An Australian Perspective

G'day readers. My name is Justin Jones and I am Galrahn's latest recruit to ID. I will be blogging from an Asia Pacific, specifically Australian, perspective. In my day job, I am a serving Naval Officer and the Director of the Sea Power Centre - Australia, the Royal Australian Navy's 'think tank.' I am also the Naval Associate at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. My blog contributions will represent my own views and not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force or Royal Australian Navy.

I am honored to be invited to contribute to this very prestigious blog and I look forward to interacting with you virtually. I can be contacted via the email address on the right hand side of the page. You can also follow me on Twitter: @DaggerNav

CSIS Asia Pacific Posture Assessment

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 27, 2024) The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and the amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) are underway in close formation during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012 exercise. Twenty-two nations, more than 40 ships and submarines, more than 200 aircraft and 25,000 personnel are participating in the biennial RIMPAC exercise from June 29 to Aug. 3, in and around the Hawaiian Islands. The world's largest international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a unique training opportunity that helps participants foster and sustain the cooperative relationships that are critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans. RIMPAC 2012 is the 23rd exercise in the series that began in 1971. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Raul Moreno Jr./Released) 

 

 

Section 346 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Defense Department to commission an independent assessment of U.S. force posture in Asia. This task was assigned to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who has delivered a very excellent report that will be discussed in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness at 2:00pm on Wednesday, August 1, 2024.

I had never heard of David Berteau before this report, he just never popped up on my radar, but he's in my A+ list because this guy is a serious professional, and the report reflects exactly that. In my opinion, the U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment by CSIS is exactly the kind of high bar quality we should expect from the Defense Think Tank community. CSIS has delivered quality taxpayer funded work, and should be proud of their effort.

So enjoy the report, and see also this unclassified response from Secretary Panetta regarding the report. I do believe many in this audience will appreciate the high quality work delivered in this report on a very relevant topic.

Below are only a few (of the many) thoughts inspired by my reading of this report. I encourage the community to contribute your own analysis and commentary in the comments.

Engage the Army
Did you read the Army prepositioning article in the New York Times I linked to Monday. What I did not mention in that topic is that the article actually describes a change from the existing APS Strategy 2015, although surprisingly nobody in the comments apparently picked that up, and Army folks simply argued as if APS Strategy 2015 was still the plan. APS Strategy 2015 called for 9 prepositioning ships, but the Army didn't fund 9 ships, and while not fully funding all 9 ships the Army also decided to use that afloat space as the storage facility for MRAPS rather than as a traditional prepositioning squadron.

From what I am seeing, all appearances are the US Army is simply checking boxes specific to MRAP storage and prepositioning rather than taking the prepositioning of Army assets forward in the Pacific seriously. I don't think many caught on to the changes that have been made to APS Strategy 2015, and I think folks believed this prepositioning squadron reported in the New York Times was exactly the same as traditional Army prepositioning squadrons, even though it is clearly something different. This approach to Army prepositioning, using it as afloat MRAP storage and reducing the size of prepositioning altogether in the Pacific appears to be counter to the recommendations on page 91 of the CSIS report.

Indeed I found it noteworthy that most of the recommendations on page 91 that are recommendations intended to better align the engagement strategy of PACOM with the DOD are specific to what the US Army needs to be doing. I'm a simple Navy nerd, but if I was an Army nerd, I would note that all data points suggest there is a huge vacuum of critically thinking about how the US Army has capabilities specifically relevant to the Pacific theater just waiting for some smart guy to start talking about with new ideas. If you think you're that guy, perhaps you need to be writing those ideas here on ID, because we welcome new ideas and unconventional thinking specific to the Pacific theater from smart Army folks. Dumb Army folks can go apply at Blackfive (just kidding!).

