Nomenclature

In my latest at the Diplomat I call for a more standardized vocabulary of naval affairs:

Navies do a poor job of developing such a nomenclature, in part because they have good reasons to avoid standardized ship designations.  Civilian policymakers don’t like to hear that they’ve devoted a substantial portion of the government treasury to building a buying a light carrier (CVL); they’d prefer to think that they’ve invested state funds in an aircraft carrier comparable to those operated by the United States. On the other hand, the terms “aircraft carrier” and “destroyer” can have idiosyncratic negative political implications, pushing navies to refer to ships as “frigates” or “helicopter destroyers.” Whatever its other merits, the Washington Naval Treaty and its follow up agreements established an international standard for ship types. By defining the terms battleship, aircraft carrier, heavy cruiser, and light cruiser, the treaty system created a warship typology that allowed relatively easy comparison across states.  Giving the typology legal and normative substance surely created some odd incentives, including aJapanese effort to build fleet carriers of less than 10,000 tons and a multinational “light cruiser” competition involving ships bristling with 6” guns and displacing in excess of 10,000 tons.  Nevertheless, it resulted in a system of de facto standardization, and consequently of defense acquisition transparency.

This Week in Aircraft Carriers

What a wonderful week for the navalist, no?  The Middle Kingdom has taken its aircraft carrier to sea and operated jet aircraft on it.  Not to be outdone, the King of Aircraft Carrier Navies (the U.S.) is pictured loading a UAV for deckspot testing.  As we say in the world of TACAIR close control, "Fight's On".


Some random thoughts on these events, if you will.  First on China.

It has been interesting to read the varied reactions to China's accomplishment this week.  Those who believe the military threat from China is overblown tend to downplay the news, citing myriad operational issues they will have to overcome in order to become proficient, not to mention the clear overmatch the US holds in both numbers and proficiency.  On the other hand, those who believe the threat from China is real and mounting point to these events as the latest evidence of a nation whose ability to bend learning curves to their will is something to behold. 

I tend to come down closer to the latter crowd.  The plain truth is that for seven-ish decades, the US Navy has made much hay from the peacetime presence, deterrence, and assurance roles that its aircraft carriers play.  And while (for the time being), I see the Chinese carrier as a big, fat, target for US attack submarines, that advantage accrues only when the shooting starts.  In the meantime, China begins to add to its toolbox of regional persuasion.  It is not difficult to see how this capability could change the steady-state regional security picture, especially if China fits out several of these ships. 

As for the United States, the photos of the X-47B being loaded onto the HARRY S. TRUMAN are occasion for great anticipation.  We are watching the future of naval aviation play out before our very eyes.

The relevance of the aircraft carrier has been much bandied about lately.  It is unfortunately, a misplaced discussion.  The aircraft carrier is no more rendered irrelevant by threats to it than are tarmac and airstrips by threats to them.  The CVN is a means, not an end.  The combat power of an aircraft carrier is a function of several things, including its size and sustainability.   But no factor is more important than the configuration of the airwing.  The blithe assumption of Sea Control made for the past several decades drove our airwings to evolve into short-legged sortie generation machines.  As presently configured, a modern aircraft carrier and its airwing DO appear increasingly obsolete.  But the photos we saw in the past few days of the X-47B show the way forward into decades of additional relevance.

This relevance will be built along two lines--one will be long(er) range strike, and the other will be sea control.  The X-47B is a hint of the future of long-range, strike; stealthy enough to be difficult (but not exquisitely stealthy) and armed with long range stand-off weapons.  CNO's "payloads, not platforms" mantra in action.

Where I don't see similar progress is in the evolution of the airwing to act as a part of a grander Sea Control CONOPS.  The ability to project power from the sea depends on the capability to control the seas one wishes to operate in.  It grows increasingly clear to me that Sea Control must rise in the priority of Naval Aviation planners, even if it means privileging Strike less handsomely.  An airwing that can strike at range while contributing to the dominance of its own environment is critical to the nation's ability to project power from the sea, something it appears to still value. 

The P-8 will play a large role in Sea Control from the air, but organic (to the battle group) capability will still be required. 

First flight of J-15 off Liaoning

It has finally happened. We finally have news confirmation from Xinhua and also have pictures of J-15's first take/off and landing from Xinhua. The news of first landing came a couple of days ago, but this is the first time we have seen the photos.

Here is a timeline of China's naval flanker program just to give you an idea:

• 2001, Assemble the T-10K-3 prototype that PLAN purchased from Ukraine. Use this for long term technical study.
• January 2007, AVIC1 and PLAN’s major program (J-15) research work started.
• July 2007, AVIC1 SAC had a large program tackling meeting
• January 2008, blueprint work finished, start prototype research & production stage
• August 31st 2009, J15-0001 had maiden flight
• May 6th 2010, maiden take-off flight from the simulated jet-ski at CFTE. Continued production of single digit number of prototypes for future testing
• August 10th, 2011, China’s first aircraft carrier went out for sea trials. J-15-0005/CFTE-554 and J15-0008/CFTE-556 prototypes made numerous fly-overs, low altitude touch and go landing along the way.
• July 2012, Finished certification test flights, given permission to product single digit number of batch 0 J-15s for initial testing/trials works
• September 25th, 2012, PLAN first aircraft carrier was named Liaoning and had its first sailing after commissioning in October
• November 3rd, 2012, J-15S-0001 had maiden flight
• Early November, 2012, Liaoning had second sailing after commissioning
• November 20th, 2012, a PLANAF pilot made the first carrier landing trial.
• November 23rd, 2012, Two PLANAF pilots flying 2 J-15s finished carrier op controlled first official takeoff and landing trials. This marks successful completion of first stage of the Carrier aviation project.

Farley and McGrath on Bloggingheads

This time with the whole show, and with Rob's name spelled correctly.

Patterns of Defense Spending in East Asia

A couple of my recent posts at the Diplomat have concerned defense spending patterns in East Asia.  On general trends:

There are at least three potential interpretations of the increase in Asian defense spending. The first is straightforward; Asian powers are beginning to transform post-Cold War economic growth into military power, producing more modern, competent, and capable military organizations (especially at sea and in the air). The broad trend of defense growth suggests that these increases represent balancing against one another, perhaps with a focus on China.

A second interpretation, however, implies that the great powers of Asia feel relatively secure, and have not yet begun to engage in the kind of defense buildup that would suggest real concern about their safety.  In American political culture, dire warnings about the paucity of the defense budget are common, and yet few-to-no Asian countries devote nearly the same resources to defense as the U.S. In this interpretation, the absolute increases represent simply the results of economic growth, perhaps looming larger in the imagination because of simultaneous cuts to European budgets. 

A final interpretation is that the atmosphere of relative security in Asia depends on U.S. military hegemony, and that this hegemony depends on the willingness of the United States to spend and the willingness of potential competitors not to spend. U.S. military capability does not yet appear so threatening that enemies have balanced in response, and the potential for U.S. intervention in any given conflict holds down expenditures.

And on the character of the arms industry specifically:

An arms relationship represents both an economic and a political commitment. What’s at stake in making such a commitment? While Sino-U.S. competition likely won’t descend into the kind of alliance structure that predominated during the Cold War, some navies could nevertheless find themselves on the “wrong side” of political competition in the Western Pacific, which could leave them vulnerable. Committing to one supplier creates a relationship of dependency, with the client needing to stay in the good graces of the patron in order to maintain access to spares, munitions, and modernization kits. The smaller navies of Southeast Asia need to decide how best to develop force structures in a future which may see competition between the United States and China. 

On this last, see also this report (which is considerably better and more in depth than my post).