level of assertiveness to alter the means by which it completes human-designated ends.

Because of the imperfections of language, we will likely continue to use "autonomous" instead of "more autonomous," but we should understand that automated and autonomous are rarely absolute states. A truly autonomous weapon would be one that could alter the ends to which force is applied, not the means. At that point, we've gone too far into the realm of science fiction and Jessica Biel.

Any reader of P.W. Singer's book knows that weapons platforms and command and control systems with greater levels of autonomy are on the horizon, but we've lived with precursors for some time.
Indeed, the advent of missile warfare and modern air defense has necessitated greater automation of command and control systems, and the result has been systems with significant degrees of autonomy. These systems, ranging from the Semi-Automated Ground Environment (SAGE) to the AEGIS arose because the speed of tactical kinetic engagement in some areas of warfare outpaced the ability of human operators to engage.

Others have written more eloquently on the tactical possibilities of autonomous unmanned aircraft and undersea craft in a naval campaign, but some comment on the strategic aspects are warranted. It is likely that such systems will face significant resistance to employment from moral/legal and practical perspectives. The former are overrepresented in the debate, and the latter are underappreciated. Writing about nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, Solly Zuckerman argued that a more technologically complex military that relies on revolutionary weaponry tends to frustrate rather than enable commanders seeking freedom of action. The more complex a weapon, the greater its personnel requirements and backbone of supporting technologies and systems. And when a weapon is politically sensitive, it also will require specialized command and control arrangements that may decrease overall military effectiveness.

There is, however, as I've noted while conversing with Gulliver and Dan Trombly on Twitter, an implicit bias in autonomous weapons discussions against tactically offensive systems. People do not like autonomous robots or autonomous cyberweapons because they seem risky to employ without collateral damage and encourage robo-aggression. But offense and defense is a matter of context. Defensive systems midway on the automated/autonomy spectrum could be easily positioned to support a strategic offensive while sitting on the tactical defense. In regards to naval warfare, one could easily envision a scenario in which naval platforms with defensive systems are concentrated in a theater of engagement to support a primarily offensive joint campaign. Moreover, when it comes to missile warfare even tactical distinctions between offense and defense easily break down.

Likewise, tactically offensive weapons are likely to appeal most to those seeking to mount what they consider to be a strategic defensive. Dictators pursuing domestic regime survival come to mind as do many states with either insecure borders or the threat of great power projection. Due to the higher stakes involved, they will likely possess far less scruples than major Western powers seeking autonomous military solutions.

An update from Chinese shipyards

It's been a while since I've last updated on the activities of the Chinese shipyards. I've last updated in April and we have seen quite a lot of activities since that time. Just to give an update on progress from different shipyards before showing some pictures.

The 3rd 052C looks to have entered service as 150. We haven't seen too many photos from JN shipyard, so I'm not sure what exactly are the status of the 4th and 5th 052C. Although, I expect the 4th 052C to be on sea trials right now. 054A construction continues to be at a brisk pace. The 5th 054A from HD shipyard joined the North Sea Fleet as 546. The 6th 054A from HP shipyard joined the South Sea Fleet as 572. We have seen the launching of the 8th 054A from HP shipyard and the 7th 054A from HD shipyard. I think there will eventually be 18 054A joining service. Combining that with the 2 054 FFG, they will form 5 flotillas (2 in SSF, 2 in ESF and 1 in NSF). The other interesting part is that the newer 054As are all getting sent to Gulf of Adens. Having additional 054As in rotation for 3 months deployments (longer when we factor the time to go there and back) would reduce the stress level for the sailors of the earlier 054As. It provides for a long extended sea trials for the new 054As and a great training opportunity for their crew. We have to remember that most PLAN crews have neither operated on a modern ship nor been on long deployments before getting assigned to their new ships.

We also have seen the launching of the first 056 class patrol ship from both HD and HP shipyards. It remains to be seen how large of a production run 056 will see, but the speculation is that 056 will be replacing 037 class. That would put the production number somewhere between the 054A class and the 022 class. Among the larger ships, we have seen both Type 903 AORs from GSI and HD shipyard launched. PLAN's existing fleet of AORs have been severely over-worked on Gulf of Aden deployments, so they would really welcome the additional Type 903s. Also, it appears that the second Type 926 submarine tender have joined the service.

