Foreign Entanglements: Libertarians in Our Foreign Policy

I dunno how many people will be interested in this, but given Bryan's comments on libertarian views of foreign policy there might be a few takers. On this week's episode of Foreign Entanglements, I chatted with Jason Sorens of Pileus about varieties of libertarian foreign policy views:

 
 Also, if you haven't read Chris Cavas' excellent interview with John Lehman, do so as soon as convenient. Some very interesting stuff that I'm sure both Bryan and Galrahn will be commenting on soon.

On Categorical Statements...

This is the worst post on naval affairs ever to appear on the internet. Some additional thoughts here.

Vanguard CEO Bullish on America

Why?  Seapower!

And we still have the most powerful military. Again, these are real macro factors. But if you look at 200 years of history, sea power — the correlation between who controls the seas has a huge impact on economic growth and prosperity. Because when you think about it, still 94 percent of all trade occurs over the oceans. So us having the most credible navy is a positive factor. 

Bryan McGrath

ROKN

For this week's Diplomat contribution I discussed the impressive growth of the ROKN:

South Korea’s robust shipbuilding industry (the world’s largest) helps support and underwrite the ROKN’s expansion and modernization. Four Dokdos and six KD-IIIs are planned, although actual construction may not match these numbers. If it does, however, this would represent one of the most potent naval warfare squadrons in the world, potentially capable of conducting many different missions in the region. The KD-IIIs and Dokdos are supported by a force of nine modern large frigates (designated destroyers), all displacing from 3500-6000 tons and specialized for surface and sub-surface warfare. Another fifteen 3000 ton frigates are in the ROKN’s plans 

Much like the PLAN, the ROKN has taken advantage of every opportunity to develop experience with distant, long-term deployments. South Korea is a regular participant at RIMPAC, as well as other significant multilateral exercises. Also like the PLAN and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the ROKN has maintained a continuous presence in support of CTF 151’s anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. All of this suggests that the ROKN is built for exigencies well beyond war on the Peninsula.

As one reader suggested, the gap between South Korea and Brazil, a state seemingly well-positioned to take on a larger maritime role, is huge.

The Army Joins AirSea Battle

As AirSea Battle moves ever closer to a "void of meaning buzz-phrase" rather than the substantive approach to A2AD challenges that it is, there is news here of the US Army getting onboard with the concept, soon to sign on to an MOU and presumably provide full-time staff at the requisite level within the ASB Office.

This is excellent news, but not an unconditional good.

If the Army is joining in as a means of bureaucratically monitoring and potentially impeding the progress of the effort, then obviously this is not a good thing.  I don't believe that is their aim, but stranger things have happened, and declining budgets create opportunities for mischief.'

If the Army is joining in as a means of finding a means to marry a vision of increased maneuver battalions in each Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the DoD "latest thing", then I fear bureaucratic stalemate and inefficiency.

But if the Army is joining in order to truly advocate for and understand better the role of ground forces in Joint Operational Access, then this is a very positive development.  Essential to putting this foot forward however is recognition at the very top of the Army that there are many Army capabilities of great value to AirSea Battle and Joint Operational Access--but the BCT writ large is not necessarily among them.

Army Air Defense Artillery--probably the part of the Army in greatest demand from the Joint force in countering A2AD capabilities--must rise in Army priorities if the Army's participation in ASB is to be taken seriously.  Put simply, Army ADA capability and capacity to defend critical assets in the "pre ASB/JOA" world was questionable; in order for ASB and JOA to succeed, more, better and different ADA will be required.  It must become more mobile--not just able to move quickly with land forces on the march, but in its ability to be tactically useful in the maritime environment of the Pacific (this point applies to the entire Army, but especially to ADA).  It must develop new interceptors, so that expensive missiles are not wasted on modest targets. It must work with the other Services toward fielding effective directed energy weapons.  It must begin to think more deeply about cover, concealment, and deception in order to make the interceptors it has go farther against opponents that outgun us--concepts that ADA has moved away from in the post-Cold War Era. It must re-evaluate its hostility to elevated, netted sensing (JLENS).  And it must think about C2 approaches in comms denied environments and across vast expanses of maritime space. 

None of this will occur if the Army does not recognize the moment.  If the Army fails to see the strategic value of this under-valued and under-resourced capability, it will be incumbent upon the Joint community and OSD to point this out.  This is an area where the AirSea Battle office can be influential.

Bryan McGrath