On Growing the High End
In option three, which is the option that increases the force posture in the Pacific, the report suggests a CSG in Perth and an ARG in Hawaii. Why did the authors not recommend a CSG in Hawaii and an ARG in Perth? The authors made clear in the report that basing a nuclear powered aircraft carrier in Australia was a huge political hurdle, and they also noted the enormous associated costs. So why the recommendation if it's almost certainly a no-go politically? From a political and financial perspective the CSG in Hawaii and ARG in Perth would appear to be the more politically viable approach, and if the ARG was centered around an America class LHA, would that not work as a nice middle ground approach? I find the 4 MAGTF argument in the report a very compelling discussion for forward basing a second ARG in the region, although with the neverending DoD pivot towards the Middle East rather than Asia, Perth makes more sense for that ARG to me than Hawaii does.

On Decreasing Posture
One of the things I try to do is question assumptions, and sometimes I do it even when I don't necessarily believe the assumptions are wrong. I found it curious that according to the CSIS report there is nothing whatsoever to be gained except affordability in the decreased posture option 4. I'm not sure I believe that a decrease in force posture in the Pacific can have only negative impacts to everything but cost, and decrease in force posture is inherently negative to US policy.

It seems to me that what option 4 reveals is that the report is written with an opening assumption that decreasing force posture in the Pacific is inherently a bad thing for US policy. That assumption bothers me because it presumes a lack of resiliency and trust in the capabilities of our allies without us there to hold their hand. I'm sorry, but I've had the pleasure to get to know and understand the capabilities of folks from Australia, South Korea, and Japan - three of the primary places in the Pacific US forces are being forward based under the current Pacific posture policy; and in my opinion CSIS has overvalued our handholding and undervalued the abilities of our allies. I am curious, upon reflection and feedback, if the authors have reconsidered their conclusions in option 4, even if only in parts, and considered the possibility of any (at all) benefits whatsoever in decreases in force posture, even if they are selective and specific about what those decreases are.

In my opinion, CSIS did not give the same intellectual rigor to option 4 that they appeared to give the rest of the study, because I find it very hard to believe the US could not reduce the military footprint in the Pacific in any way without only having negative impacts.

MiG-29 Lands on INS Vikramaditya

India's carrier program takes a step forward.

Free Syria’s Nascent Navy

Whilst the world’s eyes focus on the fighting in Aleppo, the questionable security of Syria’s large WMD inventory, and Assad’s staying power, a group of rebels have formed a maritime force* to oppose the regime at sea. Like the Free Syrian Army writ large, the exact composition of the FSN is sketchy, but appears to be a combination of defected naval personnel and interested rebels with boats. Of note, last August, a Syrian Naval Colonel defected publically. Besides a social media campaign, the FSN appears to be developing several lines of operation:

Logistics support: FSN is urging participants to catch fish which will be used to supply hungry FSA fighters. Likely other missions will include coastal smuggling of weapons and fighters for the FSA.  This sort of maritime facilitation occured during Libya's revolution last year and is a key component of practically every insurgent movement in coastal areas.

Maritime Interdiction: The FSN wants to equip fishing and other small craft with armor plating and heavy weapons to take on Syrian patrol boats and stop incoming weapons shipments.  Boldly, the FSA has established some naval infantry composed of Syrian navy defectors, with intentions to threaten Russia's Naval presence at Tartus. "Many of our men used to work in the port of Tartous and they know it well," said Captain Walid, a former officer in the Syrian Navy."

Amphibious Operations: The FSN wants a fleet to support a “unified strike on Latakia to drive regime troops away from Aleppo.” Last August Assad's navy indiscriminately shelled Latakia, killing dozens.  Also interestingly, on 7 October, 1973, the seas off Latakia were the site of the world's first surface-to-surface naval missile exchanges during the Yom Kippur War.

As a point of reference, Syria’s naval order of battle is comprised of older Soviet-era fast attack and patrol craft, minesweepers, and some more modern ASCM’s, based at Latakia, Minat al-Baida, and Tartus.  In a possible attempt towards deterring against NATO intervention, earlier in July Assad's Navy publicized naval and coastal defense exercises (or at least some stock video of their weapons launches).

For those interested in irregular warfare at sea, the FSN should be an interesting case study. Stay tuned.

*Note, I have no idea if the linked blog is actually representative of the FSN, or made up from some guy wanting to fill out his paypal account, so would-be donors, beware.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.