Here are some recent photos from around Chinese shipyards. The first 3 are from HD shipyard. They show the recently launched 7th 054A and the first 056 from HD shipyard.


The pictures below shows the yet to be launched second 056 class and the newly launched Type 903 AOR.


Now, we have photos from HP shipyard showing the 8th 054A and the first 056 ships. The one below shows the second 056 which appears ready to be launched soon.


Finally, we have a picture from GSI (Guangzhou Shipyard International) showing the third type 926 submarine tender and the other Type 903 AOR.

CNO Hints Towards the (New?) Future of Carrier Launched Naval Aviation

Contrary to a recent suggestion regarding the decline of influence by the US Naval Institute and the organizations flagship product Proceedings magainze, Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has penned an article in Proceedings magazine this month that is already getting a lot of attention. Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course is a really important article, indeed there are several aspects of the article that jumped off the page the first, second, and every other time I've read the article.

In general I have been less than impressed with the analysis of the Proceedings article to date, indeed I think most people who have publicly commented either missed the point, or failed to connect the dots. The whole article is important, not just the pieces that made headlines, and I believe it really informs us on modern ideas being circulated inside the Navy - many of which are very smart.

Please, if you have not done so, go read the entire article before reading any further. Once you have read the article, come back and read what I'm saying, then go back and read the article to see if I have this right. I'm not certain I am reading it correctly, but I think I am.

Ready? OK...

First, I have to address something. This kind of industry shrilling by think tank people who I thought were credible analysts needs to stop. The suggestion through fear by Mackenzie Eaglen that the end of manned military aviation will occur if any aspect of the Joint Strike Fighter program is changed by the Navy is either the definition of jumping the shark, or perhaps more appropriately the act of 'credibility hara-kiri.' If the defense analyst community continues to promote political fear in lockstep support of industry and policy failures instead of legitimate ideas for the DoD to deal with programs and policies that have gotten way out of control (too big to fail, a meme that applies to both the JSF and Afghanistan), then the defense analyst community is damaging their credentials beyond the ability of those folks to ever effectively lead the defense establishment in the future, and a new source of expertise needs to be sought after.

The fine line between think tank analyst and defense industry lobbyist is being blurred today by a lot of folks who were once thought of as highly credible, and I absolutely include folks at CNAS in the same category as Heritage Foundation and AEI. There is a lot of self-licking Ice Cream cone BS coming out of DC today, and that article in AOL Defense pissed me off with it's new extreme in hyperbole.

Second, Phil Ewing got it right, TWICE, but failed to connect the dots. Did the CNO just take a big swipe at the F-35? You bet the CNO did. The CNO absolutely made clear that the cost of stealth and exactly what the capability advantage of stealth is has forced the Navy to evaluate with clear eyes how to use stealth in naval aviation in the future, but the stealth issue is bigger than just the F-35C - it also must be applied to unmanned carrier aviation as well.

The CNO starts out by stating clearly that the Navy needs "to move from ‘luxury-car’ platforms—with their built-in capabilities—toward dependable ‘trucks’ that can handle a changing payload selection." Because the use of the word "truck" has historically only been applied to ships in the context of modularity or swapping out equipment on ships, it is assumed he is speaking only about ships when he mentions trucks. That would be a bad assumption, because I think he is talking about naval aviation as well.

If you recall, Bob Work sent out a memo on July 7, 2024 to Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley, Vice Chief Of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and assistant Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford to form a team to develop three alternative tactical aviation force structures, respectively representing cost savings of $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the future years defense plan. Ultimately, Work expects to determine “the best-value alternative, factoring in both cost and capability. The purpose of the study was to determine whether the Navy and Marines could operate fewer than the 40 squadrons of JSFs currently planned and to look at the possibility of accelerating development of unmanned alternative systems."

Everybody knows the costs of the Joint Strike Fighter has grown too high for the Navy to afford the future carrier air wing, indeed there is no future for unmanned carrier aviation unless the Navy reorganizes current plans of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and existing Unmanned Carrier Launched Systems programs in an effort to find more money. That memo last year was the study of plans to determine what the options are. We have never seen the results of that memo, although my impression is the CNO just hinted what they might be.

What I believe the CNO is basically saying is that the F-18E/F works effectively as a manned truck, if new weapons are brought online to support the aircraft's ability to strike at long range - which is the cover story that Captain Hernandez ran out to Phil Ewing after his original post. Like I said, Phil Ewing got it right, twice!

What the CNO is also saying is that the stealthy UCAS-D is too expensive, and that unmanned carrier launched aviation doesn't need to be stealthy, rather it needs to be capable of endurance/range and high payloads. This has been coming awhile, because one of the worst kept secrets is how many problems there are with UCAS-D. UCAS-D weighs way too much, costs too much, has less than desired endurance, and has a limited payload capacity in favor of its stealth profile. My bet is the Navy isn't going down that road long term, although the Navy will use UCAS-D as a technology demonstrator.

But the CNO emphasized stealth was important? You bet he did, and how he discusses the importance of stealth in that Proceedings article reminded me of a concept I heard discussed with regards to the future of unmanned naval aviation at a recent USNI conference where the Joint Strike Fighter will still play an important role in future naval aviation that includes unmanned systems.

Basically, the Navy would field carrier launched aviation platform "trucks" that carried a variety of long range missiles forward, and escorting these large flying trucks - trucks which would include F-18E/F manned fighters and unmanned carrier launched medium payload delivery vehicles - would be stealthy F-35Cs that basically functioned as forward observers that helped targeting for the payload trucks that could operate at stand off distances. By taking that approach, fewer F-35Cs would be needed, because the internal strike payload of the F-35C is no longer as important relative to the payload capacity of the overall strike package - which would be offloaded to manned F-18E/Fs and medium capacity carrier launched UAVs.

So that is basically where I think this is going. The Navy is going to address the very real concerns about the future carrier air wing in FY14, and they will restructure the various programs. The F-35C program will likely be restructured in the same way it was last time, by reducing the number of squadrons fielded per carrier. Last time the F-35C was reduced to 2 squadrons per carrier, this time it will likely be reduced to 1 squadron per carrier. With F-35C IOC currently scheduled for FY14, but expected to be delayed, the purchase of fewer F-35Cs and the delayed IOC will mean more F-18E/Fs will need to be purchased. This comes just in time too, because the production line for F-18E/F only goes through FY14, so more F-18E/Fs will keep that production line open longer.

The rest of the savings, which will be either $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the FYDP will decide the details of the F-35C and F-18E/F program changes, and also determine to what degree unmanned carrier aviation will play in the future Carrier Air Wing by 2020 and beyond. I believe it is a very good bet that unmanned carrier launched aviation will find funding, that the F-35C purchase will be reduced, and that the F-18E/F production line will stay open beyond FY14 - but the details of what unmanned carrier launched aviation will look like by 2020 is still very much unclear.

It is also important to recognize that under the CNO's emerging vision of payloads instead of platforms, platforms like the F-35C still have a primary role, but that role is changing. In part, the F-35C is still a very necessary stealth capability that will perform the always important intercept function - although the payloads for intercept will be carried at stand-off range. F-35C will also function in the forward observer role - again in support of weapons held at safer, stand-off distances. These roles for the F-35C would be vital to the tactical and operational level execution of air superiority and combat air support by carrier aviation well into future decades, which means that while the total number of F-35Cs might be fewer in the future Carrier Air Wing, it's existence in the future Carrier Air Wing becomes even more vital than it is today - particularly if the unmanned "truck" options materialize as legitimate. In many ways, I could see these changes seen as a mixed result for Lockheed Martin, on one side the F-35C is purchased in lower quantity but on the other side the platform becomes the most critical piece of the puzzle, something the platform is not under current plans.

In the end, all I believe can be said with any certainty is that based on the CNO's Proceedings article and the fiscal reality of naval aviation heading into the next two very, very tight budget years, the UCAS-D is the least likely full production approach for the future of unmanned carrier aviation.